Supervenience: New Essays

334 Pages·1995·17.567 MB·English

by  Elias E. Savellos, Umit D. Yalçin

SUPERVENIENCE

Supervenience
New Essays
Edited by
ELIAS E. SAVELLOS
UMIT D. YALQIN
CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sao Paulo
Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK
Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521450027
© Cambridge University Press 1995
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 1995
This digitally printed version 2007
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data
Supervenience: new essays / Elias E. Savellos, Omit D. Yalcin.
p. cm.
ISBN 0-521-45002-0
1. Metaphysics. I. Savellos, Elias E. II. Yalcin, Omit D.
BD111.S86 1995
110-dc20 94-38590
CIP
ISBN 978-0-521-45002-7 hardback
ISBN 978-0-521-03964-2 paperback
For Vivian Ackerson, Miranda Yalgm, and Ayten Inter

Contents
List of Contributors page ix
Introduction 1
ELIAS E. SAVELLOS AND UMIT D. YALgiN
Varieties of Supervenience 16
BRIAN P. MCLAUGHLIN
Supervenience: Model Theory or Metaphysics? 60
JAMES C. KLAGGE
"Global" Supervenient Determination: Too Permissive? 73
JOHN F. POST
Weak Supervenience Supervenes 101
JOHN BACON
The Tweedledum and Tweedledee of Supervenience 110
THOMAS R. GRIMES
Reduction in the Mind of God 124
DANIEL BONEVAC
Psychophysical Supervenience, Dependency, and Reduction 140
CYNTHIA MACDONALD
Supervenience Redux 158
JOHN HEIL
Nonreducible Supervenient Causation 169
BERENT ENg
Physicalism, Supervenience, and Dependence 187
PAUL K. MOSER AND J. D. TROUT
An Argument for Strong Supervenience 218
BARRY LOEWER
Arguments for Supervenience and Physical Realization 226
DAVID PAPINEAU
vii
viii Contents
Supervenience and the Essences of Events 244
ELIAS E. SAVELLOS
How Does Ontology Supervene on What There Is? 264
FELICIA ACKERMAN
Supervenience and Intentionality 273
EARL CONEE
Supervenience, Coherence, and Trustworthiness 293
KEITH LEHRER
Does Truth Supervene on Evidence? 306
JAMES VAN CLEVE
Index 317
Contributors
Felicia Ackerman is Professor of Philosophy at Brown University. She
has published papers on a wide range of philosophical subjects, includ-
ing methodology of philosophy, philosophy of language, and related
issues in epistemology and metaphysics.
John Bacon is Reader in Philosophy at the University of Sydney. He
has written in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and modal and
predicate-functor logic. A book on tropes, Relations Particularized: The
Alphabet of Being, is in press (Blackwell).
Daniel Bonevac is Professor and Chair of the Department of Philoso-
phy at the University of Texas at Austin. He is the author of Reduction
in the Abstract Sciences (Hackett, 1982), Deduction (Mayfield, 1987), The
Art and Science of Logic (Mayfield, 1990); editor of Today's Moral Issues
(Mayfield, 1991); and coeditor of Beyond the Western Tradition (Mayfield,
1992) and Understanding Non-Western Philosophy (Mayfield, 1993). He
has published articles on Kant, metaphysics, semantics, and philosoph-
ical logic.
Earl Conee is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of
Rochester and Book Review Editor oiNous. He is the author of various
papers, largely of a critical nature, on topics in epistemology, ethics,
metaphysics, and philosophy of mind. Currently his philosophical op-
position is directed primarily toward naturalism in epistemology and
imputations of begging the question.
Berent Enc,, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-
Madison, has published papers on scientific reduction, metaphysics,
and the philosophy of mind. His current interests range from studies
in animal behavior, action theory, and functional explanation to the
philosophy of Hume.
Thomas R. Grimes is Professor of Philosophy at Arkansas State Uni-
versity. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Arizona. He has
published articles on ontology, confirmation, and explanation and is
currently working on a project on scientific realism.
ix