Table Of ContentREMARKS
ON
THE NAVAL OPERATIONS
IN
THE BLACK SEA,
AND
THE SIEGE OF SEVASTOPOL.
BY
GENERAL SIR HOWARD DOUGLAS, BART.,
G.C.B., G.COM,G., D,EL.,F.R.S.
[EXTRACTED FROM THE FOURTH EDITION OF DOUGLAS ON NAVAL GUNNERY.]
Second Edition.
LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.
1855.
WORKS
BY
SIR HOWARD DOUGLAS, BART.
A TREATISE ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF GUNNERY. Fourth Edition, revisedandenlarged. Plates. 8vo. 218.
<<•Sir Howard hasbroughttohistask an amount of industry, ofpracticalknow
ledge,and ofscientificexperience,suchas wehaveseldom seenequalled. Theclear
andablemannerin which hisviewsare putforward,andtheperspicuity, terseness,
andsoldierlyvigourof his style,—the workmust beatext-bookfortheartilleryist,
aslongasthescienceisstudied.”—UnitedServiceMagazine.
Bythesame Author,
THE PRINCIPLE AND CONSTRUCTION OF MILI
TARY BRIDGES, AND THE PASSAGE OF RIVERS IN MILITARY
OPERATIONS. Third Edition,revised, withPlates. 8vo. 218.
“ Thefruitof manyyears'professionalexperienceand reflectionishereembodied
inahighlyimportantandwell-known work. ThefirsteditionofGeneralDouglas's
treatise on ·Military Bridges' wasalmostready for publicationnearlyhalfacentury
ago,namely, in 1808; butfromprofessional causesthe publicationwas postponed
till 1816. Thesecond editionwascalledforin 1829, butelaborated andimproved
till 1832,when itappeared; andthepresentedition comes before the publicwith
the stillfurther advantage ofother twenty years'experience and wisdom. This
may,therefore, wellbea standard work.” — TheBuilder.
MILITARY WORKS, AND WORKS RELATING TO THE
WAR IN THE EAST.
THE CAMPAIGN IN THE CRIMEA. The QUARTERLY REVIEW for
January,1853. ThirdEdition. Map. 8vo. 68.
RUSSIAONTHE BLACK SEAAND THE SEA OFAZOFF. With
someAccountofthe Crimea. ByH.DANBY SEYMOUR, M.P. Map. 8vo.
PROGRESSOF RUSSIA INTHEEAST:anHISTORICALSUMMARY, con
tinuedtothePresentTime. Third Edition. WithMap. 8vo. 6s.6d.
COMMENTARIES ON THE WAR IN RUSSIA AND GERMANY.
1812-13. BythelateGeneralSirGEORGECATHCART. WithPlans. 8vo. 148.
THE CAMPAIGN INRUSSIA OF 1812. By GeneralClausewitz. Trans
latedfromtheGerman. WithMap. 8vo. 108.6d.
THERUSSIANSINBULGARIAANDRUMELIA,duringtheCampaign
of theDanube,the Siegesof Brailow,Varna, Silistria, Schumla, and the Passageof
theBalkan, 1828–9. By BaronVonMOLTKE, Major on the Prussian General Staff.
With PlansofSchumla,Varna,Silistria,& c. 8vo. 14s.
HANDBOOK FOR TURKEY,CONSTANTINOPLE, ASIA MINOR, &c.
Maps. Post8vo. 10s.
THE CONDUCTOF THE WAR. A Speech. BytheRight Hon. SYDNEY
HERBERT, M.P. 8vo. 18.
PROSPECTSAND CONDUCT OF THE WAR. A Speech. By A. H.
LAYARD,M.P. 8vo. 18.
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.
THE NAVAL OPERATIONS
IN
THE BLACK SEA.
The battle of the Alma, and the powerful attacks sub
sequently made by the Russians in the field, together
with the vigorous defence of Sevastopol itself, though
in every conflict success has crowned the heroic exer
tions of the allied armies, have so thinned the ranks of
these, that their commanders have been compelled to
suspend all active operations, till reinforcements in
troops and materials, sufficient to warrant the prosecu
tion of ulterior measures, shall be received. The awful
effects of the late storm, moreover, by causing the loss
of the vessels containing ammunition and stores, of
which the troops begin to feel the want, have brought
the armies to a very distressing and even perilous con
dition. The valour, constancy, physical endurance, and
heroism ofthe French and Britishtroops, cannot be too
highly estimated ; and it may be permitted the author
to enter into an examination concerning the causes of
a failure which has so grievously disappointed the san
guine expectations which the public had been led to
entertain of rapid and complete success in the Expedi
tion.
A 2
4
The author would not have presumed to make this
important matter the subject of a special publication,
but having been informed by his bookseller that the
work in which he had long previously treated of naval
gunnery was out of print, and that it was much in de
mand, he could not avoid undertaking a new edition.
In so doing he felt himself bound to bring down to
the present time, all that relates to naval operations,
whether of fleets alone, or in combination with land
forces; and this he has done amidst much severe do
Finding, after the most mature
mestic aflliction.
deliberation, that he should be compelled, by his con
victions, to treat a part of his subject in a manner
which would conflict very much with the prevailing
opinion, that the war would be brought to a speedy
and successful termination by our vast and noble fleets
alone; convinced that this expectation would be disap
pointed, and that the country would be involved in a
war by land with a colossal military power, for which
we were little prepared, he could do no less than con
clude this work by re-stating his former convictionsand
his apprehensions, the justness of which he has, during
the continuance of the strife, found no occasion to
doubt, and which he has distinctly avowed as often as
his opinion was asked, throughout the operations of the
present year. In proof that these are no ex postfacto
opinions, the author may appeal to the very numerous
persons, of every rank and station,to whom he imparted
his apprehension, and stated his opinion ; this he did
with a degree of hardihood from which, in other cir
cumstances, he would have shrunk, but having stated*
* 66Naval Gunnery,” Art. 332.
5
that attacks of maritime fortresses by a judicious co
operation of military and naval forces are generally
successful, he feels bound to show why, with such
an army and navy, this great operation should have
The actual publication of his obser
so far failed.
vations he has, however, reserved till this moment,
when they can produce no discouraging effects upon
the operations of the present campaign; and, by show
ing past errors, they may tend to provide for a happier
result in that which is to come.
At the beginning of the year 1854 there remained
little hope that the peace of Europe would be pre
served, and it was soon afterwards judged necessary to
send a British army to the East, in order to co-operate
with one from France. By great exertions, upwards of
20,000 troops, infantry and cavalry, were shipped and
sent off; the guns, military stores, and provisions, were
to be despatched in proportion as they could be col
A few field batteries only, affording, on an
lected.
average, scarcely one gun for every thousand men, were
sent. Gunner-drivers and horses for the train, waggons
to carry ammunition, spring carts for the sick or
wounded, sappers and miners with their intrenching
tools, and bridge equipments, with all the other indis
pensable requisitesfor an armyin the field, were scantily
supplied, and some were altogether wanting.
Thus, on a small peace establishment, the country
was caught in a political storm , and involved in a
mighty war. There existed some good regiments of
infantry, and a fewover-officered squadrons— they could
not be called regiments — of well-appointed cavalry;
but all were totally unprovided with the means neces
sary for enabling them forthwith to take and keep the
6
field. In this state a military force, constitutingnearly
the whole of our effective strength, was despatched
with wonderful promptitude to the contemplated seat
of war; but, lacking the establishments which should
have given it vitality, it is not surprising that it was
not prepared to enter on a campaign till the season
propitious for military operations was near its termina
tion.
These deficiencies and disabilities cannot, however,
with anyjustice,be charged to the present Government
of the country, nor could they be provided at the
eleventh hour by any administrative talent on the part
of the new Department of War. The evils were too
deeply seated to be removed on a sudden ; all that zeal,
energy, and ability could accomplish, has been done by
>
the Government to repair the evils, and supply the de
ficiencies which resulted from the persistence of Parlia
ment, at and ever since the conclusion of the late war,
in measures dictated by a reckless spirit of economy, to
abolish or reduce the military establishments of the
country, as if war were never again to overtake the na
All the establishments which are indispensable
tion.
to enable the army to take the field, of which we now
in vain lament the want, had to be restored and re
organised. For this, much time must necessarily be
lost, and precious opportunities be let slip, ere England
can collect and organise her neglected military re
sources, and beagain prepared to buckle on her armour
and exert the plenitude ofhermilitarystrength, whether
for defending her own territories, or to resist aggressions
directed against those of her allies.
The author feels himself justified in making public
the above reflections, because they are consonant with
7
what he has written, published, and on some occasions
spoken, since the termination ofthe late war, up to the
present eventful period. Now that the evil predicted
has overtaken us, it is hoped that the country will take
warning, and become convinced that something more
than numerical strength and personal bravery is re
quired to render an army efficient in the field; and that
a nation which had so neglected her military establish
ments as to have permitted her army to fall into such
a state of inefficiency for immediate service, could
scarcely be counted upon as a military power, capable
of promptly taking part in a great territorial war, and
of immediately sustaining and vindicating the lofty
tone which, without reflecting upon our very limited
military means, the Government of this country so
nobly assumed, and the spirit of the nation so gene
rously and congenially re-echoed, at the breakingoutof
this great war.
Under these very disadvantageous and inauspicious
circumstances, with respect to the small amount of our
effective military force, and the late period of the sea
son at which it was so far equipped as to be able to
take the field, the allied army, deeplyimpregnatedwith
the seeds of disease, and, had it even been in an effi
cient sanitary state, not numerically strong enough,
particularly in cavalry, to ensure success, entered on
the arduous service in which it is now engaged, the ob
ject being to besiege, capture, and destroy the great
fortress and naval arsenal of Sevastopol.
There never was a case in which a siege required to
be undertaken with greater regard to the relative
strength of the besieged and besieging armies, and to
the quantity as well as quality of their siege artillery
8
-never one in which a great superiority of the invest
ing army over the forces forming the garrison of the
place was so imperative. In estimating the amount of
force required to besiege andcapture Sevastopol,regard
should have been had to the important fact that, in its
local character as a military position, that town is a
vast fortress situated on both sides of a long harbour
resemblingaverybroad river,and of which the northern
side, occupied by the citadel, is elevated above the
southern part. The place belongs, therefore, to the
category of a fortress divided into two portions by an
unfordable river,* in which case the divisions of the
investing corps would be prevented from mutually as
sisting each other. To invest such a place there is re
quired an army twice as strong as would suffice, if no
such obstruction to intercommunication and mutual
support existed. In this case, also, the enemy keeping
the field with a numerous army ofobservation, a strong
and very extensive line of circumvallation would be
necessary.
With respect to the means of defence, with which it
is well known that Sevastopol was plentifully provided.
-Here is a vast naval arsenal already well fortified,
and capable, from the time of being menaced with an
attack, of being greatly strengthened in its works and
its garrison: it possessed enormous quantities of ord
nance and ammunition, which had been accumulated
in its magazines; and, exclusive of the artillerymen
* “ Une place partagée par une rivière non guéable exige le
double plus de forces pour son investissement qu'une place autour
de laquelle des communications faciles permettent à tous les corps
qui en forment l'investissement de s'entre-secourir promptement."
-Bousmard, Essai Général de Fortification, liv. i. chap. ii. p. 65.
9
attached to the ordnance of the place, it had thepower
of drawing from the fleet in the harbour vast numbers
of well-trained naval gunners, all of whom could be
rendered available for manning the artillery during the
progress ofthe siege.
No operation in war may be depended upon with so
much certainty as the siege of a fortress, provided it be
undertaken with sufficient means and be skilfully con
ducted;* but no measure is so disastrous as the under
taking of a siege, as was the case with that of Burgos,
at which the author served, in 1812,t without the
requisite strength in men and materials. The attacking
force should be sufficiently numerousto invest the place
on every accessible side, so that nothing may be able
to get in or out, and it should be equal in amount to
about five, and never less than three times the garrison:
there should be, moreover, in thefield a covering army,
of which a large portion should be cavalry, in order to
protect the operations of the siege, and prevent them
frombeing interruptedby an army ofobservation, which
the enemymay bring upwhilethey are being carriedon.
The allied army in the Crimea found itself manifestly
inadequate to the accomplishmentof the object in view,
and even the victory on the Alma rendered it still less
able to compete with the overwhelming power of its
opponents. The allied commanders were then com
pelled to come to a determination on which side, the
northernor thesouthern, Sevastopolshouldbe attacked:
on both at once they could not act.
The northern side
is strongly fortified; the Russians held a formidable
position on theBelbec River, and no shelter fortheships
* Napier, “ History ofthe Peninsular War," vol. iv. p. 476.
# Ib., vol. v. p. 369.
10
could be afforded on that part of the coast; there was
no place, in fact, convenient for landing the siege-train,
or for establishing a secure point of communication
between the army and the fleet, which at that late
season could not be expected long to lie at anchor on
theopensea. On these accounts it was promptlydeter
mined to abandon the precarious base of operations
north of Sevastopol ; and to turn the enemy's positions
on the Belbec and the northern heights, by a flank
march to the south, in order to establish in Balaklava
Bay a new base, from which the attack might be made
on the southern heights.
Toinvade the Crimea, an integral portion of the Rus
sian empire, and lay siege to Sevastopol at that late
period ofthe season, and, as has been already observed,
with an army deeply impregnated with the seeds of
disease, was, in the opinion of the author, a desperate
and dangerous operation, undertaken,it is said,contrary
to thejudgment of an eminent engineer, whose opinion
should have ruled, but who, when that determination
was taken, did all in his power to meet the difficulties
ofthe case by recommending, as a matter of necessity,
to abandon the base northof Sevastopol,whosecommu
nications with theseahad at that lateperiod of the year
become precarious, and to seizeupon some bay south of
the place, in which a secure base might be established
-a change of position which, under the difficulties in
which the allied army was placed from insufficiency of
force, was apparently the best measure that could be
adopted under such circumstances; and this very criti
cal movement was gallantly and successfully accom
plished by a somewhat hazardous march of the whole
army.
