The pseudo-democrat's dilemma : why election observation became an international norm

262 Pages·2011·1.543 MB·English

by  Susan D. Hyde

THE
PSEUDO-
DEMOCRAT’S
DILEMMA

THE
PSEUDO-
DEMOCRAT’S
DILEMMA
WHY ELECTION
OBSERVATION BECAME AN
INTERNATIONAL NORM
Susan D. Hyde
CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS
ITHACA AND LONDON
Cornell University Press gratefully acknowledges receipt of a grant from
the Whitney and Betty MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies
at Yale University, which helped in the publication of this book. The book
was also published with the assistance of the Frederick W. Hilles Publication
Fund of Yale University.
Copyright © 2011 by Cornell University
All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book,
or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without
permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address
Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca,
New York 14850.
First published 2011 by Cornell University Press
Printed in the United States of America
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Hyde, Susan D.
The pseudo-democrat’s dilemma : why election observation became
an international norm / Susan D. Hyde.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-8014-4966-6 (alk. paper)
1. Election monitoring. 2. Elections—Corrupt practices.
3. Democratization. 4. International relations. I. Title.
JF1001.H93 2011
324.6'5—dc22 2010049865
Cornell University Press strives to use environmentally responsible
suppliers and materials to the fullest extent possible in the publishing
of its books. Such materials include vegetable-based, low-VOC inks
and acid-free papers that are recycled, totally chlorine-free, or partly
composed of nonwood fi bers. For further information, visit our
website at www.cornellpress.cornell.edu.
Cloth printing 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
To
Howard Leichter, Dawn Nowacki,
and Elliot Tenofsky,
who introduced me to this profession,
and David Lake, my mentor

CONTENTS
List of Figures and Tables ix
Acknowledgments xi
Introduction 1
1 Signaling Democracy and the Norm of Internationally
Observed Elections 28
2 Sovereign Leaders and the Decision to Invite
Observers 56
3 Democracy-Contingent Benefits 89
4 Does Election Monitoring Matter? 126
5 The Quality of Monitoring and Strategic
Manipulation 158
Conclusion: Constrained Leaders and Changing
International Expectations 185
Appendixes
A. Formalization of Signaling Game 211
B. Codebook 216
Selected Bibliography 225
Index 239

FIGURES AND TABLES
Figures
I.1. Internationally observed elections, 1960–2006 8
1.1. International observation, election manipulation,
and probability of victory 43
2.1. Total number of elections per year, 1960–2006 66
2.2. Diffusion of elections and election observation by region 67
2.3. Regime type in observed elections vs. global average 70
2.4. Elections with pre-election concerns about fraud 71
2.5. Elections held by transitional government 72
2.6. Elections held following suspended elections 72
2.7. First multiparty elections 73
3.1. Changes in democracy-contingent benefi ts over time 94
3.2. Trends in observed elections and foreign aid to
government and civil society 108
3.3. Percentage of bilateral offi cial development assistance
devoted to democracy assistance 108
3.4. Negative reports, 1975–2005 112
3.5. Bilateral foreign aid to Haiti 118
3.6. Bilateral foreign aid to Togo 122
3.7. Noninviting countries, 2000–2006 123
4.1. Round one vote share for incumbent in monitored vs.
unmonitored polling stations 142
x Figures and Tables
5.1. Average number of reported short-term observers
per observed election, 1960–2004 167
5.2. Trends in international observation missions 171
Tables
2.1. Observed elections and Cold War alliances, 1962–1988 68
2.2. Observed elections and Cold War alliance patterns, 1989–1994 69
2.3. Binary logit, observed elections 77
2.4. Effects of country characteristics on the probability
of inviting observers 80
2.5. Alternative explanations 83
4.1. Armenia round one observer coverage by region 139
4.2. Logistic regression of round two monitoring
on background covariates 140
4.3. Effects of observations on vote share for
President Robert Kocharian 141
4.4. Logistic regression of assigned-to-treatment group
on registered voters 146
4.5. Carter Center observation coverage of villages in Indonesia 148
4.6. Summary statistics for all available village-level variables 149
4.7. Estimated effects of intent to treat on total votes
for Megawati 151
4.8. Estimated effect of observers on total votes for
Megawati in observed villages 153
5.1. Election manipulation and observer response 168
B.1. Descriptive statistics for table 2.3 221
B.2. Countries included in analysis 222
B.3. Excluded countries by reason for exclusion 223