The Anthropology of Intentions: Language in a World of Others

310 Pages·2015·3 MB·English

by  Alessandro Duranti

The Anthropology of Intentions
Howandtowhatextentdopeopletakeintoaccounttheintentionsofothers?
AlessandroDurantisetsouttoanswerthisquestion,showingthattheroleof
intentionsinhumaninteractionisvariableacrossculturesandcontexts.
Through careful analysis of data collected over three decades in US and
Pacific societies, Duranti demonstrates that, in some communities, social
actors avoid intentional discourse, focusing on the consequences of actions
ratherthanontheirallegedoriginalgoals.Inothercases,heargues,peopledo
speculateabouttheirownintentionsorguesstheintentionsofothers,includ-
inginsomesocietieswhereitwaspreviouslyassumedtheyavoiddoingso.
Toaccountforsuchvariation,Durantiproposesan“intentionalcontinuum,”
aconceptthatdrawsfromphenomenologyandthedetailedanalysisofface-
to-faceinteraction.
A combination of new essays and classic re-evaluations, the book draws
together findings from anthropology, linguistics, and philosophy to offer a
penetratingaccountoftheroleofintentionsindefininghumanaction.
alessandro duranti isDistinguishedProfessorofAnthropologyatthe
UniversityofCalifornia,LosAngeles.

The Anthropology of Intentions
Language in a World of Others
Alessandro Duranti
UniversityPrintingHouse,CambridgeCB28BS,UnitedKingdom
CambridgeUniversityPressispartoftheUniversityofCambridge.
ItfurtherstheUniversity’smissionbydisseminatingknowledgeinthepursuitof
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Informationonthistitle:www.cambridge.org/9781107652033
©AlessandroDuranti2015
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Firstpublished2015
PrintedintheUnitedKingdombyClays,StIvesplc
AcataloguerecordforthispublicationisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary
LibraryofCongressCataloguinginPublicationdata
Duranti,Alessandro.
Theanthropologyofintentions:languageinaworldofothers/AlessandroDuranti.
pages cm
ISBN978-1-107-02639-1(Hardback)–ISBN978-1-107-65203-3(Paperback)
1. Anthropologicallinguistics. 2. Languageandculture. 3. Intention. I. Title.
P35.D8572014
306.440089–dc23 2014023513
ISBN978-1-107-02639-1Hardback
ISBN978-1-107-65203-3Paperback
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Contents
List of figures page ix
Acknowledgments xi
1 Rethinking anti-intentionalism 1
1.0 Introduction 1
1.1 Reopeningadialoguethatnevertookoff 2
1.2 Selfandother 5
1.3 Ethnopragmatics 6
1.4 Themes,issues,andintellectualconnections 7
1.5 Titleandexpectations 8
2 Intentions inspeaking andacting: the StandardTheory andits foes 11
2.0 Introduction 11
2.1 TheStandardTheory:Grice,Austin,andSearle 11
2.1.1 Thespeechactofpromising 12
2.1.2 Searle’sfivetypesofspeechactsandthenotionof“directionoffit” 14
2.1.3 Searle’smodelofintentionality 16
2.1.4 Searle’snotionsofNetworkandBackground:capturingimplicitcultural
knowledge 17
2.2 Theroleofintentionindefining“action” 19
2.2.1 Unintendedconsequencesandthepracticalengagementwiththeworld 20
2.3 MichelleRosaldo’scritiqueofspeechacttheory 22
2.4 Brentano’sandHusserl’suseofintentions 25
2.5 CriticismofHusserl’suseofintentionalityasthefoundationofmeaning-making 27
2.5.1 Husserl’s“passivesynthesis”and“streaminglivingpresent”inthe
unpublishedmanuscripts 29
2.6 Adifferenttheoristofspeechasaction:LudwigWittgenstein 30
2.7 Themeaningofintentionandintending 31
2.7.1 Translatingintention:anexerciseinSamoanethnopragmatics 33
2.8 Notgivinguponintentions 38
2.9 Alternative“western”ways 40
3 The avoidance of intentional discourse: aSamoan case study 43
3.0 Introduction 43
3.1 Avoidanceofmakingexplicitintentionsandmotivations 44
3.1.1 The1978–79project:Samoanlanguageacquisitionandsocialization 45
3.1.2 TheLaboratoryofComparativeHumanCognition:neo-Vygotskian
perspectives 46
v
vi Contents
3.2 AbriefintroductiontotheSamoanfonoasaspeecheventandasocialdrama 48
3.3 Unintendedconsequences:Loa’scase,April7,1979 51
3.3.1 Loa’sdefense 60
3.3.2 Therelevanceofpositionalroles 62
3.4 Absoluteliability,culturalpreference,andempiricalevidence 63
3.4.1 Causes,reasons,andsources 64
3.5 Conclusions 67
4 The invention ofpromising inthe Samoan translation ofthe Bible 69
4.0 Ispromisingahumanuniversal? 69
4.0.1 PromiseandpromisinginEnglish 71
4.1 Theinventionofpromising 72
4.1.1 SearchingforpromisinginSamoantextsanddictionaries 75
4.2 SamoantranslationofEnglishpromiseindictionaries 77
4.3 ChallengesinthetranslationoftheBibleintoSamoan 80
4.3.1 TranslationsfortheChristiannotionsof“soul”and“spirit” 84
4.4 TranslationsofpromiseintheBible 88
4.4.1 DifferencesbetweentranslationsofpromiseintheOldand
NewTestaments 90
4.5 Promisesinnon-ChristianSamoantexts 92
4.6 Thecaseofthewordmāvaega 95
4.7 Promises,oaths,andpublicannouncements 96
4.8 Conclusions 98
5 Intentionalityand truth, revisited 101
5.0 Introduction 101
5.0.1 Anthropologicalthinkingandwriting 101
5.1 Truthascorrespondencebetweenthemindandtheworld 104
5.2 Intentionalityasarelationbetweenthemindandtheworld 107
5.3 Thereconstructionistmodelofinterpretation 107
5.4 Someproblemswithgoals,plans,andintentions-to-do 109
5.5 Code-relatedlimitsonspeaker’sintentions 111
5.5.1 Anexampleofhowagenreconstrainswhataspeakercansay 114
5.5.2 Audienceco-participationinshapingintentions 118
5.5.3 Culture-specificconstraintsonintrospectionandresponsibility 120
5.5.4 Multiplicityofgoals 121
5.6 Problemswiththetruth-functionalmodel 123
5.6.1 Truthandturn-taking 125
5.7 Truthandaffect 128
5.8 Truthandmetacommunication 130
5.9 Truthandaction 131
5.10 Conclusions 133
6 Speaker intentions and therole of theaudience in apolitical
campaign inthe US 135
6.1 Thediscoveryofwhatwemean 135
6.2 TheCapps-for-CongressCampaign 137
6.3 Whentheaudiencehasadifferenttake 137
6.3.1 Controllingunintendedhumor 138
6.3.2 Canoneattackwithout“beingmean”? 144
6.4 Conclusions 148
Contents vii
7 Adialogue onintentions 151
with teun a. van dijk and t. jason throop
7.0 Introduction 151
7.1 November1,2004:fromvanDijktoDuranti 151
7.2 November2,2004:fromDurantitovanDijk 152
7.3 November2,2004:fromvanDijktoDuranti 154
7.4 November8,2004:fromDurantitovanDijk 158
7.5 November9,2004:fromvanDijktoDuranti 163
7.6 November16,2004:fromThrooptoDuranti(andvanDijk) 167
7.7 November16,2004:fromvanDijktoThroopandDuranti 171
7.8 Conclusions 173
8 Opacity ofother minds: local theories revisited 175
8.0 Introduction 175
8.1 Levelsofargumentation 176
8.2 Opacityofothermindsasaproblem 179
8.3 Contextualvariationandinconsistenciesintheethnographicaccounts 179
8.4 Examiningspontaneousinteraction 180
9 Intentions and their modifications: a lesson from Husserl 187
9.0 Introduction 187
9.1 Husserl’sintentionalityandtherelationshipwiththemodificationofattention 187
9.2 Phenomenalmodifications:theconstitutionoflinguisticacts 188
9.3 Intentionalmodifications 189
9.3.1 Instigatingintentionalmodificationsinjazzstudents 192
9.4 The“naturalattitude” 197
9.5 The“theoreticalattitude” 198
9.5.1 Thetheoreticalattitudeintalktoandbychildren 201
9.6 Modificationsandtheirroleinsocialization 206
10 Asense ofthe other:from intentionality tointersubjectivity 209
10.0 Introduction 209
10.1 Beyondindividualintentionsinhumanaction 210
10.2 Searle’snotionof“collectiveintentionality” 212
10.2.1 The“Background”andthe“Horizon” 215
10.2.2 Peopleinthepark 217
10.2.3 Theparadoxofcollectiveaction:moreplanning,lesspro-socialbehavior 218
10.3 Sociallydistributedcognitionandextendedminds 219
10.4 Followingrules 221
10.5 Spontaneityandimprovisation 222
10.5.1 Naturalizingintentions 223
10.5.2 Embodiedintentions:jazzimprovisation 223
10.6 Husserl’stheoryofperceptionasanticipationoftheviewingofanOther 228
10.7 Oureverydayunderstandingofothers 230
10.8 Conclusions 231
11 The intentional continuum 233
11.0 Introduction 233
11.1 Themeaningofintentionsandtheiruses 233
11.1.1 Matchingtheorywithsomeethnographicandlinguisticdata 235
11.2 The“intentionalcontinuum” 238
viii Contents
11.3 Hypo-cognitionofintentionsandhyper-cognitionofperlocutionaryeffects 240
11.4 Theperformanceofinterdependence 241
11.5 Individuals,socialcoordination,andsocialcontrol 242
Appendix A: Transcription conventions for English examples 243
Appendix B: Transcription conventions and abbreviations used
in theSamoan examples 245
Notes 248
References 267
Index 293
Figures
2.1 The same Subject (A) can be directed toward thesame
Object (G) through two different intentional acts: looking
and worrying. page 26
3.1 Orators (onthe left) anda chief (on the right) during a fono
(photoby A. Duranti, Falefā, `Upolu, Western Samoa, 1988) 49
3.2 Map ofsectionof Anoama`a East where Falefāis located, in
the Atua district, ofwhichLufilufi isconsidered the capital and
historical center (adapted from Krämer 1902: 704–705) 52
3.3 Three types offono inFalefā, eachdefined bythe number
of participating subvillages (from Duranti 1981a: 40) 54
4.1 Title page of 1887 edition of the Tusi Paia, theSamoan translation
of theBible, acollaborativeeffortby George Pratt,HenryNisbet,
and others 83
5.1 Truth ascorrespondence between mindand world 105
5.2 Interpretation as correspondence between aproposition and
a state-of-affairs 105
5.3 Two possible relations betweena proposition and the
state-of-affairs it describes 107
5.4 The same Subject (A) can be directed toward thesame Object (G)
throughdifferent intentional acts, e.g., admiration,fear 108
6.1 WalterCappsspeaking toa group ofsupporters in PasoRobles,
California, November 15, 1995, saying “How do Iknow that?” 139
6.2 WalterCappsspeaking inSan Luis Obispo, November 15,1995,
saying“How do we knowwe’re gonna win?” 141
6.3 WalterCappsspeaking atHancock College, Santa Maria,
November 15, 1995, saying “I think thereason
we’regonna win ...” 143
6.4 WalterCappsspeaking onthe campusof theUniversity of
California, Santa Barbara, November 15, 1995,saying
“this super-charged political rhetoric that ...” 149
9.1 The same Subject (A) isdirectedtowardthe same Object (G) at
time t1in theintentional act of admiration and attime t2 inthe
intentional act offear 191
ix