The Intersection of Abortion and Gun Rights[*]

86 Pages·2013·0.39 MB·English

by  Kim Stolfer

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[Copyright©1997Rutgers LawReview.Originallypublishedas 50RutgersL.Rev.97-197
(1997).Permissionfor WWWuseatthissitegenerouslygrantedbytheauthor. For educational
useonly.Theprintededitionremains canonical. Forcitationalusepleaseobtainabackissue
from WilliamS.Hein &Co.,1285MainStreet,Buffalo,NewYork14209; 716-882-2600or
800-828-7571.]
Principles and Passions: The Intersection of
Abortion and Gun Rights[*]
NicholasJ.Johnson[**]
Inthis article,ProfessorNicholasJ.Johnsonexplorestheparallelsbetweentherightofarmed
self-defenseandthewoman'srighttoabortion.ProfessorJohnsondemonstrates thatthetheories
andprinciplesadvanced tosupporttheabortionrightintersectsubstantiallywithanindividual's
righttoarmedself-defense.ProfessorJohnsonuncoverscommongroundbetweenthegunand
abortionrights--tworights thathavecometosymbolizesociety'sdeepestsocialandcultural
divisions--divisions thatpromptmanytoembracetheabortionrightwhilesummarilyrejecting
thegunright.Unreflectivedisparagementofthegunright,heargues,threatensthevitalityofthe
abortionchoicetheories withwhichgun-rightsargumentsintersectandsuggeststhatsociety's
mostdifficultquestions aresettlednotonprinciple,butbypeople's passions.
Introduction
Rights arecostly. WesleyHohfeld'sclassicaccountcasts rightsas aprivilegetoinflictharm.[1]
Nowhereisthis critiquemoreaptthanthehotlycontested"rights"[2]to abortanunwanted fetus,
andtoownagunforprivateself-defense.These(p.98)rights areinonesensetheultimate
liberties.Theyhavethecapacitytoabsolutelyconsumeverysubstantialcompetinginterests,
makingunparalleleddemandsonourtoleranceofthecosts thatrightsimpose.Yet,our
generation,amidst much controversy,hascontinuedtotoleratebothabortionrights and gun
rightsandtheircosts.[3]
This isduesubstantiallytoourrecognitionthattheseliberties allowwhatmightbecrucial
privatechoicesinextremepersonal crises.Howeverwecomedownpolitically,intrulydesperate
circumstancesmanyofus mightwantforourselvesorsomeonewelovetheoptionofferedby
thesetwomostcontroversialrights.[4]
WhileanalliancebetweenNARAL[5]andtheNRA[6]seemsunlikely,[7]thecommonthemeof
preservingavitaloption inalife-changingorlife-threateningcrisis hasproducedsignificant
(p.99)parallelsbetween arguments supportingaconstitutionalrighttoabortionandarguments
supportingarighttopossessindividualfirearmsforself-defense. Answeringcriticsand
addressingtheirowndissatisfactionwiththeconceptualfoundationonwhichtheSupremeCourt
hassettheabortionright,commentators haveofferedalternativeandimprovedtheoretical
foundations forafundamentalrighttoabortion.Manyofthese efforts aregroundedonconcepts
thatdovetaileerilyandironicallywiththoseofgun-rightscommentatorsandtheorists. From
directself-defenseanalogiestoaccountsrespondingtosocialandpoliticalfailure,theseprojects
aretheprimaryguidepoststhatIwillemploytotracetheintersectionbetweenconceptions of
abortionand gunrights.
Broadlyspeaking,thecorethemeofthetwomovementsis thesame:privatechoicein making
life's mostcriticalandpivotaldecisions.Moreover,thereturns outtobeaconsiderable
congruenceofrhetoric,politicalstrategy,andregulatoryproposalsfromthe groups thatoppose
individualdecisionmakingontheseissues.
This isironicbecausethesetwoissuesareoftenviewedasoccupyingoppositepositionsinthe
politicalspectrum.Thattheyaretrulyso farapartisbyno means clear.Icanfindnopollwhich
haseversurveyed whatgunownersthinkofabortionorwhatabortion-rights supporters thinkof
gunownership.[8]Butcertainlyin grosspoliticaltermsthe"standardposition" (p.100)oftheleft,
reflectedforexamplebythestanceoftheClintonAdministration,defendstheabortionchoice
but generallycondemns privategunownership.[9]
Idonotcontendthattheconceptualoverlapbetweenabortionrights and gunrights iscomplete.
Thereareabortion-rights theories thatdonotintersectwith gun-rights arguments.[10]Moreover,
onelarge aspectofthegun-rights debateis of minorimportancehere--argumentsaboutthe
collectivepoliticalvalueofacitizens'militia,its properconfigurationand constitutionalpedigree
arelargelyoutsidetheintersection.Thegun rightthatintersectsabortion-rightstheoriesisthe
"right"toownandusea gunforindividualself-defense.[11]Armed resistanceagainstcriminal
attackis the"modelcase"thattherightaddresses.(p.101)
Myaimintrackingthisunlikelycongruenceofideasistouncoverconceptualcommon ground,
nottofulminateabouthypocrisy.ButIalsohaveapoliticalpointtomake. Thatpointis the
crucialimportanceofunwaveringconsistencyforthosewhocalluponpublicofficials tohonor
controversialrights and calluponthepopulacegenerallytorespectacontestedsphereofprivate
choice. Itiscrucialthatsuchadvocates respectthe rangeofchoicesthat arefairlywithinthe
boundaries ofthetheories theyespouse. Itwillberuinous tosuchadvocacyifitseemsthatits
theoristsareadvocatingtolerancemerelyforachoicetheypersonallyvalue, totheexclusionof
otherchoicesthattheirowntheories support.
Former ACLUnationalboardmemberAlanDershowitz,whoadmits thathe"hates" guns and
wishestoseetheSecond Amendmentrepealed,neverthelesswarns:
FoolishliberalswhoaretryingtoreadtheSecond Amendmentoutofthe
Constitutionbyclaimingit'snotanindividualrightorthatit's toomuchofa
publicsafetyhazarddon'tseethedangerinthebigpicture.They'recourting
disasterbyencouragingotherstousethesamemeanstoeliminateportions ofthe
Constitutiontheydon'tlike.[12]
Allthissaid,theintersectionbetweenabortionrightsand gunrights mightnotnecessarilyrender
thestandardpositionincoherent.Commentatorsandsupporterswhoembraceformulations of
abortionrights thatfallwithintheintersection,andstilloperatefromthestandardposition,might
articulatesomeprincipledbasis fortheirdisparatetreatmentofthetworights.[13]Butthatwork
is yettobedone.
PartIbeginswithacritiqueofexplicitself-defenseanalogiessupportingtheabortionright. Part
IIexamines aclusteroftheoriesthat groundtheabortionrightonrenditionsofautonomyand
self-determinationthatprovideequalorstrongerjustificationsforarmedself-defense. Part III
focusesonone writer's(p.102)attempttoformatextualhookfortheabortion rightusing
argumentsthatofferequalorstrongersupportfor armedself-defense. PartIVemploysthe
communitarianpairingofabortionand gunrights tounderscoretheirintersectionand gaugetheir
relativeclaims as fundamentalrights. PartVpresentsanarrayofcongruencies betweenthe
positions opposingthetworights. PartVIexaminestheapparentpolitical gulfbetween abortion
rightsand gun rightsand layssomeoftheground workforfutureeffortsto reconcilethis
politicaldivisionwiththeconceptualintersection ofthetworights.
I. Explicit Self-Defense Analogies Supporting Abortion
Rights
Thesuggestionthatthereisanoteworthyintersectionbetweenconceptions ofabortionrightsand
gunrights issupporteddirectlybyeffortstoprovidealternativeorstrongertheoretical
foundations fortherighttoabortion.Thethemeof privatechoiceinpersonalcrisishasprompted
analogiesbetweenthenewlyestablished abortion rightandthetraditionallyprotectedchoiceof
self-defense.TheseanalogiesareexplicitintwoearlyworksthatCass Sunsteincontends
underpinthestrongestcurrentjustificationfortheabortionright.[14]
1. "Re-writing Roe v. Wade"
DonaldRegan's attempttoprovideamoresatisfyingjustificationforRoev. Wade[15] grounds
theabortionrightexplicitlyonself-defenseprinciples.[16]Reganfirstanalogizes abortionrights
tosamaritanlaw.[17]Heofferstheself-defense analogy(p.103)forthosewho"cannotbring
themselves toviewremovingafetusfromawoman's bodyas anomissionforpurposesofthe
bad-samaritanprinciple."[18]
Reganpresentstheabortionchoiceinthecontextofaspectrumofscenarioswhereself-defense
is permissible:self-defenseagainstawillfulcriminalattacker,aninsaneattacker, aconvulsive
epilepticswingingacleaverinasmallcabin,and self-defensebyaboat-wrecksurvivoragainsta
deliriouscompanionwho triestodrownhim.[19] Regan anchorsthislinewithaprohibitedactof
self-preservation--thepotentialvictimwhouses anotherinnocentas ashieldagainstafatal
blow.[20]Accordingto Regan,abortionchoicefitssomewherebetweenself-defenseagainstthe
epilepticcleaverswinger andthewrongfuluseof aninnocentperson asashield.[21]
Regan concedesthatjustifyingabortionasself-defenseismuchmoredifficultthantolerating
self-defenseagainstawillfulcriminalattacker:"Howdoes oneanswerthesuggestionthat,
providedthemother'slifeis notatstake,theprivilegeofself-defenseislostbecause abortion
involvesexcessiveforce?"[22]ReganrespondsthattheModel PenalCodepermitsdeadlyforce
toavoid"death,seriousbodilyharm,rapeor kidnapping."[23]"Theburdens ofpregnancyand
childbirthcanbeassimilatedeithertoseriousbodilyharmortorape."[24]Abortiondefends
againstserious bodilyharmbecause"pregnancyis aprotractedimpairmentoffunctionof[a
woman's]bodyasawhole."[25]
Sharpeningthis argument,Regan endorses adramaticandilluminatingexpansionofself-
defense. Henotes thattheRestatement(Second)ofTortsincludesanexamplethat"strongly
(p.104)impliesthatabrokenarmisseriousbodilyharm."[26]Abortiondoesnotinvolveexcessive
forcebecause"abroken armandpregnancyinvolvesimilarinterferences withnormalphysical
activity."[27]Theobjectionthattheburdensofpregnancydonotjustifydeadlyforcebecause
"theforceusedtorepelanattackmustalwaysbeproportionatetotheharmthreatened" ignores
thefactthatourlawtends todivideharms intotwocategories:deathorseriousbodilyharmand
lessthandeathorserious bodilyharm.[28]
Whateversomepeoplemightlike,ourlawdoesnottakethepositionthatdeathis
inaclass byitself.Unquestionablyone can killinself-defenseinordertoavoid
someharms lessthandeath.Surelyonecan killtoavoidbeingmadea
quadriplegic.Surelyonecan killtoavoidbeingmadeaparaplegic.Surelyonecan
killtoavoidbeingblinded.[29]
TheparallelbetweenRegan's analysis andtheargumentforarmedself-defenseisilluminating.
Thefirstandobvious pointisreflectedinRegan'sownacknowledgementthatabortionis less
likeself-defenseagainstawillfulattackerand morelikeusingdeadlyforceagainsttheepileptic
cleaverswinger.[30]Bythismeasure,thecaseforarmedself-defenseis strongerthanthecase
forabortionchoice.Resistanceagainstwillfulcriminalattackisthe"modelcase" onwhichthe
"right"toarmedself-defenseis grounded.Herbert Weschler's classicaccountshows thatself-
defensederivesfrom"the[then]universaljudgment (p.105)thatthereisnosocialinterestin
preservingthelives of aggressors atthecostofthoseoftheirvictims."[31] Whilethereare
varyingdegreesof controversyoverits effectiveness,[32]its constitutionalpedigree, anditsrole
incivilizedsociety,[33]fewdisputethatindividualself-defenseisatthecoreofthe
contemporarygun-rightsdebate.[34]
Theactofself-defenseonwhichRegan's analogyrelies--lethalself-defenseagainsttheharmof a
broken(p.106)arm[35]--is much moreproblematic. Whenviewedinthegun-rightscontext,itis
likelyto generatestrongobjections.Implicitinmanygun controlargumentsis thenotionthat
oneshouldnotresistacriminalattack.[36] In commonwithotheranti-gun organizations,
HandgunControl, Inc.("HCI"),advisesvictimsof criminal attacktosubmitratherthan
physicallyresist:"[T]hebestdefenseagainstinjuryistoputupnodefense--givethem whatthey
want,orrun."[37]Under thisview,submissionresultingin merelyabroken arm forthevictim
seemspreferabletothehazardsofarmedresistance. Ironically,operatingfromthestandard
position,onemightembracebothRegan's andHCI's arguments withoutperceivingthetension
betweenthem.
Thearmedself-defenderaimstoavoidthepreciseharmsthatformRegan's analogical
foundation.Regan'sburden,on(p.107)theotherhand,is toequatetherigors ofpregnancyand
childbirthtotheharms thattriggertherightofself-defense.Regantravels muchofthesame
pathtakenbythosewho wishtopreserveforindividualstheopportunitytouseguns forthecore
self-defensepurposesidentifiedbytheModelPenalCode,[38]butultimatelyhemustcutdeep
intoterritorythatoneneednotexploretosustainthegun right.
Regan acknowledgesthattheinnocenceofthefetuscreateswrinklesinhis self-defense
analogy.[39]Thelawimposesadutyto retreatwheretheattackerisinnocentorwherethe
"victim"hasprovokedtheattack.[40]Regan answers thatwhileapregnantwoman generallyhas
done"somethingwhich madeherpregnancymorelikely,"incaseswhereshehas used
contraception,shehas not"invited"attackbythefetus.[41]
Thegun rightavoidsthis wrinkle.Inthemodelcase,thevictim maynotinviteorprovokethe
attack.Ifshedoes,theself-defenseclaimgenerallyfails.[42]
Atanotherstageofthecomparison,however,thegunrightfaces moredifficulty.Regan
contendsthatabortionisanessentiallibertybecauseitistheonlyremedythatwillsavethe
woman fromtheharms ofpregnancyand childbirth.[43]Thatclaimishardertomakeforthe
gun-user,who mighthaveanumberofalternativestoarmedself-defense. Thisallows two
generalpoints.
First,itinvitestheobservationthatpassiveavoidancemeasures such aslockingdoorsand
avoiding"dangerous"placesaretothegunargumentasabstinenceorcontraceptionaretothe
abortionargument.Avoidanceresponses,likemorepoliceandbetterlocks,[44]arenon-
responsivetotheproblemthatthe(p.108)gunrightaddresses--viz.,whathappenswhereavoidance
mechanismshavefailed. Awomanfacinganunwantedpregnancywillfindexhortationsto
celibacyor contraception equallynon-responsive.
Second,ithighlightstheobjectionthatself-defenseandarmedself-defensearedifferent. Ideal
withthisobjectionindetailinPart IV,drawinguponresponsestosimilarobjectionsofover-
inclusivenessintheabortiondebate.Also Iarguethere,as Ihaveelsewhere,[45]thatthe
objectiondoesnottakeself-defenseagainstdeadlythreatsseriously.As governmentalchoicesof
defensetoolsshow,guns areunparalleledinstrumentsofself-defense.[46]Moreover,empirical
workshows the gun'sdeterrent/threatvalue(itscapacitytostopaggression withoutbeingfired)
is unmatched.[47]Thealternativeof contactweaponswouldsacrificethis deterrentvalueand
effectivelydenyself-defensetophysicallyweaker oroutnumberedpeoplewhomayneedit
most.[48]
Regan'slastanalogyisbetweenunwantedpregnancyandrape.[49] Heconcedes thata
significantbarriertotherapeanalogyistheinnocenceofthefetus.[50]To accountforthis,
Regan employs ahypothetical"innocentrapist" andthenadvocates aright toself-defenseagainst
him.[51]Inthis comparison, (p.109)Reganagaintravels throughterritoryand reliesuponpoints
thatsupportarightofarmedself-defenseagainstawillfulcriminalattacker.[52]To makethe
caseforabortionrights inthiscontext,hemustmovewellbeyondthe"modelcase"ofthewillful
criminalattackertothefantasticexampleofthe"innocentrapist"whosecircumstances arecloser
totheunwantedfetus.[53]
Regan acknowledgesthattherightofself-defensegrowssubstantiallyfromanasymmetryof
claimstophysicalintegritybetweentheattackerandthevictim.[54] AsReganshows,this
asymmetryis mostseverewheretheattackerisacriminal aggressor--theprimaryconcernof
thosewhoadvocatestrongprotectionforarightofarmedself-defense.Attentiontothis
asymnmetryunderscores thecomparativeweaknessoftheabortionargument.Thearmed
victim'sdutytowardherattackerissignificantlydiminishedbytheattacker's aggressiveaction.
AsRegan'sanalogies show--e.g.,theinnocentrapist--establishingthatsameasymmetrybetween
themother andthefetus ismuchharder.
Regan's analysis has beenwidelycited.[55]His self-defenseargumentsaresquarelywithinthe
intersectionoftheabortionand gun rights.This demandsreflectionbythosewhofindRegan
convincingbutwho alsoadoptthestandardposition.(p.110)
2. Self-Defense Against the Fetus as Person
JudithThomsonusestheself-defenseanalogytosupportabortionchoiceas amatterof moral
philosophy.[56]Thomsonintentionallysurrenders muchofthecontested groundintheabortion
debate, grantingforthesakeofargumentthatthefetusis aperson atconception.Througha
seriesofanalogies sheshowsthatitisalongand uncertainjourneyfromtheretostrict
prohibitionofabortion.[57]
Youwakeupinthemorningandfind yourselfbacktobackinbedwithan
unconsciousviolinist.Afamousunconsciousviolinist.Hehasbeen foundtohave
afatal kidneyailment, andtheSocietyof Music Lovershascanvassed allthe
availablemedicalrecords andfoundthat youalonehavetherightbloodtypeto
help.Theyhavethereforekidnapped you,andlastnighttheviolinist'scirculatory
systemwaspluggedintoyours....Tounplug you wouldbetokillhim....
[R]emember....allpersonshavearighttolife,and violinistsarepersons.[58]
Thomsonargues thatone'snaturaloutrageasthevictimofthis arrangement helpsillustratethe
distancebetweenadeclarationthatthefetusisapersonandaprohibitiononabortion.
LikeRegan,Thomsonbuildshercaseforabortionrightsonthemesthat moreeasilysupport
armedself-defense.Theviewthatwemaynotintervene, eventosavethelifeofthemother[59]
falls toherargumentthatthemothersurelywould have(p.111)arighttoabort,wherethefetus
wasthreateningherlife.[60]
Thomsontakesthepointfurtherwithan analogythatisilluminatinginits contentandtone.She
positsthecaseofamothertrappedinaverysmallhousewitharapidlygrowingchild.[61]The
childis growingatsuch aratethatitsoonwillcrushthemotheragainstthewallsofthe
house.[62]Thomsonpressestheself-defensepointinrhetoricthatisinstructive.Underthese
circumstances,sheinsists,"itcannotbeconcludedthat[thewoman] candonothing, thatyou
cannotattackittosaveyourlife."[63]
Thereis anotabledissonancebetweenthisrhetoricandtheemotionsthattypicallyaccompany
parenthood,evenincaseswherethechildisunplanned.Thomson's suggestionofa"rightto
attack"thelife-threateningchilddoesnotseemtocapturethedecisionfacedbythemother
whoselifeisthreatenedbyaproblempregnancy. Thomson's accountconnotes indignationabout
havingbeenassaulted.Thiscertainlyresonatesinthecontextofarmedself-defenseagainsta
criminalattack.Butisitaccuratetosaythatwomenwhochooseabortionthinkofthemselves as
attackingthefetus?ThescenarioThomsonposes,seems morea"tragicchoice"[64]between
conflictingvirtuesthanaviolentcontestwhereavictimresists andtriumphsoverawrongful
aggressor.
Thedissonancegrows as Thomsonlayerstheanalogywiththefurtherindignationofthewoman
beingcrushedtodeathinherownhome.[65] Knowingthatthewomanowns thehouse,she
contends,compels abystandertochoosebetween thewomanandthe child.[66]Itis notmere
impartialitytosaythatwecannotchoosebetween thetwo.[67](p.112)
[T]hemotherandtheunbornchildarenotliketwo tenantsinasmallhousewhich
has,byanunfortunatemistake,been rentedtoboth:themotherownsthehouse.
Thefactthatshedoesadds totheoffensiveness of deducingthatthemother can
donothingfromthesuppositionthatthirdpartiescandonothing.Butitdoes more
thanthis:itcasts abright lightonthesuppositionthatthirdparties candonothing.
Certainlyitletsusseethatathirdpartywhosays "Icannotchoosebetween you"
is foolinghimselfifhethinksthisisimpartiality. IfJoneshasfound andfastened
onacertaincoat,which heneedsto keephimfromfreezing,butwhichSmithalso
needsto keep fromfreezing,thenitisnotimpartialitythatsays"Icannot choose
between you"whenSmithownsthecoat. Women havesaidagain andagain
"[t]his bodyismybody!" andtheyhavereasonto feelangry, reasontofeel thatit
hasbeenlikeshoutingintothewind.[68]
Thedissonanceisclearerhere.Thomson'srelationofthewoman's angerseems misplaced. While
angereasilymightbedirectedtowardsocialandlegalstructuresthatcomplicateanalreadytragic
choice,itishardertoimaginethewomanfeelingtowardthefetusthetypeofangerthatThomson
describes. Itis mucheasiertounderstandthistypeofangerdirected atthecriminalaggressor
whoforces avictimtoshootinself-defense.This illustrates inadifferentwaythatthethemes
Thomsonemploys supportarmedself-defensemoreeasilythantheydotheabortionright.[69]
Thomson's nextanalogyparallels thecaseofthefetuswhoisnotathreattothelifeofthe
mother.Theequivalent,shesuggests,isagainourkidnappingvictim,whothis timelearnsthat
shecansavethelifeoftheviolinistmerelybystayingconnectedtohimforanhour.[70]
Thomsonargues thatwhileitwouldbeindecentforonetorefusetheviolinistunderthese
(p.113)circumstances,thatdoesnottranslateintoarightoftheviolinisttodemand assistance.[71]
Sheargues thatlaws prohibitingabortionrequirethemotherto actas agoodsamaritanforthe
benefitofthefetus,inawaythatisvastlyinconsistentwithour generalviewsofwhenoneis
compelledtogiveassistancetosavethelifeofanother.[72]Shefinisheswithapointthatis
importanthere:"[T]hegroupscurrentlyworkingagainstliberalizationofabortionlaws,infact
workingtowardhavingitdeclaredunconstitutionalforastatetopermitabortion,hadbetterstart
workingfortheadoptionofGoodSamaritanlaws generally,orearnthechargethattheyare
actinginbadfaith."[73]
Thomson's suggestionthatabortionrestrictionsputauniqueburdenonwomentoactas
samaritans--mademoreforcefullyas anequalprotectionargument--isaccordingtoCass
Sunstein,oneofthestrongesttheoreticaljustifications fortheabortionright.[74]Herchallenge
invitesasimilaronetocommentatorswho groundtheabortionrightonself-defenseprinciples
butstillembracethestandardposition.Idonotarguethatinconsistencyon theseissues
necessarilyearnsthechargethatpeopleareactinginbadfaith.As Iindicatein Part VI,
reconciliation mightbepossible.
Withinthesamaritancritique,thearmed citizencanraisestrongobjectionsthatparallel
Thomson's points onabortion.Perhapsasplendid samaritanwouldundertaketo assistasmall,
butwidelydistributedandunidentified groupofputativevictimsbysacrificingherpersonal
firearm (ontheview (p.114)thathergun mightfallintothewronghandsand beusedcriminally
againstoneofthem).[75]But giventherelativeduties oftherightbearers(thewomantowardthe
fetusandthearmedcitizentowardothercitizens generally),forcingsuch anobligationby
banningdefensivefirearmswouldbeagreaterimpositionofsamaritandutythanoccurs inthe
abortioncontext.
Finally,Thomsondeals withtheobjectionthatherargument missesthepoint:thatitisnot
merelyaviewofthefetus as apersonthatfuels oppositiontoabortion,butalsotheresponsibility
oftheparentstothefetus.[76]Thomsonresponds thattheparentshavenosuchspecial
responsibilityuntilthechildisbornandtheymaketheaffirmativedecision totakeithome.[77]
Sheseemstobealoneonthisviewofparental responsibility.
NotwithstandingThomson'sviewitisclearthatparentalresponsibility,thecausallinkbetween
actionsoftheparents and theplightofthefetus arecentraltotheself-defenseanalogiesthatshe
drawsupon.ThisisapparentfromDonaldRegan'sdiscussionabove,explainingthattheself-
defendermaynotuselethalviolencewhereshehas "caused" the confrontationinthefirst
place.[78](p.115)
Forourpurposes,therelativeresponsibilityoftheright-bearers helpstoorderthetwoliberties.
AsdiscussedindetailinPart IV,theparentshavea greaterresponsibilityforthefetus thandoes
thearmedvictimforthe criminal attackerinthe"modelcase."[79]Inthiscontext,thegun-rights
claimisstronger.
II. Social Failure, Autonomy, Personal Crisis, and Self-
Determination: Private Choice in Pivotal Life Decisions
Anarrayofformulations drawuponprinciples ofautonomy,choiceinpersonalcrisis,social
failureandphysicalintegrity,toadvanceconceptionsofessentiallibertythatsupportthe
abortionright.ThesethemescoalesceroughlyintheSupremeCourt'slatest abortion-rights
decision,PlannedParenthoodv.Casey.[80]Thesesamethemessupportequally,andoften more
powerfully,arighttoarmedself-defenseagainst criminal attack.[81] Indeed,theCaseydecision
is explicitinthesuggestionthattheabortionrightrestsonafoundationof fundamentalrights
thatincludesanindividualrighttoarms. Sections Athrough Ddiscussthethemesthathave
emergedinthe abortion-rightsliteratureandtheintersectionofthesethemeswithgun-rights
arguments.SectionEdiscussesCasey.(p.116)
A. Grounding Rights on Social Failures: A Modified Rawlsian Account
Robin Westoffers ageneralconceptionofrightsthatmightprovideastrongerjustificationfor
abortionrights.[82]Shecallsherformulationa"modifiedRawlsian"account:"Towhatever
degreewefailtocreatetheminimalconditionsforajustsociety,wealsohavearight,
individuallyandfundamentally,tobeshieldedfromthemostdireorsimplythe mostdamaging
consequences ofthatfailure."[83]ByWest's account,ajustsocietymusthavemorethanthe
qualitiesdescribedbyRawls.
[A]justsocietyisasocietyinwhichbeingamotherwithattached,connected,or
simplydependentchildren,doesnotundulyburdenparticipatorycitizenship.
Indeed,Iwouldtakethisinsightfurther:Ajustsocietyis oneinwhich"connected
relationality"--whetherthrough motherhood,fatherhood,sisterhood,brotherhood,
intimacy,friendship,orwhatever--notonlydoes notundulyburdenparticipatory
citizenship,butis central toourconceptionofparticipatorycitizenship.Sucha
worldwouldbe morejustthantheworldwepresentlyinhabit. Itwouldalsobea
verydifferentworld;itwouldrequirenotonlyadisplacement,buta
transformationofourprevailingnorms ofcitizenship.
Inthemeantime,wehavearight, Iwouldargue,tobeshieldedfromtheharshest
consequences ofour failuretosecuresuch aworld.Theabortionrightpartakesof
thissecond-best,residual,transitionalform. We musthavetherighttooptoutof
anunjustpatriarchalworldthatvisits unequalbutunparalleledharms upon
women withwantedand celebratedchildren, and even moreseriousharms upon
women withunwantedpregnancies.[84]
Thequestionforourpurposesiswhetheritisfair toexcludefromthis account,awoman'schoice
ofarmedself-defenseagainstassault,rapeorthe"grimworldofterrorabuseandviolence"that
radicalfeminists havearguedis therealityformanywomenintheprivate sphere.[85]Tothe
extentthatwomen(p.117)voluntarilyparticipatein theactthatleads toanunwantedfetus,[86]the
abortionrightresponds toalessobvioussocietalfailure.Arguably,thegreaterfailureis where
women cannotfeelsafefromphysicalassaultawayfromorintheirhomes.
West'sprincipleextendsnotjusttowomen. Itisasolidfoundationforarighttoarmedself-
defenseforallcitizensin asocietywherephysical assaultisarealdangerandwherecollective
measurestoaddresstheproblem aredemonstrablyinadequate.[87]GaryKleckconfirms,
empirically, whatshould beobvious:"policeprimarilyrespondreactivelytocrimes after they
haveoccurred....Policeofficers rarelydisruptviolentcrimes orburglaries inprogress...."[88]
Moreover,policehavenolegaldutytoprotectindividualcitizens.[89] Withcollective
mechanismsstructurallyinadequate,armedself-defense responds (p.118)toamoredirectand
seriousfailurethantheone Westcontendssustainstheabortionright.
This conclusionisstrengthenedwhenwemeasure West'spositionagainstboththetraditional
theoreticaljustificationforself-defenseandRawlsianarguments for expansionofself-defensein
batteredwomen cases.[90]
Social/politicalfailureor incompetency(viz.,theinabilityofcollectivemechanisms torespond
toanimminentviolentthreat) are corerationalesforourtraditionalrightofself-defense.[91]The
state'sinabilitytostopimminentcriminalattacksjustifies,andindeedcompels,arighttoarmed
self-defensetofillthegap.[92]
[T]heimminencerequirementexpresses thelimitsof governmental competence:
whenthedangertoaprotectedinterestis imminentandunavoidable,the
legislaturecannolongermakereliablejudgementsaboutwhichoftheconflicting
interestsshouldprevail. Similarly, whenanattackagainstprivateindividuals is
imminent,thepolicearenolongerinapositiontointerveneandexercisethe
state's functionofsecuringpublicsafety.Theindividualrighttoself-defensekicks
inpreciselybecauseimmediateactionisnecessary.[93]
Thegun rightrestssolidlyonthis inevitablefailure. West grounds theabortionrightonamore
amorphous deficiency.
Arguingforabroaderrightofself-defenseforbatteredwomen,BenZipurskywouldexcusethe
imminentthreatrequirementtoallowdeadlyforce wherethe womanhas no accessinfactto
genuinealternatives.[94] Hepresents Statev.Norman[95](p.119)asthetypical"noaccess"case:
JudyNormanexperienceddecadesofseriousphysicalandemotionalabusefrom
herhusband. Shekilled[shot]himwhileheslept, buthehadstatedthathewould
killherwhenheawoke. Hehadtrackedherdown oneveryprevious occasionon
whichshehadtriedto escape.Hereffortstohavehiminstitutionalizedfailedand
causedhertobemoreseverelyabused.Theauthoritieshadpermittedhimto
returnhome.[96]
Zipurskyarguesthatfromasocialcontractperspective,physical,psychological,sexualand
politicaldominationofwomenisareasontofavoraself-defenserulethatdoesnotrequire
imminence.[97]ZipurskybuildsthisideaonRawls's"originalposition,"[98]expandingthe
boundaries ofself-defenseinawaythat closelytracks West'sargument[99] thattheright
(p.120)tochooseabortionis essentialtoredressingtheinjusticesleviedonwomenunder
patriarchy.[100]Zipurskyarguesthatasystemthatprohibitstheno-access self-defense
justificationcannotaskfortherationalallegiance ofwomen.[101]
Thebasicfailuresthatleaveabatteredwomanwithnoaccess torealoptions outsidelethal
violencearesimilartothosethat Westclaimssustaintheabortionright.Buttheparent's
responsibilityfortheplightofthefetus makesthebatteredwoman's claimforacompensating
self-defenserightstronger.
Comparedeithertothemodelcaseoftraditionalself-defenseorZipursky's expanded
formulation,theabortion rightrestsonamoretenuousconnectionbetween societalfailureand