Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge

384 Pages·1996·18.426 MB·English

by  Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski

Virtues of the mind
Almost all theories of knowledge and justified belief employ
moral concepts and forms of argument borrowed from moral
theories, but none of them attends to the current renaissance in
virtue ethics. This remarkable book is the first attempt to establish
a theory of knowledge based on the model of virtue theory in
ethics. The book develops the concept of an intellectual virtue,
and then shows how the concept can be used to give an account of
the major concepts in epistemology, including the concept of
knowledge.
A highly original work of philosophy for professionals, the
book will also provide students with an excellent introduction to
epistemology, virtue theory, and the relationship between ethics
and epistemology.

Virtues of the mind
An inquiry into the nature of virtue
and the ethical foundations of knowledge
LINDA TRINKAUS ZAGZEBSKI
Loyola Marymount University
CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS
PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE
The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 1RP, United Kingdom
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK http: //www.cup.cam.ac.uk
40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA http: / /www.cup.org
10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia
© Cambridge University Press 1996
This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and
to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without
the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 1996
Reprinted 1998
Typeset in Palatino
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data is available
ISBN 0-521-57060-3 hardback
ISBN 0-521-57826-4 paperback
Transferred to digital printing 2002
For Walter and Sander

Contents
Acknowledgments page xi
Introduction xiii
Part I The methodology of epistemology 1
1 Using moral theory in epistemology 3
1.1 Contemporary epistemic theories and their
ethical models 6
1.2 Some advantages of virtue-based theories 15
2 Difficulties in contemporary epistemology 29
2.1 Problems in the notion of justification 29
2.2 The neglect of understanding and wisdom 43
3 More reasons to try a virtue approach: the relations
between believing and feeling 51
4 An objection to modeling evaluation in epistemology
on ethics: the dispute over the voluntariness of belief 58
4.1 The irrelevance of the objection to virtue theory 59
4.2 The voluntariness of belief 61
4.3 Moral and epistemic luck 70
5 Conclusion to Part I: why center epistemology on the
virtues? 73
Part II A theory of virtue and vice yj
1 Types of virtue theories 78
vii
Contents
2 The nature of a virtue 84
2.1 The many notions of virtue 84
2.2 Virtue and the good 89
2.3 Virtues distinguished from natural capacities 102
2.4 Virtues distinguished from skills 106
2.5 Virtue and habit: the transformation machine 116
2.6 Virtues, feelings, and motivations 126
2.7 General account of a virtue 134
3 Intellectual and moral virtues 137
3.1 Aristotle's distinction between intellectual and
moral virtues 137
3.2 Some connections between intellectual and moral
virtues 158
4 The two components of intellectual virtues 165
4.1 The motivation for knowledge and reliable
success 166
4.1.1 The motivation for knowledge 168
4.1.2 The success component of the intellectual
virtues 176
4.1.3 Montmarquet on the virtues and truth
conduciveness 184
4.1.4 Motivation in excess 194
4.2 The value of the components of intellectual
virtues 197
4.2.1 The value of intellectual virtue in a
happiness-based theory 197
4.2.2 The value of intellectual virtue in a
motivation-based theory 202
5 The importance of phronesis 211
5.1 Aristotle and Aquinas on practical wisdom 211
5.2 A proposal on the function of phronesis 219
6 The definition of deontic concepts 232
6.1 Right acts, justified beliefs 233
6.2 Acts of virtue 246
6.3 Beyond duty 253
7 Conclusion to Part II: the scope of the moral 255
Vlll
Contents
Part III The nature of knowledge 259
1 Knowledge and the ethics of belief 260
2 Defining knowledge 264
2.1 The definition 264
2.2 High-grade and low-grade knowledge 273
3 Gettier problems 283
3.1 The problem for JTB theories 283
3.2 Resolving Gettier problems in a virtue theory 293
4 Reliabilism 299
4.1 Objections to reliabilism 300
4.2 Anticipated objections to my theory from the
perspective of reliabilism 311
5 Plantinga's theory of proper function 319
6 Harmonizing internal and external aspects of
knowing 329
7 Conclusion to Part III: ethics, epistemology, and
psychology 334
Bibliography 341
Name index 359
Subject index 362
IX