Separation, Assimilation, or Accommodation: Contrasting Ethnic Minority Policies

217 Pages·2003·0.83 MB·English

by  Terrence E. Cook

Separation, Assimilation,
or Accommodation
C E M
ONTRASTING THNIC INORITY
P
OLICIES
Terrence E. Cook
LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
Cook,Terrence,E.,1942–
Separation,assimilation,oraccommodation:contrastingethnicminoritypolicies/Terrence
E.Cook.
p. cm.
Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
ISBN0–275–97825–7(alk.paper)
1.Ethnicity—Politicalaspects. 2.Ethnicconflict. 3.Assimilation(Sociology) I.Title.
GN495.6.C69 2003
305.8—dc21 2002033384
BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationDataisavailable.
Copyright(cid:1)2003byTerrenceE.Cook
Allrightsreserved.Noportionofthisbookmaybe
reproduced,byanyprocessortechnique,withoutthe
expresswrittenconsentofthepublisher.
LibraryofCongressCatalogCardNumber:2002033384
ISBN:0–275–97825–7
Firstpublishedin2003
PraegerPublishers,88PostRoadWest,Westport,CT06881
AnimprintofGreenwoodPublishingGroup,Inc.
www.praeger.com
PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica
Thepaperusedinthisbookcomplieswiththe
PermanentPaperStandardissuedbytheNational
InformationStandardsOrganization(Z39.48–1984).
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents
Figures vii
Introduction ix
Chapter1 SeparationsasSegregations:Strategiesofthe
StrongerEthnicGroup 1
Chapter2 SeparationsasSeparatisms:StrategiesoftheWeaker
EthnicGroup 21
Chapter3 AssimilationsasControls:StrategiesoftheStronger
EthnicGroup 61
Chapter4 AssimilationsasIntegrations:Strategiesofthe
WeakerEthnicGroup 89
Chapter5 AccommodationsasMinimal:Strategiesofthe
StrongerEthnicGroup 105
Chapter6 AccommodationsasMaximal:Strategiesofthe
WeakerEthnicGroup 121
Chapter7 HowtoGetOutofaZero-sumGame:TheCaseof
theKashmirConflict 147
Chapter8 TransformationalGameTheoryinConflict
Resolution 165
References 179
Index 191

Figures
1.1 SixMainDirectionsinEthnicMinorityPolicy 3
5.1 PairedEthnicMinorityPolicyChoicesandPossible
Consequences 107
5.2 HowRegimeandPartyVariablesAffectChancesofEthnic
Accommodation 111
6.1 HowStrongerandWeakerEthnicGroupsApproach
Accommodations 134
6.2 SpansofCoalitions,LeadershipMedians,and
AccommodationDistancesbetweenGroupsinConflict 145
7.1 TypeofGamesorProblemSituations:OrderedbyTypically
IncreasingDanger 149
8.1 FourTypesofGameTheory 168
8.2 EvolutionaryGameTheoryContrastedwithTransgenic
GameTheory 170
8.3 TransformingGames,Benevolentvs.MalevolentDirections 172
8.4 FourWaysThirdPartiesMayHelpTransformaHigh-
ConflictGameintoaMoreTractableSituation 176

Introduction
Thisisabookaboutconflictsofethnicgroups,defining“ethnic”quitebroadly
to understand racial, religious, linguistic, national, or kindred cultural cate-
goriesotherthanthoseofclass.Byonedefinition,anethnicgroupsharesits
name,notion of common descent, history,culturaltraits,andsenseofhome
place(cf.Gurr,2000,5;Smith,1986,22–28).AlthoughIdwellonethnicities,
othersmayfindthatthebook’sanalysiscanbereadilyextendedtootherkinds
ofconflicts,suchasthoseofclassorgender.
Ethnic conflicts, often far more than other sorts of human conflicts, are
prominent in everyday news, if only because they often result in highly de-
structiveforms,takingmanyhumanlivesaswellasdestroyingmuchproperty.
International wars have been sparse since 1990, whereas civil warring has
become common, although the violence has somewhat subsided fromabout
1995. But Maya Chadda notes that “of the eighty-six conflicts recorded by
theUnitedNationssince1989,onlythreeinvolvedarmedconflictsbetween
countries. The rest were internal wars caused by ethnic and intercommunal
violence”(Chadda,1997,x–xi).MettaSpenceroffersareinforcingobservation
of one year: worldwide, of the 40 wars fought in 1996, 38 of them involved
conflictbetweenrivalethnicgroups,andoneofthetworemainingwasawar
amongdistinctiveclansofwhatwasessentiallythesameethnicgroupinSo-
malia(Spencer,1998,18;also38notes28and29).Butmoreviolenceoccurs
inlessspectacularforms,suchasethnicriotsorindividualactsofaggression.
Ethnic animosity was involved in the terroristic destruction of the World
TradeCentertowersandpartofthePentagon,takingabout3,000lives.Any
theoryabouthumanviolencemustgiveacentralplacetoethnicgrouprival-
ries. These are humanly caused and potentially subject to human control.
x Introduction
Although there are many speculative theories of human aggression, we ac-
tuallyknowverylittleaboutit,asidefromgoodevidencethathotterclimates,
and the hottest seasons of temperate climates,correlatewithmoreofit.But
becausewecannotair-conditionmeancitystreets,thatcauseisnotsomething
wecancontrol(Geen,2001,32–35).
Virtually all states have some ethnic diversity, and many of these states
experience heightened forms of conflict among groups. Furthermore, it is
impossibleforastatenottohavesomekindofpolicy(orsometimesasetof
policies)regardingitsethnicminorities.
For the sponsors of a given sort of policy, what are they saying they are
trying to do? When can we take these self-reports for granted, and when
should we consider the possibility of ulterior motives? What are the implicit
assumptions behind those announced and unannounced policy objectives?
Whataresometheoreticalandpracticalproblemswiththosepolicyinitiatives,
considering such possibilities as counterproductivity, unintended and un-
wantedandusuallyunforeseenconsequencesofimplementation,shouldthat
succeed?
Ifapolicyworksatallathelpingaproblem,perhapsitisappliednotenough
whentheproblemisnotbeingbettermanagedorsolved.
But a policy approach is being pushed too far when it (1) becomes coun-
terproductive with regard to its own goal, or (2) does unacceptable damage
to the effort to reach other worthwhile goals. Although one could arguably
make an exception for moderation, literal “maximization”ofanyonegoalis
madness.Trade-offsituationsinevitablyoccur,butitisrarelyclearhowsuch
tensions among worthwhile goals should be handled. Illustrations of such
problemswillariseduringthecourseofthisbook.
OF HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY: IMMEDIATE,
EMERGENT, SUBMERGENT
Someholdthatanysocialsciencemustberootedin,orevenquiteliterally
reducedto,“microfoundations,”orsomeallegedlysimplepropositionsabout
human behavior at the micro (small) level that could permit the building of
theoriesatthemeso(middle)ormacro(large)levels.
Perhaps this thinking supposes thereare someverysimplemechanismsat
thesmalllevelthatcanpermitdeductionofbehavioratmiddleorlargelevels.
Theremaybesomeimmediateandsimpleaspectsofhumanpsychology,such
as drives for self-preservation or sex, that often are shared with nonhuman
animals.Therearealsorelativelysimplemechanismsoflearningorchanging
therelationshipofstimuliandresponsesasthroughimitation,classical(Pav-
lovian)conditioning,oroperant(Skinnerian)conditioning.
But sometimes forms of learning seem less helpful in predicting political
behavior than are some cognitive weaknesses that limit our more complex
psychology.AsHerbertSimonandhisassociatesknew,weareonly“bound-
Introduction xi
edly”rationalatbest.Considersomelimitsofourrationality.Wetendtobe
unableto(1)discernmanydifferencesinwhatseemsremotefromus,suchas
inanideologicalfamilyremovedfromourown,(2)preferenceordertoomany
things,(3)evaluatebyverymanystandards,(4)graspmanyoptionsasawhole
setratherthan by pairs orserially,meaningonebyone,(5)bemorelogically
consistentthanaffectivelysoasinuncriticallylinkingonethingpleasantwith
another,orwhatispainfulwithitslike,(6)experienceasmuchpleasureinan
equivalentgainaspaininaloss,(7)avoiddiscountingwhatwecouldnotget
yesterday or what we could only get in the distant future, (8) recognizethat
thesameinputmaynothaveaconstantrelationtooutputatallmagnitudes,
places, and times, (9) avoid the gambler’s fallacy of exaggerating the overall
probabilityofgaindependentonaseriesofreallydiscreteevents,(10)correctly
see much higher risk when a specific case of low risk becomes repeated at
manysimilarplacesorduringmanyfutureepisodes,or(11)avoidbeingmired
intosunkcosts,orthrowinggoodmoneyafterbad,or(12)recognizethatnot
allindividualswillbealikeinalloftheforegoing.
Bycontrast,whatwouldunboundedrationalitylooklike?Probablyinspired
byalargelyimaginaryviewofinvestorbehavior,manyeconomistswouldhave
usspecifyarelevantframeofidentity(self-interestorother-regarding,where
many have accented self-interest), a master motive or “maximand” (often
taken to be economic gain), and a general model of how agents handle un-
certainty(usuallytakentobeexpectedutility-maximizing).Althoughthisra-
tionalchoiceparadigmincreasinglypenetratesothersocialsciences,including
political science, I am growing quite skeptical of the view that speaks as if
salient identity, dominant aim, and orientation toward uncertainty aresome
“simples”thatpreexistanysituation.
On the contrary, I recognize rather complex human psychological reper-
tories in personal identities, goals, and postures toward risk,differentlymo-
bilizedinadaptationtothesituationofchoice.Further,withoutmeaningany
personification, I hold that the situations of agents often largely determine
whatisselectedfromsuchrepertories,orcanliterallyshapetheserepertories,
asinaddingorsubtractingmotives,andsoon.Thatis,Irecognizethereality
of“emergentproperties”and“submergentproperties,”asdefinednext.
First,letusaddressemergentproperties.MarioBunge,althoughconceding
that wholes are built up of parts, has denied the position (called “methodo-
logical individualism”) that social behavior must be reducible to primitive
axiomsandhypothesesofhumanbehavior(letalonetochemistryorphysics),
orthatlarge-scalemovementsofmattermustbeaccountedforultimatelyby
subatomictheories,perhapsendingwithsuperstringtheory.Whatthemeth-
odological individualists fail to grasp is that there are emergent properties in
manyphenomena,suchthat,say,ascalingupwillrevealbehavioralproperties
that could never be discerned by looking at the parts (in the social sciences,
individuals)alone,evenifasystemicanalysiswouldincludeattentiontoparts
(Bunge, 1996, 51). He goes on to say, “the individual approach to society