Re-Imagining Charles Taylor's Best Account Principle Andrew Renahan A Thesis In the Depa

232 Pages·2013·1.22 MB·English

by  Andrew Renahan

From Authenticity to Accountability:
Re-Imagining Charles Taylor’s Best Account Principle

Andrew Renahan

A Thesis
In the Department
of
Religion

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy (Religion) at
Concordia University
Montréal, Québec, Canada

July 2013

© Andrew Renahan, 2013
CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
This is to certify that the thesis prepared
By: Andrew Renahan
Entitled: From Authenticity to Accountability: Re-Imagining Charles Taylor’s Best
Account Principle
and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy (Religion)
complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with
respect to originality and quality.
Signed by the final examining committee:
___________________Chair
Dr. Peter Stoett (Political Science, Concordia University)
___________________External Examiner
Dr. Ronald Kuipers (Center for Philosophy, Religion and Social Ethics, University of
Toronto)
___________________External to Program
Dr. Matthias Fritsch (Philosophy, Concordia University)
___________________Examiner
Dr. Marc Lalonde (Religion, Concordia University)
___________________Examiner
Dr. Norman Ravvin (Religion, Concordia University)
___________________Thesis Supervisor
Dr. Michael Oppenheim (Religion, Concordia University)
Approved by
_________________________________________
Dr. Leslie Orr, Graduate Program Director

August, 29, 2013 _______________________
Dr. Joanne Locke, Dean, Faculty of Arts and Science
ABSTRACT

From Authenticity to Accountability:
Re-Imagining Charles Taylor’s Best Account Principle

Andrew Renahan, Ph.D.
Concordia University, 2013
This dissertation explores the possibility of re-imagining aspects of the moral
theory advanced by Charles Taylor. The framework of my study is moral discourse as it
is, and has been, expressed in what is historically and culturally understood as western
philosophy.
What might it mean to live a good life? It is upon this question that the crux of my
dissertation revolves. In his tome Sources of the Self, Charles Taylor eloquently drew the
distinction between a utilitarian concept of what it is right to do, and a more substantive
consideration of what it is good to be. My own work has been considerably influenced by
this short dialectic. Despite my sympathy with some of Taylor’s arguments, my
dissertation involves a considerable critique of his conclusions vis-à-vis authenticity and
dignity. A prime focus of my analysis deals with what I contend is Taylor’s unnecessarily
limited descriptions of languages and embodiment.
My aim is to engage in a re-imagining of Taylor’s concept of the “best account
principle”. I argue that in Taylor’s work, the “best account” evinces a genre of
clairvoyance on the part of a self-reading moral agent. I critique Taylor’s portrayal of
agents transitioning toward increasingly lucid expressions of their vision of the good. The
basis of my critique is focused upon what I contend to be the narcissistic self-concern
underlying Taylor’s concept of moral agency. In re-imagining the “best account
iii
principle”, I expand upon the description of embodiment to include a consideration of
gender, and an examination of implied “normativity”. To this thickened portrait of
embodiment I apply insights from the work of Emmanuel Levinas regarding the “I” and
the “other(s)”. The juxtaposition of Taylor’s theory with that of Levinas’ will help us to
transform the “best account”, from an expression of authenticity, to one of accountability.
I employ aspects of Charles Taylor’s theory in a fashion which I do not believe
would beget his blessing. Mine is not the story of the making of the self. It is, rather, an
indictment of the self on the grounds of accountability.

iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

No one accomplishes anything alone. I would like to express my sincere and heartfelt
thanks to those who have given their best, to help me achieve my best. To my Mom and
Da, for their support and wisdom. To my supervisors, for their trust and guidance. To
Tina and Munit, for making our department a home. To Fiso and Lola, for perspective.
And, to my wife Jessica, for love and inspiration. Thank you.

Study, research, and writing take time. I would like to thank Le Fonds de Recherche du
Québec – Société et Culture, as well as Concordia University for the funding
opportunities which allowed me to devote the necessary time to my work.

v
Table of Contents

Introduction………………………………………………………………………………1

Chapter 1 On Language and Philosophy……………………………15

On Language…………………………………………….18

On Epistemology………………………………………...20

On Wittgenstein………………………………………….23

On Levinas……………………………………………….30

Argument………………………………………………...45

On Fideism……………………………………………….47

Chapter 2 Sources of Sources……………………………………….53

On Herder………………………………………………..58

On the Linguistic Dimension…………………………….67

On Moral Realism and Non-Realism…………………….68

On Transitions……………………………………………77

Argument………………………………………………...82

Chapter 3 Sources Re-Visited………………………………………86

On Malaise……………………………………………….88

On the “Affirmation of Ordinary Life”…………………..91

On the “Reductive Thesis”……………………………….94

On the Importance of Conversation…………………….101

On the “Sovereignty of the Good”……………………...106

On Sincerity and Authenticity………………………….113

On Retrieval…………………………………………….118
vi
On Empowerment………………………………………122

Secondary Sources……………………………………...126

Questions………………………………………………..140

Chapter 4 Investigating Authenticity………………………………143

On Embodiment………………………………………...146

On Gender………………………………………………151

On Difference…………………………………………...164

On the “Fullness of Being”……………………………..170

Argument……………………………………………….178

Chapter 5 Investigating Accountability……………………………183

On Ethics………………………………………………..185

On Transcendence and the Transcendental……………..193

Juxtaposition……………………………………………198

Argument……………………………………………….206

Embodied Accountability………………………………214

Postscript………………………………………………………………………………218

References……………………………………………………………………………...220

vii
Introduction

19. And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life.
(Wittgenstein 1958, 11e)
I have chosen to begin my Doctoral dissertation under the auspices of the above
quote from Ludwig Wittgenstein, as I strongly believe that my work constitutes merely
the addition of my voice to an ongoing conversation within a pre-existing form of life. As
such, I contend that it is imperative that I position my contribution within the body of
western moral philosophy according to the framework of the existent tenor of the
discourse. Wittgenstein’s statement is central to this situating task. Over the course of my
studies I have become a firm proponent of a Wittgensteinian understanding of language.
While Wittgenstein wisely refrained from the attempt to devise a systematic theory of
language, he did advance some profoundly interesting insights regarding the character of
languages as heterogeneous, composed of metaphor and analogy, and grammatically
particular to the form of life within which they are comprehensible. I have endeavoured
to use these critical insights to shape my study of moral discourse as it has variously been
expressed in what is historically and culturally understood as western philosophy.
I am keenly aware that my entry into the scholarly discourse surrounding moral
and ethical concerns in the west signals my taking up the mantle of a participant in the
language game apropos to this field. I fully acknowledge my own embeddedness in this
discourse, and thus make no claim to occupying a disengaged, or meta, position
empowering me to comment upon the subject from a theoretical crow’s nest. In doing
philosophy one invents a “being” capable of asking specific questions; a notion I have
borrowed from Martin Heidegger (Heidegger 2010, 6). For the purposes of writing this
1
dissertation I have invented a persona uniquely interested in the subject at hand; carrying
out investigations seemingly oblivious to all other concerns or interests. In undertaking
this project I am engaging in a specialized discourse concerning the study of moral
language. Commensurately, I am also a moral subject enmeshed in the pursuit of a good
life. I strongly believe that it is critically important that I acknowledge that I occupy a
variety of other roles in different forms of life which simultaneously complement, clash
with, or proceed entirely indifferent to, my scholarly role.
The temptation to assume a totalizing voice when engaged in philosophical work
is, in my experience, very strong. The chief symptom of succumbing to this totalizing
voice is evinced by an attitude of disengagement evoked by authors who write as though
they were capable of occupying a position regarding their subject from an objective
remove. This position, so penetratingly described by Thomas Nagel in his work The View
from Nowhere, is compounded by a teleological desire to impose a reductive thesis, in a
unilateral fashion, which effectively discounts the conceptual paradoxes and epistemic
gaps one inevitably encounters when theorizing. The narrative structure attached to the
normative dissertation template in the west is, I contend, rife with temptations to
assuming a totalizing voice. This is illustrated in the foreword to the “Thesis Preparation
and Thesis Examination Regulations”, published by the School of Graduate Studies on
Concordia University’s website (effective as of October, 2011), wherein it is stated that
“A thesis is the final report on a comprehensive research program that meets accepted
scholarly criteria and is of a cohesive, unitary character…The actual style and format of a
thesis are of utmost importance. It should be clear, concise and systematic”
(http://graduatestudies.concordia.ca/documents/publications/graduatehandbooks/thesisprepar
ationguide.pdf).
2
The consequence of desiring to adhere to these institutionalized standards of
practice is that a doctoral candidate may feel the need to answer all questions in a
definitive fashion. This totalizing impulse is re-enforced by established academics who
prescribe homogeneous formulas for successful dissertation writing, such as that written
by Tara Brabazon, a professor of media studies at Brighton University, who in the
January 28th, 2010 edition of The Times Higher Education wrote an article entitled “How
Not To Write a PhD Thesis”, wherein under tip number three she advises,
The way to relax an examiner is to feature a sentence in the first paragraph of a
PhD abstract that begins: “My original contribution to knowledge is…” If
students cannot compress their argument and research findings into a single
statement, then it can signify flabbiness in their method, theory or structure. It is
an awful moment for examiners when they – desperately – try to find an original
contribution to knowledge through a shapeless methods chapter or loose literature
review. If examiners cannot pinpoint the original contribution, they have no
choice but to award the script an MPhil.
The key is to make it easy for examiners. In the second sentence of the abstract,
ensure that an original contribution is nailed to the page. Then we can relax and
look for the scaffolding and verification of this statement.
(http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?storycode=410208)
The result of such a doctrinaire approach is often something more akin to
ideology than theory. Instead of a probing exploration of a given subject, attended to by
tentative arguments, the audience is often presented with a monolithic account which
seeks to supress any and all incongruity. To accept such a linear and parochial worldview
would entail a sort of pathological denial of the pluralistic and heterogeneous character of
lived experience. I assert that this problem needs to be brought out and acknowledged as
the first step in resisting the urge to write in a totalizing voice. My concerns here have
largely to do with style. However, I also believe that attending to the multiplicity of
3