Report into the death of Alexander Litvinenko

328 Pages·2016·4.33 MB·English

The Litvinenko Inquiry
Report into the death of
Alexander Litvinenko
Chairman: Sir Robert Owen
Presented to Parliament pursuant to Section 26 of the Inquiries Act 2005
Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on 21 January 2016
HC 695
© Crown copyright 2016
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| Contents
Contents
Introductory
Part 1 Preface 7
Part 2 Introduction 9
Open narrative evidence
Part 3 Alexander Litvinenko – his life in Russia and the 13
United Kingdom, his illness and death
Chapter 1 In Russia 13
Chapter 2 Leaving Russia 26
Chapter 3 In the United Kingdom 29
Chapter 4 Illness and death 33
Chapter 5 Scientific examination of Alexander Litvinenko’s body 45
Part 4 Why would anyone wish to kill Alexander Litvinenko? 51
Chapter 1 Introduction 51
Chapter 2 Enemy of the Russian State? 52
Chapter 3 Work for UK intelligence agencies 63
Chapter 4 Work for the Mitrokhin Commission in Italy 68
Chapter 5 Work for the Spanish security services 72
Chapter 6 Private security work 74
Part 5 Alexander Litvinenko’s final months 85
Chapter 1 Introduction 85
Chapter 2 The 2006 Russian laws 86
Chapter 3 Continued opposition to President Putin 92
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The Litvinenko Inquiry
Chapter 4 Did Alexander Litvinenko fall out with and/or attempt 94
to blackmail Boris Berezovsky?
Chapter 5 The Ivanov report 100
Chapter 6 The murder of Anna Politkovskaya 104
Chapter 7 British citizenship 106
Chapter 8 Alexander Litvinenko’s state of mind in October 2006 108
Part 6 The polonium trail – events in October and 109
November 2006
Chapter 1 Introduction 109
Chapter 2 Introduction to the scientific evidence 110
Chapter 3 Dmitri Kovtun 113
Chapter 4 Visa applications 117
Chapter 5 Events in London 16-18 October 121
Chapter 6 Events in London 25-28 October 141
Chapter 7 Events in Hamburg 28 October – 1 November 148
Chapter 8 Events in London 31 October – 3 November 155
Closed evidence
Part 7 The closed evidence 181
Findings as to responsibility for death
Part 8 Who killed Alexander Litvinenko? 183
Chapter 1 Introduction 183
Chapter 2 Medical cause of death 184
Chapter 3 Where did Alexander Litvinenko ingest polonium 210 186
on 1 November 2006?
Chapter 4 Was there an earlier ingestion of polonium 210? 187
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| Contents
Chapter 5 Did Alexander Litvinenko poison himself? 189
Chapter 6 Who administered the poison? 192
Part 9 Who directed the killing? 209
Chapter 1 Introduction 209
Chapter 2 Boris Berezovsky 210
Chapter 3 UK intelligence agencies 211
Chapter 4 Organised crime 212
Chapter 5 Mario Scaramella, Chechen groups, Alexander Talik 213
Chapter 6 Russian State responsibility – introduction 214
Chapter 7 Russian State responsibility – the source of the 216
polonium 210
Chapter 8 Russian State responsibility – motive and evidence of 227
similar deaths and killings
Chapter 9 Russian State responsibility – links between Andrey 234
Lugovoy and Dmitri Kovtun and the Russian State
Chapter 10 Russian State responsibility – events since Alexander 235
Litvinenko’s death
Chapter 11 Conclusions regarding Russian State responsibility 239
Chapter 12 Russian State responsibility – involvement of Nikolai 241
Patrushev and President Vladimir Putin
Conclusions
Part 10 Summary of conclusions 245
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The Litvinenko Inquiry
Appendices
Appendix 1 The history of the Inquiry and procedures adopted 247
Appendix 2 Terms of Reference 265
Appendix 3 List of Issues 267
Appendix 4 Chronology 271
Appendix 5 Dramatis personae 283
Appendix 6 Abbreviations 295
Appendix 7 Restriction Notices and Orders 297
Appendix 8 Key documents 315
Appendix 9 List of witnesses 319
Appendix 10 List of Inquiry staff and counsel 323
Appendix 11 List of core participants and legal representatives 325
Appendix 12 Closed appendices 327
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Part 1: Preface
1.1 On 22 July 2014 the Secretary of State for Home Affairs, the Rt Hon Theresa May MP,
announced, in a written statement laid before the House of Commons, that an Inquiry
under the Inquiries Act 2005 was to be held into the death of Alexander Litvinenko.
I was appointed to chair the Inquiry.
1.2 The Terms of Reference for the Inquiry, upon which I was consulted prior to my
appointment, are to be found at Appendix 3 to this Report. I was invited by the
Secretary of State to complete the Inquiry by December 2015. I opened the Inquiry
on 31 July 2014. The oral hearings were completed on 31 July 2015, and my Report
was duly delivered to the Secretary of State in January 2016.
1.3 The Inquiry has been completed substantially within the budget prepared by the
secretariat, and adopted by the Secretary of State in setting a budget cap.
1.4 I am indebted to Counsel to the Inquiry, Robin Tam QC, Hugh Davies QC and Andrew
O’Connor QC, and to the Solicitor to the Inquiry, Martin Smith, and his assistant, Abigail
Scholefield, for their invaluable assistance in the collation, analysis and presentation
of the evidence, and in the preparation of this Report.
1.5 I must also record my appreciation of the work of the Inquiry secretariat, Lee Hughes
CBE, Secretary to the Inquiry, his deputy Frances Currie, Press Officer Mike Wicksteed
and Paralegal Amy Nicholls. They have organised the administration of the Inquiry in
a most efficient and professional manner.
1.6 I am indebted to the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, who authorised his
officers to continue to provide the investigative and evidential services that had been
provided to me as Assistant Coroner charged with the conduct of the inquest into the
death of Alexander Litvinenko following the establishment of the Inquiry. I place on
record my appreciation of the work of the officers of the Metropolitan Police Service
(MPS) who carried out an exemplary investigation into the death of Mr Litvinenko, and
who provided the greatest assistance to me in providing investigative and evidential
services in the course of the Inquiry. I should in particular pay tribute to the work
carried out by Commander Ball, Detective Inspector Craig Mascall, Detective Chief
Inspector Mike Jolly and all members of the Operation Avocet team.
1.7 I was greatly assisted by Solicitors and Counsel for the Core Participants who took
part in the Inquiry: Ben Emmerson QC, Adam Straw and Elena Tsirlina for Marina
and Anatoly Litvinenko; Richard Horwell QC, Saba Naqshbandi, Jenny Leonard and
Prit Mandair for the MPS; Neil Garnham QC, Robert Wastell, Paul Bishop and
Catherine Turtle for the Secretary of State; and David Evans QC, Alasdair Henderson
and Simon Ramsden for AWE plc.
1.8 My conclusions on the central issues in this Report are to be found at Parts 8, 9 and
10. Those Parts of the Report, and the conclusions they contain, are based on the
totality of the evidence that I have heard – that is, both the ‘open’ and the ‘closed’
evidence. The conclusions are mine and mine alone.
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The Litvinenko Inquiry
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Part 2: Introduction
2.1 In August 2012, over three years ago, I was appointed to conduct what were then the
inquest proceedings concerning the death of Alexander Litvinenko.
2.2 I have described the procedural history of both the inquest and this Inquiry in some
detail at Appendix 1, but I propose shortly to summarise the position by way of
introduction.
2.3 The inquest proceedings into Mr Litvinenko’s death had been resumed by Dr Andrew
Reid, the then Coroner for Inner North London, in late 2011. A considerable amount
of work was undertaken in preparation for the inquest, both prior to and following my
appointment. However, the inquest proceedings ran into difficulties. In the end, and at
my request, the inquest was replaced by the Public Inquiry that I have now conducted.
The preparatory work was not wasted – almost all of it was simply carried over to the
Inquiry.
2.4 The difficulties with the inquest centred on the existence of sensitive government
documents that were relevant to the investigation that I was conducting. More
particularly, the documents raised an arguable case that the Russian State bore
responsibility for Mr Litvinenko’s death.
2.5 The law does not allow evidence to be taken in what are known as ‘secret’ or ‘closed’
sessions at an inquest. But the government material was so sensitive that it could
not be adduced in any form of public or ‘open’ session. The material was therefore
excluded from the inquest proceedings under the legal principle known as public
interest immunity.
2.6 It has always been my view that the question of possible Russian State responsibility
for Mr Litvinenko’s death is one of the most important issues arising from his death. It
was an issue that I had intended to investigate at the inquest, but it did not seem right
to me to investigate this issue in the knowledge that government material that was
of great relevance had been excluded – albeit that it had been excluded for a good
reason.
2.7 I therefore asked the Home Secretary to establish a Public Inquiry to replace the
inquest. The advantage of a Public Inquiry over the inquest was that the rules governing
an inquiry allow for sensitive evidence to be heard in closed session.
2.8 The Home Secretary initially refused to establish a Public Inquiry. She subsequently
agreed to do so after her refusal had been successfully challenged in the High Court
by Mr Litvinenko’s widow, Marina Litvinenko. I agreed to serve as the Chairman of the
Inquiry.
2.9 The Inquiry was formally set up on 31 July 2014. I was at that time a serving High
Court Judge; I retired from that post in September 2014.
2.10 The Inquiry’s Terms of Reference are to be found at Appendix 2 to this Report. In
broad terms, the issues that have been investigated by the Inquiry pursuant to the
Terms of Reference replicate the matters that I would have investigated at the inquest.
The issue of Russian State responsibility, in particular, has been fully examined. The
sensitive government material that was excluded from the inquest on the ground of
public interest immunity has been considered.
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The Litvinenko Inquiry
2.11 The Inquiry sat to conduct open hearings at the Royal Courts of Justice on 34 days in
January, February, March and July 2015.
2.12 Closed hearings were also conducted.
2.13 As I trust the detail of this Report will demonstrate, I took evidence from a very wide
range of sources. The witnesses who gave evidence to the Inquiry included not only
Mr Litvinenko’s family, friends and business associates, but also medical professionals,
nuclear scientists, police officers and experts in fields as diverse as Russian history
and polygraphy.
2.14 Transcripts of the open hearings, together with the very considerable volume of
documentary evidence that I adduced, are available on the Inquiry website.
2.15 There were, however, several important witnesses from whom I did not hear.
2.16 Boris Berezovsky, who was a close friend of Mr Litvinenko and whom some have
blamed for his death, died himself in 2013. I did, however, have access to a large
quantity of documentary material – principally police witness statements and interview
transcripts which contain detailed accounts given by Mr Berezovsky regarding the
matters under investigation. I adduced all this material into evidence.
2.17 Andrey Lugovoy and Dmitri Kovtun, both of whom are wanted by the British authorities
for the murder of Mr Litvinenko, declined my invitation to give evidence to the Inquiry.
That is a matter of regret to me. Both men took some part in these proceedings.
Mr Lugovoy was represented for a time during the preparations for the inquest, but
declined to take any further part when the inquest was converted into an Inquiry.
Mr Kovtun made contact with the Inquiry towards the end of the scheduled hearings
and indicated that he wished to give evidence. He provided a witness statement and
arrangements were made for him to give oral evidence by videolink from Moscow. In
the end, however, he decided not to do so.
2.18 The decision was, of course, a matter for them. Since both men were out of the
jurisdiction I could not compel them to attend the Inquiry and give evidence. Their
decision not to give oral evidence means that I do not have the answers to the
questions that they would have been asked, and I have noted in the course of the
Report several points in the evidence that demand an explanation from them.
2.19 Finally on this point, I should emphasise that, in the end, the fact that Mr Lugovoy
and Mr Kovtun did not give oral evidence does not undermine the findings that I have
made about their involvement in Mr Litvinenko’s death. The findings are clear. I am
entirely confident in making them.
2.20 As I have explained at paragraphs 122-123 of Appendix 1, in making findings of fact
I have adopted the ‘flexible and variable’ approach to the standard of proof that was
formulated by Sir William Gage in the Baha Mousa Inquiry. I add that where in this
Report I state that ‘I am sure’ I will have found a fact to the criminal standard. When I
use such expressions as ‘I find’ or ‘I am satisfied’ the standard of proof will have been
the ordinary civil standard of proof, namely the balance of probabilities. Where it is
obvious that I have found a fact but I have not used one of these terms, the standard
will have been the civil standard. All other expressions, such as a reference to a state
of affairs being ‘possible’ will not be a finding of fact, but will indicate my state of mind
in respect of the issue being considered.
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