Persian Dreams: Moscow and Tehran Since the Fall of the Shah

439 Pages·2008·2.16 MB·English

by  John W. Parker

P e r s i a n
D r e a m s
Related titles fRom Potomac Books
The Wolves of Islam: Russia and the Faces of
Chechen Terror—Paul murphy
The Wars of Edvard Shevardnadze, Second Edition, Revised
and Updated—melvin Goodman and Carolyn m. ekedahl
Kremlin Rising: Vladimir Putin’s Russia and the End of
Revolution, Updated Edition—Peter Baker and susan Glasser
P e r s i a n
Moscow and Tehran
D r e a m s
Since the Fall of the Shah
J o h n W. Pa r k e r
Potomac Books, Inc.
WashIngton, D.c.
Copyright © 2009 by John W. Parker
Published in the United States by Potomac Books, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book
may be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission from the publisher,
except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews.
The views expressed in this book are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of
the U.S. Department of State or the U.S. government.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Parker, John W., 1945–
Persian dreams : Moscow and Tehran since the fall of the Shah / John W. Parker.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-59797-236-9 (hardcover : alk. paper)
1. Soviet Union—Foreign relations—Iran. 2. Iran--Foreign relations—Soviet Union. 3. Russia
(Federation)—Foreign relations—Iran. 4. Iran—Foreign relations—Russia (Federation) I. Title.
DK68.7.I7P36 2009
327.47055—dc22
2008033716
Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper that meets the American National
Standards Institute Z39-48 Standard.
Potomac Books, Inc.
22841 Quicksilver Drive
Dulles, Virginia 20166
First Edition
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
For susan

Contents
Preface ix
1 From the Shahs to the Ayatollah 1
2 Gorbachev and Khomeini: Perestroika Pen Pals 23
3 Soviet Collapse: Revanche or Accommodation? 39
4 Tajikistan: “Greater Iran” or “Near Abroad”? 57
5 The Bait of “Strategic Partnership” 83
6 Kilo Subs, Bushehr, and Shahab 103
7 The Putin Factor 129
8 Caspian Tempests 147
9 Taliban Threats, Tajik Accords, and U.S.-Iran Talks 169

10 9/11 and Afghanistan 183
11 No “Strategic Partnership” 207
12 Operation Iraqi Freedom 223
13 The Ahmadinejad Shock Wave 247

14 Beyond Turkmanchai? 273
Postscript: The Road to Tehran 301
Notes 311

Selected Bibliography 393
Index 405
About the Author 417

Preface
moscow’s ties with the new Islamic Republic of Iran underwent dramatic fluc-
tuations in the quarter-century following Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s
triumphant return to Tehran in early 1979. After a prolonged implosion, they fitfully
expanded. By summer 2006, as Iran forged ahead with its nuclear program and Iranian-
backed Shia and Sunni forces flexed their muscles across the Middle East, Russian-
Iranian relations again appeared to be on the threshold of an entirely new dynamic.
This book looks at Moscow’s motives and approaches to dealing with Tehran,
shaped not only by the rush of events in the period examined but by centuries of
ingrained practices, prejudices, fears, and hopes. It weaves into the public record
the recollections and analyses of Russian politicians, diplomats, and experts who
dealt directly with Iran, both under the Pahlavi monarchy and after the 1979 Islamic
Revolution. In both capitals, a variety of imperatives combined to override what was
otherwise a mutual aversion going far back in history. Russians in fact were particularly
repulsed by the fanaticism of the Khomeini-inspired theocratic regime. By 1996–97,
however, the relationship had grown fairly solid—if still filled with wariness on both
sides—and was even described as “strategic” by some.
Even at their low point, however, when there were no nuclear power plants or
conventional weapons contracts to protect, the dominant approach in Moscow was the
same as when ties were at their peak. Iran was a big neighbor, went the Russian refrain,
with whom close contacts had always to be maintained lest Tehran behave badly towards
Moscow’s interests in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East. This outlook
in part reflected Moscow’s sense of vulnerability to Iranian proselytizing inside the
Soviet Union and then, after 1991, in Russia proper and in those newly independent
post-Soviet nations with extensive Muslim populations. However, Moscow’s concerns
were probably needlessly exaggerated given the historical animosities toward Shia Iran
throughout the predominantly Sunni peoples of these territories.
Shaping this Russian stance was also Moscow’s historically founded wariness of
spontaneous as well as inspired mob violence against Russian interests inside Iran and
ix