The Animal Question: Why Non-Human Animals Deserve Human Rights

193 Pages·2001·1.25 MB·English

by  Paola Cavalieri

The Animal Question
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The Animal Question
Why Nonhuman Animals Deserve Human Rights
Paola Cavalieri
Translated by Catherine Woollard
Revised by the author
2001
198MadisonAvenue,NewYork,NewYork10016
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Themoralrightsoftheauthorshavebeenasserted
DatabaserightOxfordUniversityPress(maker)
AnearlierversionofthisbookwaspublishedinItalianas
LaQuestioneAnimalebyBollatiBoringhieriin1999
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LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
Cavalieri,Paola,1950–
[Questioneanimale.English]
Theanimalquestion: whynonhumananimalsdeservehumanrights
PaolaCavalieri;translatedbyCatherineWoollard.
p.cm.
Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
ISBN0-19-514380-9
1.Animalrights.2. Speciesism.I.Title.
HV4708.C43132002
179′.3—dc212001036835
Preface
In recent years, nonhuman animals have been at the center of an intense philosophical debate. Many authors have
criticized traditional morality, maintaining that the way in which we treat members of species other than our own is
ethically indefensible. Taking this shared idea as a starting point, some have provided a reformulation of the moral
status of nonhumans based on their own specific normative positions.
My line of reasoning will be different. Instead of proceeding from a particular ethical perspective, I will start from
premises that are, as far as possible, shared. I will then attempt to explore what they actually imply. What I shall
develop will be, in other words, a dialectical argument.
The aim of the first part of the book is to put the animal question in context. The first chapter focuses on recent
cultural changes bothin the philosophical and in the scientific domain. In thesecond, the problem of thestructure of
the moral community will be explored, and an inclusive criterion will be put forward. I will employ the results thus
reached as a framework within which to discuss, in the third chapter, the main defenses of the traditional position.
vi PREFACE
Once these foundations have been laid, I will confront the fundamental issue: from a moral point of view, how much
do nonhuman animals count? The fourth chapter is devoted to a critique of the idea that it is possible to draw a line
betweenourspeciesandotherspeciesthatcreatestwodistinctmoralcategories.Inthefifth,Iwillexaminesomeofthe
recent attempts to reconstruct the moral community so as to avoid any arbitrariness and group loyalty. I will suggest
that, although a route can be identified, many problems remain unresolved.In the sixth chapter, finally, after showing
thatwe already haveat our disposal a theory that provides an answer to some of these questions, I willclaim thatthis
theory cannot be confined to human beings without severe inconsistency. In other words, my conclusion will be that
among those entitledto that minimum of equalityand equitythat allows oneto live a lifeworthliving,there are many
nonhuman beings whom we currently treat as little more than mere things.
Anyoneinterested inthetopicofour ethicalrelationswithnonhuman animals owes a debt toPeter Singer; inmy case
this debt has grown through years of collaboration and discussion. I am deeply, and especially, grateful to Harlan B.
Millerforhisunsparinghelpandhisconstructiveandoftenwittycriticism.IowespecialphilosophicaldebtstoSteveF.
Sapontzis and to James Rachels, whose moral views taught me even more than is already evident from the text. Sue
DonaldsonandWillKymlickaearnedmygratitudefor theirencouragementandfor theirhelpfuladvice.And,mostof
all, I thank Franco Salanga, without whose unswerving cooperation and support this book would not exist.
Contents
1 The Cultural Premises 3
A Problem for Political Philosophy: How to Establish Human Equality 4
Bioethical Dilemmas: Who Is Human? 7
After Behaviorism, or How Animal Minds Started to Exist Again 12
2 The Problem of Moral Status 23
Moral Agents and Moral Patients 28
In Search of the Criteria 31
Inclusion in the Moral Community 32
3 The Traditional Accounts 41
Absolute Dismissal, or Descartes and God's Clocks 41
The Superiority of Rational Nature: How Kant Created Humanism 47
Ethics Makes a Turn: Utilitarianism 59
After the Inclusion 67
viii PREFACE
4 Speciesism 69
Traditional Speciesism: Attributing Weight to Biological Characteristics 71
The Correspondence Approach: Species as a Mark of the Morally Relevant Characteristics 73
An Attempt to Grant Paradigmatic Status to Nonparadigmatic Humans 76
Retreat: Comparable Status, Different Treatment 79
5 Welfare and the Value of Life 87
Welfare 88
When Killing Is Wrong 101
The Value of Life: Qualitative Theories 105
The Value of Life: Quantitative Theories 109
Internal Perspectives on Prudential Value 113
An Open Problem 116
The Notion of Person as an Alternative Solution? 117
6 A Minimal Normative Proposal 125
Human Rights: Sphere of Reference 125
Human Rights: Essential Characteristics 128
Human Rights: Justification 131
For an Expanded Theory of Human Rights 137
Notes 145
Bibliography 165
Index 175
The Animal Question