The Luck of the Draw: The Role of Lotteries in Decision Making

208 Pages·2011·0.93 MB·English

by  Peter Stone

The Luck of the Draw
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The Luck of the Draw
THE ROLE OF LOTTERIES IN DECISION-MAKING
PETER STONE
1
3
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Stone, Peter, 1971 Oct. 14-
Th e luck of the draw : the role of lott eries in decisions-making / Peter Stone.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-19-975610-0
1. Lott eries. 2. Decision making. 3. Political science—Decision making.
I. Title.
HG6111.S76 2011
320.6—dc22 2010037607
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
For Lauren,
who helps people do great things
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Preface and Acknowledgments
In this book I shall provide a systematic account of decision-making by lott ery.
At the heart of this account is what I will call the lott ery principle . Th is principle
states that a lott ery is a defensible way of making a decision when, and to the
extent that, it is important that bad reasons be kept out of the decision. Lott eries
can perform this task because they make decisions on the basis of n o reasons.
Lott eries sanitize decisions by keeping reasons out. Th is may prove useful (when
bad reasons may rear their ugly heads), harmful (when good reasons are avail-
able), or uninteresting (when neither possibility exists).
Th ere is a growing literature devoted to the subject of lott eries. Th is literature
has ably cataloged the advantages and disadvantages of lott ery use. I show that
the lott ery principle can account for the reasons both for and against lott ery use
cataloged by this literature. Whenever there is a valid argument for using a lot-
tery to make a decision, that argument rests upon the need to exclude reasons
from that decision. Whenever there is a valid argument against using a lott ery to
make a decision, that argument rests upon the desire to include reasons in that
decision. All arguments for and against lott ery use thus become variations upon
a single theme. (Th is fact need not, of course, render it easy to decide whether or
not to use a lott ery in a given context.)
I am not the fi rst person to notice the ability of lott eries to exclude reasons
from decision-making. Niklas Luhmann, Lewis Kornhauser and Laurence
Sager, and Jon Elster, among others, have noted this ability. Th e idea has also
att racted some att ention in recent years as interest in lott eries has grown—
notably in the work of Oliver Dowlen. But none of these accounts place the
sanitizing eff ect of lott eries at the core of the explanation for lott ery use. None
att empt to use this eff ect to account for all of the desirable features lott ery use
might have. Th at is, none off er something equivalent to the lott ery principle. It
is the defense of this principle that constitutes this book’s contribution to the
fi eld of decision-making.
viii Preface and Acknowledgments
I believe that this contribution is well worth making. Lott eries have been used
to make a host of decisions. Many of these decisions lie at the heart of political
theory. Th ey involve the allocation of scarce goods, or the assignment of public
responsibilities, or both. It is therefore all the more important to att ain a clear
understanding of when and why lott eries ought to be used in making these
decisions. Th e lott ery principle does not sort out every problem surrounding the
incorporation of lott eries into political practice, but it does provide a framework
within which this sorting out can take place eff ectively.
C hapter 1 motivates the discussion that will follow. It does so by providing
copious examples of real-world lott ery use and uses them to demonstrate both
the intuitive appeal and the seeming strangeness of decision-making by lot.
Chapter 2 lays out and defends the lott ery principle. Th ese two chapters
together constitute part I of the book. Part II ( chapters 3 – 5 ) demonstrates how
the lott ery principle applies to the allocation of scarce resources. It does so by
specifying the contribution that lott eries can make to allocative justice. Along
the way it off ers an account of the relationship between justice and such con-
cepts as impartiality, equality, and rights. It should therefore especially interest
philosophers and others concerned with normative theory. Th e fi nal two chap-
ters comprise part III of the book. C hapter 6 applies the lott ery principle to the
assignment of public responsibilities—notably, political offi ce. Th is chapter
should interest anyone concerned with the problem of institutional design in a
democratic society. C hapter 7 concludes with more general lessons yielded by
the lott ery principle.
I have been working on lott eries for more than a decade. While a graduate
student at the University of Rochester, I became interested in the idea of select-
ing political offi cials by lot. Th is led me to write one paper on the practice, then
another, and fi nally to focus my dissertation (Stone 2000) upon the subject.
(Th is dissertation shares its name with this book, but otherwise it is a com-
pletely independent work.) Since then I have developed my ideas in a series of
papers. Th ree papers have proven particularly crucial to this development—
“Why Lott eries Are Just” (Stone 2007c); “Th e Logic of Random Selection”
(Stone 2009a); and “Lott eries, Justice, and Probability” (Stone 2009c). I have
drawn extensively upon the ideas in these papers, but none of them are repro-
duced here.
A long the way to completing this book, I have incurred many debts. While at
the University of Rochester, Melanie Manion helped me decide to make lott eries
the focus of my dissertation, and my dissertation committ ee—Jim Johnson,
Annabelle Lever, and David Austen-Smith—encouraged my early work on the
topic. I have presented my thoughts on the subject at meetings of the American
Political Science Association, Association for Political Th eory, Critical Th eory
Roundtable, Manchester Workshops in Political Th eory, Midwest Political
Preface and Acknowledgments ix
Science Association, Radical Philosophy Association, Southern Political Science
Association, and Western Political Science Association, as well as at workshops
at Duke University, Stanford University, and the University of California, San
Diego. My colleagues at Stanford’s Political Science Department—Joshua
Cohen, Josiah Ober, and Rob Reich—helped build a very supportive and nur-
turing atmosphere for political theory of which I have taken ample advantage.
Th is atmosphere has att racted a growing number of excellent graduate students.
I have greatly benefi ted from conversations with them about my work, both
inside and outside of class. Among them I owe particular thanks to Ed Bruera,
Jon Dolle, Paul Gowder, and Anne Newman.
O ver the past few years I have been privileged to be a part of an international
working group on lott eries known as the Kleroterians. (Th e group takes its name
from the machine employed in classical Athens to fi ll juries.) Th e emergence of
this group is both a consequence and a cause of the increasing scholarly att ention
lott eries continue to receive. May the group long continue to raise conscious-
ness about random selection and the contribution it can make to our lives, both
through its scholarship and through its blog (h tt p://equalitybylot.wordpress
.com ). I have greatly benefi ted from contact with the members of this group,
including John Burnheim, Jorge Cancio, Lyn Carson, Oliver Dowlen, Cynthia
Farrar, Ethan Leib, Brian Martin, Joel Parker, Mindy Peden, Ben Saunders,
Antoine Vergne, and Martin Wainwright. Special thanks should be given to
Conall Boyle, the founder of the group; Barbara Goodwin and Keith Sutherland,
whose series on “Sortition and Public Policy” at Imprint Academic has provided
a worthy home for research on the topic; Gil Delannoi, for organizing an excel-
lent conference for the Kleroterians in Paris (hopefully not the last); Yoram Gat,
the creator of the group’s blog; and Hubertus Buchstein and Ben Wilbrink, both
of whom have commented extensively on the work leading up to this book.
My editor at Oxford University Press, David McBride, made the entire pub-
lishing process as painless as an author could hope for. Th e scholars who
reviewed my manuscript for Oxford did likewise. I am very grateful to all of
them. Others deserving special mention for their input and encouragement
include Robert Adcock, Th omas Christiano, Paul Clements, Barbara Fried,
Tom Grey, Nicole Hassoun, Eric MacGilvray, Mike Munger, Avia Pasternak,
Andrew Rehfeld, Andy Rutt en, Melissa Schwartzberg, George Sher, Zofi a
Stemplowska, and Bob Taylor.
M y department at Stanford has enabled me to employ numerous undergrad-
uate research assistants over the years. I have benefi ted greatly from their time
and eff orts, and would especially like to thank Stephanie Alessi, Merlin
Britt enham, Connie Dang, Cristiana Giannini, James Hansell, Matt ie Hutt on,
Christina Nguyen, Ray Seilie, and Christopher Simpson for the research bur-
dens they took turns lift ing from my shoulders.