Notes on an Anarchist Theory of Language, or, A Sympathetic Critique of Zerzan's Primitivist ...

25 Pages·2011·0.32 MB·English

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AnarchistDevelopmentsinCulturalStudies
TenYearsAfter9/11: AnAnarchistEvaluation
2011.1
Notes on an Anarchist Theory
of Language, or, A Sympathetic
Critique of Zerzan’s Primitivist
Refusal of Symbolic Language
Tere Vadén
*
Abstract
Theanarcho-primitivistrefusalofsymboliclanguageistypicallypre-
sentedinwritingorinspeech.Thisobviousparadoxcanbealleviated
byadoptinganotionoflanguagethatisbothmorenaturalisticand
morephenomenologicalthantheoneincludedintheprimitivistcri-
tique.Fromtheprimitivistpointofview,apositiveconsequenceisthe
possibilityofanon-hierarchicaltheoryofexperienceandlanguage,
oneinwhichthecutbetweenthetwoiserased. Atthesametime,
thisasubjectivetheoryofexperienceandlanguagemeansthatthe
critiqueoftechnologyandcivilisationcannotbebasedonthenotions
ofsubjectivityandindividuality;aconsequencethatdoesnotsitwell
withallofthetenetsofanarcho-primitivistthought.
TereVadénteachesphilosophyandinteractivemediaintheUniversityofTampere,
*
Finland.HeisalsoaneditoroftheFinnishphilosophicaljournalniin&näin.
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TheProblem: PrimitivistParadox
InFragmentsofanAnarchistAnthropology(2004:15)anthropolo-
gistDavidGraebercreditsauthorandpoetRobertGraveswiththe
(mostrecent)“invention”oftwomajorintellectualtraditions: the
ideaofaGreatGoddess(MotherEarth,Gaia)andarejectionofin-
dustrialcivilisation. Graebergoesontosaythatwhilepaganshave
adoptedthefirstidea,agroupofprimitivistswithJohnZerzanas
themostfamousproponent,havetakentherejectionofcivilisation
andhopeofitscollapseevenfurtherbysuggestingthattheadop-
tionofagriculturewasaBigMistake.1Graeberagreeswithoneof
thecentralclaimsofprimitivisttheory: therehavebeenandstill
aresocieties(peoples,groups,bands)thatdisplayverylittleofthe
hierarchicalandviolenttraitsofmodernity. Thisissomethingthat
theanthropologicalrecordisclearon,andwhileGraeberreliesalso
oncontemporarywork(partlyhisown)oncontemporarysocieties,
thelocusclassicusofprimitivism,Zerzan’sessay“FuturePrimitive”
(1994), credits the seminal work of anthropologists like Marshall
SahlinandRichardLee. AnothercommonbeliefforGraeberand
Zerzanisthatthestudyofthese(typicallynon-Western)non-hierar-
chicalsocietiesmayyieldfruitfulexperiencesandknowledgeabout
howtoovercomethecurrentunsustainablepractices—socially,eco-
logically,politically,spiritually.2
Whatdoestheanthropologicalrecordtell,then,accordingtoGrae-
ber,Zerzanandothers? Boththeexampleswehaveandatheoretical
analysisofthereasonsofwhytheyaregoodexamplespointtothe
covariant absence of violence and alienation with the absence of
agriculture, division of labour and symbolic culture. These three
characteristics—agriculture/domestication,divisionoflabourand
symbolicculture—formaninterweavingcommontargetforprim-
itivist critique. They are not only historically linked in that they
seemtoariseinhumanevolutionroughlysimultaneously,butare
alsoconceptuallyconnected,inthatagriculturedemandsdivisionof
labourandsymbolicculture,withoutwhichitwouldbeimpossible
1 Zerzan(1994:42)seestheideaoftheMotherEarthasafeatureofagriculturalsocieties.
2 SeealsoDouglasP.Fry’spath-breakingTheHumanPotentialforPeace: AnAnthro-
pologicalChallengetoAssumptionsaboutWarandViolence(2005). Fryshowsthat
aggressionandwararenot“natural”tohumansocieties.Ontheotherhand,hedoes
findbothagriculturalandgatherer-huntersocietiesthathaveacultureofpeaceful-
ness.
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NotesonanAnarchistTheoryofLanguage 243
inanylargescale. AsZerzan(1999:41)pointsout,writingarises
asaccounting;itisatoolofhierarchyfromitsveryinception: “The
earliestwritingsarerecordsoftaxes,laws,termsoflaborservitude.”
Zerzanseesthatevenifthesethreeandotherinterconnectedphe-
nomena—suchashierarchy,gendersystems, organisedviolence,
etc. — could in abstract thought be picked apart and analysed in
separation, such an analysis is not helpful as it loses the integral
livephenomenon: “Self-domesticationthroughlanguage,art,and
ritualinspiredthetamingofanimalsandplantsthatfollowed”(ibid.:
28). OneimportantconsequencetorememberisthatforZerzan,the
progressofdomesticationimpliestheincreaseofviolence—contrary
tothereceivedunderstandingofthemeaningoftheterm.
Thesetwoanarchists,GraeberandZerzan,partwaysinsuggest-
ingthelessonsoftheanthropologicalobservations. WhileZerzan
thinksthatonlyprimitiveconditionsmayprovideforfullhumanre-
alisation,Graeber(2004:16)doesseesomethingquixoticinanarcho-
primitivism,comparingitagaintoGraeves’work: “[...]itisreally
impossible to know on what level one is supposed to read it. It’s
bothridiculousself-parody,andterriblyserious,atthesametime.”
ThoughGraeberdoesnotelaborate,onecanguessthatonesupposed
element of self-parody in primitivism is the fact that primitivists’
texts, including Zerzan’s often erudite and richly sourced essays,
readalotlikehighlycivilisedtreatises, thusinawaytakingpart
inthespecialised,mediatedandsymbolicculturetheyatthesame
timerefuse. Zerzanhimselfnotestheparadoxattheendoftheessay
“Language: OriginandMeaning”(inZerzan1999),butgoesontosay
thathehastousewordsinordertospeak. Indeed,wemightwantto
acceptZerzan’sprimitivistanalysisofthe“BigMistake”onlytoend
upwithaconundrum: ifsymbolicthoughtisnecessarytoreification,
objectificationandalienation,howisitpossibletoworkagainstit
inwords,bywritingandspeaking? Oneofthethingsthatmakes
writingandspeakingaboutprimitivism“ridiculous”is,presumably,
preciselythisstrictimpossibilityofpractisingwhatonepreaches
— an impossibility that is in a sense as troubling as the practical
impossibilityofgatherer-hunterlivelihoodsonthecontemporary
depletedandoverpopulatedplanet.
Thisparadoxmightalsobeattheheartofacuriouspassageinan
interviewofZerzanbyDerrickJensen. Thecontextisadiscussionon
violenceandwordsasweapons. Jensenisfrustratedbythefactthat
whiletalkingisbeingdone,theworlddeterioratesfurtherandnature
isbeingdestroyed. Jensen(2000)says: “Ortotakeanotherexample,
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IrecentlyreadthatGandhiwrotealettertoHitlerappealingtohis
conscience,andwasamazedthatitdidn’twork.”HereisZerzan’s
answer: “Gandhi’s failure doesn’t mean words must always fail.
Hewasobviouslydirectinghiswordsatthewrongplace. Hadhe
spokenmoreradicalandeffectivewordstohisfellowIndians,things
mightbedifferenttherenow.”Thisisarelativelysurprisinganswer,
compared,forinstance,withtheblanketstatement: “Alongthese
lines,intermsofstructure,itisevidentthat‘freedomofspeech’does
notexist;grammaristheinvisible‘thoughtcontrol’ofourinvisible
prison. Withlanguagewehavealreadyaccommodatedourselves
to a world of unfreedom” (Zerzan 1999: 34). Do or do not words
alwaysfail? Or,toputitinanotherway,wheredoesthe—obvious
—liberatingandhealingpoweroflanguagestemfrom?
To answer these questions we have to look closely at Zerzan’s
critiqueofsymboliccultureandlanguage,atthesametimeremem-
beringthatthesearenottobeseparatedfromthelargerphenomenon
ofwhichtheyareparts. Hopefully, thiswaywemightbeableto
alleviatetheparadoxwithoutthrowingthebabyoutwiththebath-
water;thatis,withoutlosingtheoverallcriticalanalysisofcivilisa-
tionandtheBigMistake.
WhatisWrongwithLanguage?
Thequoteabovealreadylocatesthecruxofthecritique: language
isastructuresetuponmoreamorphousandfreeexperience. More
particularly,“Symbolisingislinear,successive,substitutive;itcannot
beopentoitswholeobjectsimultaneously. Itsinstrumentalreason
isjustthat: manipulativeandseekingdomination. Itsapproachis
‘let a stand for b’ instead of ‘let a be a.‘ Language has its basis in
theefforttoconceptualizeandequalizetheunequal,thusbypassing
the essence and diversity of a varied, variable richness” (Zerzan
2002: 2). The claim that symbols and language have a petrifying
effectis,assuch,arelativelywell-knownthemeeveninstandard
Westernphilosophyoflanguage3andphilosophicalanthropology,
3 Forinstance,theanarchistphilosopherPaulFeyerabenddevotedhisposthumously
publishedworkConquestofAbundance.ATaleofAbstractionversustheRichnessof
Being(1999)tothethemeofhowWesternphilosophyhasbeenobsessedwithatrend
ofoversimplificationandahabitofglorifyingtheoversimplified.
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NotesonanAnarchistTheoryofLanguage 245
asZerzandemonstrateswithamplequotationsin“Language: Origin
andMeaning.”
Tobesure,mostcontemporaryphilosophicalthoughtonlanguage
agreeswithZerzanthatsymbolisationinsomesenseobstructsorcon-
structsexperience. Therearesomeschoolsintheso-calledanalytic
traditionofphilosophyoflanguage,wherethought(proposition)and
language(representation)areseenasindependent. Consequently,
thedependenceofthoughtonlanguage(i.e.,linguisticrelativism)is
denied,andtheultimatefreedomofsymbolicthoughtasserted. How-
ever,alreadyBertrandRussell(2002:218),aclassicoftheanalytic
tradition, saw a connection between grammar and philosophical
thought. InJenseitsvonGutundBöseNietzschefamouslyspeculated
ontheinfluenceofIndo-EuropeangrammaronWesternmetaphysics
andthedifferenceincomparisontoUralic-Altaiclanguages(Niet-
zsche1999). SinceNietzsche,theideathatlanguagesomehowforces
itsstamponthoughtandexperienceinspiteofthewishorwillof
theexperiencingsubjecthasbeenamainstayofmanyschoolsof
continentalthought. Infact,oneofthemainthemesof20thcentury
phenomenologyinGermany(Heidegger)andFrance(Sartre)isthe
descriptionofhowlanguage—widelyunderstood—formsthatvery
subjectivityandthesocialstructuresaroundit. Anextremeexample
isthethoughtofJacquesLacan, wheretheintroductionofthein-
fanttothesymbolicuniverseisthefoundinggestureofsubjectivity
(see,e.g.,Žižek1996; interestingly,Žižek(2008:52)agreesonthe
violentnatureofsymbolisation: “thereissomethingviolentinthe
verysymbolisationofathing,whichequalsitsmortification”).
Corresponding to this idea of language as an oppressive filter
on experience is both the philosophical and artistic craving for a
form of experience (and possibly expression) that would be free
of ossified linguistic structures. As an example one can mention
Schopenhauer’snotionofmusicasthedirectlifeofWille,without
thepracticalandsymbolic—andthereforeservile—sidesofallother
formsofart. Oneformofthiscravingisthe(romantic)idealofart-
for-art’s-sake,artwithoutanyulteriormotivesthatwoulddemand
structuresonexperience.
Theinsistenceonnon-symbolicexperienceisoftenseenasnaïve.
Manyschoolsofphilosophyotherwisesympathetictotheideasof
liberationandemancipationpointoutthatpureorunmediatedex-
periencedoesnotexist. Oftenthisclaimofnon-existenceistaken
furtherbyclaimingthat,consequently,asearchforpureexperience
is not only empirically misguided but also ethically dubious. For
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example,aLacaniantheoristwouldpointoutthathumansubjectiv-
ityisformedbythestructuresofthesymbolicuniversesothata
yearningforpureexperienceisayearningbeyondnotonlysubjectiv-
itybutalsohumanityaltogether. Nodoubt,manyLacanianswould
findtheideaofpureexperiencenotsomuchatopictobediscussed
butasymptomtobediagnosed. Likewise,apostmodernistthinker
wouldpointoutthat“thereisnothingbeyondtext”;allmeaningis
constructed. Ifthereissomethingbeyondtextthenthatsomething
cannotbydefinitionbemeaningful. ThisDerrideanpointiscloseto
Wittgenstein’s(2001)argumentagainstprivatelanguage: meaning-
fullanguageisbydefinitionsomethingsharedandintersubjective.
Thereforealanguagefullyliberatedfromthestructuresofgrammar,
ideologyandsoonwouldpresumablyloseitsintelligibility—we
get the paradox of primitivist texts in a new form. The problem
isnotonlyrelatedtomeaningandcommunication,butalsosocial.
For instance, a Foucaultian theorist would say that an insistence
onpureexperienceisamoveinagameofpower/knowledgewith
specificeffectsandassuchimpotenttomoveoutsidetheexisting
co-ordinatesofepistemologicallyrelevantaction.
Insum,mostofcontemporarycontinentaltheory(aswellasana-
lyticphilosophy,initscritiqueofthe“mythofthegiven”(seeSellars
1956),i.e.,themythofatheory-free—orsymbol-freeorinterpreta-
tion-free—experience)agreesthatthestructuresofmeaningand
subjectivity are the structures of language, understood in a wide
sense. Thus the eradication of language in favour of a non-inter-
pretative,non-symbolicordirectexperienceisatbestanillusionof
pre-humanexistenceandatworstaproto-authoritativequestfor
unproblematicanduncriticalauthenticitybeyondbothsubjective
and intersubjective criteria. Put briefly, according to the critique,
to insist on pure experience is to elevate something that can not
bediscussedorcriticisedintoadecisiverole,therebypromotinga
worldofmight-makes-right.
TohiscreditZerzaniswillingtofacetheparadoxandgoallthe
way. Iftheintersubjectivityofsociallifeandmeaningfulcommuni-
cationare,indeed,dependentonandconstructedoutofsymboliclan-
guage,andiftheroadtodirectexperiencemeanslanguagelessness,
thenwehavetodowithoutintersubjectivityandcommunicationin
thesensesgiventotheminthetheoriesmentionedabove: “Andif
timelessnessresolvesthesplitbetweenspontaneityandconscious-
ness,languagelessnessmaybeequallynecessary”(Zerzan1999:31).
That,mostcertainly,meansdoingwithoutacivilisationrecognisable
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NotesonanAnarchistTheoryofLanguage 247
from a Lacanian, Derridean or Foucaultian perspective. Zerzan’s
primitivismacceptsnohalf-measureshere.
GettingRidofSymbolicLanguage
However,thereisadeeperproblematissue. Letusproceedby
wayofananalogy. Anarcho-primitivismisnotaboutsurvivalismor
life-boatism. Itmaybepossibleforahealthyyoungpersontolive
inprimitiveconditions(say,inaforestwithoutmoderntechnology):
however,thatisnottheinterestingthing. Theinterestingproblem
ishowtolivewithoutcivilisationinlarger,socialgroupsconsisting
ofseveralgenerationsforlongperiodsoftime. Analogously,itmay
very well be possible to temporarily get rid of ossified symbolic
language(say,inartisticorreligiouscontexts),butthatisnotthe
interestingproblem. Theinterestingcaseislanguagethatissocial,
multi-generationalandnon-alienating. Letuscallthisinteresting
casethatof“collectivenon-symboliclanguage.”
Theanthropologicalrecordalsotellsusthategalitarianandnon-
alienatedband-societies,includingtheclassiccaseof!KungBush-
men,oftenrelyonrichoraltraditionsandengageinstory-tellingand
othertypesofdiscussionsonadailybasis(Lee1968:37).4Thereis
noprimafaciereasontothinkthatthisis“symboliccommunication,”
atleastnobetterreasonthantothinkthatprimitivestonetoolsare
“technology.”Indeed,onemayofferthehypothesisthatinbothcases,
i.e.,inovergeneralisingstonetoolsastechnologyandalllanguage
assymboliccommunication,themistakeistotaketheself-under-
standingandself-descriptionofWesternmetaphysicsatfacevalue.
Westernmetaphysicalcivilisationbelievesthatalllanguageissym-
boliccommunicationandthatallengagementwiththeenvironment
istechnology. Ifthesebeliefsweretrue,itwouldcertainlymakethe
caseforcivilisationmuchstronger. Thesebeliefsarealsothedriving
forcebehindthecritiqueaccordingtowhichtheabandonmentof
reasonandcommunicativerationalitymeansalsotheabandonment
ofethicsinfavourofauthorityandviolence.
4 SeealsoGraeber’semphasisonthecentralityoforaltraditionsinmodernday“Provi-
sionalAutonomousZones”inMadagascar(Graeber2007).Theoralityofthelinguistic
traditionmaybecrucialhere.AsJamesC.Scott(2010)hasargued,thestate-evasive
practicesofmanypeoplesinuplandSoutheastAsiaincludethelossofliteracy:in
ordertolivewithoutstatehierarchycertaingroupshavebecomeeffectivelypost-lit-
erate.
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Here,itisimportanttonotethattheconsistentrefusalofinter-
subjectivecommunicativesymboliclanguagebyZerzandoesnot,
assuch,answertothecriticismthatatthesametimemeaningful
criteria of ethics are lost, and that the search for immediacy and
experience happens in a vacuum where authority and force have
alltheassetsontheirside. Twopointshavetobenotedhere. First,
again to his credit, Zerzan does not brush the problem under the
carpetbyclaimingthatexperientialintensityorimmediacywould
somehow guarantee non-authoritarian or non-hierarchical condi-
tions. Experiential intensity and immediacy does have a part in
individual and collective oppression and murderousness. Second,
thisiswheretheanthropologicalobservationthatnon-civilisedand
egalitariansocietiesdoexistbecomescrucial. Ofcourse,itwouldin
principlebepossibletoclaimthatgiventhefailureofcivilisation,
therefusaloftheessentialsymbolicstructuresmakingcivilisation
possible—andconsequentlytherefusalofcivilisation—wouldbe
advisable even if we had no examples of successful non-civilised
life: therefusalwouldbea“jumpintotheabyss.”However,thein-
creaseddivisionoflabour,exploitationofnature,spiritualalienation,
andsoon,seemtogotogether(and,viceversa,thefactthatwhen
thesearedecreased,wemaycomeclosetoaformofhunter-gatherer
egalitarianism,sustainabilityandnonviolence)givetheprimitivist
argumentagainstsymbolicstructuresthenatureofaprogramme
andprovideitwithadirection(towardprimitive’conditions). How-
ever,inordertoanswertotheethicalproblem, thisdirectionhas
tobesupplementedwithanideaofhowtheslidedowntheslope
ofintersubjectivecommunicativesymboliclanguageistoendinan
egalitarian and anarchistic situation and not, say, in an experien-
tiallyexitedrabidnationalismorethnicism. Thisistheexperiential
sideofthepoliticalproblemofhowthecollapseofstatepoweris
toleadtoamoreegalitarianandanarchistsociety,andnottothe
ruleofwarlordsandMafiathugs(aproblemthatconcernsGraeber
inPossibilities(2007)).
Withregardtotheethicsoftheissue,itisinstructivetolookat
thecaseofGermanphilosopherMartinHeidegger,whosethought
servesasaspringboardfornearlyallcontemporarycontinentaland
postmodernphilosophy,includingDerridaandFoucault. Whatdoes
Heideggersayabouttherelationshipbetweensymboliclanguage
andexperience? ThecaseofHeideggerisrevealingbecausehehas
beenaccusedofmakingpreciselythemistakeofgivingfullreignto
thesearchforauthenticexperienceandtherebyfallingintotheallure
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NotesonanAnarchistTheoryofLanguage 249
ofNazism(seeDerrida1991andŽižek1999). Heidegger’sphiloso-
phypresentshumansfirstandforemostasengagedandembodied
beings that can under certain circumstances function as individ-
ualsubjects. However,primordiallyandforthemostparthumans
are a “distributed” opening and experiencing of a shared always-
alreadymeaningfulworldtowhichtheyarethrown(thismodeofex-
istenceHeideggercallsDasein). Heideggercriticisescontemporary
civilisationforforgettingthisfundamentalhumanconstitutionand
coveringitupbytheobject-likestructuresofsubjectivity,science,
rationalityandsoon. ForHeidegger,thesubjectandtheobjectare
bothstructuresthatareundercertainconditions(thoseofWestern
metaphysics)builtonamoreprimordialasubjectiveandaobjective
levelofbeing-in-the-world(seeHeidegger1993andthecommentary
inDreyfus1990).
WhenHeideggerinsiststhatlosingoneselfintotheeverydayav-
erageness(dasMan)ofwhat-everybody-saysandwhat-everybody-
wantscanbecounteredbyresolutelyfacingmortalityandanxiety
thatrevealamoreauthenticwayofbeing,thedangerofmisusing
thenotionofauthenticitydoes,indeed,appear. Forinstance,itcan
beclaimedthatthisHeideggeriandescriptionleavestoomuchroom
intermsofthecontentofauthenticity: almostanyresolutefacing
ofdeathandanxietywilldo.5Acceptingthathumanbeingisbased
onnothingandthatallmeaningisgoingtodie,andstillresolutely
pushingaheadand“choosingaherointhegenerationalbattleofa
people”(asHeideggerputsitintheendofSeinundZeit)becomes
avoluntaristicenterprise: nationalsocialismwilldo,ifitpromises
a rooted and embodied stand in the face of nothingness. Losing
oneselfinthe“authentic”national(völkisch)experience,onelosesall
intersubjectiveoruniversalethicalcriteria. Heidegger(1976)does
claim,forinstance,thattheovercomingofWesternmetaphysicsis
aproblemthatcanbeencounteredonlyintheGermanlanguage;if
Heideggerisright,wewhodonotspeakGermanasanativelanguage
justhavetoacceptthisclaimwithoutreallybeingabletoevaluate
it. Thesamegoesfornationalexperience: wewhodonotbelong
toit,cannotreallycriticiseitoritsauthenticityeither. However,
fromtheanarcho-primitivistperspectivethecritiqueofHeidegger
should not concentrate on the fact that Heidegger tries to under-
minethecriteriaofcommunicativerationality(agoalthatanarcho-
primitivismshareswithHeidegger),butratheronthefactthathe
5 SeetheanalysisofHeideggerasadecisionistbyKrockow(1990).
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didnotradicallyenoughquestionstructureslikedivisionoflabour
andhierarchy,bothofwhichcharacterisedhisviewsonpoliticsand
philosophy.6
Language,SubjectiveandAsubjective
Howdoesthisethicalproblemapplytoaprimitivistsearchforim-
mediateexperience? WehavetogobacktoZerzan’scritiqueoflan-
guage. InZerzan’saccount,languageintroducesadistancebetween
humans and nature and humans and their experience: “Though
language, initsdefinitivefeatures, seemstobecompletefromits
inception,itsprogressismarkedbyasteadilydebasingprocess. The
carvingupofnature,itsreductionintoconceptsandequivalencies,
occursalonglineslaiddownbythepatternsoflanguage. Andthe
morethemachineryoflanguage,againparallelingideology,subjects
existencetoitself,themoreblinditsroleinreproducingasociety
of subjugation” (1999: 33). In this very basic sense, language is a
tool of alienation, when alienation is understood as explained by
Zerzan: “Marxdefinedalienationasbeingseparatedfromthemeans
ofproduction. Insteadofproducingthingstouse,weareusedby
thesystem. Iwouldtakeitastepfurtherandsaythattomeitmeans
estrangedfromourownexperiences,dislodgedfromanaturalmode
ofbeing”(ZerzaninJensen2000).
Tobesure,thistendencyexistsinlanguage. Heidegger’sdescrip-
tionoftheaverageeverydaynessoflanguageanditswayoflevelling
authenticexistenceprovidesasimilardescription. Butisthisallthere
istolanguage?
To say that language is necessarily or only a tool of alienation
seemsstrangegiventhefullcontinuumoflanguagefromthesimple
cries and calls of animals to full-fledged human language. There
seems to be no clear-cut point where the “language” of animals
andbabies(or,non-alienated,intoxicated,impaired,etc.,humans)
turns into the necessarily alienating symbolic structure (Zerzan)
orthecalculating,translatableanduniversalisablelanguageofthe
marketplaceandthesciences(Heidegger). Indeed,giventherich
varietyofcallsandcriesintheanimalworld,itislittlewonderthat
scientists widely agree that some animals do posses rudimentary
6 TheethicalprobleminHeideggerandhiscritiqueoftechnologyisfurtherdiscussed
inVadén(2004).
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