Table Of ContentOUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 06/19/2017, SPi
Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 06/19/2017, SPi
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 06/19/2017, SPi
Philosophy Within
Its Proper Bounds
Edouard Machery
1
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 06/19/2017, SPi
3
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© Edouard Machery 2017
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First Edition published in 2017
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OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 06/19/2017, SPi
A mes parents,
Pierre et Dominique Machery
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 06/19/2017, SPi
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 06/19/2017, SPi
Contents
Acknowledgments ix
List of Figures xi
List of Tables xiii
Introduction 1
1. The Method of Cases 11
2. The Empirical Findings 45
3. Fooled by Cognitive Artifacts 90
4. Enshrining Our Prejudices 126
5. Eight Defenses of the Method of Cases: Amateur Psychology,
Reflection, Expertise, Limited Influence, Fallibility, Reform,
Mischaracterization, and Overgeneralization 149
6. Modal Ignorance and the Limits of Philosophy 185
7. Conceptual Analysis Rebooted 208
Postscript 245
Bibliography 247
Index 268
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 06/19/2017, SPi
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 06/19/2017, SPi
Acknowledgments
This won’t surprise you if you’re already an author: It takes a village to write a book,
and authors take on so many debts that it may be more convenient to pretend to be an
intellectual island. But I won’t travel that path, acknowledging instead my many debts.
The impetus for this book comes from an invitation by Michael Strevens and David
Chalmers to present some work in the Mind and Language seminar they organized at
NYU in 2013. The shortcomings of my presentation convinced me of the need to write
a book on the topic. I thought the book would be sweet and short, but sometimes reality
bites, and a longer, more detailed treatment ended up being necessary.
Many philosophers have generously taken the time to comment on older versions of
this book, and I have extensively benefited from their generosity. Students, colleagues,
and visitors at Pitt suffered through the first version of the manuscript in a reading
group at the end of 2014, and their feedback was extraordinary: Thanks to Mikio
Akagi, Joshua Alexander, Jim Bogen, David Colaço, Matteo Colombo, Taku Iwatsuki,
Joe McCaffrey, Jasmin Özel, Alison Springle, and Zina Ward. Many thanks too to the
participants to the reading group at Washington University during my semester-long
visit in the winter of 2015: Mike Dacey, Eric Hochstein, Anya Plutynski, Felipe Romero,
Rick Shang, Brian Talbot, and Tomek Wisocky. I am particularly grateful to Brian
Talbot, who raised challenging objections for each of the chapters. Mark Sprevak
organized a seminar meeting on a version of Chapter 3 during my visit at Edinburgh
in 2014 and, again, a reading group on the whole book in 2016. The discussion of
Chapter 3 with Mikkel Gerken, Michela Massimi, Andrea Polionoli, Stephen Ryan,
and Mark Sprevak led me to rewrite this chapter entirely (thanks guys!). I have also
been thinking about, and sometimes struggling with, the comments from the 2016
reading group for months: Thanks to Ian Bisset, Jesper Kallestrup, Stephen Ryan, Rick
Sendelbeck, Mark Sprevak, Orestis Spyridon, and Annie Webster. Sascha Benjamin
Fink organized a wonderful one-day workshop on the book manuscript at the Berlin
School of Brain and Mind during the fall of 2015. Thanks to all the participants: in add-
ition to Sascha Benjamin Fink himself, Raphael Becker, Dimitri Coelho Mollo, Matthijs
Endt, Ramiro Glauer, Markus Hoffmann, Rhea Holzer, Joachim Horvath, Lena Kästner,
Juan R. Loaiza, Stephan Pohl, and Lara Pourabdolrahim. Corinne Bloch Mullins
organized a reading group at Marquette and sent me some comments resulting from
the participants’ discussion. Thanks to the participants to this reading group, including
Yoon Choi, Anthony Peressini, and Margaret Walker. Wesley Buckwalter wrote some
detailed feedback on Chapter 4 and Joe Milburn on Chapters 1 and 3; Jennifer Nagel
made some helpful remarks about Chapter 1. Stefano Cossara read the near final
version of the whole book and helped me reformulate some key claims. Thanks
for the detailed, sympathetic feedback from the two anonymous reviewers for
