Offshore Archipelagos Enclosed by Straight Baselines

27 Pages·2017·0.46 MB·English

OCEANDEVELOPMENT&INTERNATIONALLAW
https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320.2018.1443420
ORIGINALARTICLE
Offshore Archipelagos Enclosed by Straight Baselines:
An Excessive Claim?
J.AshleyRoach
U.SDepartmentofState(Retired),Washington,DC,USA
ABSTRACT ARTICLEHISTORY
This article examines the conclusion in the decision of the Arbitral Received25November2017
Tribunal in the South China Sea Case that straight baselines may not Accepted28November2017
beusedtoencloseoff-shorearchipelagosunlesstheymeetthecriteria
KEYWORDS
setoutinArticles46and47oftheLawoftheSeaConvention.
1958TerritorialSea
Convention;LawoftheSea
Convention;archipelago;
baselines;statepractice
Introduction
Inits2016awardonthemeritsinthematteroftheSouthChinaSeaarbitrationbetweenthe
PhilippinesandChina,theArbitralTribunalwrote:
TheConventionalsoprovides,initsArticle7,forStatestomakeuseofstraightbaselinesundercertain
circumstances,andtheTribunalisawareofthepracticeofsomeStatesinemployingstraightbaselines
withrespecttooffshorearchipelagostoapproximatetheeffectofarchipelagicbaselines.IntheTribu-
nal’sview,anyapplicationofstraightbaselinestotheSpratlyIslandsinthisfashionwouldbecontrary
to the Convention. Article 7 provides for the application of straight baselines only “[i]n localities
wherethecoastlineisdeeplyindentedandcutinto,orifthereisafringeofislandsalongthecoastin
its immediate vicinity.” These conditions do not include the situation of an offshore archipelago.
AlthoughtheConventiondoesnotexpresslyprecludetheuseofstraightbaselinesinothercircum-
stances,theTribunalconsidersthatthegrantofpermissioninArticle7concerningstraightbaselines
generally,togetherwiththeconditionalpermissioninArticles46and47forcertainStatestodraw
archipelagicbaselines,excludesthepossibilityofemployingstraightbaselinesinothercircumstances,
inparticularwithrespecttooffshorearchipelagosnotmeetingthecriteriaforarchipelagicbaselines.
AnyotherinterpretationwouldeffectivelyrendertheconditionsinArticles7and47meaningless.
NotwithstandingthepracticeofsomeStatestothecontrary,theTribunalseesnoevidencethatany
deviationsfromthisrulehaveamountedtotheformationofanewruleofcustomaryinternational
lawthatwouldpermitadeparturefromtheexpressprovisionsoftheConvention.1
TheAwarddoesnotprovideanyfurtheranalysistosupporttheseconclusions.Thispaper
seeks to fill those gaps. After distinguishing “offshore archipelagos” from “archipelagic
States,”thepaperexaminestherelevantprovisionsoftheLawoftheSea(LOS)Convention
andthenegotiatinghistoryofArticle46inPartIVoftheConventiononarchipelagicstates.
CONTACT J.AshleyRoach [email protected] 820S.QuincySt.,Arlington,VA22204-1562.
Theviewsexpressedinthisarticlearethoseoftheauthorandarenotintendedtoreflecttheviewsofanygovernmentor
agency.Theauthorisgratefulforthecommentsandsuggestionsmadethatimprovedthetext.Allerrorsremaintheresponsi-
bilityoftheauthor.
©2018Taylor&FrancisGroup,LLC
2 J.A.ROACH
Thereafter,relevantstatepracticeisreviewed,aswellasthePhilippinesresponsetotheTri-
bunal’s question as to a customary international law right to draw straight baselines to
enclose offshore archipelagos. Next, the possibility of enclosing the Spratlys (Nansha) with
straightbaselinesisreviewed.Thereafter,writingsthatsupportenclosingoffshorearchipela-
gos with straight baselines are examined. The rules on the formation of customary interna-
tional law are examined in this context. Possible remedies for judicial determination of
enclosingoffshorearchipelagoswithstraightbaselinesarereviewed.Severalconclusionsare
drawnfromthisanalysis.Detailsofthepracticeofstatesinenclosingtheiroffshorearchipel-
agoswithstraightbaselinesaresetoutintheappendix.
Offshorearchipelagos
The Arbitral Award speaks in terms of “offshore archipelagos.” This term is used in the
Award to describe a group of islands geographically forming an archipelago belonging to a
coastal or island state. This is in contrast to the definition of “archipelagic State” in Article
46ofPartIVoftheLOSConvention,whichreadsasfollows:
ForthepurposesofthisConvention:
(a)“archipelagicState”meansaStateconstitutedwhollybyoneormorearchipelagosand
mayincludeotherislands;
(b)“archipelago” means a group of islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting
waters and other natural features which are so closely interrelated that such islands,
watersandothernaturalfeaturesformanintrinsicgeographical,economicandpoliti-
calentity,orwhichhistoricallyhavebeenregardedassuch.
Article 46 thus limits the scope of the archipelagic regime to independent archipelagic
states, of which there are less than two dozen today. Accordingly, in this paper, “offshore
archipelagos,”whicharenotindependent“archipelagicstates,”arereferredtoas“isused”to
distinguishthemfrom“archipelagicstates.”
Doestheconventionpermittheuseofstraightbaselinestoencloseoffshore
archipelagos?
Article5,NormalBaseline,oftheLOSConventionprovides:
Except where otherwise provided in this Convention, the normal baseline for measuring the
breadthoftheterritorialseaisthelow-waterlinealongthecoastasmarkedonlarge-scalecharts
officiallyrecognizedbythecoastalState.
The introductory phrase “except where otherwise provided in this Convention” is taken
fromtheintroductoryphraseofArticle3ofthe1958TerritorialSeaConventiononthenor-
mal baseline, which reads “except where otherwise provided in these articles.”2 This phrase
correspondstoArticle4oftheILCdraftarticleonthenormalbaseline,whichreads“subject
totheprovisionsofArticle5andtotheprovisionsregardingbaysandislands.”3Thetextual
changestothisintroductoryclausebetween1956and1982weremerelydraftingchangesto
reflectotherdevelopmentsinthetreatytext.
AsArticle121(2)oftheLOSConventionprovidesthatthemaritimezonesofislands“are
determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land
OCEANDEVELOPMENT&INTERNATIONALLAW 3
territory,”Article7straightbaselinesmaybeemployedinlocalitiesonindividualislandsofa
offshorearchipelagothatmeettheapplicablegeographiccriteriainArticle7.
The introductory phrase “except where otherwise provided in this Convention” also
meansthatthefinalpreambularparagraphoftheConventionthat“mattersnotregulatedby
thisConventioncontinuetobegovernedbytherulesandprinciplesofgeneralinternational
law”4doesnotapplytothebaselineregimessetoutintheConvention,exceptArticle10(6)
onhistoricbaysandmulti-statebaysnotincludedinArticle10(1).5
Accordingly,claimsthataseparatecustomaryinternationallawrulepermitsthedrawing
of straight baselines around offshore archipelagos are without a basis in law.6 The analysis
thatfollowselaboratesonthisconclusion.
NegotiatinghistoryofLOSConventionarticle46
While it is true that the LOS Convention does not address offshore archipelagos,7 that was
theresultofalackofconsensusontheissueattheThirdConferenceontheLawoftheSea
(UNCLOSIII). ThenegotiatinghistoryofArticle46, definingtheterm“archipelagicState,”
whichledtothatoutcome,isdescribednext.
During the 1974 session of the conference, a number of states wished the archipelagic
regime nowinPartIV oftheConventionto applytooffshorearchipelagos.8Ecuadorwasa
primeproponentforthisregimetobeappliedtotheGalapagos,asithadbeenin1971.9Dur-
ing the same session other states, both archipelagic and coastal states, disagreed and pro-
posedthattheregimeapplyonlytoarchipelagicstates.10
Given thesecompeting views,the1974MainTrendsworkingpaperof theSecondCom-
mitteeonarchipelagosnecessarilyprovidedtwoalternateformulationsfortheapplicationof
the provisions on archipelagos. Formula A would apply the regime only to archipelagic
states;FormulaBwouldalsoapplytheregimetooffshorearchipelagos.11
AtthethirdsessionofUNCLOSIIIin1975,theInformalSingleNegotiatingText(ISNT)contin-
uedtopresenttwoalternateformulations.12However,atthefourthsessionin1976,followingfur-
ther informal negotiations, the Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT) omitted the provision
applying the archipelagic regime to offshore archipelagos.13 The Virginia Commentary suggests
“somedecisionhadbeenreachedregardingthestatusofoceanicarchipelagobelongingtocontinen-
talStates.”14TheIntroductiontoPartIVintheVirginiaCommentaryismoredirect:Droppingthis
provision“reflectedtheagreementwhichhadbeenreachedthattheconceptofanarchipelagicState
wouldonlybeappliedtoStatescomposedofoceanicarchipelagos,nottoarchipelagosbelongingto
acontinentalState.”15TheCommentarycorrectlynotesthatnosimilarprovisionapplyingthearchi-
pelagicregimetooffshorearchipelagos“wasincludedinanysubsequenttext.”16
Statepractice
In the portion of the Arbitral Award quoted at the beginning of this paper, the Tribunal’s
referencetostatepracticewasaconclusion.TheAwarddidnotexplainhowitarrivedatits
conclusion, although it may have drawn on the Philippines’ written answer to Question 16
posedbytheTribunalonDecember16,2014,whichreadsasfollows:17
The Philippines isinvited to address whether, asa matter of international law,anarchipelago
not pertaining to an Archipelagic State (as defined by Article 46 of the Convention) may be
4 J.A.ROACH
subjecttoasystemofstraightbaselinessurroundingthearchipelagoasawhole.ThePhilippines
islikewiseinvitedtoaddresswhethertheSpratlyIslandsmaybesuchanarchipelagopursuant
totheapplicationoftheConvention,ofhistoricrightsortitles,orofgeneralinternationallaw.
ThePhilippinesansweredthesetwoquestionsasfollows:
…anarchipelagonotpertainingtoanArchipelagicState(asdefinedbyArticle46oftheCon-
vention)maybesubjecttoasystemofstraightbaselinessurroundingthearchipelagoasawhole,
butonlyifitconformstothecriteriaforemployingstraightbaselinessetoutinArticle7ofthe
1982Convention.
…theSpratlyIslandsarenotsuch anarchipelagopursuanttotheapplication oftheConven-
tion, of historic rights or titles, or of general international law. There is no basis for drawing
straight baselines around the Spratlys as a whole, nor have China or the Philippines applied
their respective systems of straight baselines and archipelagic baselines to the Spratly Islands.
Nor has Viet Nam, which claims sovereignty over all of the Spratly features, endeavoured to
applyasystemofstraightbaselinestothem.18
Accordingly, this section lists state practice of enclosing offshore archipelagos with
straightbaselines(claimsandprotests)thatisinthepublicdomain,thedetailsofwhichare
setoutintheappendix.
ThisstatepracticeincludesmeasurestakenpriortotheLOSConventionbyDenmarkfor
the Faroes in 1963 (revised in 1976 and 2002), Norway for Svalbard in 1970 (amended in
2001), Ecuador for the Galapagos in 1971 (repeated in 2012), Spain for the Canary Islands
in1977,andFrancefortheKerguelenIslandsin1978.
ClaimsmadeaftertheadoptionoftheConventionincludeGuinea-BissauandCanada,theUnited
KingdomfortheTurksandCaicosandtheFalklandsin1989,ArgentinafortheMalvinasin1991,
ChinaforHainanIslandin1992andfortheParacelsin1996,FranceforGuadeloupein1999and
fortheLoyaltyIslandsin2002,MyanmarforCoCoandPeparisIslandsin2008,andChinaforDia-
oyuDao(SenkakuIslands)in2012anda2016claimoftherighttodosoaroundtheSpratlys.
For ease of reference, Table 1 lists these claims, where they may be found and where they
havebeenanalyzed,andanypubliclyavailablereactionsbystatesorpubliciststothoseclaims.
As canbe seenfrom thistable, sixof the15 claimsto encloseoffshore archipelagoshave
beenprotestedbyninestates,allbutoneofwhicharepartytotheLOSConvention.Several
claims are by states that lost in their effort at UNCLOS III to have the archipelagic regime
applytooffshorearchipelagos.
This practice forms the basis for the argument that such practice may be or is becoming
customary international law. However, those making that argument fail to acknowledge a
number of relevant counter factors: opposition to such claims by state parties as well as the
UnitedStates,19andthecontrarypracticebystateswithoffshorearchipelagos.Anumberof
states with offshore archipelagos have not sought to enclose them with straight baselines,
suchastheUnitedStateswithregardtoHawaii,IndiawithregardtotheAndamanandNic-
obar Islands, and Spain with regard to the Belearic Islands. (It is notable that at UNCLOS
III, India and Spain both supported permitting offshore archipelagos to be enclosed with
straight baselines.) Other states that have enclosed their offshore archipelagos with straight
baselines haveneverthelessprotestedtheclaimsof others,suchas bySpain(whichencloses
its Canary Islands with straight baselines) with regard to Ecuador’s 2012 reiteration of its
claim to enclose the Galapagos with straight baselines, as described in paragraph 3 of the
Appendix.
OCEANDEVELOPMENT&INTERNATIONALLAW 5
Table1. Offshorearchipelagosenclosedbystraightbaselines.
Feature State/date Analysis Reaction Date
Faroes Denmark LIS13 UnitedStates 1991
1959 LIS13 PrescottandSchofield,p.
141;Kopela,pp.126,
195–200
1963:DecreeNo.156of EMC3,pp.108–109n Munavvar,p.126;
April24,1963
1976:OrdinanceNo.599 Kopela,p.126 Elferfink,14IJMC,Lpp.
541,549
2002:ExecutiveOrderNo.
306,
LOSBull.,No.68,pp.13–
16
Svalbard Norway1970:Royal LIS39 Kopela,p.134
Decree,
September25,1970 Kopela,pp.119–120
2001:LOSBull.,Nos.46,
pp.72–80;
54,p.94
Galapagos Ecuador1951Legislative LIS42;IICumulative UnitedKingdom 1951
Decree,February21, Digest,pp.1791–1792
1951
1971: LOSBull.,No.83,pp.16 UnitedStates 1951,
and18
SupremeDecreeNo.959- Kopela,pp.125–126 Germany 1986,2005,
A,June28,1971 2013
Kopela,p.279 Belgium,Spain,Sweden 1986
2012 ReismanandWesterman, 2013
p.156;Munavvar,p.
126;Kopela,pp.200–
207
LOSBull.,No.80,p.14 2013
CanaryIslands Spain1977 Kopela,pp.127–130 Kopela,pp.247–252
RoyalDecreeNo.2510/
1977,Map207
Law44/2010,December
30
Kopela,p.283
KerguelenIslands France1978: Kopela,p.117 Kopela,p.117
DecreeNo.78–112(II
Durante&Rodinopp.
3–4)
2015:DecreeNo.2015–
635,
LOSBull.,No.89,pp.26–
27
Azores PortugalDecreeLawNo. IICumulativeDigest,pp. UnitedStates 1986
495/85,November29, 2068–2069
1985,
TablesIII,IV,andV Kopela,p.131;Munavvar,
p.126
Falklands UnitedKingdom1989 Kopela,pp.122–123 ReismanandWesterman,
Kopela,p.276 p.163,n93;Kopela,
pp.122–124
TurksandCaicos UnitedKingdom1989 Kopela,pp.132–133 Kopela,p.133
Kopelap.281
Malvinas Argentina1991 Kopela,p.122 Kopela,p.123
ActNo.23.968Annex
1at9–11Maps
H-410,H-411
Kopela,p.277
(Continuedonnextpage)
6 J.A.ROACH
Table1. (Continued)
Feature State/date Analysis Reaction Date
Hainan,Paracels China1992, LIS117,pp.7–8 UnitedStates 1996
1996 LOSBull.,No.38, UnitedStates,Philippines, 1996
pp.54–55 Vietnam
Kopela,p.288 Vietnam 1998
Kopela,pp.138–139
Guadeloupe France1999 Kopela,p.124 Kopela,p.124
Decree99–324,article2,
Kopela,p.278
LoyaltyIslands France2002 Kopela,p.134 Kopela,p.134
NewCaledonia LOSBull.,No.53,
pp.58–64,66;Kopela,
p.285
CoCoandPreparis MyanmarLawNo.8/2008 LOSBull.,No.70,p.61 Bangladesh 2009
Islands LOSBull.,No.69,pp. Kopela,pp.136–137
69–71;Kopela,p.286
DiaoyuDao/Senkaku China2012 2013Digest,pp.369–370 UnitedStates 2013
Islands LOSBull.,No.80,pp. Roach,ASILInsight
30–31
TheresponsebythePhilippinestotheTribunal’squestionregardinggeneralinternational
lawaddressedsomeofthesepoints,asfollows(mostfootnotesomitted):
16.17.Theobjectionstothisargumentareasobviousastheyarecompelling.First,itissimply
inconsistentwiththe1982Convention.TheConventiondoesnotleavethematteropenforfur-
therdevelopment:itregulatesitdefinitively.20Article5providesthat“Exceptwhereotherwise
provided in this Convention, the normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial
seaisthelow-waterlinealongthecoastasmarkedonlarge-scalechartsofficiallyrecognizedby
thecoastalstate”.Thedrawingofstraightbaselinesis“otherwiseprovided”forinArticles7,9,
10,and46[sic]oftheConvention.Unlessthedrawingofstraightbaselinescanbejustifiedby
referencetooneormoreofthoseprovisions,thenormalbaselinereferredtoinArticle5applies.
AnythingelseiscontrarytotheConvention.
16.18.Second,asnotedearlier,theextensionofarchipelagicstatustooffshoreoceanicarchipel-
agoswasdiscussedatUNCLOSIIIandrejected.ThelimitationofPartIVtoarchipelagicStates
waspartoftheconsensuspackagedeal.ItisnotopentoStatesPartiestoderogateunilaterally
from the Convention’s agreed terms. The regime of straight baselines and archipelagic waters
setoutinPartsIIandIVofUNCLOShasnotbeenamendedbytheStatesParties;itisnotthe
subjectofanyimplementingagreement;therearenorelevantUNGeneralAssemblyresolutions
orinformalunderstandingsoftheStatesParties;therearenointerseagreementsdealingwith
thematter.
16.19. Third, even if it could be accepted (but only for the sake of argument) that State
practice could in theory evolve into customary law displacing provisions of the Conven-
tion, a change of this kind cannot be brought about unilaterally, any more than Iceland
could change treaty provisions on fisheries jurisdiction unilaterally. It would require, if
not the agreement of other States, then at least their tacit consent or acquiescence. There
is no such tacit consent or acquiescence to any extension of the archipelagic waters
regime. Inter alia, the US, UK, and Germany have protested at the straight baselines
drawn around the Galapagos Islands. The US, Philippines and Viet Nam have protested
the straight baselines China has drawn around the Paracels. The US has also objected to
straight baselines drawn around the Faroe Islands and the Azores. At the same time, the
OCEANDEVELOPMENT&INTERNATIONALLAW 7
United States has conspicuously refrained from drawing straight baselines around the
Hawaiian Islands; France has similarly not done so around Polynesia [author’s note: but
has done so around the Kerguelen, Loyalty, and Guadeloupe islands].
16.20.Fourth,thepracticeofStateswhichhavedrawnstraightbaselinesaroundoffshorearchi-
pelagos is not sufficiently consistent, uniform or widespread to establish customary interna-
tional law on the subject. On the contrary, the contours of the alleged rule are fundamentally
uncertain. Is it an expression of the requirements of Article 7? Or of Article 47? Or of some
m(cid:1)elangeofthetwo?Orisitstricterthaneitherofthoseprovisions?Orlessstrict?Orjustdiffer-
ent? Without some authoritative articulation of the rule, State practice alone is not capable of
expressingconsistentnormativecontent.Moreover,ifthepracticeofnon-partiesisconsidered
significant, then it supports the consensus agreed at UNCLOS III, not the evolution of some
newrule.
16.21. Fifth, if on the other hand we interpret the practice of the States using straight
baselines around offshore archipelagos as largely confined to groups of closely linked
islands, where not much ocean space is enclosed, and sea routes normally used for inter-
national navigation are not affected, then it is clear that the Spratly Islands would fall out-
side any such rule on all three counts. The features which might be used as archipelagic
basepoints are tiny and widely dispersed. There is simply no scenario where a series of
straight baselines could cordon off a maritime area whose water/land ratio is anywhere
near 9:1. The total land area for the entire Spratly Island region is less than 4 square kilo-
metres, which means that any straight baseline system could only enclose within these fea-
tures a total of 36 square kilometres of water—less than the territorial sea to which the
high-tide features are already entitled. Moreover, the South China Sea, including the area
straddled by the Spratlys, is a major international shipping lane, not a remote area of
unused ocean. Preventing the enclosure of areas of this kind was exactly the reason for
the opposition of maritime States to extending the archipelagic waters regime to offshore
archipelagos.
In addition to these points made by the Philippines, it would be inaccurate to con-
clude from the lack of public protest of certain claims noted in Table 1 that states have
necessarily acquiesced in those claims, as some have written.21 In the experience of this
author, most diplomatic correspondence of this sort is most frequently conveyed
through private or classified channels, both informally and formally, and is not made
public. It may also be noted that many states will not protest unless and until their
national interests are directly affected.22 Therefore, in the absence of further evidence,
one does not know to which additional claims, if any, there has been opposition or
acquiescence, and thus it would be incorrect to assume acquiescence merely on the
basis of failure to object publicly.23
PossiblestraightbaselinesenclosingtheNanshaIslands(Spratlys)
Inthe2016AwardinthePhilippines/Chinaarbitration,theArbitralTribunaladdressedthe
possibilityofChinadrawingstraightarchipelagicbaselinesintheSpratlys:
573. … China’s statements could also be understood as an assertion that the Spratly Islands
shouldbeenclosedwithinasystemofarchipelagicorstraightbaselines,surroundingthehigh-
tidefeaturesofthegroup,andaccordedanentitlementtomaritimezonesasasingleunit.With
this, the Tribunal cannot agree. The use of archipelagic baselines (a baseline surrounding an
archipelagoasawhole)isstrictlycontrolledbytheConvention,whereArticle47(1)limitstheir
use to “archipelagic states”. Archipelagic States are defined in Article 46 as States “constituted
8 J.A.ROACH
whollybyoneormorearchipelagosandmayincludeotherislands.”ThePhilippinesisanarchi-
pelagic State (being constituted wholly by an archipelago), is entitled to employ archipelagic
baselines,anddidsoinpromulgatingthebaselinesforitsterritorialsea.China,however,iscon-
stituted principally by territory on the mainland of Asia and cannot meet the definition of an
archipelagicState.
574. In any event, however, even the Philippines could not declare archipelagic baselines sur-
rounding the Spratly Islands. Article 47 of theConvention limits theuse of archipelagic base-
linestocircumstanceswhere“withinsuchbaselinesareincludedthemainislandsandanarea
inwhichtheratiooftheareaofthewatertotheareaoftheland,includingatolls,isbetween1
to1and9to1.”TheratioofwatertolandintheSpratlyIslandswouldgreatlyexceed9:1under
anyconceivablesystemofbaselines.24
In response to this possibility, in December 2016 the United States delivered a note ver-
bale to China referring to China’s three July 12–13, 2016, statements reacting to the
Tribunal’s award regarding the maritime zonal entitlements of its claimed features in the
SouthChinaSea.25ReferringtoparagraphIIIoftheChinesegovernmentstatementandpar-
agraph70oftheChinesewhitepaper,thenotestated:
…totheextentChina’sclaimto“internalwaters”contemplateswaterswithinstraightbaselines
aroundanySouthChinaSeaisland,theUnitedStatesobjectsforreasonsincludingbutnotlim-
ited to those set forth in … Limits in the Seas #117 … Consistent with international law as
reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention, including Articles 5, 7, 46, and 47, China cannot
claimstraightorarchipelagicbaselinesintheParacelIslands,PratasIsland,MaccelesfieldBank,
ScarboroughReef,ortheSpratlyIslands.
Similarly,China’sclaimsrelatedtowhatitcalls“NanhaiZhudao(theSouthSeaIslands)”and
to “Dongsha Qundao (the Dongsha Islands), Xisha Qundao (the Xisha Islands), Zhongsha
Qundao (Zhongsha Islands) and Nansha Qundao (the Nansha Islands)” would be unlawful to
theextenttheyareintendedtoincludeanymaritimeclaimbasedongroupingmultipleislands
together as a single unit for purposes of establishing internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous
zone,exclusiveeconomiczoneandcontinentalshelforanyothermaritimeclaim.
Moreover,MacclesfieldBankisanentirelysubmergedfeature;itandotherfeaturesinthe
South China Sea that are not “islands” as reflected in Article 121(1) of the Law of the Sea
Conventionarenotsubjecttoappropriationanddonotgenerateanyentitlementtoaterri-
torialsea,contiguouszone,exclusiveeconomiczoneorcontinentalshelfundertheinterna-
tionallawofthesea.26
Notwithstanding the foregoing, China has continued to assert its right under customary
international law to enclose the Spratlys with straight baselines and has been supported by
scholarswhosewritingsarediscussedinthenextsection.
Writingssupportingtherighttodrawstraightbaselinesenclosingoffshore
archipelagos
There areatleastninescholars(eightofwhomaremainlandChinese)whohavesupported
China’srighttodrawstraightbaselinesenclosingtheSpratly(Nansha)Islands:JiangLiand
Zhang Jie; Jia Nan; Hong Nong, Li Jianwei, and Chen Pingping; Zhang Hua; Chris
Whormseley;andYuxiaoHan.Theirarticlesarediscussedchronologicallyinthissection.
Perhapsthefirstarticletoexaminethequestionofwhetherthearchipelagicregimecould
be applied in the South China Sea was a co-authored article published in 2010, “A
OCEANDEVELOPMENT&INTERNATIONALLAW 9
PreliminaryAnalysisoftheApplicationofArchipelagicRegimeandtheDelimitationofthe
SouthChinaSea.”27AfterexaminingthenegotiatinghistoryofArticle46,LiandJiecorrectly
concludethat“thearchipelagicregimewasexcludedfromapplyingtothemid-oceanarchi-
pelagos,”thatis,offshorearchipelagos.However,theseauthorsthenstatethat“[n]eitherthe
legislativeprocessnorthespecificprovisionsoftheConventiongiveaclearindicationasto
the legal status” of offshore archipelagos and that so far “no final conclusion on this issue
has been made in the circle of the international maritime law” (page 171). After explaining
theviewsofscholarsproandcononthisissue,theauthorsconcludethatwhilethearchipe-
lagicregime cannotbeappliedtooffshorearchipelagos,theregimeofstraightbaselinescan
beappliedtothemasawhole,andalsotothefourgroupsofislandsintheSouthChinaSea,
relying on the practice of states that have done so (pages 174–185). This article does take
accountofoppositiontothosestates’claimsandcontrarystatepractice.
A second article, “On the Outlying Archipelagos of Continental States,” appeared in
2012.28 Jia Nan continues the theme that the regime concerning offshore archipelagos
“remains unsettled,” treating offshore archipelagos as separate categories of archipelagos
(coastalandmid-ocean).Henotesthattheuncertaintycontinues“tothisday,duetodiverg-
ingstatepracticesandvarioustheoriesofpublicists”(page45).Hereviewsstatepracticeand
the views of publicists separately for each of his categories of offshore archipelagos (pages
46–56) and concludes straight baselines can be used to enclose “outlying” (mid-ocean) off-
shorearchipelagos(page57).Jia’sarticlesuffersfromthesamedeficienciesasthefirstarticle
discussedinthepreceding,inparticularhisrecognitionof“divergingstatepractices”under-
cutsclaimsforanew,permissive,customarylawrule.
In 2013 a third and more detailed analysis appeared in the co-authored article, “The
ConceptofArchipelagicStateandtheSouthChinaSea:UNCLOS,StatePracticeandImpli-
cation.”29AfterrecountingtheexistingarchipelagicstatesregimeinPartIVoftheConven-
tion,andbrieflyreviewingthenegotiationsoverwhethertoincludeoffshorearchipelagosin
thearchipelagicstateregime,theauthorsrelyonthefactthat“thefinalversionofUNCLOS
leaves the issue out,” asserting that there are “no provisions clearly stating what principles
should be applied to oceanic archipelagos of continental States in regard to their baselines,
their maritimezones andrelevantjurisdictionalmechanisms” (page220).The authorscon-
cedethatthenegotiatinghistorydemonstratesthattherewasadeliberatedecisionintheSec-
ond Committee and the Conference to apply the archipelagic state regime only to
independentarchipelagicstatesmeetingthecriteriainArticle46.TheauthorspointtoChi-
neseandotherAsianscholarswhosupportthisconclusion,whilesummarizingthepositions
ofotherChinesescholarswhodisagree(page222).
Further,theseauthors,likethosebeforethem,donotmentiontheconstraintsimposedby
Article5,NormalBaseline,tolimitallrelevantbaselineprovisionstothosecontainedinthe
Convention.Inaddition,nomentionismadeofArticle121(2),whichprovidesthatthemar-
itimezonesofislands(otherthanrocks)“aredeterminedinaccordancewiththeprovisions
of[the]Conventionapplicabletootherlandterritory.”
The authors draw support for their argument to apply straight baselines to China’s fea-
tures in the South China Sea from a lengthy description of the practice of Ecuador
(Galapagos),Denmark(FaroeIslands),Norway(Svalbard),Spain(CanaryIslands),andPor-
tugal (Azores) (pages 223–237). The authors fail to take note of the opposition to those
claimsandthecontrarypracticedescribedearlierinthispaper(inthefifthsection)thatwas
publicly available at the time of writing of their article. Similarly, the description of China’s
10 J.A.ROACH
practice in using (only)straight baselines inthe SouthChinaSea doesnot mentionopposi-
tiontotheirusealongthemainland, HainanIsland,theParacels,andtheDiaoyuDao/Sen-
kakus(pages237–239).ThepaperconcludesbyraisingthepossibilitythatChinawillapply
thestraightbaselineregimetotheNansha/SpratlyandZhongsha/MaccelsfieldBank30island
groups(page239).
AnotherscholarsuggestingChinadrawarchipelagicstraightbaselinesintheSouthChina
Sea,withoutmakingspecificreferencetotheSpratlys,wasDr.Kuen-chenFuinashortarti-
cleentitled“FreedomofNavigationandChineseStraightBaselinesintheSouthChinaSea,”
basedonhispresentationattheCenterforOceansLawandPolicy2013conferenceinSeoul,
Republic of Korea. There, Dr. Fu, then dean of the South China Sea Institute, Xiamen Uni-
versity, recounts in some detail the negotiating history in 1974–1976 of failed attempts to
extend the archipelagic state regime to offshore archipelagos. After concluding it would be
infeasible to amend the Convention, he suggests that the best course of action for China
wouldbetoapply“theprincipleofarchipelagicwaters”unilaterallytotheParacelsandother
locales in the South China Sea while delineating sea lanes “to allow foreign vessels and air-
crafts to sail through and fly over the internal waters created by its straight territorial sea
baselinesintheregion.”31
AfifthscholarwritingonthissubjectisZhangHua,alectureratNanjingUniversityLaw
School. In 2014, he published an article (in Chinese) entitled “On the Legality of Applying
StraightBaselinestoChina’sMid-OceanArchipelagos:APerspectivefromCustomaryInter-
nationalLaw.”32Therearetwoweaknessestohisargument.
First, while acknowledging there is no specific provision in the LOS Convention on the
application of straight baselines to offshore archipelagos, his brief, one short paragraph,
review of the negotiating history at UNCLOS III (page 137 of the original) merely notes
someoftheproposalstopermitstraightbaselinestoencloseoffshorearchipelagos.Hethen
assumesthatthematterisnotregulatedbytheConventionandtherefore“judgingthelegal-
ity of this type of straight baseline naturally cannot resort to the provisions of UNCLOS”
(page 138). He then asserts that the legal basis for applying straight baselines to offshore
archipelagos “originates from customary international law, andis ‘sui generis’…and natu-
rallycannotbecomparedwithnormalstraightbaselinesandarchipelagicstraightbaselines”
(pages 139, 141). He fails to consider the full history recounted earlier in this paper (in the
fourthsection)andtheeffectoftheintroductoryphrasetoArticle5“exceptwhereotherwise
providedinthisConvention”discussedinthepreceding(thirdsection).
Second, his recount of and reliance on state practice are incomplete and unconvinc-
ing. He describes 12 of the claims in Table 1, but mentions only the U.S. reactions to
those claims. He fails to acknowledge protests by others, all state parties, identified in
the preceding and detailed in the appendix, as well as the contrary state practice
described in the fifth section of this paper. He concludes that the United States is a
mere “persistent objector” that cannot prevent the development of customary interna-
tional law. He makes this assertion on the unproven claim that the “international soci-
ety has adopted a silent attitude toward the use of straight baselines for” offshore
archipelagos (page 138); as stated earlier in this paper, there is no evidence of the
actions by states in nonpublic diplomatic correspondence.
A sixth scholar supporting China’s right to draw straight baselines enclosing offshore
archipelagos in the South China Sea is Chris Whomersley, a former deputy legal adviser in
the United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office. His article “The Award on the