The Mind’s Affective Life: A Psychoanalytic and Philosophical Inquiry

183 Pages·2001·1.02 MB·English

by  Gemma Corradi Fiumara

The Mind’s Affective Life
The Mind’s Affective Lifeis an innovative examination of the relationship between
feeling and thinking. Our thoughts and behaviour are shaped by both our emotions
and reason; yet until recently most of the literature analysing thought has
concentrated largely on philosophical reasoning, and has neglected emotions.
This book is an original and provocative contribution to the rapidly growing
literature on the neglected affective dimensions of our thinking. Drawing on
contemporary psychoanalysis, philosophy, feminist theory and recent innovations
in neuroscience, the author argues that in order to understand thought we need to
consider not only its emotional and rational aspects but also the complex interaction
between them. Only through such a rich and subtle understanding of thought pro-
cesses can we hope to avoid what the author identifies as a significant contemporary
problem for individuals and cultures: the suppression or denial of intolerable states
of feeling.
The Mind’s Affective Lifewill appeal to and inspire students and experts alike in
the fields of philosophy, psychoanalysis, psychotherapy and women’s studies. It will
also be of great interest to anyone concerned with the relation between the cognitive
and emotional dimensions of the mind.
Gemma Corradi Fiumarais Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University
of Rome and a training member of the Italian Psychoanalytic Society.
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The Mind’s Affective Life
A Psychoanalytic and Philosophical
Inquiry
Gemma Corradi Fiumara
First published 2001 by Brunner-Routledge
This edition published 2014 by Routledge
27 Church Road, Hove, East Sussex BN3 2FA
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Taylor & Francis Inc
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint ofthe Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2001 Gemma Corradi Fiumara
Typeset in Times by Keystroke, Jacaranda Lodge, Wolverhampton
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced
or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means,
now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording,
or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publishers.
Every effort has been made to ensure that the advice and information in
this book is true and accurate at the time of going to press. However,
neither the publisher nor the author can accept any legal responsibility or
liability for any errors or omissions that may be made. In the case of drug
administration, any medical procedure or the use of technical equipment
mentioned within this book, you are strongly advised to consult the
manufacturer’s guidelines.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Corradi Fiumara, Gemma.
The mind’s affective life : a psychoanalytic and philosophical inquiry /
Gemma Corradi Fiumara.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 1-58391-153-7 – ISBN 1-58391-154-5 (pbk.)
1. Psychoanalysis and philosophy. 2. Emotions and cognition.
3. Emotional intelligence. I. Title.
BF175.4.P45 C67 2001
150′.1 – dc21 00-053351
ISBN 978-1-58391-153-2 (hbk)
ISBN 978-1-58391-154-9 (pbk)
For Linda and Michele Fiumara
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Contents
Introduction 1
1 The fragility of ‘pure reason’ 4
The island of ‘pure reason’ and the sea of passions 4
The contingency of the subject 9
Hierarchised knowledges 14
Notes 17
2 From philosophy to epistemophily 20
Latent functions of knowledge 20
Alternative modes of inquiry 24
Notes 29
3 Thinking affects 33
The problem of thinking affects 33
The conquest of affects 35
Ulterior perspectives 37
Notes 39
4 A passion for reason 41
Passions in reason 41
The pleasures of mental efficacy 45
Notes 50
5 Minding the body 53
Mental life and embodied existence 53
Knowledge as an organismic derivative 56
Notes 58
6 The terminology of affects 60
The question of classification and terminology 60
Familiarity and continuities 63
viii Contents
Vocabularies and perception of affects 66
Notes 68
7 Affective knowledge 72
Affective components of reason 72
Expanding the conditions of knowledge 75
Relational knowing 76
Affects and cognition 79
Notes 82
8 The price of maturity 87
The question of maturity 87
The legitimacy of affects and moods 91
Silencing affects 96
Notes 99
9 Towards affective literacy 103
Naming our inner states 103
Cultural influences 108
Notes 109
10 Affects and narratives 112
Joint narratives 112
Narrative constructions 114
Psychoanalytic narratives 117
Notes 121
11 Affects and identity 124
Identity and affects in the psychoanalytic relation 124
Empathy and identity 127
Reprocessing our inner past 132
Notes 135
12 Affects and indifference 138
The question of indifference 138
Psychodiversity and co-optosis 141
Preliminaries as conclusions 146
Notes 149
Bibliography 153
Index 167
Introduction
While affects co-operate with reason to make it functional, they can also distort it
to the point of rendering it useless or self defeating. It is therefore essential to focus
on the intersections, synergies, and conflicts which exist between emotion and
intelligence, feeling and thinking. This central topic is approached through different
paths and perspectives, indicated in the titles of the chapters and paragraphs that
compose the book.
We cannot envisage the relationship between affective life and rational theo-
rising in terms of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’: we argue that affects inhabit and fuel the
illusively empty interiority of our epistemologies – while ultimately remaining
external to the intellectual productions that would confer cognitive legitimacy onto
them. This paradoxical, obscured texture of our culture needs to be made visible
for our evolving rationality to become more integrated and inclusive. The book
tries to indicate ways of developing our emotional intelligence; it aims, in fact, at
an account of how emotions serve to construct both interpersonal relations and
reality.
Our mind’s life presents paradoxical aspects because it is at once dependent
upon affects while considering itself autonomous in generating knowledge. In fact,
reigning world views appear both to rely upon anddisavow the role of affects in
their epistemic constructions. There would be no enclaves of ‘pure’, homogeneous
rationality if they were not sustained by the connecting forces of ignored emotional
resources. Moreover, our affective capacities seem to meet the challenge of life’s
problems so efficiently as to relieve abstract thought from these burdens. Such
‘lesser’ functions of our mind and culture almost protect the intellectual games of
the ‘higher’ levels by steadily coping with relational vicissitudes on their behalf.
It is unlikely that any epistemology will face alarming problems of pluralism of
views, and of its psychic genesis, as long as the more affective ways of knowing
laboriously perform these tasks. Of course, attempts to resolve these unavoidable
tensions are unwittingly played out in our society with a great variety of results.
Contemporary views drawing on our psychoanalytic culture exemplify chal-
lenges to existing enclaves of homogeneous rationality which are inexorably made
more problematic and even recognised as defensive forms of insulation from our
affective life. But then, the exploration of affects in psychoanalysis is also related