Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History

328 Pages·2009·1.324 MB·English

by  Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, Barry R. Weingast

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VIOLENCEANDSOCIALORDERS
Allsocietiesmustdealwiththepossibilityofviolence,andtheydosoindifferentways.This
bookintegratestheproblemofviolenceintoalargersocialscienceandhistoricalframework,
showinghoweconomicandpoliticalbehaviorarecloselylinked.Mostsocieties,whichwecall
naturalstates,limitviolencebypoliticalmanipulationoftheeconomytocreateprivileged
interests. These privileges limit the use of violence by powerful individuals, but doing so
hindersbotheconomicandpoliticaldevelopment.Incontrast,modernsocietiescreateopen
accesstoeconomicandpoliticalorganizations,fosteringpoliticalandeconomiccompetition.
Thebookprovidesaframeworkforunderstandingthetwotypesofsocialorders,whyopen
accesssocietiesarebothpoliticallyandeconomicallymoredeveloped,andhowsometwenty-
fivecountrieshavemadethetransitionbetweenthetwotypes.
Douglass C. North is co-recipient of the 1993 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sci-
ence.HeistheSpencerT.OlinProfessorinArtsandSciencesatWashingtonUniversityin
St.Louis,whereheservedasdirectoroftheCenterforPoliticalEconomyfrom1984to1990,
andistheBartlettBurnapSeniorFellowattheHooverInstitutionatStanfordUniversity.
A member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a former member of the
BoardofDirectorsoftheNationalBureauofEconomicResearchfortwentyyears,Professor
NorthreceivedtheJohnR.CommonsAwardin1992.Theauthoroftenbooks,including
Institutions,InstitutionalChange,andEconomicPerformance(CambridgeUniversityPress,
1990)andUnderstandingtheProcessofEconomicChange(2005),ProfessorNorthhasresearch
interestsinpropertyrights,economicorganizationinhistory,andtheformationofpolitical
andeconomicinstitutionsandtheirconsequencesthroughtime.Heisafrequentconsultant
fortheWorldBankandnumerouscountriesonissuesofeconomicgrowth.
JohnJosephWallisisprofessorofeconomicsattheUniversityofMarylandandaresearch
associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. He received his Ph.D. from the
UniversityofWashingtonin1981andwentontospendatwo-yearpostdoctoralfellowshipat
theUniversityofChicago.Duringthe2006–7academicyear,hewasaVisitingScholaratthe
HooverInstitutionandaVisitingProfessorofPoliticalScienceatStanford.ProfessorWallis
isaneconomichistorianwhospecializesinthepublicfinanceofAmericangovernmentsand
moregenerallyontherelationbetweentheinstitutionaldevelopmentofgovernmentsandthe
developmentofeconomies.Hislarge-scaleresearchonAmericanstateandlocalgovernment
finance,andonAmericanstateconstitutions,hasbeensupportedbytheNationalScience
Foundation.
BarryR.WeingastistheWardC.KrebsFamilyProfessorintheDepartmentofPoliticalScience
andaSeniorFellowattheHooverInstitutionatStanfordUniversity.HeisalsoaSeniorFellow
(bycourtesy)oftheStanfordCenterforInternationalDevelopment.Weingastreceivedhis
Ph.D. from the California Institute of Technology in 1977. Prior to teaching at Stanford,
ProfessorWeingastspenttenyearsatWashingtonUniversityinSt.LouisintheDepartment
ofEconomicsandtheSchoolofBusiness.TherecipientoftheRikerPrize,theHeinzEulau
Prize, and the James Barr Memorial Prize, among others, he has also worked extensively
withdevelopmentagenciessuchastheWorldBankandtheU.S.AgencyforInternational
Development.ProfessorWeingastcoauthoredAnalyticalNarratives(1998)andcoeditedThe
OxfordHandbookofPoliticalEconomy(2006).Hisresearchfocusesonthepoliticalfoundations
ofmarkets,economicreform,andregulation,includingproblemsofpoliticaleconomyof
development,federalismanddecentralization,andlegalinstitutions.

Violence and Social Orders
A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded
Human History
DOUGLASS C. NORTH
WashingtonUniversityinSt.Louis
JOHN JOSEPH WALLIS
UniversityofMaryland
BARRY R. WEINGAST
StanfordUniversity
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo
Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK
Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521761734
© Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast 2009
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the
provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part
may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published in print format 2009
ISBN-13 978-0-511-51783-9 eBook (NetLibrary)
ISBN-13 978-0-521-76173-4 hardback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy
of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication,
and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain,
accurate or appropriate.
ThisbookisdedicatedtoourwivesElisabeth,Ellen,andSusie

Contents
Preface pagexi
Acknowledgments xv
1. TheConceptualFramework 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 TheConceptofSocialOrders:Violence,Institutions,and
Organizations 13
1.3 TheLogicoftheNaturalState 18
1.4 TheLogicoftheOpenAccessOrder 21
1.5 TheLogicoftheTransitionfromNaturalStatestoOpen
AccessOrders 25
1.6 ANoteonBeliefs 27
1.7 ThePlan 29
2. TheNaturalState 30
2.1 Introduction 30
2.2 Commonalities:CharacteristicsofLimitedAccessOrders 32
2.3 Differences:ATypologyofNaturalStates 41
2.4 Privileges,Rights,andEliteDynamics 49
2.5 Origins:TheProblemScaleandViolence 51
2.6 NaturalStateDynamics:FragiletoBasicNaturalStates 55
2.7 MovingtoMatureNaturalStates:Disorder,Organization,
andtheMedievalChurch 62
2.8 MatureNaturalStates:FranceandEnglandinthe
Sixteenth,Seventeenth,andEighteenthCenturies 69
2.9 NaturalStates 72
Appendix:SkeletalEvidenceandEmpiricalResults 75
vii
viii Contents
3. TheNaturalStateApplied:EnglishLandLaw 77
3.1 Introduction 77
3.2 Chronology 79
3.3 TheCourts,LegalConcepts,andtheLawofProperty 87
3.4 BastardFeudalism 91
3.5 BastardFeudalismandtheImpersonalizationofProperty 98
3.6 TheTypologyofNaturalStates 104
Appendix 106
4. OpenAccessOrders 110
4.1 Introduction 110
4.2 Commonalities:CharacteristicsofanOpenAccessOrder 112
4.3 Institutions,Beliefs,andIncentivesSupporting
OpenAccess 117
4.4 Incorporation:TheExtensionofCitizenship 118
4.5 ControlofViolenceinOpenAccessOrders 121
4.6 GrowthofGovernment 122
4.7 ForcesofShort-RunStability 125
4.8 ForcesofLong-RunStability:AdaptiveEfficiency 133
4.9 WhyInstitutionsWorkDifferentlyunderOpenAccess
thanLimitedAccess 137
4.10 ANew“LogicofCollectiveAction”andTheoryof
Rent-Seeking 140
4.11 DemocracyandRedistribution 142
4.12 AdaptiveEfficiencyandtheSeemingIndependenceof
EconomicsandPoliticsinOpenAccessOrders 144
5. TheTransitionfromLimitedtoOpenAccessOrders:
TheDoorstepConditions 148
5.1 Introduction 148
5.2 PersonalityandImpersonality:TheDoorstepConditions 150
5.3 DoorstepCondition#1:RuleofLawforElites 154
5.4 DoorstepCondition#2:PerpetuallyLivedOrganizations
inthePublicandPrivateSpheres 158
5.5 DoorstepCondition#3:ConsolidatedControlofthe
Military 169
5.6 TheBritishNavyandtheBritishState 181
5.7 Time,Order,andInstitutionalForms 187
6. TheTransitionProper 190
6.1 InstitutionalizingOpenAccess 190