Whose China Model is it anyway? The contentious search for consensus

140 Pages·2005·0.97 MB·English

ReviewofInternationalPoliticalEconomy,2013
Vol.20,No.2,390–420,http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2012.660184
Whose China Model is it anyway?
The contentious search for consensus
Matt Ferchen
DepartmentofInternationalRelations,TsinghuaUniversity,Beijing,China
3
1 ABSTRACT
0
2
y HasaBeijingConsensusemergedtochallengetheWashingtonConsensus?
ul Ifso,whatistheessenceofthisalternativeconsensusandwhydoesitmat-
J
1 ter? This article argues that efforts at a definitive description of a Chinese
3
9 modelofstate–economyrelations,especiallyasitcomparestotheoriginal
7:0 policyrecommendationsoftheWashingtonConsensus,haveandwillcon-
0 tinuetoproveunsatisfying.Thisisbecauseanysuchcomparativeexercise
at isinherentlypoliticalandpronetovariousanglesofcritique.Instead,this
y] articlearguesthatitispreciselybecauseofthepoliticsofsuchcomparison
sit thatcompetingandoftencontradictoryportrayalsofaBeijingConsensusor
r
e China Model have taken on importance inside and outside of China. This
v
ni articlefurtherarguesthatwesternaccountsofaBeijingConsensusorChina
U
ModelalternativetotheWashingtonConsensustoooftenignoreorminimize
c
o the contentious debates within China about how best to describe Chinese
K
[ economicgovernance.Thisstudy,incontrast,seekstounderstandChina’s
y relationshiptotheWashingtonConsensusbyexploringhowconceptslike
b
d theBeijingConsensusorChinaModelaredeployedandcontestedoutside
e
d andinsideofChina.Thearticleconcludesbyofferingsuggestionsforfurther
a
o research on the domestic Chinese and international policy implications of
nl debatesabouttheBeijingConsensus.
w
o
D
KEYWORDS
BRICs;WashingtonConsensus;BeijingConsensus;NewLeft;CCP;Chinese
CommunistParty;neoliberal.
The ‘Beijing Consensus’ is a concept that draws its power from its
keypositioninawholesystemofinteractingconcepts:asthepolar
oppositeoftheWashingtonConsensus,thetermexpressescompactly
the collapse of the Washington Consensus and the success of the
ChinesegrowthexperienceandtherisingroleofChinaintheworld
today.(Naughton,2010:438)
(cid:2)C 2013Taylor&Francis
FERCHEN: WHOSE CHINA MODEL IS IT ANYWAY?
HasaBeijingConsensusemergedtochallengetheWashingtonConsensus?
If so, what is the essence of this alternative consensus? In one sense, a
Beijing Consensus most obviously has emerged; a quick Google search
quickly turns up hundreds of hits to related book, articles, lectures and
blogposts.However,foreachsuchpublicationorpresentationtheBeijing
Consensusmightbeportrayedaltogetherdifferently.Therefore,tosaythat
the idea or concept of a Beijing Consensus has emerged to challenge the
Washington Consensus is not at all the same as saying that agreement
existsaboutwhattheBeijingConsensusactuallyis.Thequoteaboveaptly
demonstrates the inherent difficulty of getting at the ‘truth’ of what the
Beijing Consensus is or is not and how it does or does not stand as a
viablealternativetotheWashingtonConsensus.Thisarticleinsteadasksa
separate,butrelatedquestion:whatistherelationshipbetweenChinaand
theWashingtonConsensusandwhydoesitmatter?Thisquestionallows
3
1 for a more focused analysis of the importance of political contestation
0
2 embedded in competing understandings of the Washington Consensus
y
ul andChinesealternativesliketheBeijingConsensusor‘ChinaModel’.
J
1 OnewaytounderstandtherelationshipbetweenChinaandtheWash-
3
9 ington Consensus is to measure China’s economic development policies
0
7: against John Williamson’s original 10 Washington Consensus policy rec-
0
at ommendations. The first section of this article demonstrates that even
] againstafixedtargetoftheoriginalWashingtonConsensuspolicylistsuch
y
sit acomparisonquicklyrunsintothedifficultyofansweringthefollowing:
r
ve whichChinesepoliciesatwhichpointsintimeinwhichsectorsconstitute
ni a valid comparison? Even if there were agreement on what constitutes a
U
c validcomparison,therewould(anddo)remainsignificantdisagreements
o
K amongexpertsontheresultingconclusions.Theproblemwithanysearch
[
y foradefinitiveanswertohowChina‘really’linesupincomparisontothe
b
d original10WashingtonConsensuspolicyrecommendationsisthatnomat-
e
ad terhowexperttheexpertwhoanswersthisquestion,hisorheranswersare
o
nl inevitably tied into larger political debates and therefore open to further
w
critiqueanddisagreement.Thisisnottosaythatsomeanswerswouldnot
o
D
beclosertothemarkthanothers,butonlytounderscorethelargerpolitical
issuesatstakeinwhatseemsaratherstraightforwardcomparison.
In fact, the politics of comparison quickly come to the fore when ex-
ploring the relationship between China and the Washington Consensus.
One key reason is that the Washington Consensus itself became a mov-
ing target because of its controversial policy and ideological baggage
(see Babb, this issue). But comparing China’s developmental experience
with the Washington Consensus is inherently political in other impor-
tant ways as well. Because for as uninspiring as some discussions of
state–economy typologies can be, at heart they are about assessing what
forms of state governance of the economy are successful and therefore
legitimate and which ones are not and should be replaced by a superior
391
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
alternative.ThereforedefiningChina’sparticulartypeofstate–economyre-
lations,bothintermsofitsowndetailsandhowitlinesupincomparison
with other types, has important political implications. As Robert Gilpin
has stated, ‘dominant economies not only influence the world economy,
buttheyarealsoarchetypesformanyothereconomies’(Gilpin,2001:149).
Thisremindsusthatdefiningacountry’sstate–economyrelationsasbeing
a certain type also implies potential lessons for other countries (positive
or negative). Gilpin’s stress on ‘dominant economies’ also underscores
how, fair or not, describing some countries’ state–economy relations as
corresponding to or challenging a certain type takes on more political
importancethanforsomeothercountries.
Therefore it should come as no surprise that what might seem like a
simple exercise in comparison between China and the Washington Con-
sensus has come to take on such importance. It is precisely because the
3
1 comparison is between an American (or even Western) type or model of
0
2 state–economyrelationsandapurportedChinesealternativethatsomuch
y
ul isatstake.China’sincreasingimpactonglobaleconomicandpoliticalaf-
J
1 fairs,andtherelativespeedwithwhichithasachievedthisstatus,isboth
3
9 interestingandimportantformanybeyondChina’sborders.Inaddition,
0
7: for many academics, politicians, journalists and businesspeople around
0
at the world, having an influential description of the relationship between
] theChinesestateandeconomycanmakecareersaswellasenhancewealth
y
sit and power. The same could not be said for most other countries. At the
r
ve sametime,theemergenceofanytrulynew‘consensus’abouttheappro-
ni priaterelationshipbetweenstatesandmarketshasimportantimplications
U
c for structuring not only China’s domestic political economy but also for
o
K tradeandfinanceattheinternationallevel.Thusanydescriptionofhow
[
y China’stypeofstate–economyrelationscomparestoAmerica’s,especially
b
d if it implies a viable alternative (whether healthy or harmful), is deeply
e
ad political.
o
nl But if such typological comparison is deeply political, and politically
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relevant for all of those analyzing China from the outside, it should be
o
D
apparent that it is all the more important for the government and peo-
pleofChinathemselves.AlltoooftenaccountsofaBeijingConsensusor
ChinaModelalternativetotheWashingtonConsensusignoreorminimize
thecontentiousdebateswithinChinaabouthowbesttodescribeChinese
economicgovernance.Suchdebatesareequallyormorepoliticalthanthe
WashingtonConsensusvBeijingConsensustypologizingthattakesplace
outside of China. This article therefore describes and analyzes how the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), as well as competing groups of Chi-
neseNewLeftandliberalpublicintellectuals,debateanddefendvarious
interpretationsoftheWashingtonConsensusanditspossibleChineseal-
ternatives.WithinChina,whatisatstakeinthesedebatesisnothingless
than the power to influence how the country’s leaders and people think
392
FERCHEN: WHOSE CHINA MODEL IS IT ANYWAY?
about what the Chinese government’s relationship to the economy has
been,whatitistodayandwhatitshouldbeinthefuture.
Withsomuchatstake,bothinsideandoutsideofChina,itisnowonder
thatweseethecontentiousrangeofopinionanddisagreementaboutwhat
a Beijing Consensus or China Model alternative to the Washington Con-
sensusmightbeandwhatsuchanalternativemightmeanforChinaand
theworld.Atthesametime,allsucheffortsatdefinitivelydescribingand
assessing a Chinese type of state–economy relations inevitably runs into
theinherentcomplexityofChinaitself.NotonlyisChinachangingquickly,
but its sheer geographical and population size defy simple descriptions.
This means that ‘China’ can be and often is a mix of contradictory and
confusing realities. Thus efforts to have the last say on defining the rela-
tionship between state and economy in China, whether as an alternative
to the Washington Consensus or not, will inherently lead to frustration
3
1 andcontention.Thisstudy,incontrast,takesasitsstartingpointthatany
0
2 understanding of concepts like the Washington Consensus, Beijing Con-
y
ul sensusorChinaModelareinherentlysocialandpolitical.Whatfollowsis
J
1 anefforttounderstandChina’srelationshiptotheWashingtonConsensus
3
9 byexploringhowsuchconceptsaredeployedandcontestedoutsideand
0
7: insideofChina.
0
at Thisarticleisarrangedasfollows.Ifirstpresentapoint-by-pointcom-
] parisonoftheoriginal10WashingtonConsensuspolicyrecommendations
y
sit and China’s own developmental experience. I then explain why such an
r
ve approachcananddoesleadtomorequestionsthananswersbyexplaining
ni thatboththeWashingtonConsensusanditspositedChinesealternatives
U
c are more than mere lists of policies but are also part of contested ideal
o
K types.NextIexplainhowobserversoutsideofChina,mostlyacademics,
[
y journalists or businesspeople in the United States and Europe writing in
b
d English, have offered competing explanations of a Beijing Consensus al-
e
ad ternative to the Washington Consensus. Finally, shining the spotlight on
o
nl related debates within China, I turn to official CCP as well as New Left
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andliberaldiscussionsabouttheWashingtonConsensus,‘neoliberalism’
o
D
andpossiblevariationsonaChinaModelalternative.
CHINA AND THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS:
FRUSTRATING COMPARISONS
In order to answer how the BRICs in general and China in particular
have relied upon, transformed or rejected the Washington Consensus, a
common-senseandseeminglystraightforwardfirststepistolineupJohn
Williamson’s original list of Washington Consensus tenets and compare
thosewithChina’sowneconomicpolicies(Williamson,2008).Indeed,this
approach has been adopted by some American and Chinese scholars in
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REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
theirevaluationsofwhetherornotChinarepresentsarejectionoralterna-
tivetotheWashingtonConsensusthrougha‘BeijingConsensus’or‘China
Model’.Somesuchcomparisonshavefound,contrarytoconventionalwis-
dom,thatinfactsincetheoutsetofChina’sreformperiodinthelate1970s
the country’s economic development policies have largely conformed to
theoriginalcoretenetsoftheWashingtonConsensus.1
Forexample,AmericanpoliticalscientistScottKennedy(2010)andChi-
neseeconomistYaoYang(2010b)botharguethatathumbnailcomparison
showslittleChinesedivergencefromWilliamson’soriginal10points.Both
agreethatChinahasmaintainedrelativefiscaldisciplinethroughtaxbase
expansion and that public expenditure has been reoriented away from
‘non-merit subsidies toward public goods’ like infrastructure (Kennedy,
2010; 470). Both Kennedy and Yao also concur that China has embraced
internationaltradeandforeigndirectinvestmentwhilemaintainingacom-
3
1 petitiveexchangeratethathasunderpinned‘theexport-ledgrowthmodel
0
2 [that] was adopted as a national development strategy in the mid 1980s’
y
ul (Yao, 2010b: 42). Finally, while pointing to certain exceptions and obsta-
J
1 cles, both scholars agree that China has moved steadily to deregulate
3
9 pricesandeasemarketentryandexitbarriers,toenhancepropertyrights,
0
7: andtoprivatizestate-ownedenterprises(Kennedy,2010:470;Yao,2010b:
at 0 42–3).2
] It is only interest rate liberalization, which Yao argues is indicative of
y
sit laggardChinesefinancialsectorreformingeneral,thatstandsoutasthe
r
ve one glaring exception to a general Chinese correspondence to the orig-
ni inal list of Washington Consensus policies. However, even scholars like
U
c Kennedy and Yao, who make a strong case for a high degree of overlap
o
K between the original tenets of the Washington Consensus and China’s
[
y overall reform trajectory, are quick to note that such a general listing of
b
d points of agreement is less than fully satisfying. Immediately after com-
e
ad pleting his China–Washington Consensus comparison Kennedy admits
o
nl that ‘Despite these areas of overlap, it is entirely reasonable to see that
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China’s behavior has not approached the Washington Consensus ideal’
o
D
(Kennedy,2010:470).BelowIreturntotheimportanceofhowaseemingly
straightforwardchecklistcanmorphintoapoliticallychargedidealtype.
Butfornowitisenoughtonotethatthiskindofpoint-by-pointcompari-
son,whichindicatesahighdegreeofoverlapbetweentheoriginaltenets
oftheWashingtonConsensusandthegeneraltrajectoryofChina’sdevel-
opmental experience over the last 30-plus years, can leave even its own
authorsunsatisfied.3
Indeed,ifageneralchecklistWashingtonConsensus–Chinacomparison
demonstratesahighdegreeofcorrespondence,thenamorefine-grained
approachtothistypeofcomparisonquicklyleadstoarangeofqualifica-
tionsandrefutations.Simplyasking‘whichChinaarewetalkingabout?’
394
FERCHEN: WHOSE CHINA MODEL IS IT ANYWAY?
instantly complicates the high degree of overlap between the original
Washington Consensus policies and China’s developmental experiences.
For example, each of Williamson’s original 10 points can be approached
by making temporal and/or sectoral distinctions and comparisons. Just
looking at the overlap described by Kennedy and Yao leaves the reader
withtheoverallimpressionthatthegeneraldirectionofreforminChina
overtimehasbeentowardacloserfittotheindividualWashingtonCon-
sensuspolicyrecommendations.However,alongbothofthesevectorswe
can find contrary, or at least complicating, evidence and examples. Any
exhaustiveefforttofullyenumeratepossiblepointsofChinesedeviation
from the original Washington Consensus policy recommendations is be-
yondthescope,andindeedpurpose,ofthisstudybuthereIprovideafew
illustrativeexamples.
Temporally, and of obvious but maybe too easily overlooked impor-
3
1 tance, China began its reforms before there was such a thing as a Wash-
0
2 ington Consensus. China’s background conditions, such as its potential
y
ul market size and its huge but underemployed rural workforce, are key
J
1 forunderstandingthecountry’sreformsandpatternsofeconomicdevel-
3
9 opmentsincetheinitiationof‘ReformandOpening’uponMao’sdeath.4
0
7: Moreover,thepolitical,economicandideologicalforcesatplayinbringing
0
at aboutChina’sreformshadaninternallogicthatwasquiteseparatefrom
] the Latin American experiences that formed the basis for Williamson’s
y
sit original 10points.5 Butduring thereformeraitselftherehave beentem-
r
ve poraldiscontinuitiesthatbelieaunidirectionalmomentum.Forexample,
ni intheareasofruralagriculturalandindustrialreformorfinancialreform,
U
c recentstudieshavenotedthatstrongmomentuminthedirectionofWash-
o
K ingtonConsensuspoliciesduringearlierperiodsofreformhasdissipated
[
y or collapsed. MIT political economist Huang Yasheng thus enjoins us to
b
d rememberthattemporally‘Chineseperformancehasbeenheterogeneous
e
ad ratherthanhomogenous’(Huang,2011:11).6
o
nl Sectoral distinctions are also open to this kind of scrutiny. The most
w
prominent example of a sectoral deviation from the original baseline
o
D
Washington Consensus policies is evident in China’s ‘strategic’ or ‘life-
line’industries.Insectorslikefinance,telecommunications,civilaviation,
petroleum, and electricity the Chinese government has gone through re-
peatedroundsofrestructuring.However,theendresulthasbeenlimited
competition among a handful of state-owned firms that the government
hopes to see become ‘national champions’.7 Underlying these strategic
sectoralpolicieshavebeenChina’smuch-debatedfixedexchangerateand
capitalcontrolspolicies.AndthelistofpolicydeviationsfromtheWash-
ingtonConsensusidealcouldgoon.Butwhether‘thereare... manyChi-
neseeconomies’(Pearson,2007:719)orjust‘twodistincteconomies... the
domestic-orientedstate-ownedeconomyandtheexport-orientedprivate
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REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
economy’(WalterandFraser,2011:22),thevariationissignificantenough
soastorenderapoint-by-pointcomparisonwiththeoriginalWashington
Consensusopentomultiple,strongly-contestedinterpretations.8
ThisbasicexerciseincomparingtheoriginalpointsoftheWashington
ConsensustoChina’sowndevelopmentalexperienceillustrateshoweven
againstastationaryWashingtonConsensustarget,suchfine-grainedanal-
ysisdoesnotnecessarilyleadtoasatisfyinglyclearresult.Thisbringsus
back to Kennedy’s concern that despite his finding a general correspon-
dence between the original Washington Consensus and China’s overall
storyofreform,ChinastilldeviatesfromtheWashingtonConsensusideal-
type. In fact, such detailed comparison can lead to important insights.
However, only once we realize that the Washington Consensus itself is
morethanjustthesumofitsparts,andmoreofamovingthanastationary
target,canwebegintounderstandtheinterestandcontroversysurround-
3
1 ingafullyformedChinesealternativetotheWashingtonConsensus.Thus
0
2 seemingly contradictory understandings of how China compares to the
y
ul WashingtonConsensuscananddoco-existandvieforacceptanceasthe
J
1 bestwaytounderstandChina’sstate–economyrelationship.
3
9 Inordertobetterunderstandwhatisatstakeinthecontentionamong
0
7: these visions of a Chinese alternative to the Washington Consensus, it is
0
at first necessary to underscore that the Washington Consensus itself has
] transformedfromalistofspecificpolicyrecommendationstobecomeas-
y
sit sociated withastigmatized ‘neoliberal’ ideology. Thespecifics of exactly
r
ve howthistransformationhappenedarewellcoveredbyothercontributions
ni tothisvolume.Hereitsufficestonotethatoverthecourseofthe1990sand
U
c early 2000s, the original set of 10 discrete Washington Consensus policy
o
K recommendationsbecamenegativelyassociatedwithAmericaneconomic
[
y andpoliticalhegemonyingeneralandmorespecificallywithapejorative
b
d ‘neoliberal’ ideology.9 So it is against this backdrop that we must under-
e
ad standhowaconceptliketheBeijingConsensushascometoofferapossible
o
nl alternativetotheWashingtonConsensus.
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o
D
THE BEIJING CONSENSUS:
SINOMANIA VS. SINOPHOBIA
Whatfollowsisatwo-partdiscussionofexactlyhowthesedebatesabout
China and the Washington Consensus have played out in discussions
inside and outside of China. In this first part I focus on how the idea of
theBeijingConsensushasbeenunderstoodanddebatedoutsideofChina.
By ‘outside of China’ I primarily point to discussions in English among
academics,journalistsandbusinesspeoplemostlyfromtheUnitedStates
andEurope.10IalternatelyrefertothesecommentatorsasEuroAmerican
orWestern.InthesecondandconcludingsectionIdiscussdebateswithin
China about how to understand or critique the Washington Consensus
396
FERCHEN: WHOSE CHINA MODEL IS IT ANYWAY?
anda‘ChinaModel’alternative.By‘withinChina’IpointtoofficialCCP
critiquesoftheWashingtonConsensusanddebateamongChinesepublic
intellectuals from opposing New Left and liberal camps. Most, but not
all, of these discussions take place in Chinese and among those living in
mainland or greater China (Hong Kong in particular).11 What emerges
fromthesedebatesinsideandoutsideofChinaisanythingbutconsensus.
TheBeijingConsensus:cheerleaders
TheoriginalconceptofaBeijingConsensuswasintroducednotbyaChi-
nesescholarorofficial,butbyJoshuaCooperRamo,anAmericanwhowas
aTimemagazineeditorandthenwentontobecomemanagingdirectorof
KissingerAssociates.In2004,whileaffiliatedwithTsinghuaUniversityin
Beijing, Ramo published a monograph entitled The Beijing Consensus for
3
1 theBritishForeignPolicyCentre.EarlyinthemonographRamostates:
0
2
y [TheBeijingConsensus]replacesthewidely-discreditedWashington
ul
J Consensus,aneconomictheorymadefamousinthe1990sforitspre-
1
3 scriptive, Washington-knows-best approach to telling other nations
9
0 howtorunthemselves.TheWashingtonConsensuswasahallmark
7:
0 ofend-of-historyarrogance;itleftatrailofdestroyedeconomiesand
at badfeelingsaroundtheglobe.(Ramo,2004:4)
]
y
sit For Ramo, the Beijing Consensus thus stands as a fully-formed, supe-
r
ve rioralternativetotheWashingtonConsensus.Inpractice,Ramo’sBeijing
Uni Consensus functions at both the level of China’s domestic development
c andalsoattheinternationallevelasindicatedbythecountry’snovelap-
o
K proach to international affairs. Domestically, Ramo claims that China’s
[
y developmenthasbeenbasedon(a)innovation,and(b)abalancebetween
b
d sustainableeconomicgrowthandequality(Ramo,2004:12).Attheinter-
e
ad nationallevel,notonlydoesRamoclaimthat‘China’semergingpoweris
o
nl based on the example of their own model’ (Ramo, 2004: 38), but he also
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o emphasizesthatChina’sforeignpolicyofself-determinationandconflict
D
avoidance offers a clear and superior alternative to American hegemony
(Ramo,2004:39).
MuchoftheresponsetoRamo’soriginalformulationoftheBeijingCon-
sensus,especiallyamongWesterneconomistsandpoliticalscientistswho
havespecificallyaddressedeachofRamo’smainclaims,hasbeenscathing.
BothScottKennedy(2010)andBarryNaughton(2010)findlittleconnection
betweenRamo’sclaimsandChina’sdevelopmentalexperience.Kennedy
says that ‘as apiece of analysis, [The BeijingConsensus] isrelatively inco-
herentandlargelyinaccurate’(Kennedy,2010:467).Kennedythenrefutes
Ramo’s core claims point-by-point: (1) China continues to struggle with
economicinnovation;(2)inequalityhasrisendramatically;and(3)evenif
China’sglobalinfluencehasrisen,itisnotatallobviousthatthisisbased
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REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
onaclearanduniquedevelopmentmodelrepresentedbyaBeijingCon-
sensus (Kennedy, 2010: 469–73). In turn, Naughton scathingly describes
Ramo’s monograph as ‘a Fauvist canvas of bright smears of description
thatholdstogetheronlybecausetheartistiswillingtoabandonverisimil-
itude’(Naughton,2010:440).
Yet despite such pointed critiques, Ramo’s Beijing Consensus concept
has tapped into the mix of excitement and anxiety inspired by China’s
boomingeconomyanditsrapidlyexpandingglobaleconomicandpolit-
ical influence. In particular, in response to the financial crisis there is a
heightened receptivity to or at least curiosity about the possibility that
China is ascendant and America in decline. Titles of books like Martin
Jacques’ 2009 tome When China Rules the World: The End of the Western
World and the Birth of a New Global Order build and expand on Ramo’s
claimthatarisingChinaoffersaclearalternativetoWestern(readAmeri-
3
1 can)economicandpoliticaldominance.TheseargumentspointtoChina’s
0
2 cultureandhistory,itsvery‘civilization’,assuperiortoandincreasingly
y
ul moreappealinggloballythanaliberalWesternmodernity.
J
1 OnehighlycriticalreviewofJacques’bookpronouncesitasanexample
3
9 ofan‘unabashedexerciseinboosterism’thathasaveryshallowgrounding
0
7: incontemporaryChinesesocialandpoliticalrealities(Anderson,2010:4).
0
at However, this simply highlights that the appeal to some readers of such
] portrayalsmayliesomewherebeyondtheveracityoftheauthors’partic-
y
sit ularclaims.12Thatis,nomatterhowcarefulpoint-by-pointrefutationsof
r
ve Ramo’sTheBeijingConsensusorJacques’WhenChinaRulestheWorldmight
ni be,suchworkssellbooksandelicitsound-bitesfromWesternpoliticians,
U
c whether supportive or critical.13 Readers outside of China may love, or
o
K lovetohate,theChinathatemergesfromsuchbooks,butpartoftheap-
[
y pealcomesfromaChinathatisportrayedastheantithesisofsuchideasas
b
d the‘West’,‘Neoliberalism’,or‘TheWashingtonConsensus’.Theopening
e
ad quotefromNaughtoncapturesnicelytheinsightthatmuchoftheappeal
o
nl of the idea of a Beijing Consensus lies not necessarily in the closeness of
w
its fit with actual conditions in China, but instead in its open-ended, op-
o
D
positional nature. On the other hand, claims about an ascendant Beijing
Consensus, seen as part of a recovered Chinese civilizational greatness
withrisingglobalappeal,mightalsoplaywelltosomePartyleadersand
intellectualsinChina,butasIexplainbelow,arealsostronglyopposedby
others.
TheBeijingConsensus:thechallengesofilliberalstatecapitalism
AspartofthisrecentwaveofwhatPerryAndersonhascalled‘Sinomania’
(Anderson, 2010), the idea of a Beijing Consensus has clearly struck a
nerve for boosters as well as critics of China’s development model. It is
to this critical backlash among EuroAmerican commentators that I now
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FERCHEN: WHOSE CHINA MODEL IS IT ANYWAY?
turn. If The Beijing Consensus and other works of breathless praise for a
unique and transcendent Chinese development model have sold books,
createdsoundbitesforpoliticiansandpresumablygreasedthewheelsof
commerce for certain foreign business people in China, it has also been
matchedbythosewhoseetheBeijingConsensusasathreateithertothe
globalcommunityortoChina’sowncontinuedeconomicgrowth.These
criticalapproacheshaveincommonthattheyseeChina,andthereforethe
Beijing Consensus, as a model of ‘state capitalism’ that is clearly distinct
fromWesterndemocraticcapitalism.
However,suchcritiquesoftheBeijingConsensusdifferfromeachother
intheiremphasisontheeconomicversustheideologicalchallengesposed
bytheChinesemodel.Thefirstapproachemphasizesthewaysinwhich
Chinese state capitalism approximates the developmental state or ‘mer-
cantilist’developmentalmodeladoptedbyotherEastAsiancountrieslike
3
1 JapanorKorea.AsecondapproachthatisalsocriticaloftheBeijingCon-
0
2 sensussimilarlypointstoChina’sstatecapitalistdevelopmentmodelbut
y
ul stressestheilliberalideologicalimpactChinaincreasinglyhasonthede-
J
1 veloping(andpossiblyalsothedeveloped)world.
3
9 For many EuroAmerican observers, in particular Western economists
0
7: attemptingtoexplainthenatureordirectionofChina’seconomicgrowth,
0
at China’s developmental model is not unique but instead looks very sim-
] ilar to the one adopted by other East Asian countries. As Michael Pettis,
y
sit a China-based finance specialist, has noted, ‘There is nothing especially
r
ve ChineseabouttheChinesedevelopmentmodel.Itismostlyasouped-up
ni versionoftheAsiandevelopmentmodel’(Pettis,2010b).Inthisperspec-
U
c tive,thedefiningcharacteristicsofChina’sdevelopmentmodel,sharedin
o
K commonwithJapanandSouthKoreainparticular,areafocusonindus-
[
y trialstrategywiththeaimofcreating‘nationalchampionindustries’.This
b
d industrialstrategyreliesheavilyonstateinvestment,creditandcurrency
e
ad policiestoprovideselectChinesefirmsprotectionfrominternationalcom-
o
nl petitionandtopromote‘market-sharegrab’(Anderson,2009:28)aswell
w
asoutboundinvestmentactivities(Anderson,2006;Pettis,2010a;Huang,
o
D
2010).
SomewhoviewChinaasfollowinginthedevelopmentalstatefootsteps
of its East Asian neighbors believe that the model, based as it is on high
levelsofstateinvestment,willreachalimitasitdidinJapan.14Theyargue
thatasothercountrieshavebefore,Chinawillconfrontdecreasingreturns
on its state-led investment policies and this, tied to growing asset and
capacitybubbles,willeventuallyleadtomuchslowergrowthrates(Pettis,
2010b).15SomehaveinvokedtheexampleofBrazilinthe1960sand1970s,
arguingthat:
... today’s Beijing Consensus is really just a replay of Brazil’s tra-
jectory during its golden era. Many of the same ingredients are
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