The Evidentiary Theory of Blackmail

85 Pages·2014·7.76 MB·English

by  Mitchell N. Berman

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Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
1998
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Mitchell N. Berman
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School
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Berman, Mitchell N., "The Evidentiary Theory of Blackmail: Taking Motives Seriously" (1998). Faculty
Scholarship at Penn Law. 1486.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1486
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The EvidentiaryT heoryo f Blackmail:
Taking Motives Seriously
MitchelNl . Bermant
TABLEO F CONTENTS
Introductio.n... ...................... 796
I. ExistingT heories:A Surveya nd Critique . .799
A. The Social Consequenceso fB lackmai.l8 00
1. Law and Economicsc: riminalizinign efficient
conduct . .800
a) The argumentb: lackmailp roduces
deadweightlo ss. 801
b) Adventitioubsl ackmail:
underinclusivene.s8s0 2
c) Nonadventitioubsl ackmailt: he
indeterminacoyf e xternaltie.s8 08
d) The unbridgedg ap: whyc riminalize.? 810
2. RichardE pstein:b lackmaila s the "hand-
maident o corruptionan d deceit.". . 814
3. JeffriMe urphyb: lackmaile ncouragesi nvasions
ofp rivacy . .817
B. Blackmaila s an InherentW rongO: fU nconditional
Acts and ConditionaTl hreats . . .820
1. Feinberga nd Gorr:t he wrongfualc t .. 820
2. Lindgrena nd Fletchert: hew rongfutlh reat. .823
3. Katz: the punishmenpt uzzle . .826
4. Nozick:b lackmaila s coercion . .828
C. Summary.. 832
II. A ProposedS olution.. ........................ 833
A. Criteriao fC riminalization... ....................... 834
1. Generalj ustifyingai ms. .......................... 834
t AssistantP rofessorT,h e Universityof T exas Schoolo fL aw. C 1998 MichellN . Ber-
man. I wouldl ike to thankS hermanC lark,J ohnC obau,R ichardF riedman,S am Gross,
Don Herzog,Y ale Kamisar,R onaldM ann,J ohnP arry,P eter Westen,a nd James Boyd
Whitef ore xtremelhye lpfucl ommentosn earlierd raftsI. am also gratefutlo the law firm
ofJ enner& Blockf ors upportintgh isp rojectw henI was an associatei n its Washington,
D.C. officeM. y greatestd ebti s due myw ife,I ngridJ ohansenf, orh er unfailinge ncour-
agementg, oodh umora, nd sounda dvice.
795
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2. Threec riteriao fc riminalizatio..n.. ......................8. 35
3. The thirdc riteriond:e finingte rm.s. ....................8. 37
B. CriminalizinBgl ackmail:O fH arma nd Bad Motive. . 840
1. A directa pproach.. ............ 840
2. Detour:c riminalizintgh eu nconditional
disclosur.e.. ........ 842
3. Bad motivea nd thec onditionatlh rea.t. ...............8 44
C. SummaryR: esolvingt he Puzzles ..............................8..4 8
1. The principapl uzzle:w hyt he act is legal and
thet hreati llegal.. ...................................... ... 848
2. The secondaryp uzzle:d istinguishinogt her
voluntarytr ansaction..s. .....................................8..5 1
III. Testingt heE videntiaryT heoryT: he CentralC ase
and Beyond . . .... 852
A. A BlackmailT est .................................... 853
B. Applications .................................... 855
1. "Hard"b argains.. ................. .................. 855
2. Marketp riceb lackmai.l.. ................................. 857
3. Crimee xposureb lackmai.l. ................................8..6 0
4. Victimb lackmai.l.. .................................. 862
5. Publici nterestb lackmail. ..................................8. 64
6. Noninformationballa ckmai.l.. ............................8..6 6
7. Bribery... .................................. 867
IV. Implications . . ............................8..7 0
A. Motivea nd Mens Rea in the CriminalL aw ................8 70
B. GovernmentaMl otivesU: nderstanding
UnconstitutionCalo nditions . ........................8..7 3
Conclusion .... 876
INTRODUCTION
I am legallyf reet o reveal embarrassingin formatioanb out
you. Generallys peaking,I am also freet o negotiatep aymentt o
refrainf rome xercisinga legal rightB. ut ifI combinet het wo-of-
feringt o remains ilentf ora fee I am guiltyo f a felonyb: lack-
mail.W hy?
The so-calledp aradoxo fb lackmail1h as garnereda n extraor-
dinaryd egreeo f interdisciplinarsych olarlya ttentionC. ontribu-
' Althoughth e reasonw hyt he additiono f a conditionatlh reats houldm ake a legal
differenicse o bscuret,h isp uzzlei s not,a s a mattero fs trictlo gic,a paradoxS. ee WendyJ .
GordonT, rutha nd ConsequencesT:h eF orceo fB lackmail'sC entralC ase, 141 U Pa L Rev
1741, 1742-43( 1993). Nonethelessf, ollowincgo nventionw, e need not insistu pon the
point.
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1998] TakingM otivesS eriously 797
torst o the debateh ave includedl aw professorasn d judges, moral
philosophersa nd economistsD. espite manye ffortsh,o wever,it is
an understatementto observet hat no consensush as emergedi n
supporto f any one or combinationo f the profferetdh eories.2In -
deed, in his afterwordto a symposiumd evotedt o the subject a
few years ago, ProfessorJ ames Lindgren,t he most intensely
committedco ntributotro the debate,v enturedt hat the blackmail
paradoxr emains" one of the most elusive intellectualp uzzles in
all ofl aw."3
This Articlep roposesa new solutiont o the puzzle. Specifi-
cally,i t endeavorsb oth to justifyb lackmail'sc riminalizationas
fullyc onsistentw itht he centralt enetso ft he criminall aw and to
explain why,a nd under what circumstancesb, lackmaili s prop-
erlyc riminalized.
The Articleb egins,i n SectionI , by arguingt hat no current
theorya dequatelyu nravelst he paradox.E ach failst o accountf or
significanatn d substantiala spectso fp revailingb lackmaill aw as
well as widespreadi ntuitionsa bout what the law shouldb e. Fur-
thermoreS, ectionI seeks to demonstratet hat the two predomi-
nant approachest o resolvingt he paradox( in additiont o the spe-
cifica nswers thus far proposed)a re doomed to failure.C onse-
quentialistt heories,w hicht urnu pon the particulars ocial conse-
quences of blackmail,a nd deontologicatl heories,w hich seek to
identifyt he objectivem oral differencbe etweent he conditional
threatt o performa n act and the unconditionapl erformancoef
that same act, will both always prove unable to distinguish
blackmailf romm uch behaviort hat is, and should remain,f ree
fromc riminals anction.
Section II developsa nd defendsw hat I call the evidentiary
theoryo f blackmail.I t begins with the propositiont hat, consis-
tent withc onsequentialista s well as retributiviscto nceptionso f
the justifyinga im of the criminall aw, societym ay criminalize
conductt hatt endsb otht o cause harma nd to be undertakenw ith
wrongfuml otives.O n this animatings upposition,a nd because
societyc ould( and oftend oes) recognizei njuryt o reputationa s le-
2 The fulleste laborationo ft he puzzle,i ncludingc ritiqueso fi nitiale fforttso solvei t,
appears in JamesL indgrenU, nravelingt heP aradox of Blackmail,8 4 ColumL Rev 670
(1984). Othere speciallyn oteworthcyo ntributiontso the literaturein cludeD ouglas H.
Ginsburga nd Paul ShechtmanB, lackmail:A n EconomicA nalysiso ft heL aw, 141 U Pa L
Rev 1849 (1993); RichardA . Posner,B lackmail,P rivacya, nd Freedomo f Contract1, 41 U
Pa L Rev 1817 (1993);J oelF einbergH, armlessW rongdoin2g4 0-58( Oxford1 988); Richard
A. Epstein,B lackmail,I nc., 50 U Chi L Rev 553 (1983); JeffriGe . MurphyB, lackmail:A
PreliminarIyn quiry6, 3 Monist1 56 (1980); and RobertN ozick,A narchyS,t ate,a nd Utopia
84-87( Basic Books1 974).
3 JamesL indgrenB, lackmail:A n Afterword14, 1 U Pa L Rev 1975,1 975 (1993).
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798 The Universitoyf C hicagoL aw Review [65:795
gally cognizableh arm, a legislaturec ould unproblematically4
criminalizea ll disclosureso fe mbarrassingin formatiosno longa s
we could reasonablyb elieve that most personsw ho make such
disclosuresd o so withm orallyu nacceptablem otivesB. ut the op-
positei s true:w e knowt hatp eopler eveale mbarrassingin forma-
tiona bouto thersf ora ll typeso fr easonsa nd, consequentlyo,u t of
varyingm oralp ostures-good,b ad, and (arguably)n eutral.T he
diversityo fm otivesf orr evealingh urtfuiln formatioanb out oth-
ers thus providesa sufficien(tif not necessary)e xplanationf or
society'sr efusalt o proscribea nd punisha ll such revelationsT. o
be sure, the legislaturec ould tryt o tailor the offenses o as to
punisho nlyt hosep ersonsw hod isclosee mbarrassingin formation
with,i n Blackstone'st erm," vitiousw ill."5B ut in that eventt he
factfindewr ould confronat heftyc hallenge:h ow to determine
whethera nyg ivend efendanatc tedw itht he requisiteb ad motive.
If the defendanwt erea blackmailert,h e task wouldb e much
easier. For reasonst o be explained,w e can usuallyi nfert hat an
individualw ho disclosese mbarrassingin formatioonn lya ftert he
persone mbarrassedb y the disclosuref ails to pay a requested
sum is drivenb ym orallyb ad motivationto make thatd isclosure.
The act ofb lackmailt hush as evidentiarysi gnificancoen ly:i t re-
veals somethingab outt he moralc haractero ft he actor'sm otiva-
tiont hatw e wouldb e less likelyt o suspecth ad he disclosedw ith-
out firsth avingm ade the conditionatl hreat.A rmedw ith that
(supposed)k nowledges,o cietyc an punisht he blackmailerf ort he
same reasont hati s sufficientto punisht hosew ho engagei n un-
paradoxical,g ardenv arietyc rimes:b ecause the actorc auses (or
threatensh) armw hilea ctingw ithm orallyc ulpablem otives.
SectionI II simultaneouslyte sts and elaboratest he eviden-
tiaryt heoryb ya nalyzinga rangeo fv ariationsw ithina nd beyond
blackmail'sp aradigmaticc ase. This Sectionj ustifiesc riminaliz-
ing severalt ypeso fb lackmailt hati ntuition(a nd, oftene, xisting
law) suggestss houldb e criminalb, ut thato ne or morep rominent
theoriesh ave been unable to accountf or.I t also explainsw hy
severalo therc lasses ofc onductt hats hare the formasl tructuroef
core cases of blackmails houldn ot be criminal.I n so doing,t his
Sectioni nvitesl awmakerst o considerw hetherit wouldb e feasi-
ble to excludes uchc onductf romt heb lackmailb an.6
4 Unproblematicalltyh,a ti s, as fara s criminatl heoryis concernedI. herep ut aside
considerationsts rictleyx ogenoutso thec riminalla w.
'
William Blackstone,4 Commentaries *21.
6 This is nott o demanda perfecitd entitybe tweent he positivela w and them orali m-
porto ft he evidentiartyh eoryL. aw is alwayss omewhato ver-a nd/oru nderinclusivree la-
tivet o thed ictateso fi ts theoreticajul stificationSse. e generallyJ osephS tory1, Commen-
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1998] TakingM otivesS eriously 799
SectionI V suggestss ome broaderl essons of the evidentiary
theoryA. ftera ll, the blackmailp aradoxi s not merelya tantaliz-
ing intellectualp uzzle. The numbera nd statureo f minds it has
attractedb espeak a widelyh eld belieft hat a solutiont o this sin-
gle conundrumw ill bear broad and deep implicationsA. s Lind-
gren has put it, simplyi f dramatically": The strugglet o under-
stand blackmaili s a strugglef ort he soul of the criminall aw."7
This Sectiono ffersso met houghtsr egardingw hats ignificancteh e
evidentiarys olutiont o the blackmailp uzzle mighth ave fort he
fundamentaql uestionso fc riminalt heoryA. lso, in an efforbt oth
to buttresst he validityo ft he evidentiaryth eoryin its core appli-
cationa nd to demonstrateit s utilityo utsidet he contexto fb lack-
mail, I indicateh ow the analysis developedi n SectionsI I and III
mighth elp to resolve yet anothero f the great mysterieso f the
law-the doctrineo fu nconstitutionaclo nditions.
I. EXISTING THEORIES: A SURVEY AND CRITIQUE
The blackmailp aradox has attracteda n impressivea rrayo f
thinkersf roma wide range ofd isciplinesF. or purposeso fe xposi-
tion and analysis (and followingL indgren),t his Section divides
theirt heoriesi nto two broad groups.8S ectionI .A examiness ev-
eral theoriest hatj ustifyc riminalizationof b lackmailb y reference
to the supposedlya dverse social consequencest hat could be ex-
pectedi n a regimet hat toleratedb lackmail.S ectionI .B investi-
gates theoriest hat advocatec riminalizationon the groundst hat
blackmaili s wrongi n and ofi tself.
Any satisfactoryth eorym ust accountf orb oth parts of the
blackmailp uzzle. First,i t must explainw hethera nd whyb lack-
mail shouldb e made criminal.S econd,i f it supportsc riminaliza-
tiono fb lackmail,i t muste xplainw hethera nd whyu nconditional
performancoef t he acts a blackmailerm ightt hreatens houldr e-
main lawful.P ut otherwiset, he theorys houldp rovidea n account
oft he blackmailt hreatt hatb othj ustifiesi ts criminalizationa9n d
tarieso n EquityJ urisprudenc?e 7 (Little,B rown1 2the d 1877);F rederickS chauer,P lay-
ingB y theR ules 31-34( Oxford1 991).
Lindgren1, 41 U Pa L Rev at 1975 (citedi n note3 ).
8 See Lindgren8, 4 ColumL Rev at 680 (citedi n note2 ). This is notq uitet o label the
firstc ategory"c onsequentialistasn" d thes econd" deontologistsS.e"e , fore xample,G ordon,
141 U Pa L Rev at 1741-46( citedi n note 1) (applyingt hesel abels to the twoc ategories).
One who believest hat blackmaili s wrongo n deontologicagl roundsc ould approvei ts
criminalizatioonn consequentialisgtr oundsI.n otherw ords,i t can be importantto distin-
guisht he moralb ases ofc laims about the wrongfulnesosf g ivenc onductf romt he moral
bases ofj ustificationfso rp unishingt hat conduct.S ee notes 138-39a nd accompanying
text.
9 Few theoriesd isputet hat at least some substantials ubseto ft he presento ffensoe f
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800 The Universitoyf C hicagoL aw Review [65:795
distinguisheist , in a mannerr elevantt o thatj ustificationf,r om
the act upon whicht he threati s leveraged.B y and large, the
theoriesi n the firstg roupp assably performth e secondt ask of
distinguishintgh et hreatf romt hea ct. But theyf ailt o accomplish
thef irstt ask-showingw hyb lackmails houldb e criminalI.n con-
trast,s everalt heoriesi n the secondg roupp rovides eeminglyp er-
suasive explanationsf orb lackmail'sc riminalizationb,u t fail to
accounta dequatelyf ort he differencbee tweent he threata nd the
act. No priort heoryp erformbso thj obs satisfactorily.10
A. The Social Consequenceso fB lackmail
This Section considers theories that justify blackmail's
criminalizatioonn the groundst hatd ecriminalizatiowno uldp ro-
duce undesirables ocialc onsequences.
1. Law and Economicsc: riminalizinign efficiencto nduct.
The principalp uzzle of blackmaili s this: why is it (and
shouldi t be) illegal to threatent o do whati t is legal to do absent
a threat?1I1n otherw ords,b lackmaili s an exceptiont o the gen-
eral rule of law and moralst hat one may threatent o exercise
one's rights.H owever,b lackmaili s also unusual in anotherr e-
spect.E x post,t he successfubl lackmailt ransactionlo oks like a
gardenv arietyv oluntarye xchange:t he blackmail" victimb" uys
blackmaiils properlmy adec riminalT. he contesteqdu estionst,h en,c oncernth er easonf or
its criminalizatioann d the properc ontourosf t hec rime.O ne exceptionco mesf romli ber-
tarianismS. ee MurrayN . Rothbard1, Man,E conomya,n d State 157 n 49 (Van Nostrand
1962) ("[B]lackmaiwl ouldn otb e illegali n thef rees ocietyF. orb lackmaiils ther eceipto f
moneyi n exchangef ort he serviceo fn otp ublicizingce rtaini nformatioanb outt he other
person.N o violenceo r threato f violencet o persono r propertyis involved.")B. ecause
Rothbard'cso nclusionst andso r fallsu ponf amiliarli bertarianp remisesh, oweveri,t need
notb e addressedh ere.
10T hisi s nott o say thata theoryis necessarilyin firmun lessi ts lessonsp reciselyco n-
formt o eitherp resentla w orc ommonm orali ntuitionsR. athert, het heorym ustb e able to
explaino utcomesw e wouldd eemp roperu ponc onsideredr eflectionF.o r a discussiono f
this methodo f "reflectiveeq uilibrium,s"e e John Rawls, A Theoryo f Justice4 8-51
(Belknap1 971).N aturallyt,h e" burdeno fp ersuasionw" illf allm osth eavilyo n thoset heo-
riest hatd epartf romt hes tatusq uo bya rguinge ithert hatb lackmai(lo r somes ubstantial
subsett hereofs)h ouldb e madel egal,o rt hatt heu nconditionaple rformanocfes omep res-
entlyl egala ctss houldb e madec riminal.
"
See, fore xample,S idneyW . DeLong,B lackmailersB, ribeT akers,a nd theS econd
Paradox,1 41 U Pa L Rev 1663,1 663 (1993) (The criminalizatioonf b lackmaihl as been
consideredp aradoxicalb ecause it wouldm ake unlawfula threatt o do somethingth e
threatenehr as a legal rightt o do.");G insburgan d Shechtman1, 41 U Pa L Rev at 1850,
1873( citedi n note2 ); Gordon1, 41 U Pa L Rev at 1742( citedi n note1 ); RonaldH . Coase,
The 1987M cCorklLe ectureB: lackmail,7 4 Va L Rev 655, 667 (1988); FeinbergH, armless
Wrongdoinagt 252 (citedi n note2 ); GlanvilleL . WilliamsB, lackmail,1 954 CrimL Rev
79, 162-63.
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1998] TakingM otiveSse riously 801
the blackmailer'sp romisen ot to disclose certaini nformationto
which the blackmaileri s privy.A nd, ex ante, the blackmailer's
threatt o discloset he informatiounn less the deal is consummated
looks just like any seller's threat to withholda good or service
unless the potentialb uyerm eetst he seller'sp rice.B ut voluntary
transactionsa re generallyf avoredi n the law. A secondp uzzle of
blackmail,t hen,i s this: Why is blackmail,i n contrastt o other
voluntaryt ransactionsi,l legal?"2
Because economistsa re greatb elieversi n voluntaryt ransac-
tions,t his second puzzle has attracteds ome of the most distin-
guishedm indsi n the fieldo f law and economicsA. lmosta ll"3f a-
vor continuingt o criminalizeb lackmail-at least in its paradig-
matic case -ven while acknowledgingt hat it is a voluntary
transactionU. nlike most otherv oluntaryt ransactionst, hey ar-
gue, blackmaili s economicallyin efficientT.h is Sectionp resents
this economict hesis and then offerst hreer easons whyi t is in-
firm.
a) The argumentb: lackmailp roducesd eadweightlo ss. The cen-
tral insight,a ssociatedp rincipallyw ithJ udgeD ouglas Ginsburg
and ProfessorR onald Coase, is simple: In an ordinarym arket
transactiong, oods,s ervicesa nd/orm oneym ovei n differendti rec-
tions.A gives $x to B, and B transfersg ood y to A. Because the
parties would not consummatet he deal unless each valued her
expectede nd state highert han her initial state,t he transaction
mustm ake bothp artiesb ettero ffA. nd, all thingsb einge qual, it
increases net social welfare.I n contrast,t he objectivea nd the
usual result of a blackmailp roposali s to redistributeec onomic
resourcesf romt he victimA, , to the blackmailerB, , withouto th-
12 One answert o this puzzle would denyt he premise.U ndera theoryt racedt o the
philosopheRr obertN ozick,t he blackmailp roposali s coercivea nd,t hereforet,h e consum-
matedb lackmailt ransactionis not a "voluntarye"x change.I f the exchangei s notv olun-
taryb ecauset heb lackmailerco ercest hev ictim(a nd assumingt hatc oercionis a primaf a-
cie wrong),t he coerciont heoryb elongst o the secondc ategory-thoset hatj ustifyc rimi-
nalizationo fb lackmaila s a wrongi n itselfS. ee SectionI .B.4. In anye vent,a lthougha d-
herentso ft he law and economicsa pproachb y and large approveo f criminalizinbgl ack-
mail,f ewi fa nya greet hatt he deal betweenb lackmaileran d victimi s "involuntaryS.e" e,
fore xample,P osner,1 41 U Pa L Rev at 1819 (citedi n note 2) ("One alternativet o eco-
nomica nalysisi n ... the blackmailc ases is to play witht he meaningo f 'voluntaryf,'o r
exampleb yc onfinin'gv oluntarya'c ts to thosei n whichs everec onstraintasr e absent;b ut
thisj ust adds a layero fu ncertainty."J);e nnifeGr erardaB rownB, lackmaila s PrivateJ us-
tice,1 41 U Pa L Rev 1935, 1950 n 32 (1993) ("Thatt he blackmaileem ayb e facedw itha
hard choiceb etweent he consequenceso f disclosurea nd payingt he blackmailerd oes not
necessarilym aket heb lackmaila ny morec oercivet han the choicef acingm anyp artiest o
whollyle gitimateec onomitcr ansactions.").
For one exceptions,e e JosephI senberghB, lackmailF romA to C, 141 U Pa L Rev
13
1905 (1993) (discusseda t notes4 8-52a nd accompanyintge xt).
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802 TheU niversiotfyC hicagoL aw Review [65:795
erwisec hangingt hes tatusq uo ante;B givesn othingo fv alue toA .
The blackmailt ransactioni s thus a sterile redistributiveex -
change.C ruciallym, oreoveri,t is nota costlesso ne,f ort he prac-
ticec onsumest wot ypeso fr esourcesT. he blackmailerin vestsr e-
sourcesi nto" diggingu p the dirt,"a nd bothh e and his victimi n-
cur transactionc osts. Blackmailt herefories likelyt o be ineffi-
cient,p roducingd eadweightl osses and reducingo verall social
utilityH. ence,G insburgC, oase, and othersc oncludei,t shouldb e
prohibited.'4
b) Adventitioubs lackmail:u nderinclusivenesTs.h e firstp rob-
lem witht he economict hesis is that it is based on a dubious,i f
not manifestlyin correctp, remise. Were blackmail legal and
blackmailc ontractse nforceableB, would be transferrinsgo me-
thingo fv alue toA -B's rightt o performth e act he threatensB. e-
foret he transactionis completedB, is legallyf reet o revealA 's
adulteryt o A's spouse. By acceptingB 's blackmailp roposala nd
tenderingp aymenth, oweverA, buysB 's promiseo fs ilence( along,
veryl ikely,w iths uch tangiblet hingsa s photographasn d nega-
tives).'5I f bothB and A exchanges omethingo f value, then the
existenceo f transactionc osts (includingr esourcesB investst o
procures omethingv aluable to offeAr ) seemsi rrelevantT. he eco-
nomict hesisd oes not distinguishb lackmailf roma ny othere co-
nomic exchange.P ut otherwise," somethingd oes happen in a
blackmailb argain:a reframinogf p ropertyri ghtsb etweenA and
B."16
For the economict hesis to make sense, then, this "some-
thing"ju st cannotc ount.H owever,i t is not immediatelyob vious
preciselyw hy not.'7F or Ginsburga nd ProfessorP aul Schecht-
man, the reason is that the above criticismm isconceivest he
propert imeo f comparisonT. he key,t heya rgue,i s to "viewt he
transactiona t its outset,"w hen B firstc ontemplatebs lackmail
and has yett o unearthd irto n A: "No rationale conomicp lanner
" See, fore xample,C oase, 74 Va L Rev at 673 (cited in note 11); Ginsburga nd
Shechtman1,4 1 U Pa L Rev at 1865( citedi n note2 ).
It wouldb e beggingt he questiont o objectt hatB 's promisei s of no value on the
1
groundst hat blackmaili s illegal and blackmailc ontractsa re unenforceablWe. hether
blackmaislh ouldb e illegali s preciselyth eq uestion.
6 Isenbergh1,4 1U Pa L Reva t 1920( citedi n note1 3).
17 The reasonf orn otc ountingit cannotb e derivedf romt hes uppositionth atB has no
intentt o do as he threatensI.f the victimh as confidencteh att he blackmailerw ill not
carryo ut his threatt hen,a s a practicaml attert, he promisem ightw ell be valueless.I n
thate vent,h owevert,h ev ictimw illc all theb lackmailerb'sl uffI.f ,i nstead,t hev ictimd oes
consummatae deal witht heb lackmailerit, can onlyb e becauseh e was notc onfidentth at
the blackmailert'sh reatw as a bluffi,n whichc ase the latter's( legallye nforceablep)r om-
ise nott o carryo uth is threath as value.
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1998] TakingM otivesS eriously 803
would toleratet he existenceo f an industryd edicatedt o digging
up dirt,a t real resourcec ost, and then reburyingit .""8In other
words,b lackmaila ppears "nonallocativei"f w e comparet he situa-
tion aftert he blackmailt o that beforet he blackmailerb egan to
ferretf ore mbarrassingin formation.
But this responseh its an intractabled ifficultyIf. the eco-
nomict hesism ustf ocuso n the blackmailer'sp rojectb eforeh e ac-
quires the potentiallyd amaging informationi,t carnnojtu stify
banningb lackmailb ased on infornationt hat he happenedu pon
adventitiouslyP. rofessorM ike Hepworthh as distinguishedf our
typeso f blackmailb ased on the manneri n whicht he damaging
informatioins obtained:i n "opportunistibcl ackmail,"t he black-
maileri nnocentlyst umblesu pon informatiohne subsequentlyr e-
alizes will serve as useful blackmail fodder;i n "participant
blackmail,"h e was a participanti n the conducta bout whichh e
later blackmailst he victim;i n "commerciarl esearchb lackmail,"
the blackmailerc onsciouslys eeks informatioinn ordert o black-
mail his victim;a nd in "entrepreneuriabll ackmail,"t he black-
mailere nticesa victimi ntoa compromisinsgi tuationf ort he spe-
cific purposeo fp roducingt he materialw ithw hichh e can black-
mail.'9 Relyingo n this vocabulary,L indgreno bjectedy ears ago
(in responset o Ginsburg'st henu npublishedm anuscriptt) hatt he
economic approach is substantiallyu nderinclusiveb ecause it
cannotj ustifyp rohibitiono f either participanto r opportunistic
blackmail`0-likelya largep ercentageo fa ll blackmail.
Note that Lindgren'so bjectioni s not that the potentialm ag-
nitudeo f the deadweightl oss is significantlsym alleri n cases of
participant and opportunisticb lackmail than Ginsburg and
Shechtmans uppose. It is true that in commerciarl esearcha nd
entrepreneuriabl lackmail,t he deadweightl oss is measured by
the sum of( 1) the resourcese xpendedt o discovert he information
and (2) the transactionc osts,w hereas in opportunistiacn d par-
ticipantb lackmail,t ransactionc osts constitutet he entired ead-
weightl oss. Properlyu nderstoodt, hough,L indgren'sc riticismis
farm orep rofoundW. hent he blackmailerd oes notm ake an inde-
pendente ffortt o dig up information-thatis , when the status
quo ante cannotb e identifiedas any pointp riort o whenh e com-
municatest he blackmailp roposalt o his victim-thent herei s no
basis forc haracterizingth e completedt ransactiona s nonalloca-
tive. The transactionc osts, whatevert hey may be, are facilita-
18 Ginsburga nd Shechtman1, 41 U Pa L Rev at 1860 (citedi n note2 ).
19M ike HepworthB,l ackmail:P ublicityan d Secrecyi n EverydayL ife7 3-77( Routledge
1975).
'
Lindgren8, 4 ColumL Rev at 694-95( citedi n note2 ).
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