Taming Anger: The Hellenic Approach to the Limitations of Reason

198 Pages·2012·1.84 MB·English

by  Kostas Kalimtzis

Taming Anger
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TAMING ANGER
The Hellenic Approach to the
Limitations of Reason
Kostas Kalimtzis
LONDON • NEW DELHI • NEW YORK • SYDNEY
Bloomsbury Academic
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First published in 2012 by Bristol Classical Press
Paperback edition fi rst published 2013
© Kostas Kalimtzis, 2012
Kostas Kalimtzis has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and
Patents Act, 1988, to be identifi ed as Author of this work.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted
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British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
ISBN: HB: 978-0-7156-4079-1
PB: 978-1-4725-0443-2
ePDF: 978-1-4725-0259-9
ePub: 978-1-4725-0260-5
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
Contents
Acknowledgements viii
Introduction 1
The central argument 1
Contrast to prevailing interpretations of the Greeks on anger 1
Outline of the book 4
1. The Homeric Framework 5
A logical kernel for understanding anger 5
The preconditions to acting well 11
The problems of the thumos 11
The Homeric quandary 15
Thumos, friendship, and the limits to anger 17
2. The Search to bring Logos to Anger 23
The three sources for the study of anger 23
Heraclitus and the paradoxes of anger 25
Importing Pythagorean measure 27
3. Anger: The Guardian of Justice and Protector of Injustice 33
Justice as the measure for anger 33
The function of thumos 34
The guardian within 38
Just and unjust functions of anger 40
Anger: the brash defender of injustice 43
Alazoneia: the braggart weapons of anger 45
4. Nurturing and Educating Anger 49
The meaning of praos 49
In nurturing anger, reason is but number three 54
The possibility of sensuous ethical knowledge in anger 57
Plato’s advances towards the understanding of anger 66
5. Aristotle on the Causes of Anger 73
A dramatically new approach to the passions 73
The difference between emotion and passion 76
v
Contents
The causes of anger 77
The pain of anger: three types of slighting 86
The triggers of anger 89
Thelogos in the matter 93
Counterargument: where there is anger there is reason 94
Can one be angry at the powerful? It’s a matter of appearance 97
6. Making Anger into a Virtue 103
Praotês: a Hellenic ideal 103
The virtue of anger 103
The conditions that anger satisfies as a virtue 105
Changing the habit 115
An approximation method for taming anger 117
Friendship and the standard that determines anger’s mean 122
7. From Anger to Hatred 125
The emergence of hatred from anger 125
The pleasure of hatred and its consequences: the case of
Philoktetes 127
Overcoming the logos of hatred with friendship 129
8. The Wrath of God: Onward to the Past 135
The backward march to a ‘new’ framework for anger 135
The Stoic transformation of the Hellenic framework 136
Retooling honour to achieve indifference 138
Philo and the wrath of God 141
The Church Fathers and the new anger culture 143
The past as present 148
Afterword: The Forward-going, Backward-turning Path 153
Notes 155
Bibliography 173
Index 181
vi
To Evan and Kostas
vii
Acknowledgements
I am indebted to Professor Peter Hadreas and an anonymous scholar
who reviewed an early draft of the manuscript. Most of all, I wish to
express my thanks to Deborah Blake, the editor at Bloomsbury, for
supporting the publication of this work.
viii
And we may state without any qualification that, contrary to the opinion
of other (moralists), it is not Rational Principle (logos) which originally
points the way to Virtue, but rather the passions (ta pathê). First of all,
there must needs arise (as we know there actually does) an unreasoning
impulse towards what is noble and good; afterwards, Principle must give
its vote and verdict (on the suggested act). This is seen in the case of
children and other unreasoning beings. In them there arise first unrea-
soning impulses (hormên alogon)of the passions towards noble aims; not
till afterwards does Principle supervene, and by its approving vote bring
about the performance of noble actions. On the other hand where Princi-
ple originally points to noble ends, the passions by no means (always)
follow their assent; often they oppose it. Wherefore passion (to pathos), if
in right condition, has more claim than Principle (logos) to be the original
motive force which inclines one to Virtue.
Aristotle,Magna Moralia 2.7.30.4-31.9, tr. Armstrong (Loeb)
[In matters of conduct] the principle is the ‘that’ [i.e. the correctness of
the action] and if this be sufficiently apparent, there will be no need in
addition to search for the ‘why’ because a person [who has been nurtured
well] has, or could easily acquire, these principles.
Aristotle,Nicomachean Ethics 1095b7-10
[T]he irrational part of the soul is prior [in time] to the rational. And this
is shown by the fact that emotion, willing, and desire occur in children
immediately from the time of birth, whereas by nature reasoning and the
mind mature later in life. Hence, the care of the body necessarily precedes
the care of the soul and the training of appetite precedes that of reason.
Aristotle,Politics 1334b21-8
In the long hours of the night I have pondered over the causes that
bring ruin to the lives of mortals.
And it seems that they don’t do evil because their reason
by nature is faulty,
for many reason rightly. Consider this:
We know the good, we understand it,
but we do not practise it.
Some out of laziness,
and others because of pleasure instead of virtue.
Euripides,Hippolytus 373-83
ix