Policing gangs in America

317 Pages·2006·1.804 MB·English

by  Webb, Vincent J., Katz, Charles M

P1:JZZ
0521851106pre CB982B/Katz 0521851106 December1,2005 4:47
PolicingGangsinAmerica
PolicingGangsinAmericadescribestheassumptions,issues,problems,
and events that characterize, shape, and define the police response to
gangsinAmericatoday.Theprimaryfocusofthebookisonthegang
unit officers and the environment in which they work. A discussion
of research, statistical facts, theory, and policy with regard to gangs,
gang members, and gang activity is used as a backdrop. The book is
broadly focused on describing how gang units respond to community
gangproblemsandanswerssuchquestionsas:Whydopoliceagencies
organizetheirresponsestogangsincertainways?Whoarethepeople
who choose to police gangs? How do they make sense of gang mem-
bers–individualswhosparkfearinmostcitizens?Whataretheirjobs
really like? What characterizes their working environment? How do
their responses to the gang problem fit with other policing strategies,
suchascommunitypolicing?
Dr.CharlesM.KatzreceivedhisPh.D.inCriminalJusticefromtheUni-
versityofNebraskaatOmaha.HeiscurrentlyanAssociateProfessorof
CriminalJusticeandCriminologyatArizonaStateUniversity.Dr.Katz
hascoauthoredorcoeditedtwopreviousbooksandhasbeenpublished
inseveralscholarlyjournals,includingCriminology,JusticeQuarterly,
andCrimeandDelinquency.Dr.Katzhasconductedresearchinmore
thantwentypoliceagenciesacrosstheUnitedStatesaswellasinseveral
stateandfederalagencies.
Dr. Vincent J. Webb received his Ph.D. in sociology from Iowa State
University. He served as chair of the Department of Criminal Justice
at the University of Nebraska at Omaha for more than twenty years
andaschairoftheDepartmentofCriminalJusticeandCriminologyat
ArizonaStateUniversityforsevenyears.In2005hejoinedthefaculty
atSouthernIllinoisUniversityatCarbondaleasDirectoroftheCenter
for the Study of Crime, Delinquency and Corrections. Dr. Webb has
publishedinavarietyofcriminologyandcriminaljusticejournals,and
heisthecoauthorandcoeditorofthreeotherbooksoncriminaljustice
topics. He is a former President of the Academy of Criminal Justice
Sciences.
i
P1:JZZ
0521851106pre CB982B/Katz 0521851106 December1,2005 4:47
CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN CRIMINOLOGY
Editedby
AlfredBlumstein,H.JohnHeinzSchoolofPublicPolicyandManagement,Carnegie
MellonUniversity
DavidFarrington,InstituteofCriminology,UniversityofCambridge
Otherbooksintheseries:
LifeintheGang:Family,Friends,andViolence,byScottH.DeckerandBarrikVan
Winkle
DelinquencyandCrime:CurrentTheories,editedbyJ.DavidHawkins
RecriminalizingDelinquency:ViolentJuvenileCrimeandJuvenileJusticeReform,
bySimonI.Singer
MeanStreets:YouthCrimeandHomelessness,byJohnHaganandBillMcCarthy
TheFrameworkofJudicialSentencing:AStudyinLegalDecisionMaking,byAustin
Lovegrove
TheCriminalRecidivismProcess,byEdwardZambleandVernonL.Quinsey
ViolenceandChildhoodintheInnerCity,byJoanMcCord
JudicialPolicyMakingandtheModernState:HowtheCourtsReformedAmerica’s
Prisons,byMalcolmM.FreeleyandEdwardL.Rubin
SchoolsandDelinquency,byDeniseC.Gottfredson
TheCrimeDropinAmerica,editedbyAlfredBlumsteinandJoelWallman
Delinquent-ProneCommunities,byDonWeatherburnandBronwynLind
White-CollarCrimeandCriminalCareers,byDavidWeisburdandElinWaring,with
EllenF.Chayet
SexDifferencesinAntisocialBehavior:ConductDisorder,Delinquency,andViolence
intheDunedinLongitudinalStudy,byTerrieMoffitt,AvshalomCaspi,Michael
Rutter,andPhilA.Silva
DelinquentNetworks:YouthCo-OffendinginStockholm,byJerzySarnecki
CriminalityandViolenceamongtheMentallyDisordered,bySheilaghHodginsand
Carl-GunnarJanson
CorporateCrime,Law,andSocialControl,bySallyS.Simpson
CompanionsinCrime:TheSocialAspectsofCriminalConduct,byMarkWarr
TheCriminalCareer:TheDanishLongitudinalStudy,byBrittaKyvsgaard
ViolentCrime:AssessingRaceandEthnicDifferences,editedbyDarnellHawkins
GangsandDelinquencyinDevelopmentalPerspective,byTerenceP.Thornberry,
MarvinD.Krohn,AlanJ.Lizotte,CarolynA.Smith,andKimberlyTobin
EarlyPreventionofAdultAnti-SocialBehavior,byDavidFarringtonandJeremy
Coide
ErrorsofJustice,byBrianForst
RethinkingHomicide:ExploringtheStructureandProcessUnderlyingDeadly
Situations,byTeranceD.MietheandWendyC.Regoeczi
SituationalPrisonControl:CrimePreventioninCorrectionalInstitutions,by
RichardWortley
EconomicEspionageandIndustrialSpying,byHediehNasheri
ChoosingWhite-CollarCrime,byNealShoverandAndyHochstetler
PrisonerReentryandCrimeinAmerica,byJeremyTravisandChristyVisher
iii
P1:JZZ
0521851106pre CB982B/Katz 0521851106 December1,2005 4:47
Policing Gangs in America
CHARLES M. KATZ
ArizonaStateUniversity,Phoenix
VINCENT J. WEBB
SouthernIllinoisUniversity,Carbondale
v
P1:JZZ
0521851106pre CB982B/Katz 0521851106 December1,2005 4:47
Contents
Acknowledgments page ix
1 StudyingthePoliceResponsetoGangs 1
2 SettingandMethods 23
3 HistoricalAnalysisofGangsandGangControl 42
4 ScopeandNatureoftheCurrentGangProblem 91
5 Form,Function,andManagementofthePoliceGangUnit 125
6 TheGangUnitOfficer 165
7 OntheJob 198
8 PolicingGangsinaTimeofCommunityPolicing 241
9 ConclusionandImplications 267
References 291
Index 303
vii
P1:JZZ
0521851106pre CB982B/Katz 0521851106 December1,2005 4:47
Acknowledgments
Throughout the research project we received help and assistance from
numerouspeoplealongtheway.Wewouldbothliketothankthemen
and women of the Albuquerque, Inglewood, Las Vegas, and Phoenix
police departments. They provided us with an invaluable glimpse into
their world, and they were always helpful with accommodating our
many requests. We would also like to thank Scott Decker and Cheryl
Maxson, who provided advice along the way with regard to research
methodologyandinterpretationoffindingsandwhoprovidedvaluable
feedback after reading various versions of the manuscript. We express
gratitudetoRobinHaarrforherassistancewithdatacollectioninboth
InglewoodandLasVegasandtoKenKarpinski,whomanagedallofthe
processes associated with the production, copyediting, and typesetting
for this book. Additionally, we would like to thank Ed Parsons, our
editor,whoguidedusthroughthepublicationprocessflawlessly.
ThisresearchwasfundedbytheNationalInstituteofJustice(grantno.
98-IJ-CX-0078). The opinions expressed in this book are those of the
authors alone and are not those of the National Institute of Justice.
However,wewouldliketothankWinnieReed,ourprogrammanager,
who provided us with access to technical advisors and to federal task
forces that we otherwise would not have had the opportunity to learn
from.
Charles Katz would like to thank his colleagues at Arizona State
Universityforcreatingasupportiveworkenvironment.Hewouldespe-
cially like to thank Ed Maguire at George Mason University, who first
ix
P1:JZZ
0521851106pre CB982B/Katz 0521851106 December1,2005 4:47
x Acknowledgments
introduced him to organizational theory and who has also generated
muchenthusiasmtowardthefieldofpolicing.Likewise,MalcolmKlein,
whonotonlyprovidedmuchvaluablefeedbackonearlierdraftsofthe
manuscriptbutwhoseworkhasinspiredmuchofwhatcanbefoundin
thisbook.Additionally,CharleswouldliketothankSamWalker,who
imprinted the importance of judging the fairness of modern policing
strategiesandtactics,andVinceWebb,whoinfluencedhimonmatters
related to the understanding of crime control policy. As usual, Charles
thankshisparents,DuaneandJanet,andhiswife,Keri,foralloftheir
loveandsupportovertheyears.
VincentWebbwouldliketothankhisformercolleaguesatArizonaState
UniversityaswellasthoseattheUniversityofNebraska,Omaha,who
havemadeitpossiblethroughtheirsupportandinspirationtocarryout
anumberofprojectsassessingcrimecontrolpoliciesandpractices.Sam
WalkerandInekeMarshall,withtheirpenchantforcritiquingcriminal
justicepolicy,wereespeciallyinfluentialinthisregard.Heisalsodeeply
gratefultoCharlesKatzforhispatienceandsteadfastnessinkeepingthis
research project on track and for sharing his many theoretical insights
into the behavior of police organizations. Most importantly, he would
liketothankaveryspecialperson,hiswifeBetsy,forallofherloveand
support.
P1:PJU
0521851106c01 CB982B/Katz 0521851106 September11,2005 1:21
1
Studying the Police Response to Gangs
That’swhattheywanted–andthat’swhattheygot.
–FormerLosAngelesCRASHUnitofficer
By the mid-to-late 1980s, Los Angeles, California, had become widely
recognized as the epicenter of the nation’s growing gang problem. The
city had about 280 gangs with 26,000 members who were becoming
increasinglyinvolvedinviolenceandnarcoticstrafficking(Spergeland
Curry1990).Between1984and1992,thenumberofganghomicidesin
Los Angeles County skyrocketed from 200 to 800 homicides per year
(Maxson 1999). The seriousness of the phenomenon was highlighted
in media reporting, both locally and nationally. Local news programs
frequently led with gang-related stories in which innocent bystanders
hadbeenshotandkilledindrive-byshootings.Themovieindustrywas
producing popular films such as Colors and American Me, portraying
L.A.gangmembersasbloodthirsty,minoritymaleswhowereinvolved
inhigh-leveldrugsales(Hagedorn1998).
Asaconsequence,adeepfearofgangsgrippedpartsofthecity.The
LosAngelesTimesreportedthatresidentsingangneighborhoodswere
barring their windows and chaining their doors, sleeping in bathtubs
or on the floor, to protect themselves from nighttime drive-by shoot-
ings. People avoided wearing clothing in colors associated with gangs
topreventbeingmisidentifiedbyrivalgangs(J.Katz1990).Therewas
talk from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that the Crips in
Los Angeles were well on their way to bringing together all Crip sects
across the nation into “one major organization with a chief executive
1
P1:PJU
0521851106c01 CB982B/Katz 0521851106 September11,2005 1:21
2 PolicingGangsinAmerica
officer-styleleadershipstructure”toenhancethegang’sabilitytotraffic
drugs (Brantley and DiRosa 1994, 3). In fact, the problem in the city
became so bad that some FBI officials publicly announced that gangs
representedaseriousthreattothenationalsenseofsecurity.
Inresponse,then–PoliceChiefDarylGatesdeclaredawarongangs,
claiming that he would “obliterate” violent gangs and “take the lit-
tle terrorists off the street” (Burrell 1990); he urged President Ronald
Reagantodothesame(LosAngelesCityNewsService1988).Aspartof
hiswar,ChiefGatesallocatedadditionalofficersandstafftothepolice
department’s antigang unit, the Community Resources Against Street
Hoodlums(CRASH).Withinfiveyears,theLosAngelesPoliceDepart-
ment(LAPD)hadabout200swornofficersassignedtotheCRASHunit
(Spergel1995).
Once in full swing, the unit reacted decisively and aggressively,
sweeping through gang neighborhoods. Take, for example, Operation
Hammer, a series of gang sweeps carried out in the worst neighbor-
hoodsinLosAngeles.Thesweepswerecharacterizedbytheunitmov-
ing through neighborhoods, arresting gang members for the slightest
infractions, including wearing colors, flashing signs, jaywalking, and
curfew violations. In fact, the unit was making so many arrests that
year – close to 25,000 – that during one weekend LAPD had to cre-
ateamobilebookingfacilityattheLosAngelesMemorialColiseumto
processallofthearrestees(Burrell1990).
By the late 1990s, LAPD’s response to gangs appeared to be work-
ing. For example, in the Rampart Area, one of the regions hardest hit,
gang crimes dropped from 1,171 in 1991 to 464 in 1999 – areduc-
tion that exceeded the citywide decline for all other violent crime over
the same period (Chemerinsky 2000a). As a consequence, Chief Gates
and the police department rapidly developed a reputation for being
toughongangs,andtheCRASHunitbecameanationalmodel.Police
departments across the country were contacting LAPD for advice on
respondingtotheirowngangproblems.LAPDbeganformallytraining
officersfromotherpolicedepartmentsonLAPD’soperationalstrategies
andtacticsforpolicinggangs,gangmembers,andgangcrime.
With the CRASH unit’s success, however, came problems. CRASH
unitofficersinsomeprecinctsdevelopedasubculturethatembodiedthe
war-on-gangs mentality advocated by their chief. The subculture was
characterized by a mindset in which officers saw all young Hispanic
and African American males as gang members, believing that any and
all efforts to remove them from the community could and should be
P1:PJU
0521851106c01 CB982B/Katz 0521851106 September11,2005 1:21
StudyingthePoliceResponsetoGangs 3
used. Under the guise of protecting the community, CRASH officers
beganresistingsupervision,flagrantlyignoringpoliciesandprocedures
that they believed were inhibiting their ability to respond to the gang
problem(Chemerinsky2000b,1).
ThissubcultureeventuallygaverisetotheRampartCorruptionScan-
dal,inwhichRampartCRASHunitofficersinLosAngeleswerefound
tobeengaginginhard-corecriminalactivity.Officersadmittedtoattack-
ingknowngangmembersandfalselyaccusingthemofcrimestheyhad
not committed. The officers argued that “if the suspect didn’t commit
thiscrime,hedidanotherforwhichhedidn’tgetcaught”(Chemerinsky
2000b,27).
Theensuinginvestigationrevealedthatofficerswereroutinelychok-
ing and punching gang members for the sole purpose of intimidation.
Inonecase,officershadusedagangmemberasahumanbatteringram,
forcefully thrusting his face repeatedly against a wall. In several other
instances,officershadplanteddrugsongangmemberstomakearrests.
Corrupt sergeants and lieutenants in the division had promoted these
activities,givingawardsformisdeeds.Oneofficerhadevenreceivedan
awardforwhatemergedastheshootingofanunarmed,innocentperson
(CNN.com2000a).Asaconsequence,approximatelytenyearsafterit
had been fully staffed and promoted as the ideal in antigang enforce-
ment,LAPD’sgangunitwasshutdownbecauseofcorruption,theuse
ofexcessiveforce,andcivilrightsviolations;andthecityhadpaidout
about $70 million to settle lawsuits related to the scandal (Associated
Press2005).
Such happenings were not unique to Los Angeles. Police gang units
acrossthecountrywerecomingunderclosescrutinyforoverlyaggres-
sivetacticsandotherpolicemisconduct.
(cid:1)
InLasVegas,gangunitofficerswerefoundguiltyofparticipatingin
a drive-by shooting. Two officers, one driving and the other hang-
ing outside a van, had driven around a well-known gang neigh-
borhood until they found a group of gang members loitering on a
streetcorner.Theofficerhangingoutsidethevanshotsixtimesinto
thecrowd,killingatwenty-one-year-oldmale.Theincidentsparked
an FBI investigation into all unsolved drive-by shootings and gang
killingsdatingbackfiveyears,inthebeliefthatsomemayhavebeen
theworkofroguegangunitofficers(Hynes1997).
(cid:1)
In Chicago, gang unit officers were found by federal prosecutors to
beworkinghand-in-handwithfourChicagostreetgangstotransport