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l!roofs for Eternity, Creation
- and the Existence of God
SOP/
in Medieval Islamic
( and Jewish Philo \~{'!
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HERBERT A. DAVIDSON
University of California, Los Angeles
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New York * Oxford
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
1987
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The von Grunebaum Center
for Near Eastern Studies
PROOFS FOR ETERNITY, CREATION AND
THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN MEDIEVAL ISLAMIC
AND JEWISH PHILOSOPHY
Oxford University Press
Oxford New York Toronto
Delhi Bomby Calcutta Madras Karachi
For
Petaling Jaya, Singapore Hong Kong Tokyo
Nairobi Dar es Salaam Cape Town
Rachel and Jessica
Melbourne Auckland
and associated companies in
Beirut Berlin Ibadan Nicosia
Copyright © 1987 by Herbert A. Davidson
Published by Oxford University Press, Inc.,
200 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016
Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press
Library of Congress Cataloging·in-Publication Data
Davidson, Herbert A. (Herbert Alan)
Proofs for eternity, creation, and the existence
of God in medieval Islamic and Jewish philosophy.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.
Includes indexes.
1. God (Islam}-Proof-History of doctrines.
2. God (Judaism}-History of doctrines. 3. Philosophy, Islamic.
4. Philosophy, Jewish. I. Title.
B745.G63D38 1987 212'.1'0902 86-33179
ISBN 0-19-504953-5
Published with the assistance of The Louis and Minna Epstein Fund of
the American Academy for Jewish Research
13579108642
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
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Acknowledgments
Chapters IV and V of the present book arc a reworking of an article that appeared
in the Journal of the American Oriental Society, Volume H\I. Chapter VI incor
porates material from articles appearing in Philosophy East and West, Volume 18,
and Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature (Cambridge, 1979). An
expanded version of Appendix A, part 2, appeared in Sill dies in Jewish Religious
and Intellectual History Presented to Alexander Altmallll (University, Alabama,
197\1).
The National Endowment for the Ilumanities and the UCLA Academic Senate
have supported my work; the von Grunebaum Center for Near Eastern Studies,
UCLA, took responsibility for preparing a camera-ready copy; a grant from the
American Academy for Jewish Research to the von Grunebaum Center helped to
defray some of the composition costs. I wish to express my warmest thanks to all
those institutions. I also wish to thank Marina Preussner of the von Grunebaum
Center for her invaluable aid and irrepressible good cheer.
My wife subjected the book to a painstaking, and often painful, critique. Any
clarity that is to be detected is her doing.
The book was complete in 19HO.
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Contents
I Introduction 1
1. Eternity, creation, and the existence of God 1
2. The present book 6
II Proofs of Eternity from the Nature of the World 9
1. Proofs of eternity 9
2. Proofs of eternity from the nature of the physical world 12
3. Replies to proofs from the nature of the world 30
4. Summary 46
III Proofs of Eternity from the Nature of God 49
1. The proofs 49
2. Replies to proofs from the nature of the cause of the
universe 67
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3. Summary 85
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IV John Philoponus' Proofs of Creation and Their Entry into
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Medieval Arabic Philosophy 86
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1. Philoponus' proofs of creation 86
2. Saadia and Philoponus 95
3. Kindi and Philoponus 106
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4. Summary 116
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x Contellls
Contents xi
V Kalam Proofs for Creation 117 1. First cause of motion and first cause of existence 281
1. Proofs from the impossibility of an infinite number 117 2. The existence of God: a problem for metaphysics 284
2. Responses of the medieval Aristotelians to proofs of
3. Necessarily existent being and possibly existent being 289
creation from the impossibility of an infinite number 127
4. The attributes of the necessarily existent by virtue of itself 293
3. The standard Kalam proof for creation: the proof from
5. Proof of the existence of the necessarily existent by virtue
accidents
134
of itself 298
4. Juwayni's version of the proof from accidents 143
6. Questions raised by Avicenna's proof 304
5. Proofs from composition 146
7. The version of Avicenna's proof in Shahrastani and
Crescas 307
VI Arguments from the Concept of Particularization 154 8. Summary 309
1. Inferring the existence of God from creation 154
2. Arguments from the concept of particularization 174
( 3. Particularization arguments for the existence of God· X Averroes' Critique of Avicenna's Proof 311
without the premise of creation; particularization 1. The proof of the existence of God as a subject for
arguments for creation 187 physics 312
4. Ghazali and Maimonides 194 2. Necessarily existent by virtue of another, possibly
5. Additional arguments for creation in Maimonides and existent by virtue of itself 318
,( Gersonides 203 3. The nature of the celestial spheres according to A verroes 321
4. Averroes' critique of the body of Avicenna's proof 331
VII Arguments from Design 213 5. Summary 334
1. Cosmological, teleological, and ontological proofs of the
existence of God 213
2. Teleological arguments 216 XI Proofs of the Existence of God from the Impossibility of an
3. Summary 236 Infinite Regress of Effident Causes 336
1. The proof from the impossibility of an infinite regress of
causes 336
VIII The Proof from Motion 237
2. Unity and incorporeality 345
1. Aristotle's proof from motion 237
3. The proof from the impossibility of an infinite regress of
2. Maimonides' version of the proof from motion 240 efficient causes and the proof from the concepts possibly
3. I:Jasdai Crescas' critique of the proof from motion 249 existent and necessarily existent 350
4. Another proof from motion 275 4. Resume 362
5. Crescas on the impossibility of an infinite regress 365
IX Avicenna's Proof of the Existence of a Being Necessarily 6. Ghazali's critique of Avicenna's proof 366
Existent by Virtue of Itself 281
7. Summary 375
xii Contents
XII Subsequent History of Proofs from the Concept of Necessary
Existe1lce 378
1. Maimonides and Aquinas 37H
2. The influence of Avicenna's proof 385
3. Proofs of the existence of God as a necessarily existent
being in modern European philosophy 388
PROOFS FOR ETERNITY, CREATION AND
4. Summary 405
THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN MEDIEVAL ISLAMIC
5. Concluding remark 406 AND JEWISH PHILOSOPHY
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I
Introduction
1. Eternity, creation, and the existence of God
One might well expeet the existenee of God to be the initial issue of natural
theology; but such was not the case in the Islamic and Jewish Middle Ages.
( Medieval Muslim and Jewish philosophers did as a matter of course construct
their natural theology and their metaphysics in general on the existence of God.
The provability of the deity's existence was, furthermore, disputed; for whereas
most philosophers were confident that the deity's existence can be demonstrated
rationally, some demurred. When the possibility of demonstrating the existence
of God was challenged, the challenge came, however, not from radicals who
douhted the proposition, hut from conservatives who questioned the competence
of hUlllan rcason to ucmonstratc it. Whilc thc provability of God's cxistencc
might, then, be subject to dispute, God's existence never was, and the Middle
Ages were free from atheism and agnosticism, at least public atheism and agnos
ticism, on the philosophic plane. The existence of God could not, as a conse
quence, be the initial issue for natural theology. The existence of Gou, as distinct
from the provability of God's existence, was not strictly an issue at all.
The initial issue of natural theology for Muslims and Jews, the most funda
mental issue where opinions divided, was, it may be ventured, the inquiry con
cerning whether the world is eternal or had a beginning. Much more is at stake
there than chronology or hermeneutics-the age of the universe or the question
whether the scriptural account of the genesis of the universe should be taken
literally or allegorically. The issue of eternity and creation I provided an arena
for determining the relationship of God to the universe, for determining, specif
ically, whether God is a necessary or a voluntary cause. If the world should be
eternal, and a deity is recognized, the deity's relationship to the universe would
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likewise be eternal. Since eternity and necessity are, by virtue of an Aristotelian
'I employ Ihe lerm creal;o/l 10 mean Ihe Ihesis Ihal Ihc world came into cxistenc'c after not
having existed. not the more specific thesis that a creator brought the world into exi,tcncc. Medieval
thinkers who accepted the former thesis were invariably certain that the latter thesis can be inferred
from it.
2 Introduction I ntroduct ion 3
rule, mutually implicative,2 an eternal relationship is a relationship bound by for the existence of God, since, as already seen, a proof from the premise of
necessity; and necessity excludes wjll.3 The eternity of the world thus would eternity would lead to a deity bound by necessity and a proof from the premise
imply that the deity is, as the cause of the universe,4 bereft of will. A beginning of creation would lead to a deity possessed of will. Something more might bc
of the world would, by contrast, lead to a deity possessed of will. Should the involved. Proofs proceeding from the two different premises can differ in their
world be understood to have a beginning, all medieval thinkers agreed, the exis understanding of what constitutes a genuine proof of the existence of God. Every
tence of a creator can be inferred; and the decision on the creator's part to bring proof of the existence of God must at some stage, whether explicitly or-as
a world into existence where no world existed before would constitute a supreme occurs far more oftcn-implicitly, presuppose a definition of God, a set of spec
and paradigmatic act of volition. Will in the deity would, therefore, be ruled out ifications requisite and sufficient for the deity. A proof of the existence of God
by the eternity of the world and entailed by creation. is a chain of reasoning which concludes with the existence of a being distinguished
The issue of eternity and creation often intertwined with the enterprises of by certain attributes. Unless the attributes qualify the being possessing them as
proving the existence of God. The majority of Islamic and Jewish proofs for the the deity, no proof, however correctly reasoned, can claim that the being whose
existence of God take either eternity or creation as a premise, and rcquire a existence it arrives at is God. Proofs of the existence of God from the premise
resolution of that issue before their own proper subject can be broached. In the of eternity, at least among Islamic and Jewish philosophers, implicitly assume or
Aristotelian proof of the existence of God as the prime mover and in kindred explicitly state three specifications for the deity. By deity, a being is meant which
proofs, the eternity of the world is an indispensable premise and must be estab is, firstly, an uncaused cause; secondly, incorporeal; and thirdly, one. R Any chain
lished prior to the proof itself. The world is shown to be eternal, and the eternal of reasoning concluding with the existence of a single, uncaused, incorporeal
( motion or the eternal existence of the universe is shown to have a cause which cause would accordingly constitute a successful proof of the existence of God.
is identified as the deity.5 In Kalam proofs of the existence of God, th~ indis Volition is not, in proofs from the premise of eternity, included among the spec
pensable premise is creation. The Kalam thinkers followed what has been called ifications. In fact, volition is ruled out, since, as has been seen, the deity would
the Platonic procedure,6 that is, the procedure of first proving the creation of the be bound by necessity if the world is eternal. As Ghazali explains the virtue of
world and then inferring therefrom the existence of a creator, again identified as the proof from the opposite premise, the premise of creation, that proof must be
the deity. 7 resorted to because of the inadequacy of the definition just given. To be an
The decision to demonstrate the existence of God from the premise of eternity, uncaused cause, incorporeal, and one, Ghazali insists, is a good deal less than
on the one hand, or from the premise of creation, on the other, was not the result to bc the deity. For nothing could conceivably be designated as the deity if it is
merely of one party's happening to be convinced of the truth of eternity and the unable to make decisions affecting the course of events in the universe. <) The
other's being convinced of the truth of creation. The decision was connected with specifications presupposed in proofs from the premise of eternity must, on this
the diverse conceptions of the deity which accompany the two premises. The view, be supplemented with a further attribute, volition.
choice of one or the other premise would be rcflccted in the conclusion of a proof Ghazali had an additional reason for rcjccting any proof of the cxistcllI:e of
God not based on the premise of creation. He contends that the notion of eternal
causation is intrinsically nonsensical, that what comes into existencc after not
2 Aristotle, De Generatiolle II, II, 338a, I. cxisting can alonc be thought of as having a cause. To advocate eternity would
3Plotinus speaks of a "necessary free will" (Ellneads, IV, 8, 5); and Avicenna and Averroes
thus be tantamount to denying a cause of the universe, and to countenance eternity
speak of the deity's "eternal will" (Avicenna, Shifii': lliihiyiit, cd. G. Anawati and S. Zayed [Cairo.
1960], p. 366; Averroes, K. al-Kashf. ed. M. Mueller [Munich, 1859], p. 52; German translation. would be tantamount to countenancing the causeIessness of the universe. Argu
with pagination of the Arabic indicated: Philosophie und Theologie von Averroes. trans. M. Mueller mentation that docs not employ the premise of creation hence would fail to prove
[Munich, 1875]). Creseal, Or ha-Shem. III, i, 5. also defends the possibility of an eternal will in the existence of God not merely for those who number volition among the req
God. But these are Pickwickian senses of will; cf. Maimonides, Guide to the Perplexed, II. 21.
uisite specifications. It would fail to prove the existence of God even on the view
'Conceivably the deity COUld. though the universe is eternal, exercise his will in some fashion
of the proponents of the proofs from eternity; for it would fail to establish the
that does not relate to the universe. But that thought, if it has any meaning at all. was not entertained
r by the medievals.
sCf. below, p. 239.
6Cf. Plato. Timaeus. 28; Moses Narboni. Commentary Oil Maimollides' Guide (Vicnna. 1853). "Explicitly in Maimonidcs. Gllide. I. 71. Also ef. Alfarabi. K. An;' Air! al-Madilla al-Flidilo.
II. 2; C. Baeumker, Witelo (Muenster, 1908), pp. 320 ff.; H. Wolfson. "Notes on Proofs of the cd. F. Dieterici (Lciden. 1895). beginning; German translation: Der Mllsterstaat. trans. F Dieteriei
Existence of God in lewish Philosophy," reprinted in his Studies ill the History of Philosophy alld (Leiden. 1900). Avicenna. Shiftj': I/e;hiyejt. pp. 37-47.
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i( Religion. Vol. I (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), pp. 571-572. "t;hazali. 7ii/lI/fllt ol-hlM.,·!!o. cd. M. Bouygcs (Beirut. 1(127). Ill. ~~J. 16: Engli'h translation
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'Cf. below. pp. 154 ff. ill A,"'''''''''.' 'lilllOllIt 01-,/,11101;11. Irans S. van den Bergh (London. 1'154). pp. X'I. '16.
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4 Introduction Introduction 5
existence of anything having the first of the three specifications-the attribute of avoid linking the more fundamental and less problematic doctrine of the existence
being the cause of the universe-which the proponents of proofs from eternity of God to the less fundamental and more problematic doctrine of creation. They
themselves deem requisite for the deity. 10 therefore leave the question of creation open while demonstrating the existence
Besides proofs for the existence of God from one or the other premise, from of God and, like Ibn Tu fay I, prove the existence of God on parallel tracks, on
the premise of the eternity of the world or the premise of creation, proofs were both the hypothesis of eternity and the hypothesis of creation. 14 Once having
also advanced with neither eternity nor creation as a premise. In some instances, shown that God exists whether or not the world is eternal, they return, however -
creation is established in the course of proving the existence of God; a single unlike Ibn Tufayl-to the issue of creation and eternity; and Maimonides, for his
train of reasoning arrives at both the existence of God and the creation of the parI. offers "arguments," acknowledged by him to be less than apodictic dem
world. II In other instances, toe issue of eternity and creation is nowise touched onstrations, for creation. IS In espousing creation, Maimonides and Aquinas clearly
on. I~ Proofs of the latter sort avoid taking a position on the presence or absence espouse, as well, the presence of volition in God. But by postponing the subject
of volition in the deity. Nevertheless, they cannot avoid taking a position on the of creation until after proving the existence of God, they tacitly affirm that volition
specifications for the deity. By professing to be genuine proofs of the existence is not integral to the concept of the deity, that a proof of the existence of a single
of God without demonstrating that God possesses will, they tacitly affirm that incorporeal cause, albeit a necessary cause, would constitute a genuine proof of
will is not a requisite specification. the existence of God.
Still another procedure for proving the existence of God was in evidence. Ibn Various procedures for proving the existence of God are, in sum, discernible
Tufayl and Maimonides, as welI as the Scholastic philosopher Thomas Aquinas, in medieval Islamic and Jewish philosophy, some of which do, whcreas others
do not themselves subscribe to the eternity of the world, yet they put forward do not, require that the issue of eternity and creation be settled before a proof of
proofs of the existence of God resting on the premise of eternity. They demon the existence of God can be accomplished. The existence of God might be proved
strate the existence of God on two parallel, alternative tracks, on both the hypoth through the premise of the world's eternity. In proofs of the sort, the deity is
esis of eternity and the hypothesis of creation; and proofs resting on the premise explicitly or implicitly defined as an ullcaused cause, incorporeal, and olle. The
of eternity serve them hypotheticalIy, as a means for establishing the existence existence of God might be proved through the contrary premise, creation, the
of God on one of the two conceivable alternatives. The world, so their reasoning attendant conclusion being a deity possessed of will. Ghazali, who expatiates
goes, either is eternal or had a beginning. Should the world be eternal, the upon the import of proofs based on the premise of creation, stresses that volition
Aristotelian proof from motion and other proofs from the premise of eternity is integral to an adequate concept of the deity, that unless a proof establishes a
establish a first incorporeal cause, who is the deity; whereas if the world should first cause possessed of will, it is not a genuine proof of the existence of God.
not be eternal, its having come into existence permits the immediate inference The existence of God, creation, and hence the attribute of will, might all be
of a creator. In either event, the existence of God is established. Ibn Tufayl chose established by means of a single train of reasoning. Here, it is not clear whcther
the procedure outlined in order to refrain from any stand whatsoever on the issue volition is viewed as integral to the concept of God. The existence of God might
of eternity and creation. He explains that the issue is unresolvable and that the also be proved utilizing neither the premise of eternity nor the premise of creation.
existence of God wilI have been demonstrated only if shown to follow from both The implication now would plainly be that whether or not God docs possess will,
the hypothesis of the eternity of the world and the hypothesis of creation. 13 The volition is not part of the irreducible concept/of the deity. Finally, a proof from
rationale of Maimonides and Aquinas was different. They do take a stand on the the premise of eternity might be employed by philosophers who do not thcmsc1.ves
issue of eternity and creation, and advocate the latter. They nonetheless wish to subscribe to the premise. The proof from eternity would serve a hypothetical
function and would be supplemented through a parallel proof from creation.
Again, the implication would be that the irreducible concept of the deity does
not contain volition.
IOGhazali, Taha/ut al-Faliisifa, III, §§ 17, 28; X, § I; English translation, pp. 96, 102, 250. Thc
contention that eternal causation is nonsensical is found elsewhere; cf. below, pp. 190, 193,210.
"Below, pp. 149-150, lSI, 188, 190,387.
12The notable example is Avicenna's proof, below, Chapter IX. Kalam writers subsequent to
Avicenna commonly advance versions of Avicenna's proof side by side with the Iradilional Kalam 14Maimonides, Guide. 1,71; II, 2; Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles. I, 13. Also cr. Aquinas,
arguments. Commentary on Physics, VIII, §970. and Commentary on Metaphysics. XII, lectio 5 (end).
I'!fayy ben Yaqdhiill, cd. and trans. L. Gauthier (Beirut, 1936), Arabic text, pp. 81-86; French '5Maimonides, Guide, II, 19; 22. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae. I. q. 46, arts. I, 2; Summa
translation, pp. 62-65; English translalion with pagination of Ihe Arabic indicated: Hayy Ibn Yaqzan. colllra Gentiles. II, chap. 38. Also cf. A. Maier, ·Problem des aktuell Uncndlichcn: Aus/iehende.s
trans. L. Goodman (New York, 1972). Mille/alter, Vol. I (Rome, 1964), p. 48.
