Table Of ContentThe Philosophy of Metacognition
The Philosophy of
Metacognition
Mental Agency and Self-Awareness
e¨
Jo lle Proust
1
3
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Foreword
Why would philosophers of mind or epistemologists find scientific studies such as
thosereferencedinwhatfollowsrelevanttotheirownwork?Theparticularbrandof
naturalism that inspires the present book needs to be briefly presented. McDowell
(1994a) has defended the full autonomy of philosophy of mind with respect to
science,thatis,theclaimthatanappropriateanswertothecentralquestionsofthe
philosophyofmindshouldbedeliveredbyphilosophicalinvestigationandargument
alone,withoutrelyingondataorargumentsfromtheempiricalsciences.Naturalist
philosophers of mind, in contrast, consider that no serious conceptual inquiry,
whether descriptive or normative (e.g. about mental or rational activity), can be
brought to fruition without detailed knowledge of the informational processes
involved.1 This is not to concur with Quine’s plea for a ‘naturalized epistemology’,
thatis,withtheradicalviewthatphilosophicalepistemologyisboundtobecome‘a
chapterofpsychologyandhenceofnaturalscience’.2Itiscompatiblewithnaturalism
that philosophy of mind enjoys a certain methodological autonomy from the sci-
ences. Such methodological autonomy is not the full autonomy that McDowell
claims for philosophy; it does not mean that philosophy can freely apply forms of
inferencethatareunacceptableinscience,orthatphilosophicalactivitycanoccasionally
relaxitsstandardswithrespecttoscientificevidence.Methodologicalautonomymani-
festsitself,rather,inthewayitsquestionsareframed.Thesequestionsmaycutacross
fields of empirical research, semantic analysis, and first-person experience. They may
sometimesbeposedintheabsenceofcurrentevidence,eitherbecausetheyareconjec-
tures, or because no empirical test allows us to discriminate alternative conceptual
analyses. The methodological autonomy of philosophy also manifests itself in how
proposals are evaluated. They may be accepted merely because they are coherent and
relevant,orbecausetheyopenupthespaceofpossiblesolutions.Naturalistphilosophers
committedtothismethodologythusdonotaimsimplytoadjustphilosophicalclaimsto
scientific evidence. Their activity has its own agenda: it is to raise problems, explore
avenues,thattherelevantscientistsdonotgenerallyenvisage,andoffergeneralizations
thatscientistsareneithertrainednormotivatedtooffer.Themaingoalofthisbookisto
showhowmetacognition,arelativelyrecenttopicinthecognitivesciences,isapotential
sourceoffruitfulphilosophicalworkofthiskind.Inparticular,itopensnewpathsinthe
studyofmentalagency,practicalrationality,andselfhood,whichmight,hopefully,also
helpscientiststolookatmetacognitionfromadifferentangle.
1 Foradefence,seeProust(2002b). 2 Quine(1969).
Acknowledgements
This book would not be the same without the major contribution of three persons:
twoanonymousreviewers,whomadedetailedcriticalcommentsonapriorversion,
and my colleague Dick Carter, who has provided insightful remarks, and has
linguistically revised the manuscript. To these three contributors, I express my
deep gratitude. The research contained in this book would not have been possible
either without collaboration with a number of distinguished scientists. Research
projects, common seminars, fellowships, or other cooperative endeavours have
given me the privilege of extensive discussions with neuroscientists Laurence
Conty, Jean Decety, Julie Gre`zes, Chris Frith, the late Marc Jeannerod, the late
Jacques Paillard, Stan Dehaene, developmental psychologists Fabrice Cle´ment,
Jacqueline Nadel, Josef Perner, Markus Paulus, Hannes Rakoczy, James Russell,
PhilippeRochat, Atsushi Senju and Beate Sodian, psychologists of action Guenther
Knoblich, Wolfgang Prinz, Natalie Sebanz, psychologist of metacognition Asher
Koriat, psychiatrist Henri Grivois, comparative psychologists Michael Beran, Josep
Call, Daniel Haun, Carla Krachun, Richard Moore, Daniel Povinelli, David Smith,
MichaelTomasello,anthropologistsRitaAstutiandMauriceBloch,andmathemat-
iciansJean-PierreAubinandHelenaFrankowska.Iamverygratefultoallofthemfor
their trust and support. All my thanks to philosophers Ingar Brinck, Peter Car-
ruthers,Je´roˆmeDokic,FabianDorsch,IgorDouven,PaulE´gre´,NaomiEilan,thelate
Susan Hurley, Pierre Jacob, Julian Kiverstein, Pierre Livet, Robert Lurz, Matthew
Nudds, Lucy O’Brien, Gloria Origgi, Elisabeth Pacherie, Christopher Peacocke,
Franc¸ois Recanati, Georges Rey, Nicholas Shea, Barry Smith, Matthew Soteriou,
Dan Sperber, Tillman Vierkant, for relevant discussions and critical comments.
Special thanks go to my PhD students: Anna Loussouarn and Anne Coubray, for
acute objections, stimulating creativity and support, to student participants in my
seminars Martin Fortier and Joulia Smortchkova, to postdoctoral epistemologists
KirkMichaelianandConorMcHugh,forhelpfulfeedback,andtoSamWilkinsonfor
hislinguisticrevisionofoneofthechapters.Thanksareduetootoaudiencesofthe
APIC seminar, of the ESPP and Eurocogsci conferences, and the many European
workshopswherethisresearchhasbeendiscussed.
ResearchcollectedinthisbookwassupportedbyfundsfromtheCNRSandtheEC
SixthFrameworkProgramme(CNCC)underContractno.ERAS-CT-2003-980409;
by a ZIF fellowship on Embodied Communication, in 2006, at the University of
Bielefeld; by a Humboldt Fellowship on animal metacognition in 2007 at the Max
Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, and at the Max Planck
InstituteofCognitiveNeuroscience,Leipzig,Germany;byFrenchANRfundsasso-
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS vii
ciatedwiththeKnowjustprogramfrom2009to2011,and,from2011onward,byan
ERC senior grant # 269616 entitled DIVIDNORM. Thanks are due to all the insti-
tutions involved, and to Institut Jean-Nicod and the Foundation Pierre-Gilles de
Gennes(EcoleNormaleSupe´rieure)wheremyrecentresearchhasbeenconducted.
Allmythanksareextendedtothepublishersofthejournalsandbookswherean
initial version of these chapters was published, for accepting the present edition
including their revised versions: Cambridge University Press, Oxford University
Press,ConsciousnessandCognition,The Proceedings ofthe Aristotelian Society,and
PhilosophicalIssues.IfinallywanttoexpressspecialthankstoPeterMomtchilofffor
hissupportintheeditorialprocess.
Contents
ListofFigures x
ListofAbbreviations xi
1. Introduction 1
2. AnEvaluativistProposal:CognitiveControlandMetacognition 13
3. MetacognitionasCognitionaboutCognition:AttributiveViews 29
4. MetacognitionorMetarepresentation?ACritical
DiscussionofAttributivism 53
5. PrimateMetacognition 79
6. ARepresentationalFormatforProceduralMetacognition 111
7. MentalActsasNaturalKinds 149
8. TheNormsofAcceptance 169
9. EpistemicAgencyandMetacognition:AnExternalistView 185
10. IsThereaSenseofAgencyforThought? 207
11. ThinkingofOneselfastheSame 227
12. ExperienceofAgencyinSchizophrenia 243
13. ConversationalMetacognition 265
14. Dual-systemMetacognitionandNewChallenges 293
Glossary 309
Bibliography 325
AuthorIndex 355
Index 360
Description:Does metacognition, i.e. the capacity to form epistemic self-evaluations about one's current cognitive performance, derive from a mindreading capacity, or does it rely, at least in part, on sui generis informational processes? In The Philosophy of Metacognition Joëlle Proust provides a powerful def
