Table Of ContentNormative Pluralism
oxford moral theory
Series Editor
David Copp, University of California, Davis (Emeritus)
Drawing Morals
Essays in Ethical Theory
Thomas Hurka
Commonsense Consequentialism
Wherein Morality Meets Rationality
Douglas W. Portmore
Against Absolute Goodness
Richard Kraut
The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty
Pekka Väyrynen
In Praise of Desire
Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder
Confusion of Tongues
A Theory of Normative Language
Stephen Finlay
The Virtues of Happiness
A Theory of the Good Life
Paul Bloomfield
Having It Both Ways
Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics
Edited by Guy Fletcher and Michael Ridge
Motivational Internalism
Edited by Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder,
John Eriksson, and Fredrik Björklund
The Meaning of ‘Ought’
Beyond Descriptivism and Expressivism in Metaethics
Matthew Chrisman
Practical Knowledge
Selected Essays
Kieran Setiya
Articulating the Moral Community
Toward a Constructive Ethical Pragmatism
Henry S. Richardson
Consequentialism
New Directions, New Problems
Edited by Christian Seidel
Opting for the Best
Oughts and Options
Douglas W. Portmore
Normative Pluralism
Resolving Conflicts between
Moral and Prudential Reasons
Mathea Slåttholm Sagdahl
Normative Pluralism
Resolving Conflicts between Moral and
Prudential Reasons
MATHEA SLÅTTHOLM SAGDAHL
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Library of Congress Control Number: 2022908204
ISBN 978–0 – 19– 761469–3
DOI: 10.1093/o so/ 9780197614693.001.0001
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed by Integrated Books International, United States of America
Contents
Preface ix
1. I ntroduction 1
1.1. What We Ought to Do 1
1.2. Topic, Scope, and Aims 3
1.3. Normative Pluralism and Value Pluralism: Separate Topics 7
1.4. Procedure 10
2. Structures of Normativity and the Concept of “Ought” 14
2.1. Introduction 14
2.2. Morality and Prudence as Normative Sources 16
2.3. A Non- Relational View: Morality and Prudence as
Competing Theories of Ought 19
2.4. Normative Pluralism and Incommensurable Oughts 21
2.4.1. I ncommensurability as Noncomparability 24
2.5. Qualified Oughts as Genuine Oughts 26
2.6. The Unqualified Ought 28
2.6.1. C omprehensiveness 29
2.6.2. S upremacy 32
2.7. The Meaning of “Ought All Things Considered” and
“Just Plain Ought” 33
2.7.1. R easons and “Most Reason” 37
2.7.2. P ermissibility and Silence 38
3. The Grounding and Extent of Normative Pluralism 41
3.1. Introduction 41
3.2. A Teleological Grounding 41
3.3. Deflationary Normative Pluralism 47
3.4. Grounding a Reasonable Set of Normative Standpoints 50
3.4.1. T op- Down versus Bottom-U p Approach to Normativity 52
3.4.2. D erivative and Fundamental Normativity 58
3.5. Sidgwick and the Dualism of Practical Reason 60
3.5.1. Th e Dualism as Normative Pluralism 62
3.5.2. Th e Grounding of the Dualism 64
3.6. A Kantian Approach? 71
3.7. The Dualism of Practical Reason and Reasons of Meaningfulness 76
3.8. Summary and Conclusion 84
vi Contents
4. Incommensurability, Rationality, and Choice 86
4.1. Introduction 86
4.2. Normative Monism and Practical Rationality 88
4.3. Normative Pluralism and Practical Rationality 91
4.4. Rationality and Incommensurable Options 97
4.5. Choice and Intelligibility 103
4.6. Incommensurable Options and Stable Intentions 105
4.7. Human Agency with and without Incommensurability 110
4.8. Summary 111
5. The Argument from Nominal-N otable Comparisons 113
5.1. Introduction 113
5.2. The Structure of the Argument 114
5.3. The Possibility of Nominal-N otable Conflicts 116
5.4. The Dialectical Situation 123
5.5. Ways to Debunk the Central Intuition of the Argument 124
5.6. Biting the Bullet 127
5.7. A Test of Commensurability and an Argument against Monism 130
5.8. Two Alternative Variants of the Argument from
Nominal- Notable Comparisons 134
5.9. The Concurrence Argument 139
6. The Supremacy Challenge 142
6.1. The Codification Challenge and the Supremacy Challenge 143
6.2. The Incoherence Argument against Supremacy 144
6.3. Rationality and the Nature of the Overarching
Normative Standpoint 148
6.3.1. Th e Overarching Normative Standpoint as Rationality 150
6.3.2. T wo Meanings of “Rational” 151
6.3.3. D ifferent Conceptions of Rationality as the Overarching
Normative Standpoint 153
6.3.4. Th e Relevance of “Rational” Criticism as an Indicator
of Ought Simpliciter 159
6.4. The Overarching Normative Standpoint and the
Overridingness of Morality 160
6.4.1. M onism with Moral Overridingness Compared with
Normative Pluralism 165
6.4.2. W ays for the Monist to Avoid Overridingness 169
6.5. Summary 176
7. The Codification Challenge: Can We Discover an
Overarching Normative Standpoint? 177
7.1. Parfit’s Wide Dualism 178
7.2. Weak Monism 183
7.2.1. G ert’s Two- Dimensional Weak Monism 185
7.2.2. C omparing Gert’s Weak Monism with Normative Pluralism 191
Contents vii
7.3. Dorsey’s Hybrid Voluntarism 197
7.4. Rejecting the Codifiability Challenge 203
7.4.1. P articularism 205
7.4.2. Th ree Types of Aristotelianism 206
7.4.3. S ource Monistic Aristotelianism 207
7.4.4. P hronetic Comparativism 210
7.4.5. I ntegrative Aristotelianism 213
8. Conclusion and Integration 216
8.1. Conclusion 216
8.2. Is Normative Pluralism Revisionary? 218
8.3. Integrating versus Comparing 221
References 225
Index 231
Preface
This book has been long in the making. It all started with a casual conver-
sation outside the National Theatre in Oslo with my friend and fellow stu-
dent Eivind Kirkeby many years ago about why morality and self- interest
could not coexist as sources of normative requirements. My thinking must
also have been informed by some brief dabbling in international relations
theory, where the assumption is quite dominant that agents can be expected
to, and even have reason to, be primarily guided by their own interests. This
was in stark contrast to what seemed to be the impetus in philosophy to sub-
sume self-i nterest under the authority of morality. With these beginnings,
I started to work on a question that would come to be of great importance
to the emerging new focus on reasons in metaethics, where the compara-
bility assumption of reasons was often assumed but rarely defended. After
a Ph.D. thesis and some published papers on the subject, I was urged to
submit a manuscript, which eventually resulted in this book. The book pro-
ject was considerably delayed by a personal crisis, leading up to a gender
transition. This very demanding process has occurred at the same time as
the writing of this book and has laid claim to much of my mental focus,
making the writing of the book a very hard thing to do. I would like to give
my deepest thanks to the colleagues who were essential in helping me find
acceptance in who I am and who helped me out of my darkest period: Trine
Antonsen, Cathrine V. Felix, Heine A. Holmen, Ole Martin Moen, and
Monica Roland. I’m not sure I could have gone on to finish this book
without you. Thanks also to every philosopher anywhere who works to keep
the discipline friendly to and inclusive of trans people and voices. There
are also a number of people who have been essential to the development
of this book and who have given me their time and advice. In particular,
this book would not have been written without the encouragement of David
Copp. Also special thanks to Olav Gjelsvik, Edmund Henden, and Krister
Bykvist, who served as my advisers during my Ph.D. and helped shape my
ideas. Conversations with John Broome, Ruth Chang, Herlinde Pauer-
Studer, Joseph Raz, and Sarah Stroud have also provided essential input
to the arguments of this book. In addition, my work has benefited from
