The Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) in the Assessment of Chemical Warfare Activities

358 Pages·2014·4.83 MB·English

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1 National Defence University
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Department of Strategic and Defence Studies
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National Defence University Tel. [phone] ISBN 978-951-25-2574-4 (pbk.) 3
Department of Strategic and www.mpkk.fi ISBN 978-951-25-2575-1 (PDF) 4 Series 1: Strategic Research No 34
Defence Studies ISSN 1236-4959
PO Box 7, 00861 HELSINKI
Finland
MAANPUOLUSTUSKORKEAKOULU
STRATEGIAN LAITOS
JULKAISUSARJA 1: STRATEGIAN TUTKIMUKSIA No 34

NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF STRATEGIC AND DEFENCE STUDIES
SERIES 1: STRATEGIC RESEARCH No 34

THE ANALYSIS OF COMPETING HYPOTHESES (ACH)
IN THE ASSESSMENT OF
CHEMICAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES

JOHN D. HART

AKATEEMINEN VÄITÖSKIRJA

Esitetään Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulun tutkimusneuvoston suostumuksella
julkisesti tarkastettavaksi sotatieteiden tohtorin tutkintoa varten
Maanpuolustuskurssien luentosalissa, Maneesikatu 6, Helsinki,
keskiviikkona 17. joulukuuta 2014 kello 12.

ACADEMIC DISSERTATION

To be presented, with the permission of the
Research Council of National Defence University,
for public criticism for the degree of Doctor of Military Sciences
at the lecture hall of the National Defence Courses, Maneesikatu 6, Helsinki,
on Wednesday, 17th December 2014 at 12 o'clock.

NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY
Department of Strategic and Defence Studies
HELSINKI 2014
MAANPUOLUSTUSKORKEAKOULU
STRATEGIAN LAITOS
JULKAISUSARJA 1: STRATEGIAN TUTKIMUKSIA No 34

NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF STRATEGIC AND DEFENCE STUDIES
SERIES 1: STRATEGIC RESEARCH No 34

THE ANALYSIS OF COMPETING HYPOTHESES (ACH)
IN THE ASSESSMENT OF
CHEMICAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES

JOHN D. HART

NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY
Department of Strategic and Defence Studies
HELSINKI 2014
John D. Hart: The Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) in the
Assessment of Chemical Warfare Activities
Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, Strategian laitos
Julkaisusarja 1: Strategian tutkimuksia No 34
Väitöskirja
National Defence University, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies
Series 1: Strategic Research No 34
Doctoral dissertation

To download our latest publications in English in PDF format, please visit
National Defence University web site http://www.mpkk.fi and
Publication Archive Doria http://www.doria.fi/handle/10024/72633

Cover photo: Empty 130 mm chemical weapons artillery shells awaiting
internationally-verified destruction in 2009.
©2009 C. L. Vago. Reproduced with permission.

Layout: Anna Lind

ISBN 978-951-25-2574-4 (pbk.)
ISBN 978-951-25-2575-1 (PDF)
ISSN 1236-4959

Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu – National Defence University
Strategian laitos – Department of Strategic and Defence Studies

Juvenes Print
Tampere 2014
TO ALICE M. HART

ABSTRACT

Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) in the Assessment of Chemical
Warfare Activities

T
his study contributes to the theory and practice of how chemical weapons
programmes and activity can be evaluated in the context of the
international prohibition against their development, production,
stockpiling, transfer and use as reflected in the 1993 Chemical Weapons
Convention. It presents an application of a hybrid and qualitative variation of
Heuer’s Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) directed towards arms
control verification and intelligence practice using three case studies: the Soviet
Union, Iraq and suspected al-Qaeda affiliates. The study is comprehensive and
multidisciplinary in approach, rather than reductionist. It draws on a large array
of data as they relate to the technical, military and politico-strategic
characteristics of chemical warfare, linking a large number of historical detail
with conceptual insight into the nature of chemical warfare and chemical
weapons arms control.
The work also places intelligence operational art on a more secure
theoretical academic foundation in the chemical weapons-related context, partly
by providing a useful basis for the understanding of the operational- and
strategic-level analysis of chemical weapons threat assessments and appropriate
policy responses. It shifts ACH practice closer to theoretical international
relations models with respect to higher-level strategic and defence analysis, and
international relations theory as it relates to WMD-related international peace
and security questions. It does so partly by suggesting that a corollary exists
between the role played by national intelligence requirements, on the one hand,
and, on the other hand, that played by arms control verification. In particular, the
information taskings for both weapons-specific arms control verification and
national intelligence overlap to a great extent.
However, the priorities and perceived political acceptability for arms
control verification and intelligence assessments are distinct and, in many
respects, opposed to each other. For example, an arms control assessment carried
out within a multilateral legal regime tends to possess greater overall
international credibility and weight so long as it is done in a professional
technical manner whose findings then inform the subsequent political and legal
considerations. National based intelligence assessments are, as a rule, necessarily
kept secret to protect sources and methods and are also more likely to be
questioned on the grounds that the conclusions support national policy.
Nevertheless, the information taskings should, on the basis of their respective
technical requirements, yield similar outcomes. While in practice this does not
necessarily occur, the gap can perhaps be narrowed on the basis of better
operational-level understanding of how such assessments should ideally be
carried out. National intelligence-driven processes, procedures and purposes can
perhaps be better described at the strategic level by realism international relations
theory, while those for arms control verification can perhaps be better described
by neoliberal institutionalism.
Those in academia, government and the public can usefully refer to this
study for a baseline of authoritative information with which to evaluate the
derivation and use of information relevant to verification processes and
requirements and their broader relevance for security and defence studies. Such
evaluations can assist the consideration of what verification data actually mean
and how technical and scientific findings relate to the question of treaty
compliance by states and the resulting implications for the strength of the rule-of-
law at the inter- and intra-state levels, as well as for strategic and defence studies
in general.
ANALYSIS OF COMPETING HYPOTHESES i

CONTENTS

About the Author ix
Acknowledgements x
Abbreviations and acronyms xi
Summary xvi
Scope and focus xix
Key words and terms xxiv

PART I: INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 1

1. Introduction 2
1.1. Contribution to the Literature 7
1.2. The Problem of Data Overload and Related Considerations 10

2. The Rise of Modern Chemical Warfare 15
2.1. Preparedness and Awareness Raising 23
2.2. CW Evaluation and War Planning 26
2.3. International Cooperation on Chemical Weapons 36
2.4. Evolution of Chemical Weapons Threat Assessments 37
2.5. Chemical Industry 39

3. Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation:
Contemporary Verification Context 42
3.1. Arms Control During the Cold War 44
3.2. Post-Cold War Arms Control 47
3.3. Verification Aspects of Arms Control,
Disarmament and Nonproliferation Regimes 52
3.4. Current and Future Verification Activities 57

4. Information Acquisition and Management:
Trends and Developments 58

5. Research Questions and Framing the Issue 64

6. Structuring the Analysis 69
6.1. The Political Dimension 69
6.1.1. Behaviouralism 70
6.1.2. Rational Choice Theory 70
6.1.3. Institutionalism 70
6.1.4. Constructivism (Interpretive Theory) 71
6.2. Intelligence Management Cycle 72
6.2.1. Background on Intelligence and Information
Management Cycles 74
ii HART
6.2.2. The Intelligence Cycle Today: Towards a
Conception of Information Acquisition and Management
for CW Assessment Purposes 76
6.3. Types of Intelligence Activity 80

7. Observations on the Derivation and Use of
CW-related Information 84

8. Analysis of Competing Hypotheses 86

9. Defining a CW-focused Structured Analysis of
Competing Hypotheses 89
9.1. CW Matrices, Decisionmaking Process and Indicators 89

10. Operationalising a CW-focused ACH:
Organisation of Analysis of Case Studies 95
Step 1 Identify the Possible Hypotheses to be Considered 96
Step 2 Make a List of Significant Evidence and Arguments For and
Against Each Hypothesis 96
Step 3 Prepare Matrices with Hypotheses 99
Matrix Production/Stockpiling 100
Cumulative Preliminary Score 104
IR1. Does Target Have CW Technical Capability
(e.g., Military, Medical)? 104
IR2. Is CW Mentioned in Military Doctrine? 104
IR3. Statements and Similar Communications 105
IR4. Weight of Evidence of Integration of CW into
Military Doctrine? 105
IR5. Interest in CW Activities of Others? 105
IR6. Evidence of CW Production? 105
Step 4 Refine the Matrix 106
Step 5 Draw Tentative Conclusions About the Relative Likelihood
of Each Hypothesis 107
Step 6 Analyse Sensitivity of Conclusions 108
Step 7 Report Conclusions 110
Step 8 Identify Milestones 111
10.1. Summary of Application 111