The Mediterranean: The Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II

731 Pages·1996·27.99 MB·English

by  Fernand Braudel

FERNAND BRAUDEL
THE MEDITERRANEAN AND
THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD
IN THE AGE OF PHILIP II
VOLUME TWO
TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH BY
SIAN REYNOLDS
Contents
PartTwo
COLLECTIVE DESTINIES AND GENERAL TRENDS
(continued)
IV. EMPIRES page 657
I. The Origin ofEmpires 661
Turkishascendancy:from Asia Minor to the Balkans 661
TheTurksinSyriaand Egypt 667
TheTurkishEmpireseenfrom within 669
Spanishunity: the CatholicKings 669
CharlesV 672
PhilipII's Empire 675
Accidentand politicalexplanation 678
., 2. The State: ResourcesandWeaknesses 681
The'civilservant" 681
Reversion andsaleofoffice 687
Localautonomy: someexamples 691
Financeand credit intheserviceoftheState 693
1600-1610: thecomebackofthesmallerstate? 701
V. SOCIETIES 704
1. Noble Reaction 705
Landlordsandpeasants 706
In Castile: Grandesand Titulosversus the King 709
Hidalgosand regidoresin Castile 715
Othernobilities 716
Thesuccessivearistocracies ofTurkey 718
TheCiftliks 724
2. TheDefectionofthe Bourgeoisie 725
Bourgeoisies ofthe Mediterranean 726
Thedefection ofthe bourgeoisie 729
Nobilityfor sale 731
Hostilitytothe newnobles 733
3. PovertyandBanditry 734·.
Unfinished revolutions 735
Classstruggle? 738
Against vagrantsandvagabonds 739
Brigandseverywhere 743
Banditryand thestate 745
Banditsand nobles 749
Theincrease in banditry 752
Slaves 754
Possibleconclusions 755
650 Contents
VI. CIVILIZATIONS 757
I. Mobility andStability ofCivilizations 757
Thesignificanceofanecdote 758
Howculturalexports travelled 760
Cultural diffusion and resistance 763
Greek civilization: did itsurvive1 769
Survivalsand culturalfrontiers , 770
An example ofa secondarycultural frontier: Ifriqiya 771
Theslow pace ofchangeand transfer 773
2. Overlapping Civilizations 776,
TheTurksin theeasternBalkan plains 776
Islamin Spain: the Moriscos 780
Morisco problems 781
A geographyofMorisco Spain 785
Thedrama ofGranada 790
AftermathofGranada 792
Thesupremacy ofthe West 798
3. One Civilization Againstthe Rest: The Destinyofthe Jews 802
An unquestionablecivilization 804
The ubiquity ofJewish communities 811
Judaismand capitalism 814
Jews and the general economicsituation 820
Understanding Spain 823
4. The spreadofCivilization 826
Thestages oftheBaroque 827
Beggingthe question 829
Rome: centre for the diffusion ofMediterraneanculture 829
Anothercentre ofcultural diffusion: Spain 833
The supposed decline ofthe Mediterranean 835
836
YD. THE FORMS OF WAR
I. Formal War: NavalSquadronsandFortifiedFrontiers 836
Warand technology 838
Warand states 840
Warand civilizations 842
Defensivefrontiers in theBalkans 844
TheVenetianlimes 845
On theDanube 847
Thecentral Mediterranean: alongthe coasts ofNaples and Sicily 849
The defence ofthe coasts ofItalyandSpain 853
Thecoasts ofNorth Africa 854
Thepresidios: only a second best 859
Forand against raids 862
Defensive psychology 864
2. Piracy: A Substitutefor Declared War 865
Piracy: an ancient and widespread industry 866
Privateeringsponsored bycities 869
The prizes 972
Thechronology ofprivateering 872
:-:.:-:.:.:.:.:.:.:•••:.:.:.:.:.;.:.;.;.:.;.;.:.;.;.;.;.;.; y••••••••••••••••••••••••••" ••••••••
Contents 651
Christian privateers 873
Christian piracy in theLevant 877
Thefirst brilliantage ofAlgiers 880
Thesecond brilliantage ofAlgiers 882
Conclusion? 886
Ransomingprisoners 887
Onewarreplacesanother 890
vm.BY WAY OP CONCLUSION: CONJUNCTURE AND CONJUNCTURES 892
A wordofwarning 892
Theseculartrend 893
Intermediate-termfluctuations 896
The bankruptciesoftheSpanishCrownandeconomicfluctuations 897
Warat homeand abroad 897
Conjunctureand history 899
Short-termcrises 900
Part Three
EVENTS. POLITICS AND PEOPLE
I. 1550-1559: WAR AND PEACE IN EUROPE 904
I. The Originsofthe War 904
., 1545-1550: peacein the Mediterranean 904
TheAfrica affair 907
Miihlbetgand after 911
z. War inthe Mediterranean andoutsidethe Mediterranean 918
Thefall ofTripoli: 14thAugust, 1551 919
1552: the flames ofwar 923
CorsicabecomesFrench and England Spanish 926
TheseveralabdicationsofCharlesV: 1554-1556 931
3. The ReturnofWar: Initiative StillComesfrom the North 937
The TruceofVaucelles is broken 937
Saint-Quentin 940
The treaty ofCateau-Cambresis 945
Philip II'sreturn to Spain 949
4. Spain in Mid-Century 954
The Protestant scare 954
Political discontent 957
Financial difficulties 960
,
1I. THE LAST SIX YEARS OF TURKISH SUPREMACY: 1559-1565 967
I. War Against the Turk: A Spanish Folly? 967
ThebreakdownofTurcp-Spanish negotiations 967
ThenavalsupremacyoftheTurks 970
The Djerbaexpedition 973
z. Spain's Recovery 987
Theyears 1561 to 1564 987
A double enemy: thecorsairsand thewinterseas, 1561-1564 992
TheCorsicanuprising 1001
Peacein Europe 1004
Contents
A few figures onthe maritime recovery ofSpain 1007
Don GarciadeToledo 1012
3. Malta: A TrialofStrength (l8th May-Bth September, 1565) 1014
Was ita surprise? 1014
Theresistanceofthe Knights 1017
ThereliefofMalta 1017
Therole ofSpainand PhilipII 1020
m. ORIGINS OF THE HOLY LEAGUE: 1566-1570 1027
I. Netherlands orMediterranean? 1027 '
TheelectionofPius V 1027
TheTurksin Hungaryand in theAdriatic 1030
War breaksoutagain in Hungary 1035
TheNetherlands in 1566 1038
1567-1568:the Mediterraneaneclipsed by the Netherlands 1044
2. The WarofGranada: A Turning-Point 1055
The risingtide ofwar 1055
ThebeginningofthewarofGranada 1060
OneconsequenceofGranada: Euldj 'Alltakes Tunis 1066
Granadaand the warofCyprus 1068
TheearlystagesofthewarofCyprus 1073
ThereliefofCyprus • 1082
IV. LEPANTO 1088
1. TheBattleof7th October, 1571 1088
A delayed start 1089
France: an unknown diplomaticfactor 1092
WillDonJohn andthe fleet arrive in time? 1096
TheTurks beforeLepanto 1098
Thebattle of7thOctober llOO
A victorythat led nowhere? 1103
2.1572: A Dramatic Year 1106
TheFrenchcrisis up to the St. BartholomewMassacre, 24thAugust,
1572 1106
DonJohn's ordersand counter-orders, June-July, 1572 1114
TheMoreaexpeditions 1118
3. Venice's'Betrayal'andthe Two CapturesofTunis1573-1574 1125
Venice'scase 1125
The capture ofTunis by Don John ofAustria: another victory that
led nowhere 1127
ThelossofTunis: 13thSeptember, 1574 1133
Peaceatlastin the Mediterranean . 1139
V. TURCO-SPANISH PEACE TREATIES: 1577-1584 1143
1. Margliani'sPeaceMission, 1578-1581 1144
Backto the beginning: PhilipII'sfirst peacemoves 1144
Negotiationsin DonJohn's time 1146
MartindeAcuna: the outsiderwhosucceeded 1150
Giovanni Margliani 1152
The 1581 agreement 1161
Contents 653
2. WarLeavesthe Centreofthe Mediterranean 1165
Turkeyand Persia 1166
Thewaragainst Persia 1168
TheTurksinthe IndianOcean 1174
TheinvasionofPortugal: turning-point ofthe century '1176
Alcazarquivir 1178
1580: the Coup 1182
Spainleaves the Mediterranean 1184
VI. OUT OF THE LIMELIGHT: THE MEDITERRANEAN AFTER 1580 1186
I.ProblemsandDifficultiesfor the Turks 1188
Mter1589: rebellion in NorthMricaand in Islam 1189
TheTurkishfinancial crisis 1195
1593-1606: the resumption of major offensives on the Hungarian
front 1196
2. From theFrench Civil Wars to Open War with Spain: 1589-1598 1204
Thewarsofreligion in MediterraneanFrance 1205
TheFranco-Spanishwar: 1595-1598 1216
The peaceofVervins 1219
3. TheEndofNaval War 1222
., Falsealarmin 1591 1223
Gian Andrea Doria refuses to fight the Turkish fleet: August-
September, 1596 1230
1597-1600 1231
Falsealarm or missoo opportunityin 1601? 1232
Thedeath ofPhilipII, 13thSeptember, 1598 1234
CONCLUSION 1238
SOURCES 1245
I. UnpublishedSources 1245
TheSpanishArchives 1246
TheFrenchArchives 1250
TheItalian Archives 1253
TheVaticanArchives 1258
TheRagusa Archives 1258
EuropeanArchives outside the Mediterranean and France 1259
2. CartographicalSources 1261
Modern reference works 1261
Originalsources 1261
3. PrintedSources ,1265
Majorcollections ofpublished documents 1265
Essentialworks 1273
Bibliography: Publishedworks inalphabetical order 1276
INDEX OF PROPER NAMES 1317
GENERAL INDEX 1357
•
List of Illustrations
1. Galleys in a storm, in harbour and in battle
2. Barbarossa
3. Philip II
4.Insight ofTunis (1535) Photo A.C.L., Brussels
5. TheBattleofLepanto, artist's impression, Photo Mas, Barulona
6. Thesiege ofa fort in AfricaPhoto Mas, Barcelona
7. Don John ofAustriaPhoto Giraudon,Paris
8. Sixtus VPhoto Alinari-Giraudon,Paris
9. CharlesVPhoto Giraudbn,Paris
10. Philip II (circa 1555)Photo Giraudon,Paris
List of Figures
55. The population of the Balkan peninsula at the beginning of the six-
teenthcentury 662
56. Statefinance and the general pricesituation 680
57. State budgets and the general price situation: 1. The case ofVenice;
2. The case ofFrance 684
58. State budgets and the general pricesituation: 3. Thecase ofSpain 686
59. Theasientosand economic live in Castile 694
60.TheLuoghiofthe Casa di San Giorgio 1509-1625 700
61. Moriscos and Christians in Valenciain 1609 782
62. Populationchanges in Valencia between 1565 and 1609 784
63. TheDuke ofAlva moves troopsto Flanders, April-August, 1567 838
64. Theprivateers ofTuscany 876
65. Christian prisonersontheir way to Constantinople 890
66.Loans obtained by Charles V and Philip II from Antwerp financiers,
1515-1556 942
67. Philip II at work, 20thJanuary, 1569 1226
68. Philip IIat work, 23rd October, 1576 1227
VOLUME TWO
.,
Part Two (continued)
CHAPTER IV
Empires
Wemustgofar backin time, to thebeginningofa longprocessofpolitical
evolution, before we can achieve a valid perspective on the sixteenth
century.
At theendofthefourteenth century, the Mediterranean belongedto its
towns, to the city-states scattered around its shores. Therewereofcourse
already, here and there, a few territorial states, fairly homogeneous in
character and comparatively large, bordering the sea itself: the Kingdom
ofNaples- 'ilReame' - theoutstandingexample; the ByzantineEmpire;
QIthepossessionsunited under theCrownofAragon. Butin manycases,
these
states were merely the extensions ofpowerful cities: Aragon in the
broad sense'was a by-product of the dynamic rise of Barcelona; the
ByzantineEmpireconsistedalmostentirelyoftheextendedsuburbsoftwo
cities, Constantinopleand Salonica.
By the fifteenth century, the city-state was already losing ground; first
signs ofth~crisis could be detected in Italy duringthe early years ofthe
century. Infifty years, the map ofthe Peninsula was entirely redrawn, to
the advantage ofsome cities and the detriment of others. It was only a
partial eclipse. The upheaval failed to achieve what may have been
at issue - though I doubt it - the unification of the Italian Peninsula.
Naples, VeniceandMilaninturnprovedunequal to thetask. Theattempt
would in any case have been premature: too many particular interests
were at stake, too many cities eager for an individual existence stood in
the wayofthis difficult birth. Soitisonlypartlytrue that there was a de
clinein the power ofthecity-state. ThePeace ofLodi, in 1454,confirmed
both a balance of power and a deadlock: the political map of Italy, al
though simplified, was still a patchwork.
Meanwhile, a similar crisis was becomingapparent throughout the rest
ofthe Mediterranean. Everywhere the city-state, precarious and narrow
based,stoodrevealedinadequatetoperformthepoliticalandfinancialtasks
nowfacingit. Itrepresenteda fragileform ofgovernment, doomedto ex
tinction,aswasstrikinglydemonstratedbythecaptureofConstantinoplein
1453, thefall ofBarcelona in 1472 andthecollapse ofGranada in 1492.1
Itwas becomingclearthatonlytherival ofthecity-state, theterritorial
state.2 rich in land and manpower, would in future be able to meet the
1Seeabove, Vol. I. p. 339.
2I have deliberatelyavoided the termnation-state.
658 Collective Destinies
expenseofmodernwarfare;itcouldmaintainpaidarmiesand affordcostly
artillery; it was soon to indulge in the added extravagance of full-scale
naval wars. And its advance was long to be irreversible. Examples of
the new pattern emerging at the end of the fifteenth century are Aragon
under John II; Louis Xl's expansion beyond thePyrenees;Turkey under
Mubammad II, the conqueror of Constantinople; later France under
CharlesVIIIwithhisItalianambitionsandSpainin theageoftheCatholic
Kings. Withoutexception, thesestatesallhad their beginnings far inland,
many miles from the Mediterranean coast,3 usually in poorregions where
there were fewer cities to pose obstacles. In Italy by contrast, the wealth
andverydensityofthecitiesmaintainedweaknessesanddivisionsasmodem
structures emerged only with difficulty from the grip of the past, par
ticularlywhenthatpasthad beena gloriousoneandmuchofits brilliance
remained. Pastglorycouldmeanpresentweakness, aswasrevealed·bythe
first Turco-Venetian war, from 1463 to 1479, in the course ofwhich the
Signoria, inadequately protected by her small territory, was eventually
obliged, despitehertechnical superiority, to abandon thestruggle;· it was
demonstrated once more during the tragic occupation of Otranto by the
Turks in 14805 and appearedeven morestrikinglyinthe beginningsofthe
storm unleashed by Charles VIII's invasion of Italy in 1494. Was there
ever a more extraordinary military display than that swift march on
Naples, when, according to Machiavelli, the invader had merely to send
his billeting officers ahead to mark with chalk the houses selected for his
troops' lodgings?Oncethealarm wasover, it waseasy to makelight ofit,
even to taunt the French ambassador Philippe de Commynes, as Filippo
Tron, a Venetian patrician, did at theend ofJuly, 1495. Headded that he'
was not deceived by the intentions attuouted to the king of France, 'de
siring to go to the Holy Land when he really wanted to become no less
than signoredi tutta l'Italia'.6
Suchbravadowasallverywell, buttheeventmarkedthebeginningofa
train ofdisasters for the Peninsula, the logical penalty for its wealth, its
position at the epicentre ofEuropean politics and, undoubtedly the key
factor, thefragility ofits sophisticated political structures, ofthe intricate
mechanisms which went to make up the 'Italian equilibrium'. It was no
accidentiffromnowonItalianthinkers,schooledbydisasterand thedaily
lesson ofevents, were to meditateabove all upon politics and the destiny
of the state, from Machiavelli and Guicciardini in the early part of the
century to Paruta, Giovanni Botero orAmmirato at theend.
Italy:thatextraordinarylaboratoryforstatesmen.Theentirenationwas
preoccupied with politics, every manto his own passion, from the porter
in the market-place to the barber in his shop or the artisans in the
3A. Siegfried, op. cit., p. 184.
4H. Kretschmayr, op. cit., II, p. 382.
5SeestudiesbyEnrico Perito,E.Carusiand PietroEgidi(nos.2625,2630and2626
inSanchezAlonso~s bibliography).
GA.d.~., Modena, Venezia VIII, Aldobrandino Guidoni to the Duke, Venice,
31stJuly, 1495.