Table Of ContentU.S. Foreign Policy and China
66559933__WWaarrrreenn aanndd BBaarrttlleeyy__RReessttttiinngg..iinndddd ii 0077//1100//2200 33::1166 PPMM
For our parents
66559933__WWaarrrreenn aanndd BBaarrttlleeyy__RReessttttiinngg..iinndddd iiii 0077//1100//2200 33::1166 PPMM
U.S. Foreign Policy
and China
Security Challenges During the Bush,
Obama, and Trump Administrations
Aiden Warren and Adam Bartley
66559933__WWaarrrreenn aanndd BBaarrttlleeyy__RReessttttiinngg..iinndddd iiiiii 0077//1100//2200 33::1166 PPMM
Edinburgh University Press is one of the leading university presses in the UK.
We publish academic books and journals in our selected subject areas across the
humanities and social sciences, combining cutting-edge scholarship with high
editorial and production values to produce academic works of lasting importance.
For more information visit our website: edinburghuniversitypress.com
© Aiden Warren and Adam Bartley, 2021
Edinburgh University Press Ltd
The Tun – Holyrood Road
12(2f) Jackson’s Entry
Edinburgh EH8 8PJ
Typeset in 11/13 Adobe Sabon by
IDSUK (Dataconnection) Ltd, and
printed and bound in Great Britain.
A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN 978 1 4744 5305 9 (hardback)
ISBN 978 1 4744 5307 3 (webready PDF)
ISBN 978 1 4744 5308 0 (epub)
The right of Aiden Warren and Adam Bartley to be identifi ed as the authors of this
work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act
1988, and the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003 (SI No. 2498).
66559933__WWaarrrreenn aanndd BBaarrttlleeyy__RReessttttiinngg..iinndddd iivv 0077//1100//2200 33::1166 PPMM
Contents
Abbreviations and Acronyms vi
Introduction 1
1. The Bush Administration’s First Term: Reconciling
the China “Threat” with New Priorities 18
2. The Bush Administration’s Second Term: Searching
for the Responsible Stakeholder 49
3. The Obama Administration’s First Term: The Promises
of the “Pivot” 81
4. The Obama Administration’s Second Term: Balancing
Continuities and New Realities 114
5. The Trump Administration: Confl icting Narratives
and Aberrant Departures 151
Afterword 205
Notes 216
Bibliography 274
Index 317
66559933__WWaarrrreenn aanndd BBaarrttlleeyy__RReessttttiinngg..iinndddd vv 0077//1100//2200 33::1166 PPMM
Abbreviations and Acronyms
5G Fifth generation
A2/AD Anti-access and area denial
ABMT Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty
ADIZ Air defense identifi cation zone
AI Artifi cial intelligence
AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
APEC Asia-Pacifi c Economic Cooperation
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ASBM Anti-ship ballistic missile
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BRI Belt and Road Initiative
BUILD Better Utilization of Investments Leading to
Development
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CoC Code of conduct
CSI Container Security Initiative
CTBTO Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization
CUES Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea
DIUx Defense Innovation Unit Experimental
DMZ Demilitarized Zone (Korea)
DoD Department of Defense
DPG Defense Planning Guidance
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
EAS East Asia Summit
ECS East China Sea
EEZ Exclusive economic zone
ETIM East Turkistan Islamic Movement
ETLO East Turkistan Liberation Organization
vi
66559933__WWaarrrreenn aanndd BBaarrttlleeyy__RReessttttiinngg..iinndddd vvii 0077//1100//2200 33::1166 PPMM
Abbreviations and Acronyms
EU European Union
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FIRRMA Foreign Investment Risk Review
Modernization Act
FIU Financial intelligence unit
FMF Foreign military fi nancing
FOIP Free and Open Indo-Pacifi c
FoN Freedom of navigation
FoNOPs Freedom of the Seas Navigation Operations
FTA Free trade agreement
G2 Group of Two
G20 Group of Twenty
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM Inter-c ontinental ballistic missile
IDFC International Development Finance
Corporation
IMF International Monetary Fund
INDOPACOM Indo-Pacifi c Command
INF Intermediate-range nuclear forces
IP Intellectual property
IPR Intellectual property rights
IPS Indo-Pacifi c Strategy
IPSR Indo-Pacifi c Strategy Report
IRBM Intermediate-range ballistic missile
MDA Maritime domain awareness
MIRV Multiple independent reentry vehicle
MoFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MSI Maritime Security Initiative
NAFTA North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement
NDS National Defense Strategy
NMD National Missile Defense
NPT Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty
NSC National Security Council
NSS National Security Strategy
OPIC Overseas Private Investment Corporation
PBC People’s Bank of China
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy
vii
66559933__WWaarrrreenn aanndd BBaarrttlleeyy__RReessttttiinngg..iinndddd vviiii 0077//1100//2200 33::1166 PPMM
U.S. Foreign Policy and China
PNAC Project for the New American Century
PRC People’s Republic of China
PSI Proliferation Security Initiative
RIMPAC Rim of the Pacifi c
ROKS Republic of Korea Ship
S&ED Strategic and Economic Dialogue
SCS South China Sea
SLOC Sea line of communication
SLBM Submarine-launched ballistic missile
SME Small and medium-sized enterprise
SOE State-owned enterprise
THAAD Terminal high-altitude area defense
TPP Trans-Pacifi c Partnership
TRA Taiwan Relations Act
UCESRC U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission
UN United Nations
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution
USNS United States Naval Ship
USPACOM United States Pacifi c Command
WMD Weapon of mass destruction
WTO World Trade Organization
XUAR Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region
viii
66559933__WWaarrrreenn aanndd BBaarrttlleeyy__RReessttttiinngg..iinndddd vviiiiii 0077//1100//2200 33::1166 PPMM
Introduction
From the purview of the world outlook in 2001 as George W. Bush
stood at the podium to become the forty-third president of the
United States, America seemed positioned to experience the
extended benefi ts of the unipolar moment. Not simply was the
U.S. the world’s pre-eminent military power, the largest economic
market, and a source for innovation and leadership, but it was so
by a substantive margin. The rise at this time of China, touted by
some as the emerging opponent to the liberal world order, was
viewed in generally optimistic if not non-perturbed terms. While
the challenges of China’s military modernization, its broader
territorial claims, and its human rights transgressions were note-
worthy, they were also increasingly less worrisome; its military
build-up had “been steady, but neither massive nor rapid, nor
technologically very impressive.”1 By such measures, and with
the manifold challenges of transitioning internal social-economic
structures, China was considered to be too weak to confront the
U.S. in Asia, and would remain so “well into the twenty-fi rst
century.” Meanwhile, the project for “aligning” China with the
world’s institutions, entangling the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
within a web of multilateral associations and global economic
relationships, seemed poised to offer at least a partial liberal polit-
ical awakening.2
In looking back, these assumptions about the many benefi ts of
engagement with China appear to have been over-sold, their key
precepts seemingly anachronistic even by 2001 standards. Some
twenty years into the twenty-fi rst century, the United States and
China have become locked within a contest of great-power com-
petition. Partial decoupling in select critical technology industries
1
66559933__WWaarrrreenn aanndd BBaarrttlleeyy__RReessttttiinngg..iinndddd 11 0077//1100//2200 33::1166 PPMM
