Table Of ContentWHAT’S THE POINT OF
KNOWLEDGE?
A Function-First Epistemology
MICHAEL HANNON
What’s the Point of Knowledge?
What’s the Point
of Knowledge?
A Function-First Epistemology
MICHAEL HANNON
OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS
UNIVERSITY PRESS
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Hannon, Michael (Michael J.), author.
Title: What’s the point of knowledge? : a function-first epistemology / Michael Hannon.
Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2019] I
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2018032483 (print) ILCCN 2018051505 (ebook) I
ISBN 9780190914752 (online content) I ISBN 9780190914738 (updf) I
ISBN 9780190914745 (epub) I ISBN 9780190914721 (cloth: alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Knowledge, Theory of.
Classification: LCC BD161 (ebook) I LCC BD161 .H36 2019 (print) I
DDC 121—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018032483
CONTENTS
Preface vii
Introduction 1
CHAPTER 1 Methodologies in Epistemology 11
CHAPTER 2 The Point of Knowledge 35
CHAPTER 3 The Value of Fallible Knowledge 56
CHAPTER 4 Impure Knowledge 81
CHAPTER 5 Pluralism about Knowledge 103
CHAPTER 6 Epistemic Diversity 139
CHAPTER? Epistemic Pragmatism 157
CHAPTER 8 Skepticism and the Point of Knowledge 189
CHAPTER 9 What’s the Point of Understanding? 222
Bibliography 257
Index 271
PREFACE
Why do humans use words like “knowing,” “understanding,” and “ra
tional”? Put more broadly, what is the point of epistemic evalua
tion? This book attempts to answer this question.
I began working on this topic in 2009 at the University of Cambridge,
where my doctoral thesis explored the ways in which speaking of
“knowing” facilitates human cooperation, survival, and flourishing.
Drawing on the work of Edward Craig, I hypothesized that humans
think and talk about knowledge primarily to identify reliable sources of
information to members of their community. I claimed (and still claim)
that identifying reliable informants is essential for pooling, sharing, and
retrieving useful information. This idea might appear simple, but I believe
it has wide-reaching implications. In subsequent years, I have continued
investigating the nature, purpose, and value of knowledge, building on my
previous work while pushing deeper to extend it in new directions. The
result is this book.
In a book about our epistemic dependence on others, I must thank the
many people to whom I am indebted for their comments, criticisms, and
encouragement while working on this project. Two of the most influen
tial people are Hallvard Lillehammer (my PhD supervisor) and Stephen
Grimm (my postdoc supervisor). Together their incisive comments have
shaped many ideas in this book. I cannot imagine a better pair of mentors
and I owe each of them an immeasurable debt. I am also grateful to Krista
Lawlor for agreeing—on very short notice—to supervise part of this proj
ect while I was a visiting postdoc at Stanford University in the spring
of 2017.
Others who deserve thanks are Byron Alvares, Manuel Alves, Nathan
Ballantyne, James Beebe, Jessica Brown, Chris Cowie, Edward Craig, Tim
Crane, Keith DeRose, Sinan Dogramaci, Kate Elgin, Sam Elgin, Georgi
Gardiner, Mikkel Gerken, John Greco, David Henderson, Nick Hughes,
Mark Kaplan, Klemens Kappel, Chris Kelp, Martin Kusch, Jess Kwong,
Tania Lombrozo, Helen Marsh, Robin McKenna, Joshua Mozersky,
Gareth Nellis, Corey Nishio, Huw Price, Duncan Pritchard, Kevin Roberts,
Patrick Rysiew, Anand Shan, Barry Smith, Ernest Sosa, and Nick Treanor.
I am especially thankful to Kate Elgin and Robin McKenna for reading
and providing comments on a full draft of this manuscript. My family, too,
is owed more than deep thanks. Their influence on my work is less obvious
but no less real.
I also want to apologize to anyone I forgot to mention by name and say
thank you for your help. This book is the result of many years of thinking
about the social role of knowledge, and I am sure I have learned things
from more people than I can now remember.
Audiences at the following events have also provided helpful feed
back at various stages of writing: the Bled Epistemology Conference
(2017), Queen’s University Colloquium Series (2017), University of
Vienna (2017), Varieties of Understanding Seminar (2016), Concepts and
Cognition Lab at UC Berkeley (2016), APA Pacific Division Meeting
(2015), Buffalo Experimental Philosophy Conference (2015), Helsinki
Epistemology Workshop (2015), Central States Philosophical Association
(2015), APA Eastern Division Meeting (2014), NYC Philosophy of
Language Workshop (2013), Midsummer Philosophy Workshop (2013),
European Epistemology Network Meeting (2012), and the Cambridge
Faculty of Philosophy (2010-2013).
I have drawn, with kind permission, on previously published work.
Parts of chapter 2 are taken from “The Practical Origins of Epistemic
Contextualism,” Erkenntnis (2014) 78 (4): 899-919. Chapter 3 draws
on my paper “Fallibilism and the Value of Knowledge,” Synthese (2014)
191 (6): 1119-1146. Chapter 4 is based on “A Solution to Knowledge’s
Threshold Problem,” Philosophical Studies (2017) 174 (3): 607-629. Parts
of chapter 5 are taken from “The Importance of Knowledge Ascriptions,”
Philosophy Compass (2015) 10 (12): 856-866. Chapter 6 is a substantially
revised and expanded version of “The Universal Core of Knowledge,”
Synthese (2015) 192 (3): 769-786.1 want to thank the relevant editors and
publishers for letting me use this material.
I am also grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada for providing me with a doctoral fellowship that
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