Protecting the Ballot: How First-Wave Democracies Ended Electoral Corruption

265 Pages·2022·19.79 MB·English

by  Isabela Mares

PROTECTING THE BALLOT

Protecting the Ballot
How First- Wave
Democracies
Ended Electoral
Corruption
Isabela Mares
PRINCE TON UNIVERSITY PRESS
PRINCE TON AND OXFORD
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ISBN: 978-0-691-24002-2
ISBN (pbk.): 978-0-691-24003-9
ISBN (e- book): 978-0-691-24004-6
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CONTENTS
Illustrations ix
Abbreviations xi
Acknowl edgments xiii
1 How Did First- Wave Democracies End Electoral Corruption? 1
2 The Democ ratization of Electoral Practices 25
3 Reforming Campaigns: Reducing the Illicit Use of State
Resources 69
4 Limiting Vote- Buying and Treating 111
5 Protecting Voter Autonomy: Ballots, Envelopes, and
Isolating Spaces 145
6 Curbing Electoral Fraud 179
7 Conclusion 207
Appendix 217
References 219
Index 231
vii

ILLUSTRATIONS
Figures
1.1. Pathways to electoral reform 9
2.1. The determinants of demand for electoral reforms 39
2.2. Elite splits and demand for electoral reforms 47
3.1. The relative incidence of electoral strategies politicizing
state resources in French and German elections 75
3.2. Determinants of support for vari ous amendments seeking
to limit the use of state resources during campaigns 95
3.3. Determinants of support for proposals to limit electoral
clientelism 97
3.4. Changing electoral competition for candidates on the
right following the breakdown of the electoral cartel
(Kartellbündnis) 103
3.5. Correlates of support for the invalidation of elections that
politicize state resources: divergence among parties on
the right 107
4.1. Relative incidence of vote-b uying in French and German
elections 116
4.2. The determinants of support for reforms to limit
vote- buying in the French Chamber of Deputies 124
4.3. Average prices of bribes in contested British elections
relative to the price of weekly wages 128
4.4. Correlates of resource constraints for Liberal and
Conservative candidates 132
4.5. The determinants of demand for reforms to limit
campaign expenditures 142
5.1. Support for the introduction of the isoloir during early
deliberations 162
5.2. The composition of the electoral co ali tion supporting
the isoloir in 1907 166
ix