Sovereignty's promise : the state as fiduciary

302 Pages·2011·2.009 MB·English

by  Fox-Decent, Evan

OXFORD CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
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MartinLoughlin,JohnPMcCormick,andNeilWalker
Sovereignty’s Promise
OXFORD CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
SeriesEditors:
MartinLoughlin,JohnP.McCormick,andNeilWalker
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Sovereignty’s Promise
The State as Fiduciary
Evan Fox-Decent
McGill University
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Acknowledgements
Thisbook began as a PhD dissertationwritten at the Universityof Torontowhile
IwasinitsjointJD/PhD(philosophy)programme.Specialandheartfeltthanksgo
tomysupervisor,DavidDyzenhaus.EvenwhileonsabbaticalinNewZealand,he
remained in touch and encouraged me to persevere and dealwith the thickets of
detailthatfrequentlyobscuredtheidea.Hereadcountlessdraftsofearlierversions
of most of the chapters produced here, providing insightful and constructive
suggestions within days (sometimes within the same day) of having received the
latestbit.Astudentcouldnothaveamorededicatedandcapablesupervisor.What
is more, although the thesis was defended in 2003, he has since offered equally
generouscommentsonsectionsofthebookthathavebeenupdatedtotakeaccount
ofmorerecentdevelopmentsinadministrativelaw.
I am also very grateful for the assistance I received from the readers on my
committee, Arthur Ripstein and Lorne Sossin. Their comments were invaluable,
andalwaysforthcoming,especiallyinthefinaldaysleadinguptosubmission,when
Imadenumerousunreasonablecallsontheir timetoreviewsuccessivedraftsand
discuss ideas. They, too, have since given me generous comments on subsequent
worktowardsthisbook.
IoweasimilardebttoseveralcolleaguesatMcGillUniversity’sFacultyofLaw:
Helge Dedek, Richard Janda, Robert Leckey, Rod Macdonald, Fre´deric Me´gre´t,
Victor Mun˜iz-Fratecelli, LionelSmith, andSteveSmith.Iwould alsoliketothank
many others for encouragement, discussion, and comments, including, Daniel
Brudney,EvanCriddle,WallyFox-Decent,DennisKlimchuk,MatthiasMahlmann,
Margaret Martin, Colleen Murphy, Sean Rehaag, Robert Shaver, Kaveh Shojania,
MalcolmThorburn,MarkWalters,andRaquelYrigoyenFajardo.
Various portions of the book were presented and discussed at a number of
conferences: the Lon Fuller and Contemporary Legal Controversies two-part
conference held at the law faculties of McGill University and the University of
Toronto(2005);theYoungScholarsConferenceheldattheFacultyofLawofMcGill
University (2008); the Dunsmuir Roundtable held at the Faculty of Law of the
University of Toronto (2008); and a 2008 session of the McGill Political Theory
Workshop.Mythanksgototheorganizersandparticipants.
Special thanks are also due to a teacher, Johnston Smith, from St Paul’s High
School in Winnipeg. While he did not did participate directly in this project, he
sparkedmyinterestinpoliticalphilosophy,leadingmetoadoptascepticalviewof
stateauthority.
B
viii Acknowledgements
Ialsooweadebttoseveralstudentswhoprovidedresearchassistanceaboveand
beyond the call of duty: Paul Clark, Matt Finn, Anthony Guindon, Carlos Iva´n
Fuentes,andNelcyLo´pezCue´llar.
Two former students, Stefan Szpadja and Robert Whillans, merit thanks for
readingthroughthemanuscriptcover-to-coverduringthefinalrevisionsstageand
providing innumerablehelpfulcommentsineverychapter.Robert,infact,didthis
twiceover,underunreasonabletimeconstraints,andalsotookonthelaborioustask
ofconvertingthenotestoamodern,uniformstyle.
ThisbookwouldnothavebeenpossiblebutforthesupportoftheFacultyofLaw
andtheDepartmentofPhilosophyofUniversityofTorontowhileIwascompleting
a JD and later writing my doctoral thesis. In addition to my committee, Brian
LangilleinLawandJoyceWrightinPhilosophywereespeciallysupportive.McGill’s
Faculty of Law has since become my academic home. It has been an especially
fertile and collegial setting for interdisciplinary research, in large part due to the
leadership of its formerDean (nowJustice)Nicholas Kasirer and itspresentDean
Daniel Jutras. Also, I would like to thank the Social Science and Humanities
Research Council of Canada for financial support throughout my doctoral and
post-doctoralstudies,aswellasduringthelatterstagesoftheproject.
During the home stretch,GaryHill ofOUP provided exceptionalcopy-editing.
Everychapterhasbeenimprovedbyhiswork.
Some of the arguments in this book have appeared in articleswritten over the
pastfewyears,andwhiletheyhavebeenextensivelyrewritten,Iamgratefultothe
journals in which they were originally published for granting permission to use
them in this book. Much of Chapter II appeared in ‘Fashioning Legal Authority
from Power: The Crown-Native Fiduciary Relationship’ (2006) 4 New Zealand
Journal of Public and International Law 91. Chapter IX is a revisedversion of ‘Is the
RuleofLawReallyIndifferenttoHumanRights?’(2008)27(6)LawandPhilosophy533.
Parts of Chapters I and IV were published in an earlier form in ‘The Fiduciary
NatureofStateLegalAuthority’(2005)31Queen’sLawJournal259.
Finally, I would like to thank Adriana Goreta, for extraordinary patience and
support,andmyparents,WallyandJoanFox-Decent,whohavebeenthereforme
throughoutthecourseoftheproject.
Contents
Epigraph xiii
TableofCasesandLegislation xv
Prologue—HobbesandLegalOrder 1
1. Thedemandsoflegality 1
2. Thepeopleastheauthorsofsovereignty 5
3. Theconstitutionoflegalorder 13
4. Trustasthebasisofthestate-subjectrelationship 19
ChapterI—Introduction: TheStateasFiduciaryandthe
RuleofLaw 23
1.1 Introduction:Roncarelliandthefactofsovereignty 23
1.2 Abriefhistoryofthefiduciaryconcept 30
1.3 Towardsfiduciarydutiesinpublicsettings 34
1.4 Alegalconception 37
1.5 Arelationalconception 40
1.6 AKantian,interactionalconception 41
1.7 Achallengetolibertarianism 47
1.8 Beyondthestate 48
1.9 Summaryoftheargument 48
PART I—THE CROWN-NATIVE
FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP
ChapterII—SeekingSovereignty 55
2.1 Introduction 55
2.2 Guerin,Sparrow,andtheresistanceofAboriginaltreatyrightstodualism 57
2.3 ThebasisoftheCrown-Nativefiduciaryrelationship 62
2.4 ThelimitsoftheCrown’slegitimacy 69
ChapterIII—SomeObjections 75
3.1 Introduction 75
3.2 Paternalism,colonialism,andlegalpluralism 76