Table Of ContentMatthewH.Kramer/WhereLawandMoralityMeet FinalProof 21.9.2004 6:06pm pagei
WHERE LAW AND MORALITY MEET
MatthewH.Kramer/WhereLawandMoralityMeet FinalProof 21.9.2004 6:06pm pageii
MatthewH.Kramer/WhereLawandMoralityMeet FinalProof 21.9.2004 6:06pm pageiii
Where Law and
Morality Meet
MATTHEW H. KRAMER
1
3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford 2 6
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To the memory of Christina Margaret Kelly (1928–97)
MatthewH.Kramer/WhereLawandMoralityMeet FinalProof 21.9.2004 6:06pm pagevi
Preface
Iwishtothankthefollowingpeoplefortheirveryhelpfulcommentsonportions
of this book: Trevor Allan, Brian Bix, Gerard Bradley, Richard Bronaugh, Ian
Carter, Jules Coleman, Sean Coyle, Rowan Cruft, Sylvie Delacroix, Neil Dux-
bury, William Edmundson, Timothy Endicott, John Finnis, Michael Freeman,
KennethHimma,BrianLeiter,MargaretMartin,MarkMcBride,EmranMian,
Michael Moore, James Murphy, Amanda Perreau-Saussine, Joseph Raz, Mark
ReiV,ScottShapiro,NigelSimmonds,WalterSinnott-Armstrong,PhilipSoper,
NicosStavropoulos,HillelSteiner,BartStreumer,PeterVallentyne,andWilfrid
Waluchow. I likewise wish to thank John Louth and Gwen Booth and their
associates at the Oxford University Press for their handling of my book. In the
course of writing this volume, I have gratefully beneWted from the computing
expertiseofGilesAgnew(atChurchillCollege,Cambridge)andAndrewGerrard
andSarahKitching(attheCambridgeUniversityLawFaculty).Asalways,Iam
indebtedtomyfatherforhisencouragement.
Very early versions of the Wrst two chapters appeared in Legal Theory (2000
and2002),publishedbytheCambridgeUniversityPress.Anearlyversionofthe
thirdchapterappearedintheAmericanJournalofJurisprudence(2003),published
by the Natural Law Institute of the University of Notre Dame. An early and
somewhatabridgedversionofthefourthchapterappearedinLawandPhilosophy
(2004), published by Kluwer Academic Press. An early version of the Wfth
chapter appeared in the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2001), published by
the Oxford University Press. I am grateful to these journals for permission to
publish revised versions of my articles as chapters in the present book. (The
revisionsareespeciallyfar-reachingintheWrsttwochapters.)
Ipresented an abridgedversion of Chapter 3asa lecture at theUniversity of
NotreDameLawSchoolinApril2003,andanabridgedversionofChapter8as
alectureatDartmouthCollegeinApril2004.Iexpressmywarmthanksforthe
gracioushospitalityextendedtomeatthosetwoinstitutions.
Finally,IamgratefultothenumerousundergraduateandLLMJurisprudence
students at Cambridge University who have come upwith perceptive questions
and observations concerning many of the matters discussed herein. I have
proWtedimmenselyfromthem.
MatthewH.Kramer
Cambridge,England
April2004
MatthewH.Kramer/WhereLawandMoralityMeet FinalProof 20.9.2004 9:59am page1
Introduction
Asthetitleofthisbooksuggests,thecentraltopictobeinvestigatedhereinisthe
relationshipbetweenlawandmorality.Thatis,weshallbeexploringsomeofthe
myriad ways in which law and morality interact and some of the many ways in
whichtheyremaindisjoined.Suchanexplorationwillcontinuemylongstanding
defense of legal positivism. On the one hand, by tracing a number of points of
intersectionbetweenthelegaldomainandthemoraldomain,thechaptersbelow
will help to dispel the idea that legal positivists have somehow denied the
existence of important law-morality connections. On the other hand, by high-
lightingthecontingencyofallormostofthoseconnections,thisbookwillhave
placeditselfsquarelywithinthepositivisttradition.
Some of the controversies joined by my discussions have been carried on
mainlyamonglegalpositiviststhemselves,whodisagreewithoneanotherabout
thebestwaysofunderstandingandelaboratingtheinsightsofthejurisprudential
traditiontowhichtheyareheirs.Theydisagreeaboutthescope,thesigniWcance,
theimplications,andeventhesustainabilityoflegalpositivism’sinsistenceonthe
separabilityoflawandmorality;andtheydisagreeaboutkindredmatterssuchas
the nature of law’s conventionality. Those disputes Wgure saliently in this book,
especiallyinPartIandinChapter7.Atleastasprominentincontemporarylegal
philosophy,however,aretheabidingconXictsbetweenpositivistsandnatural-law
theorists.Throughavarietyofarguments,natural-lawthinkershaveendeavored
toestablishthatlawandmoralityareineluctablyintertwinedinimportantways.
Accordingly,anysatisfactorydefenseoflegalpositivismmustseektocounterthe
claims of natural-law theorists. The present volume (especially in Part II) will
undertake just such a task, as it builds on some of my previous writings in
responsetothechallengesoflegalpositivism’sopponents.
Although the original versions of some of the chapters in this book were
publishedasarticlesinjournals,andalthoughthereisnosustainedlycumulative
line of reasoning that runs throughout the book, this volume is more than a
collection of essays. Every chapter focuses on some facet(s) of the theme
announcedinthevolume’stitle,andthechaptersformcloselyintegratedclusters.
Eachchapterwaswrittenwiththisbookinmind.Moreover,theoriginalversions
of the previously published pieces have been signiWcantly revised to minimize
repetitionandtoincreasethecoherenceofthevolumeasawhole(and,atseveral
Where Law and Morality Meet. Matthew H. Kramer.
© Oxford University Press 2004. Published 2004 by Oxford University Press.
MatthewH.Kramer/WhereLawandMoralityMeet FinalProof 20.9.2004 9:59am page2
2 Introduction
junctures, to amplify arguments considerably in order to register the develop-
ment of my substantive views). This Introduction will outline the three main
partsofthebookandwillsetthestagefortheargumentsthatarepresentedthere.
I. Inclusivism, Incorporationism, and Exclusivism
Chapters1to4sallyforthintodebatesbetweenExclusiveLegalPositivistsonthe
one hand and Inclusive Legal Positivists and Incorporationists on the other.
Before we glance at the background to those debates, the relevant terminology
should be elucidated. Let us begin, then, with a thumbnail sketch of each of
the three major positions just named (two of which are commonly found
together).
InclusiveLegalPositivism,asunderstoodthroughoutthisbook,consistsinthe
followingthesis:itcanbethecase,thoughitneednotbethecase,thatanorm’s
consistencywithsomeoralloftherequirementsofmoralityisapreconditionfor
thenorm’sstatusasalawinthisorthatjurisdiction.Whilesuchaprecondition
for legal validity is not inherent in the concept of law, it can be imposed as a
thresholdtestundertheRuleofRecognitioninanyparticularlegalregime.1That
test,whichcanbeappliedbytheoYcialsinsucharegimetoallofthelegalnorms
therein or to only some subset of those norms, is one of the criteria which the
oYcials use for ascertaining the law. Insofar as a threshold criterion of that sort
doesprevailinanyparticularlegalsystem,then,somedegreeofmoralworthiness
is a necessary condition for the legally authoritative force of each norm that is
validated as a law within the system. Inclusive Legal Positivism, which readily
acceptsthepossibilityofsuchastateofaVairs,isinclusivebecauseitallowsthat
moral precepts can Wgure among the criteria that guide oYcials’ ascertainment
of the law. Inclusivist theorists reject the view that every criterion for law-
ascertainmentineverycrediblypossiblelegalsystemisfocusedonnonnormative
matters of provenance. At the same time, the Inclusivists are positivists because
theyalsorejecttheviewthateverycrediblypossiblelegalsystemreliesonmoral
testsamongitslaw-ascertainingcriteria.AnInclusiveLegalPositivistinsiststhat
suchtestsarecontingentfeatures,ratherthanessentialfeatures,ofthesystemsof
lawinwhichtheyareapplied.
Incorporationism, as understood throughout this book, consists in the
following thesis: it can be the case, though it need not be the case, that a
norm’s correctness as a moral principle is a suYcient condition for its status as
1 Thephrase‘RuleofRecognition’,whichIusehereandelsewhere,isofcoursetakenfromH.L.A.
Hart.ItreferstothearrayofcriteriathatempowerandobligatetheoYcialsinalegalsystemtoascertain
theexistenceandcontentsoflegalnormsinaccordancewithstandardsspeciWedbythosecriteria(which
arelargely,ifnotexhaustively,ranked).TheRuleofRecognitioninanylegalsystemisaframeworkof
normative presuppositions that underlie the law-identifying behaviorof the oYcials in the system. In
Chapter4,IexplorethegeneralnatureofanyRuleofRecognitioninsomedepth.
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Introduction 3
alegalnorminthisorthatjurisdiction.Albeittheroleofmoralcorrectnessasa
suYcientconditionforlegalvalidityisnotinherentintheconceptoflaw,itcan
obtain under the Rule of Recognition in any particular legal regime. An Incor-
porationisttheoristmaintainsthatmoralprinciplesregularlyregardedbyoYcials
as legally determinative are indeed legal norms, notwithstanding that they have
perhaps never been laid down in any explicit sources such as legislative enact-
ments or judicial rulings. When oYcials do regularly engage in a practice of
treating the moral soundness of norms as a suYcient condition for the norms’
legalauthoritativeness,theyhavetherebyincorporatedmoralprinciplesintothe
law of their system of governance—even before some or all of the applicable
principles have received any explicit recognition. An Incorporationist theorist,
whounhesitatinglyacceptsthepossibilityofsuchastateofaVairs,isnonetheless
alegalpositivistbecauseheinsiststhattheincorporationofmoralprinciplesinto
alegalsystem’sarrayofnormsiscontingentratherthaninevitable.
Whereas Inclusive Legal Positivism and Incorporationism are perfectly
compatible and are typically conjoined, Exclusive Legal Positivism is opposed
to each of them. Exclusive Legal Positivists maintain that the very nature of
law is inconsistent both with the role of moral principles as legal norms and
with their role as criteria for validating legal norms.2 While gladly acknowledg-
ing that moral principles often get invoked in the adjudicative and adminis-
trative activities of legal oYcials, the Exclusivists contend that those principles
are extra-legal standards. Such standards aVect the decisions reached by
the oYcials, but only because those decisions are not based solely on legal
requirements.
Now, the three positions just recounted have hardly emerged from nowhere.
Rather,eachofthemasadistinctivevariantoflegalpositivismhasdevelopedin
reaction to Ronald Dworkin’s early critiques of H.L.A. Hart.3 Although the
details of Dworkin’s criticisms and of subsequent rejoinders to those criticisms
cannotbetracedinanydepthhere,afewremarkswillhelptosupplythecontext
within which the arguments of this book’s Wrst four chapters can best be
fathomed.
Among the many accusations leveled by Dworkin against Hart is that legal
positivism cannot adequately take account of the role of moral principles as
2 SomeExclusiveLegalPositivistsappeartoallowthatamoralprinciplecanbealegalnormifithas
beenenactedoraYrmedinsomeformalsourcesuchasastatuteorajudicialrulingoranadministrative
regulation.See,e.g.,ScottShapiro,‘TheDiVerencethatRulesMake’,inBrianBix(ed.),AnalyzingLaw
(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1998),33,57,58–9.TotakeaccountofsuchExclusivists,then,my
referencetothestatusofmoralprinciplesaslegalnormsshouldbepaireddisjunctivelywithareferenceto
thestatusofsuchprinciplesaslegalnormsthathavenotbeendirectlyandexplicitlygroundedinany
formalsources.OnlysuchadisjunctiveformulationwouldcapturethesubstanceofwhateveryExclusive
LegalPositivistdenies.Toavoidstylisticclottedness,however,IhavenotalteredmyprosetoreXectthis
complexityintheExclusivistcamp.
3 ThosecritiquesarepresentedmostnotablyinRonaldDworkin,TakingRightsSeriously(Cambridge,
MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1978),chaps2–4.
MatthewH.Kramer/WhereLawandMoralityMeet FinalProof 20.9.2004 9:59am page4
4 Introduction
bindingbasesfordecisionsbyjudgesinhardcases.(Inhislater work,Dworkin
has—quiteunpersuasively—extendedhisanti-positivistaccountofadjudication
beyond hard cases to all cases. Even there, however, he provides the motivation
for his discussion by adverting to the operativeness of moral principles in hard
cases.4)RetortingtoDworkin’sbroadsides,legalpositivistshaveeithersoughtto
explainhowmoralprinciplescanenterintothelaworelsehavedeniedthatsuch
principles do enter into the law. In issuing such retorts, the positivists have
pursued the routes of Inclusivism and Incorporationism or the route of Exclu-
sivism.TheWrsttwoofthoseroutesarecombinable,ofcourse,whereasthethird
ofthemisatoddswiththeothertwo.
InclusiveLegalPositivismisthepositionwiththeWrmestgroundinginHart’s
own work. Well before Dworkin’s onslaughts, Hart had happily acknowledged
thatthecriteriaforlaw-ascertainmentinanyparticularlegalsystemcaninclude
moral principles. He had chieXy in mind criteria that constitute restrictions on
law-makingpower.Thatis,hehadchieXyinmindtheroleofmoralprinciplesas
hurdlesorthresholdsthatposenecessaryconditionsforthestatusofanynormas
alegalnorm.5EmbracingInclusiveLegalPositivismavantlalettre,Hartblazeda
trailthathasbeenfollowedbymanyofhispositivistsuccessors.Foremostamong
thosesuccessorsheretoforeisWilfridWaluchow,whosesubtleelaborationofthe
Inclusivist position has been a riposte to Dworkin as much as to the Exclusive
LegalPositivists.6
However,Dworkin’sattacksonlegalpositivismhavenotfocusedprimarilyon
the role of moral principles as law-validating criteria which require consistency
withsomeorallofthedemandsofmoralityasanecessaryconditionforthelegal
4 See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (London: Fontana Press, 1986), 15–30. For my doubts
about the applicability of Dworkin’s model of adjudication to easy cases, see my In Defense of
LegalPositivism(Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress, 1999)[hereinaftercitedasIDLP],173–6.See also
NigelSimmonds,‘ImperialVisionsandMundanePractices’,46CambridgeLawJournal465,479–80
(1987).
5 Among the germane passages in Hart’s work are the following: The Concept of Law (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1961) [hereinafter cited as Hart, Concept], 199; ‘Positivism and the Separation of
LawandMorals’,inEssaysinJurisprudenceandPhilosophy(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1983)[hereinafter
citedasEssays],49,54–5;‘LonL.Fuller,TheMoralityofLaw’,inEssays,supra,at343,361;‘Postscript’,
toTheConceptofLaw(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1994)(2ndedn)[hereinaftercitedasHart,‘Postscript’],
238,247–8,250–4.AlthoughIreadilyconcedethat‘thedistinctionbetween[InclusiveandExclusive]
versionsofthepositivistthesiswasunknownwhen[HartwroteTheConceptofLaw]andwastherefore
notpartofthepolemicalcontextofthetime’(LeslieGreen,‘TheConceptofLawRevisited’,94Michigan
Law Review 1687, 1706–7 (1996)), the passages cited here are strong evidence suggesting that Hart
implicitlyorexplicitlyembracedInclusiveLegalPositivismthroughouthiscareer.
MyownpreviouswritingsinthisareahavestemmedfromaperspectivesimilartothatofHart.See
IDLP,114–15,152–61,197–9;‘ComingtoGripswiththeLaw:InDefenseofPositiveLegalPositivism’,5
LegalTheory171,190–200(1999).AHartianperspectivealsogenerallyinformsW.J.Waluchow,Inclusive
Legal Positivism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). An Inclusive Legal Positivist stance is likewise
largelywhatDavidLyonsdefendsinhis‘Principles,Positivism,andLegalTheory’,87YaleLawJournal
415,423–6(1977).
6 SeegenerallyW.J.Waluchow,supranote5;W.J.Waluchow,‘AuthorityandthePracticalDiVerence
Thesis:ADefenseofInclusiveLegalPositivism’,6LegalTheory45(2000).
