Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman

369 Pages·2014·21.36 MB·English

by  Manuel Vargas

Rational and Social Agency

Rational and
Social Agency
The Philosophy of
Michael Bratman
z
Edited by
MANUEL VARGAS
GIDEON YAFFE
1
1
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Contents
Contributors vii
1. Introduction—gideon yaffe and manuel vargas 1
2. Intention as a Model for Belief—Richard Holton 12
3. The Single Phenomenon View and Experimental Philosophy
—Alfred R. Mele 38
4. Intention, Plans, and Ethical Rationalism—Kieran Setiya 56
5. What Good Is a Will?—J. David Velleman 83
6. Reasons, Policies, and the Real Self: Bratman on Identification
—R. Jay Wallace 106
7. Desires . . . and Beliefs . . . of One’s Own
—Geoffrey Sayre-McCord and Michael Smith 129
8. Segmented Agency—Elijah Millgram 152
9. The Normative Constitution of Agency
—Christine M. Korsgaard 190
10. The Nature of Agreements: A Solution to Some Puzzles about
Claim-Rights and Joint Intention—Margaret Gilbert 215
11. Massively Shared Agency—Scott J. Shapiro 257
12. Rational and Social Agency: Reflections and Replies
—Michael E. Bratman 294
Index 345

Contributors
Michael E. Bratman, U. G. and Abbie Birch Durfee Professor in the
School of Humanities and Sciences, and Professor of Philosophy, Stan-
ford University
Margaret Gilbert, Abraham I. Melden Chair in Moral Philosophy and
Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Irvine
Richard Holton, Professor of Philosophy, University of Cambridge
Christine M. Korsgaard, Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Phi-
losophy, Harvard University
Alfred R. Mele, William H. and Lucyle T. Werkmeister Professor of
Philosophy, Florida State University
Elijah Millgram, E. E. Ericksen Professor of Philosophy, University of
Utah
Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Morehead-Cain Alumni Distinguished
Professor of Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Kieran Setiya, Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh
Scott J. Shapiro, Charles F. Southmayd Professor of Law and Professor
of Philosophy, Yale University
Michael Smith, McCosh Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University
Manuel Vargas, Professor of Philosophy and Law, University of San
Francisco
viii Contributors
J. David Velleman, Professor of Philosophy, New York University
R. Jay Wallace, Judy Chandler Webb Distinguished Professor, University
of California, Berkeley
Gideon Yaffe, Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy, Yale
University
1
Introduction
By Gideon Yaffe and Manuel Vargas
The essays in this collection, and Michael Bratman’s replies to them,
contribute to a diverse set of philosophical conversations to which Bratman
has been a major, or in some cases defining, contributor for the last three
decades.
Bratman’s “planning theory of intention” plays a role in every line of in-
quiry that he has explored, and that others have explored, in responding to
and developing his views. Under the planning theory, the distinctive features
of intentions derive from the role they play in planning conduct, primarily in
advance. Bratman has done a great deal to specify with precision what these
roles are, and he has also done a great deal to identify and describe the norms
of rationality that apply to those with intentions. Intending agents are under
rational pressure to adjust their other plans, their beliefs, and their conduct in
a variety of ways, thanks to the special role that intentions play in making it
possible for agents like us to overcome our cognitive and agential limitations
and achieve our ends.
In offering the planning theory of intention, Bratman both described
this framework for thinking about intention and filled in much of the de-
tails. Our goal in this short introduction is to situate the planning theory
in relation to developments in decision theory and the philosophy of action
that influenced it and to those that it influenced. The essays contained in the
volume contribute to the later stages of ongoing lines of inquiry, and so to
understand them and Bratman’s replies to them, it helps to have some sense
of where the planning theory sits on what has become a complex map. In fact,
the map is even more complex than this volume might lead one to think, for
the volume contains only essays concerned with philosophical issues arising
from Bratman’s work. The planning theory of intention has also had an im-
portant influence on other areas. In 2008, the International Foundation of