The experience of the Mexican state with the conditional cash transfer programmes to alleviate ...

31 Pages·2016·0.39 MB·English

Espacios Públicos
ISSN: 1665-8140
[email protected]
Universidad Autónoma del Estado de
México
México
Becerril Velasco, Christian Iván
The experience of the Mexican state with the conditional cash transfer programmes to
alleviate poverty
Espacios Públicos, vol. 18, núm. 44, septiembre-diciembre, 2015, pp. 71-100
Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México
Toluca, México
Available in: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=67644589004
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The experience of the Mexican state with the conditional cash transfer
programmes to alleviate poverty
La experiencia del Estado mexicano con los programas de transferencias monetarias
condicionadas para reducir la pobreza
Fecha de recepción: 30 de octubre de 2014
Fecha de aprobación: 7 de junio de 2015
Christian Iván Becerril Velasco*
abstRact
For more than fifteen uninterrupted years, conditional cash transfer programmes (ccts) have been used
with the purpose of alleviating poverty in Mexico. However, there is little evidence that proves that the
programme is achieving its main goal. In recent decades, it has been demonstrated that within developing
countries poverty has been alleviated more effectively in countries where the labour market has been strongly
institutionalized. Using a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods, we assessed the extent to which
the weakness of the institutional capacities of the Mexican state, among other important factors, has impeded
the current Mexican cct programme known as Oportunidades from achieving its main goal. Our results
show that the weakness of the institutional capacities of the Mexican state makes poverty alleviation much
less likely to occur because it impedes the provision of training and labour market policies that complement
the programme and enable the poor to move out of poverty.
Key woRds: State, institutions, poverty, inequality, employment.
Resumen
Por más de quince años los programas de transferencias monetarias condicionadas (tmcs) se han utilizado
en México con el fin de reducir la pobreza. Sin embargo, hay poca evidencia que demuestre que el programa
esté logrando su objetivo principal. En las últimas décadas se ha demostrado que entre los países en vías de
desarrollo la pobreza ha disminuido en aquellos países en los que el mercado laboral ha sido fuertemente
institucionalizado. Utilizando una mezcla de métodos cualitativos y cuantitativos, se evaluó el grado en
que la debilidad institucional del Estado mexicano, entre otros factores importantes, ha impedido al tmc
mexicano, conocido como Oportunidades, alcanzar su objetivo principal. Nuestros resultados muestran que
la debilidad institucional del Estado mexicano impide la provisión de políticas de empleo y capacitación que
complementen al programa y permitan a los beneficiarios salir de la pobreza.
PalabRas clave: Estado, instituciones, pobreza, desigualdad, empleo.
* University of York, Reino Unido. Correo-e de contacto: [email protected]
, Issn 1665-8140, núm. 44, septiembre-diciembre 2015, pp. 71-100
The experience of the Mexican state with the conditional
cash transfer programmes to alleviate poverty
72 IntRoductIon and the openness of economic sectors, in order
to allow the markets to adjust properly – on
The 1980s represented a breaking-point in their own dynamics – to the new conditions
the social, economic and political history and challenges that the new global order
of Mexico. From the 1930s to the early presented. Paradoxically, the socio-economic
1970s, based on the Import Substitution conditions of the citizens during this period
Industrialization (isi) system, Mexico’s Gross were worsened especially due to the deep cuts
Domestic Product (gdp) grew at a relatively in social spending, which meant a regression in
rapid pace (3% per year in per capita terms), as the advancement of the social rights that had
a result of which it was known as the ‘Mexican been attained in the first half of the twentieth
miracle’ (Esquivel, 2010: 4-5). However, century. In the last two decades Latin American
not only was the Mexican state unable to countries have undertaken a path towards the
develop any productive sector that allowed the equalization of the poor´s socio economic
country to compete internationally, but it also conditions with the implementation of the
depended mostly on international loans and Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes (ccts),
the profits from oil to sustain the isi system which would allow them to have access to
(Moreno-Brid, Pardinas and Ros, 2009: 156- basic services such as health and education,
158). In this context, the globalization of the acquiring capabilities that enable them to
economy and the fall of the oil prices during the obtain sustained income in the labour market
late 1970s had serious effects on the Mexican to move out of poverty by their own efforts.
economy and in 1982 Mexico suffered a high Evaluations of the Mexican ccts Progresa-
debt crisis, bringing about large devaluations Oportunidades have been quite encouraging
and high levels of inflation, which triggered a (Molyneux, 2008; Soares, Ribas and Osório
huge increase in the levels of unemployment, 2010; González, 2012; and others). These
income inequality and poverty (understood at evaluations have demonstrated significant
that time as nutritional). impacts on the well-being of the recipients,
Consequently, following recommendations such as increasing school attendance, improving
from the International Monetary Fund (imf) health outcomes and reducing income inequality
and later on from the World Bank, like most while families or recipients belong to the
of the Latin American countries, Mexico programme, among other short-term effects.
started a process of structural adjustment However, there is little evidence that shows
and economic reforms with the intention of that the programme’s ex-recipients are able to
achieving macroeconomic stability, increasing obtain sustained income in the labour market,
s
o employment and reducing income inequality which might leave them vulnerable to the shocks
l
cu and poverty (Robertson, 2007: 1380). The so- of the economy and to falling into poverty
rtí called Washington-Consensus reforms started again. A relevant question now would then be
a
y to be implemented in the early 1980s and if the evaluations of Progresa-Oportunidades

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o basically comprised two main market-oriented have shown positive results in increasing the
y
sa strategies, the reduction of the size of the state educational levels of the ex-recipients what is
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, Issn 1665-8140, núm. 44, septiembre-diciembre 2015, pp. 71-100
Christian Iván Becerril Velasco
impeding the state from alleviating poverty? makes poverty alleviation much less likely 73
In recent decades, there has been a general to occur because it impedes the provision
consensus that within developing countries, of training and labour market policies that
strong institutionalization of the labour market complement the programme and enable the
has not only ameliorated the impacts of the poor to obtain a sustained income. The paper
global transformation initiated in the 1970s is divided into five main sections. In the first,
and 1980s but has also been more important in we review the environment that paved the way
alleviating poverty than high educational levels for the structural adjustment reforms that were
(Chang, 2010: 179; Grinberg, 2010: 185; Evans implemented in the 1980s and its effect on the
& Sewell, 2013: 48; and others). institutional capacities and the welfare model
The aim of this paper is to examine of the Mexican state. In the second section, we
the extent to which the weakness of the review the way in which the ccts have evolved
institutional capacities of the Mexican state has in the last three decades. In the third section,
impeded the ccts from enabling the poor to we present our methodology. In the fourth
obtain sustained income in the labour market section we analyse the Mexican labour market.
that would allow them to move out of poverty The fifth section concludes the paper.
in urban zones. We chose urban poverty for
three main reasons: First, in Latin American
countries in absolute terms there are more the stRuctuRal adjustment and Its
poor people in the urban zones than in rural effects on the InstItutIonal caPacItIes
areas, since the majority of the population of the state and the welfaRe system
now lives in cities (World Bank, 2006: 149).
Second, people in towns cannot depend on In the post-war period (1940s-1970s), known
self-produced consumption in the way that as a period of ‘stabilizing development’,
their rural counterparts can, and this is the Mexico’s economic development strategy
reason why they become more dependant on relied upon state intervention to encourage
the state provision of resources and services to the industrialization of the country, mainly
increase their capabilities to obtain sustained of urban areas, and protecting domestic
income in the labour market. Third, due to manufacturers from international competition
the high levels of labour informality that exist by means of isi programmes. During this
in Latin America, the main concern of state period, one of the main political actors was
policy regarding employment is that poor the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (pri)
people have sustained income generation, political party, which ruled Mexico from
s
which is the reason why the relationship with 1929 to 2000. In the course of the stabilizing o
l
the institutional capacities of the state regarding development period, this political party built cu
their opportunities in the labour market is a corporatist and clientelist relationship with rtí
a
more direct in urban zones. the private sector and different social actors, y

s
Our results show that the weakness of the directing social protection schemes only to o
y
institutional capacities of the Mexican state those well-organized enough to demand them, sa
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The experience of the Mexican state with the conditional
cash transfer programmes to alleviate poverty
74 such as state workers (the armed forces, the Ros, 2009: 157). Moreover, although the
judiciary, and so on) and the formal workers country produced much of the merchandise
of the private sector, excluding workers in the that was traded, the technology with which
informal sector. In addition, since basic services the products were produced was imported.
such as education and health are considered as In the late 1970s, Mexico was attempting to
rights in the Mexican Constitution, the state replace the technology as well. However, the
complemented that model with the universal industrial programmes of the state tended to
provision of those services and universal “operate in combination with regressive or
subsidies for rural and urban areas (Scott, only mildly progressive tax structures and low
2009: 11). tax revenues” (Teichman, 2008: 447), leaving
However, not only was the universal the oil profits and international aid as the only
coverage of basic services never achieved, but sources of finance, bringing about procyclical
also the quality of the services provided was low. social spending and economic volatility.
Notwithstanding, the isi programmes and the Most of the Latin American countries have
quasi-universal welfare system implemented historically suffered from the resource curse.
from the 1940s to the 1970s were, to some Mexico has been no exception; the decline of
extent, successful. Mexico’s annual labour oil prices at the beginning of the 1980s joined
productivity growth rate was around 2.1% and with the globalization of the economy forced
gdp per capita grew annually between 3.0% and the political authorities to implement measures
4.0% in real terms (Cárdenas, 2009: 271), as a to control the macroeconomic stability of
result of which it was known as the ‘Mexican the countries. After the 1982 collapse of
miracle’. The social contract implemented oil prices, tied to rising inflation and high
was an inclusive one since the economic and interest rates on its external debt, Mexico
social models were seen as complementary, confronted its most serious economic crisis
“the poverty alleviation strategy and the wider since its birth as a nation-state in 1917, with
development strategy were one and the same” poverty and socio-economic inequality as the
(Székely & Fuentes, 2002: 125), and the most prevalent effects, which implanted the
informal and formal sectors were close to one belief that the conservative-informal welfare
another, in consequence integrating most of model was exhausted. Consequently, President
the actors of the social structure, and bringing López Portillo (1976-1982) declared that it
about low rates of unemployment and poverty was not possible to continue paying Mexico’s
(Escobar & González, 2008: 40-41). external debt, which brought about a domino
Nonetheless, the social rights provided effect over the whole of Latin America, where
s
o were, on the one hand, just a way of keeping most of the countries found themselves in a
l
cu the different social groups under control similar situation with unpayable external debts
rtí to keep the isi system working and on the (Sánchez, 2006: 775).
a
y other hand, the industrial policies could not Due to the debt crisis, Latin American

s
o find a sector that could compete strongly governments were no longer able to finance public
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sa internationally (Moreno-Brid, Pardinas and spending through foreign borrowing because the
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Christian Iván Becerril Velasco
region was shut off from international capital and it was reformed to enhance the openness 75
markets (Sánchez, 2006: 775). Thus, conditioned of the economy and achieve macroeconomic
and encouraged by the imf, Latin American stability and fairness in income distribution.1
countries initiated a process of state reform that The main reforms were the enacting of the Fiscal
would mark the end of the conservative-informal Coordination National System (fcns) Law, with
state and begin the era of the ‘liberal-informal the purpose of avoiding double or triple taxation
state’ (Barrientos, 2004: 156). Seeking to reduce and improving the fiscal relationships among the
the huge fiscal deficit, lower inflation rates, address three levels of government, the reform of Article
macroeconomic instability and adjust to the 15 of the constitution in 1983, which delegated
new global order, the Mexican government cut to the municipalities the responsibilities for
public spending, eliminating most of the state providing some public services, the recognition
subsidies, reduced the size and scope of the state of inflation effects in the tax bases, the reduction
by dismantling or privatizing state-run companies, of personal income tax in order to enhance the
and opened up the economic and finance sectors. integration of corporations and individuals,
The problem was, as Fukuyama pointed out, that the introduction of Value Added Tax (vat) in
“in the process of reducing the scope of the state order to raise indirect tax collection, and the
those reforms decreased its strength or generated introduction of a scheme of income tax levied
demands for new types of state capabilities that in a global scheme for both individuals and
were either weak or nonexistent” (Fukuyama, corporations, which includes all kinds of realized
2005: 20). During the industrializing period, the income, among others.2 These reforms helped
state’s revenue was mainly levied on industrial the state to achieve macroeconomic stability and
production, natural resources (mainly oil-related lower inflation (Alvarez, 2007: 7). However, the
profits) and international trade with special tax system is still far from providing the Mexican
schemes for workers in the primary sector and tax state with enough non-oil revenues to fulfil its
exemptions for corporations that invested in key functions, and in relation to the gdp it is around
industrial sectors and indirect taxation was based 4.5 points below the average of Latin America
on a single turnover tax (Alvarez, 2007: 5). for both indirect and direct taxes and 25 points
The fiscal system was part of the first below Organisation for Economic Co-operation
generation reforms during the early 1980s and Development (oecd) countries.3
1 Burnell identified at least three generations of reform. First generation reforms included macroeconomic
stabilization, tariff and budget cuts, privatization, and the like. The second generation reforms began in the
late 1980s, introducing governance considerations such as the civil service, and the delivery of public services,
s
o
of the institutions that create and maintain human capital, and of the environment in which private firms l
u
operate (competition, regulation, property rights). In the late 1990s, a third generation added social policy c
tí
concerns in the form of poverty reduction strategies within international development (2008: 296-297). r
a

2 Some of the services that were delegated to the municipalities were: drinking water, public lighting, y

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rubbish collection, public markets and public municipal safety. o
y
3 See oecd tax database en http://www.oecd.org/tax. Accessed: November 2012. sa
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The experience of the Mexican state with the conditional
cash transfer programmes to alleviate poverty
76 The main reasons for this have been has focused on trying to decentralize the pull
the following. First, the influence of the of federal revenue collection without helping
international and local private sector, which or encouraging states and municipalities to
had greater participation in areas previously improve their institutional capacities first.
reserved for state-owned enterprises, to which For instance, in 2004 state governments were
the state “grants extensive tax preferential empowered to tax individual income obtained
treatment, currently accounting for about from professional services, leases of fixed
half of tax revenue” (Alvarez, 2009: 18). After property, disposal of property, and business
the signing of the North American Free Trade activity. Nevertheless, “by 2006 only three
Agreement (nafta), there has been a focus state governments – Chihuahua, Guanajuato,
on fostering the growth of the manufacturing and Oaxaca – had already implemented some
sector as the main strategy for generating form of local cellular tax” (Alvarez, 2007: 20).
employment. Therefore, corporate income tax As a result, the Mexican state has been unable
reductions and duty free vat exemptions on to mobilize enough resources towards social needs
imports of machinery, equipment, parts and and the generation of employment despite the fact
material have been granted in order to “set a that public expenditure has increased in recent
competitive level against trading partners: usa years. Therefore, the state has had to implement
and Canada” and China (Alvarez, 2007: 6-8). a residual welfare model directed only at the
Second, under the fcns arrangement, the poorest, who have to be involved in participating
federal government collects around 90% of in the solution to their own problems. Moreover,
the total government revenue, which leaves due to its weakly institutionalized bureaucratic
the state and municipal governments in apparatus, the state has been unable to find sectors
uncertainty about the budget that they are in which it could have a competitive advantage
going to receive the following year.4 Also, and this has impeded employment generation.5
this highly centralized scheme has favoured The bureaucratic or civil service reform,
the construction of an informal scheme of on the other hand, was part of the second
negotiation between the sub-national and generation reforms, which included governance
federal authorities, where the political criteria considerations mainly pushed by the World
affect the allocation of the resources (Cabrero Bank. This reform was considered to be one of
& Zabaleta, 2011: 372). Politicians under the most important in the history of the country
strong political competition direct more for scholars, researchers, politicians and society
resources to those regions with high voter in general (Méndez, 2004; Merino, 2004), since
turnout, or leave segments of the population it “aimed for the first time at introducing merit
s
o untaxed. Moreover, the federal government as the guiding principle for selecting personnel
l
u
c
rtí 4 The main formula used to allocate these resources is mainly based on the effort that local government
a
y put into tax collection and the number of people living in a certain region.

os 5 On average, the Mexican state has invested less than 0.4% of gdp in Research and Development, whereas
y
a some other oecd countries such as Korea spend at least ten times more. See oecd, in http://www.oecd-ilibrary.
s
en org/economics/country-statistical-profile-mexico_20752288-table-mex. Accessed: 12 noviembre 2012.
, Issn 1665-8140, núm. 44, septiembre-diciembre 2015, pp. 71-100
Christian Iván Becerril Velasco
policies across the federal government agencies” enacting the Federal Public Service Career 77
(Dussauge, 2011: 53). The law sought to Law in 2003.
establish “a mechanism for guaranteeing equal The new law only applied to around 40
opportunity of access to the public administration 000 workers at the federal level, leaving aside
based on merit and with the goal of advancing the unionized officials and those who work in
the development of public administration for offices where the state and the private sector
the benefit of society” (Article 2, lspc - Ley del share control. Therefore, it is a limited law if
Servicio Profesional de Carrera en la Administración we take into account the fact that the number
Pública Federal 2003 in Spanish, my translation). of civil employees of the whole Federal Public
However, the patronage and clientelist legacies Administration is more than 1 500 000, (Grindle,
and issues with the design and implementation of 2010: 15). Moreover, the traditional appointing
the civil service have constrained the development methods are still used; the governmental officers
of an effective bureaucratic apparatus. have found gaps in the law to keep appointing
The key point that allowed the implemen- positions. Dussauge found that many workers
tation of the civil service was the implementa- are appointed using Article 34 of the lspc,
tion of electoral democracy in the early 1990s which “was originally introduced to allow for
(Panizza & Philip, 2005: 690). The public non-competitive, temporary appointments,
sector reforms in Mexico were always restricted needed in case of emergencies and other
to some degree by the pri political party, whose exceptional circumstances” (Dussauge, 2011:
officials used the resources of the state to reward 62). In 2007, Felipe Calderón (2006-2012)
party members and party activists for political brought in changes with the aim of improving
support rather than to represent the interests of the effectiveness of the law. In particular, he
society. When Vicente Fox took over in 2000 “provided additional requirements for using
representing the right-wing political party Article 34 of the lspc-2003, in order to limit
Partido Acción Nacional (pan), reform of the the number of non-competitive appointments
civil service was made one of the main priorities that were apparently being made for partisan
of the government. The civil service reform was reasons in most cases” (Dussauge, 2011: 67).
part of the 2000-2006 Presidential Agenda of However, he opened a window to patronage and
Good Government, which aimed at building clientelism by leaving every ministry in charge of
institutions for markets. However, reformers the implementation of lspc without clear rules
had to use “non ‘market- reform’ arguments of inspection, constraining the development of
such as the consolidation of democracy and the an effective bureaucratic apparatus.
reconstruction of state capabilities” (Panizza & In the local governments the situation was
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Philip, 2005: 691), in order to prevent people even worse. For instance, in the case of the o
l
from associating the reform with the negative states by 2008, only eleven out of the 32 had cu
effects of the first generation reforms, finally introduced a lspc.6 However, even in the states rtí
a

y

s
o
y
6 Aguascalientes, Baja California, Chiapas, Distrito Federal, Hidalgo, Michoacán, Nuevo León, Quintana a
s
Roo, Veracruz, Tlaxcala and Zacatecas. en
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The experience of the Mexican state with the conditional
cash transfer programmes to alleviate poverty
78 that have civil system laws, the same patron- between the formal and informal sectors since
client legacies that impede the development employment shifts became more frequent and
of an effective bureaucratic apparatus at the volatile (Haagh & Cook, 2005: 171-172). This,
federal level do the same at the state level. along with the decline in the quality of public
Moreover, despite the fact that most of the services such as education and health care due
public servants hold bachelor degrees and have to the cuts in public spending, has seriously
some experience, their human resource systems aggravated the situation of the middle and
lack the technical and organizational expertise to lower classes, especially the poor in urban areas,
put it into operation (Martínez, 2008: 213-214). since the industrialization of the stabilizing
The situation of the municipalities is the worst period had transformed the country’s society
of the three levels of government. Cabrero and from a rural to an urban context (around
Zabaleta found that most of the municipalities 75% of the whole population) (Moreno-Brid,
in Mexico, even the urban and metropolitan Pardinas and Ros, 2009: 157).
ones, lack important basic rules and norms such
as those that regulate basic aspects of the political
structure or those of citizen participation in The Brazilian experience with the ccts
the activities of the municipalities. Moreover,
most of the municipalities still lack civil service The consequences of the structural reforms put
systems that provide corporate coherence and pressure on Latin American leaders to find ways
allow the public servants to gain experience to tackle inequality and poverty. The introduction
as well. This, in consequence, brings about in the early 1990s of the ccts was one of the
feeble intergovernmental relations between the main responses to these pressures, especially in
different levels of government (2011: 378-391). Latin American countries, which have some of
By the early 2000s, the goals of the the highest levels of inequality in the world. In the
structural reforms had been accomplished, last two decades, this programme has been used
having been successful in lowering inflation, as one of the main poverty alleviation strategies
reducing fiscal deficits and to some extent all over the continent; Brazil has Bolsa Familia,
income inequality as well. According to there is Chile Solidario in Chile, Colombia has
Handelman, in Mexico economic growth its Familias en Acción programme (fa), Ecuador
was also stimulated for the first time since Bono de Desarrollo Humano, Honduras the
the Mexican miracle (Handelman, 1997: Programa de Asignación Familiar (praf), Jamaica
127). However, poverty rose inexorably the Programme of Advancement through Health
during this period since the openness of the and Education (path), and Nicaragua the Red de
s
o economy profoundly changed the governance Protección Social (rps).
l
cu of labour markets in middle-income countries Bolsa Familia was the flagship of the Brazilian
rtí where there was a relaxation of traditional Workers’ Party and was created under the
a
y employment protection, such as occupational command of Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva (2003-

s
o welfare, job security and severance pay, 2006). The main goal of the programme was to
y
sa bringing about a blurring of the division break the intergenerational cycle of poverty by
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, Issn 1665-8140, núm. 44, septiembre-diciembre 2015, pp. 71-100
Christian Iván Becerril Velasco
helping the poor to acquire capabilities that would Table 1.1 shows how, in Brazil, extreme 79
improve their chances of obtaining a sustained poverty has been drastically decreased in the
income in the labour market.7 In Bolsa Familia, last decade, whereas in Mexico it has been
Da Silva centralized the programmes of direct reduced at a slower pace. Unlike the Mexican
assistance that already existed and expanded the case, the central factor that shaped the Brazilian
coverage quite quickly; by 2006 it was already labour market response to the liberalization of
covering 11.2 million families, becoming the the economy was the fact that the inception
biggest cct programme in the world. of a democratic regime started first and this
In the educational component, the objectives was followed by the opening of the economy,
of the programme are, as we shall see later, very which allowed the state to take advantage of
similar to those in Progresa-Oportunidades: its developmental tradition (corporatism) and
to increase educational attainment to reduce the collective and social capacities of its unions
poverty in the long run, to reduce poverty in the in order to adjust the institutional framework
short term with a grant, to reduce child labour of the labour markets to the new conditions
and to serve as a safety-net for poor families, (Haagh & Cook, 2005: 179). According to De
preventing them from becoming vulnerable to Andrade et al., the main changes introduced
sudden shocks in the economy. The programme were: 1. the expansion and introduction of
has been successful in achieving most of its legal open-ended contracts (temporary work
objectives; however, its success comes from contracts, part-time contracts, and so on); 2.
the strong institutionalization of the labour the increase in the state’s revenue collection
market, which has been materialized in the to tackle the growing public debt; 3. the
reduction in the levels of labour informalization adjustment of institutions that allow a real
and economic insecurity. According to the enforcement of open-ended contracts and the
Economic Commission for Latin America and bargaining of employment conditions; 4. the
the Caribbean (eclac), in Brazil since 2005, formalization of micro and small enterprises,
the annual employment rates have been higher allowing access to credit and tax incentive
than the unemployment rates, while in Mexico programmes, which has contributed to the
since 2001, the annual employment rates have formalization of employees contracted by small
been lower than the unemployment rates (2010: businesses; and 5. the increase in the minimum
122-123 and 234). wage (2010: 8-31).
Table 1.1
Patterns of extreme poverty from 1980 to 2011 (%)
Year 1981 1990 2000 2008 2011 s
o
l
Mexico 13.48 18.32 15.20 11.20 …. u
c
Brazil 24.80 23.40 13.05 7.30 6.1 rtí
a

Source: eclac 2004, 2010 and 2012. y

s
o
y
7 Bolsa Escola (Education), Bolsa Alimentacao (Nutrition), Cartao Alimentacao (Nutrition) and Auxílio Gas a
s
(Electric Energy) (Decree No. 5.209 of 17 september 2004). en
, Issn 1665-8140, núm. 44, septiembre-diciembre 2015, pp. 71-100