The World Crisis, Vol. 1

573 Pages·2013·0.14 MB·English

by  Winston S. Churchill

The World Crisis
Part I
1911–1914
Winston S. Churchill
Copyright
The World Crisis
Part I 1911–1914
First published 1923–31. © Estate of Winston S. Churchill
Cover art to the electronic edition copyright © 2013 by RosettaBooks, LLC.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any form or by
any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval
systems, without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer who
may quote brief passages in a review.
Image of Winston Churchill attending German manoeuvres, 1909 reproduced by
permission of Curtis Brown, London, on behalf of The Broadwater Collection, an
archive of photographs owned by the Churchill family and held at the Churchill
Archives Centre, Cambridge.
Electronic edition published 2013 by RosettaBooks, LLC, New York.
Cover jacket design by Alexia Garaventa
ISBN Mobipocket edition: 9780795331305
Contents
Foreword
Preface
I. The Vials of Wrath
II. Milestones to Armageddon
III. The Crisis of Agadir
IV. Admirals All
V. The German Navy Law
VI. The Romance of Design
VII. The North Sea Front
VIII. Ireland and the European Balance
IX. The Crisis
X. The Mobilization of the Navy
XI. War: The Passage of the Army
XII. The Battle in France
XIII. On the Oceans
XIV. In the Narrow Seas
XV. Antwerp
XVI. The Channel Ports
XVII. The Grand Fleet and the Submarine Alarm
XVIII. Coronel and the Falklands
XIX. With Fisher at the Admiralty
XX. The Bombardment of Scarborough and Hartlepool
XXI. Turkey and the Balkans
Appendix
A Naval Staff Training
B Tables of Fleet Strength
C Trade Protection
D Mining
E First Lord’s Minutes
FOREWORD TO NEW EDITION
This book was originally published in four large volumes which appeared at intervals
and at a cost that was necessarily beyond the means of many whom I would have been
glad to reach. It is therefore particularly gratifying to me to know that arrangements
have been made for its appearance in a form that will appeal to the large public of
average means who could never have put the earlier edition upon their shelves.
Since the publication of that issue I have submitted the work to considerable
revision, and in doing so I have been able to profit by not a little new knowledge. In
especial I have been able to give a more correct account of the circumstances attending
Lord Fisher’s resignation and a much fuller narrative of the great opening battles in
France. All this new matter, which includes all the pages devoted to the Battle of the
Marne, has hitherto only appeared in a one-volume edition which was of necessity very
considerably abridged. In the present edition, therefore, it takes its place for the first
time in the complete work. The reader thus obtains a narrative that not only appears in a
form far less costly than its earlier issues, but is also fuller and more correct.
This book, as I have elsewhere pointed out, strives to follow throughout the
methods and balance of Defoe’s Memoirs of a Cavalier. It is a contribution to history
strung upon a fairly strong thread of personal reminiscence. It does not pretend to be a
comprehensive record; but it aims at helping to disentangle from an immense mass of
material the crucial issues and cardinal decisions. Throughout I have set myself to
explain faithfully and to the best of my ability what happened and why.
I write this new Preface in a day of extraordinary difficulty and danger. So strange
indeed is the present international situation that it passes the wit of man to say what new
portent will have appeared in the European sky by the time these words see the light.
Armed to the teeth and feverishly adding to their armaments, the nations of Europe are
asking themselves, “Is this the peace for which we fought? What have all our sacrifices
brought us? What is coming next?” Is it possible that the appalling drama with which
this book is concerned was enacted in vain? Is it conceivable that in our own day the
hand of Destiny will raise the curtain on a tragedy of even greater horror?
These are gloomy questions, but History’s answer need not be gloomy. The
attainment of a genuine peace should not be beyond the reach of human wisdom
inspired by human goodwill. But if we are to escape a cataclysm fatal to civilization
itself let us lay to heart before it is too late the lesson, writ large in these pages, of the
tragic years 1914–18, a lesson that the events of this Autumn have only too bitterly
emphasized—the paramount necessity of preparedness.
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL.
November 22, 1938.
PREFACE1
I
With regard to the first section of this book, it is essential to state that from October 25,
1911, to May 28, 1915, I was, in the words of the Royal Letters Patent and Orders in
Council, ‘responsible to Crown and Parliament for all the business of the Admiralty.’
This period comprised the final stage in the preparation against a war with Germany;
the mobilization and concentration of the Fleet before the outbreak; the organization of
the Blockade; the gathering in 1914 of the Imperial forces from all over the world; the
clearance from the oceans of all the German cruisers and commerce destroyers; the
reinforcement of the Fleet by new construction in 1914 and 1915; the frustration and
defeat of the first German submarine attack upon merchant shipping in 1915; and the
initiation of the enterprise against the Dardanelles. It was marked before the war by a
complete revision of British naval war plans; by the building of a fast division of
battleships armed with 15-inch guns and driven by oil fuel; by the proposals, rejected
by Germany, for a naval holiday; and by the largest supplies till then ever voted by
Parliament for the British Fleet. It was distinguished during the war for the victories of
the Heligoland Bight, of the Falkland Islands, and the Dogger Bank; and for the attempt
to succour Antwerp. It was memorable for the disaster to the three cruisers off the
Dutch Coast; the loss of Admiral Cradock’s squadron at Coronel; and the failure of the
Navy to force the Dardanelles.
Eight years had passed since I quitted the Admiralty, and I felt it both my right and
my duty to set forth the manner in which I endeavoured to discharge my share in these
hazardous responsibilities. In doing so I adhered to certain strict rules. I made no
important statement of fact relating to naval operations or Admiralty business, on which
I did not possess unimpeachable documentary proof. I made or implied no criticism of
any decision or action taken or neglected by others, unless I could prove that I had
expressed the same opinion in writing before the event.
In every case where the interests of the State allowed, I printed the actual
memoranda, directions, minutes, telegrams or letters written by me at the time,
irrespective of whether these documents had been vindicated or falsified by the march
of history and of time. The only excisions of relevant matter from the documents were
made to avoid needlessly hurting the feelings of individuals, or the pride of friendly
nations. For such reasons here and there sentences were softened or suppressed. But the
whole story is recorded as it happened, by the actual counsels offered and orders given
in the fierce turmoil of each day. The principal minutes by which Admiralty business
was conducted embody in every case decisions for which, as the highest executive
authority in the department, I was directly responsible, and are in all cases expressed in
my own words. I am equally accountable, together with the First Sea Lord at the time,
for the principal telegrams which moved fleets, squadrons and individual ships, all of
which (unless the contrary appears) bear my initials as their final sanction.
If in the great number of decisions and orders which these pages recount and which
deal with so many violent and controversial affairs, mistakes can be found which led to
mishap, the fault is mine. If, on the other hand, favourable results were achieved, that
should be counted to some extent as an offset. Where the decision lay outside my
powers and was taken contrary to my advice, I rest on the written record of my warning.
Should it be objected that in any of these matters, many of them so highly technical, a
landsman and layman could form no valuable opinion, I point to the documents
themselves. They can be judged as they stand. But lest, on the other hand, it should be
thought that I am seeking to claim credit which is not mine, it must be remembered that
throughout this period I enjoyed the assistance, loyal, spontaneous and unstinted, of the
best brains of the Royal Navy, that every treasure of every branch of the Admiralty and
the Fleet was lavished upon my instruction, and that I had only to apply my own reason
and instinct to the arguments of those who I believe stood in the foremost rank of the
naval experts of the world.
II
In the first section of this Account I had a long and varied tale to tell: nor was it
possible to avoid dealing with many episodes of peace and war necessarily exciting
dispute. Still the broad and enduring results were crowned with success, and there was
praise and honour for all concerned in their achievement. The second section deals with
a year of ill-fortune to the cause of the Allies. Brilliant opportunities presented
themselves in vain; grave mistakes were made, and losses were incurred measureless in
their pain. The assignment and the division of the responsibility for these events is a
task at once difficult and invidious. Moreover I was for a time an actor exercising an
influence or even an authority, sometimes decisive and often potent, upon the unfolding
of the tragedy. I was brought by the convictions I held and the course I took into
unyielding conflict with two of the most honoured and famous war-figures of our
national life—Lord Fisher and Lord Kitchener. Both are now silent for ever. Yet my
contention persists, nor could I without insincerity, without concealment, without a
woeful surrender of the truth as I see it, fail to make that contention good.
I disclaimed in my original Preface the position of the historian. It is not for me with
my record and special point of view to pronounce a final conclusion. That must be left
to others and to other times. But I have set forth what I believe to be fair and true; and I
present it once more as a contribution to history of which note should be taken together
with other accounts. I cannot expect to alter the fixed and prevailing opinions of the war
generation. They lived and fought their way through the awful struggle in the light of
the knowledge given to them at the time, and their minds are stamped with its imprint.
All I ask is that this Account shall also be placed on record and shall survive as one of
the factors upon which the judgment of our children will be founded.
It is absurd to argue that the facts should not be fully published, or that obligations
of secrecy are violated by their disclosure in good faith. Thousands of facts have been
made public and hundreds of secret matters exposed. A whole library, for instance, has
sprung into existence about the Dardanelles Campaign and the circumstances which led
to it. All the principal actors have told their stories, and many minor ones. Lord Fisher
has published two volumes in which may be read not only his official memoranda, but
even the full record of his personal interventions in the secret discussion of the War
Committee. Lord Kitchener’s biographer has printed whatever documents he considered
necessary to the case he was unfolding, including even extracts from my own Cabinet
papers. Sir Ian Hamilton has published in the fullest detail his records and diaries.
Major-General C. E. Callwell, Director of Military Operations at the time, has written
what purports to be a history of the Dardanelles. The Official Naval Historian and the
Official Historian of the Commonwealth of Australia, with access to every form of
secret information, have traversed the whole ground, dealing with every episode and
quoting or summarizing every important order or telegram for which I was answerable,
and all other confidential papers which they considered relevant. The Royal
Commission on the Dardanelles has issued its lengthy and searching report. There are
many other works of importance and repute in the English language alone, professing to
deal authoritatively with the whole subject.
Upon me more than any other person the responsibility tor the Dardanelles and all
that it involved was cast. Upon me fell almost exclusively the fierce war-time censures
of Press and Public. Upon me alone among the high authorities concerned was the
penalty inflicted—not of loss of office, for that is a petty thing—but of interruption and
deprivation of control while the fate of the enterprise was still in suspense. In these
circumstances it was my intention to set forth the facts as they were known to me
without bitterness, but without compunction, seeking no offence, but concealing no
essential.
It was certainly not my purpose to shift or shirk my responsibility, or to set upon
other shoulders burdens which are my own. On the contrary, as will be seen, I accepted
the fullest responsibility for all that I did and had the power to do. I took also my share
for the unforeseeable consequences of these actions. But I wished to define and recount
exactly what that share was, and what those actions were, and to do this not in the easily
turned language of the aftertime, but as far as possible in the actual operation orders and
counsels given by me at the time and before the event.
Concerning the more general aspects of the war on which this second section
touches, I was equally conscious of running counter to many established opinions, to
the dominant military doctrines of those days, and to some extent to the naval
performance. I never therefore expected to do more than submit the convictions by
which I was actuated, and in which I still reside, to the consideration of my countrymen.
I could not ask them to share my views. I was content that they should know them.