Table Of ContentStudies in Applied Philosophy,
Epistemology and Rational Ethics
Kirk Lougheed
The Epistemic
Benefits
of Disagreement
Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology
and Rational Ethics
Volume 51
Editor-in-Chief
Lorenzo Magnani, Department of Humanities, Philosophy Section, University of
Pavia, Pavia, Italy
Editorial Board
Atocha Aliseda
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), Mexico, Mexico
Giuseppe Longo
CNRS - Ecole Normale Supérieure, Centre Cavailles, Paris, France
Chris Sinha
School of Foreign Languages, Hunan University, Changsha, China
Paul Thagard
University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Canada
John Woods
University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada
Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics (SAPERE)
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Kirk Lougheed
fi
The Epistemic Bene ts
of Disagreement
123
KirkLougheed
Concordia University of Edmonton
Edmonton, AB,Canada
ISSN 2192-6255 ISSN 2192-6263 (electronic)
Studies in AppliedPhilosophy,Epistemology and Rational Ethics
ISBN978-3-030-34502-0 ISBN978-3-030-34503-7 (eBook)
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For my first philosophy professors,
Richard Brian Davis and W. Paul Franks,
Thanks for teaching me how to disagree
Acknowledgements
ThisbookistheresultofadissertationstartedatMonashUniversityandcompleted
at McMaster University. At Monash, my early ideas about this work benefited
greatly from discussion with Graham Oppy and Robert Mark Simpson. At
McMaster, Nicholas Griffin provided detailed and timely feedback on multiple
chapter drafts. The other members of my departmental committee in Sandra
Lapointe and Mark Johnstone also provided helpful comments along the way,
particularlyatthedefense.ChristopherTindale(Windsor)servedasanexternaland
notonlyofferedwrittenfeedbackpriortothedefense,butduringithehelpedmeto
think about how this project hangs together as a whole.
Three professors from earlier in my philosophical education have remained
supportive of my philosophical endeavors. They are Rich Davis, Paul Franks, and
MyronA.Penner.Iamsadtosaythatanotheroneofmymentors,PhillipH.Wiebe,
passedawayinthefallof2018andwasnotabletoseethisbookcometofruition.
I started thinking about disagreement years ago during my MA research under
KlaasKraayatRyersonUniversity.Hecontinuestobeanexcellentinterlocutoron
theseissues.Klaasisaconstantsourceofencouragement,andIwouldnothavegot
this far without his guidance. I have also had the privilege of discussing the epis-
temology of disagreement with Nathan Ballantyne and Jonathan Matheson. They
havebothbeenextremelygenerouswiththeirtime,andthisbookisbetterbecause
of them. Lorenzo Magnani is Editor of the Studies in Applied Philosophy,
Epistemology,andRationalEthicsseries.Hewasenthusiasticaboutthisbookfrom
myveryfirstcontactwithhimaboutit.I’mespeciallythankfulthathewaswilling
to give me the opportunity to publish a full-length book as a junior scholar. This
manuscript also benefited from extensive feedback from two anonymous referees
from Springer.
Manychaptersandsubsectionsofthisworkhavebeenpresentedatconferences.
Therearetoomanyindividuals toname, butI’mgratefultotheaudiencesofthose
presentations. Finally,I’malsograteful tofeedback from anonymousrefereeswho
offered comments on relevant ideas published elsewhere. Chapter 4 contains bits
and pieces that have been published in my (2018) “The Epistemic Value of Deep
vii
viii Acknowledgements
Disagreements,”InformalLogic38(2):263–292.MuchofChap.2canbefoundin
my (2017) “The Role of Idealized Cases in the Epistemology of Disagreement,”
Southwest Philosophy Review 33 (2): 251–270. I am grateful that both of these
venues allowed me to publish this articles open access.
Philosophyrequiresmuchuninterruptedtime.Suchuninterruptedtimecomesat
a premium in our society. It is an understatement to say that my ability to do
philosophywouldlikelybeimpossiblewithouttheemotionalandfinancialsupport
ofmyparents, StephensonandDiane Lougheed.Throughoutthecourse ofwriting
this book, they supported me in ways that surely go beyond the normal moral
obligations that parents have to their adult children.
Introduction
I. Introduction to The Epistemic Benefits of Disagreement
Inhis2006paper,“EpistemologicalPuzzlesaboutDisagreement”RichardFeldman
arguesforthehighlyskepticalconclusionthatanagentoughttosuspendjudgment
about any belief over which she encounters peer disagreement.1 David
Christensen’s 2007 paper “The Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News”
suggeststhatatveryleastpeerdisagreemententailsthatanagentoughttolowerthe
confidence she had ina belief that is disputed by an epistemic peer. Their position
has come to be known in the literature as conciliationism. If Christensen and
Feldman areright, then they have raised a seriouschallenge tothe very possibility
of successful inquiry. Fields such as politics, philosophy, religion, and even the
sciences are rife with disagreement. Such disagreements occur at many different
levels including among recognized experts. The main purpose of this book is to
offer an extended argument against conciliationism, at least in the context of
inquiry. My aim is to preserve rational inquiry in the face of peer disagreement.
Inthisbook,Iofferarelativelyunexploredargumentthatconciliationists,those
defending the view that one should conciliate in the face of disagreement, are
incorrect (at least in the context of inquiry). I argue that in the face of peer dis-
agreement,inquirersneednotnecessarilylowerconfidenceorsuspendjudgmentin
the contested belief, at least within research contexts. This project consists of two
main parts: ‘Part I. The Epistemology of Disagreement: The Current Debate’ is
primarilymethodologicalandsetsthestageforPartII.TobeginPartI,Iarguethat
muchofthecurrentliteratureontheepistemologyofdisagreementismisguidedin
itsfocus.Thisisforavarietyofreasonsincluding(i)thefactthatauthorsoftenshift
inappropriately between simple and complex cases of disagreement, (ii) implicit
definitions of epistemic peerhood are overly strict or overly permissive, and
(iii) that completely shared evidence is impossible in real-life cases of
1Feldman 2009 appears to take a weaker stance. He suggests that peer disagreement is always
additionalevidencethatneedstobeweighedwiththetotalevidence.Buthethinksitisimpossible
tooffergeneralprinciplesabouthowtoweightheevidenceofpeerdisagreement(otherthanthe
simplefactthatitoughttobeweighed).
ix
x Introduction
disagreement. In sum, there has been too much focus on highly idealized cases of
peer disagreement—where parties are (near) cognitive and evidential equals—
which cannot offer insight into everyday real-life cases of disagreement. While
conciliationism needs to be reformulated in lightof these worries, I argue that it is
not defeated by them. In ‘Part II. The Epistemic Benefits of Disagreement,’ I
exploreanddefendanunderdevelopedandunderappreciatedargumentthatappeals
tothefuturepotential epistemicbenefitsofremainingsteadfast inadisputedbelief
as the proximate epistemic justification for that belief. This requires distinguishing
between synchronic epistemic reasons and diachronic epistemic reasons, a dis-
tinctionnotoftenmadebyepistemologists.Ifsuccessful,myargumentconstitutesa
new response to conciliationism, at least in the context of inquiry.
II. Chapter Summary
The first three chapters of the book make up Part I. In Chap. 1, I introduce the
epistemology of disagreement in more detail and outline some of the main argu-
ments in the literature. Chapter 2 is an analysis of the ideal cases of disagreement
often used in the literature. I argue that there are important differences between
simple and complex cases of disagreement that are often overlooked. These
differences show that lessons from simple cases of disagreement do not apply to
complexcasesofdisagreement.InChap.3,Isurveytheconceptofepistemicpeer.
I suggest that definitions are often vague, and that when they are precise, they are
usually so strict as to never obtain in cases of real-world disagreement. I offer a
broader definition of epistemic peerhood that can accommodate cases of real-life
worldview disagreement. Chapters 1–3 are intended to set the stage for my main
argument.
Chapters 4–6 make up Part II of the book. In Chap. 4, I offer the benefits to
inquiry argument. The basic idea is that future epistemic benefits can serve as the
proximate justification for an agent remaining steadfast about inquiry beliefs in
research contexts. I offer a number of examples in support of this argument, par-
ticularly from the history of science. In Chap. 5, I respond to a number of objec-
tions,includingtheworrythattheargumentonlymakesabeliefpracticallyrational,
not epistemically rational. In other words, the objection is that future epistemic
benefits are not relevant to how an agent ought to assess the current evidence she
possesses. In Chap. 6, I conclude by exploring whether the benefits to inquiry
argumentconflictswiththevirtueofepistemichumility,alongwithhowitinteracts
with different (and sometimes competing) epistemic values. Finally, I also explore
thewaysinwhichmyviewissimilaranddissimilartootherhybridtheorieswhich
recommend sometimes conciliating and sometimes remaining steadfast.
III. How to Read This Book
This book is intended to represent a unified project in the epistemology of dis-
agreement. However,Ihave also donemybest toproviderelativelyself-contained
chapters that can be understood on their own, at least by those familiar with the
epistemology of disagreement. Since Chap. 1 is a brief overview of some of the
