Meaning and Language: Phenomenological Perspectives

351 Pages·2008·3.554 MB·

by  Ullrich Melle (auth.), Filip Mattens (eds.)

Filip Mattens
Editor
Meaning and
Language:
Phenomenological
Perspectives

187
(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:0)(cid:4)
MEANINGANDLANGUAGE:PHENOMENOLOGICALPERSPECTIVES
PHAENOMENOLOGICA
SERIESFOUNDEDBYH.L.VANBREDAANDPUBLISHED
UNDERTHEAUSPICESOFTHEHUSSERL-ARCHIVES
187
FILIP MATTENS (ed.)
MEANING AND LANGUAGE:
PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
EditorialBoard:
Director:U.Melle(Husserl-Archief,Leuven)Members:R.Bernet(Husserl-Archief,
Leuven)R.Breeur(Husserl-Archief,Leuven)S.IJsseling(Husserl-Archief,Leu-
ven) H. Leonardy (Centre d’études phénoménologiques, Louvain-la-Neuve) D.
Lories(CEP/ISP/CollègeDésiréMercier,Louvain-la-Neuve)J.Taminiaux(Centre
d’étudesphénoménologiques,Louvain-la-Neuve)R.Visker(CatholicUniversity
Leuven,Leuven)
AdvisoryBoard:
R.Bernasconi(MemphisStateUniversity),D.Carr(EmoryUniversity,Atlanta),
E.S.Casey(StateUniversityofNewYorkatStonyBrook),R.Cobb-Stevens(Boston
College),J.F.Courtine(Archives-Husserl,Paris),F.Dastur(UniversitédeParisXX),
K.Düsing(Husserl-Archiv,Köln),J.Hart(IndianaUniversity,Bloomington),K.
Held(BergischeUniversitätWuppertal),K.E.Kaehler(Husserl-Archiv,Köln),D.
Lohmar(Husserl-Archiv,Köln),W.R.McKenna(MiamiUniversity,Oxford,USA),
J.N.Mohanty(TempleUniversity,Philadelphia),E.W.Orth(UniversitätTrier),
C.Sini(UniversitàdegliStudidiMilano),R.Sokolowski(CatholicUniversityof
America,WashingtonD.C.),B.Waldenfels(Ruhr-Universität,Bochum)
MEANING AND LANGUAGE:
PHENOMENOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES
edited by
FILIP MATTENS
Husserl-Archives,Leuven
LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2008922893
ISBN978-1-4020-8330-3(HB)
ISBN978-1-4020-8331-0(e-book)
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Contents
IntroductoryRemarks:
NewAspectsofLanguageinHusserl’sThought
F.Mattens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
I Aspects of Language and Meaning in Husserl 1
1 DasRätseldesAusdrucks:
HusserlsZeichen-undAusdruckslehreindenManuskriptenfür
dieNeufassungderVI.LogischenUntersuchung
U.Melle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 AnUnpleasantbutFelicitousAmbiguity:
SinnandBedeutunginHusserl’sRevisionsoftheLogicalInvesti-
gations
P.Vandevelde . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3 Husserl’sCritiqueofDoubleJudgments
C.Ierna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4 NoematicSinn:
Generalmeaning-functionorpropositionalcontent?
C.Beyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5 HusserlstypisierendeApperzeptionunddiePhänomenologie
dynamischerIntentionalität
J.D.Balle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
v
vi MeaningandLanguage:PhenomenologicalPerspectives
6 DeiktischeIdeationen:
ÜberdiemitdenWörter„dies“und„so“vollziehbarenokkasio-
nellenBezugnahmenaufidealeGegenständlichkeiten
R.Sowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
II Reflections on the Constitutive Role of Language for
Experience and Thought 125
7 DieSyntaxderErfahrung:
Zu den sachhaltigen Voraussetzungen des Logischen und des
Sprachlichen
V.DePalma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
8 OntheOriginofthe“Language”ofFormalMathematics:
AnIntentional-HistoricalInvestigationoftheDiscoveryofthe
Formal
B.Hopkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
9 DenkenohneSprache?
ZurPhänomenologiealternativerRepräsentations-Systemeko-
gnitiverInhaltebeimMenschenundanderenPrimaten
D.Lohmar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
10 Idon’thavetheWords:
ConsideringLanguage(andthelackthereof)throughthePheno-
menologicalParadigmsofTemporalityandCorporeality
L.M.Rodemeyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
III Phenomenology and its Language 213
11 LinguisticPhenomenology?
J.Benoist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
12 Laphénoménalisationetsonexpression:
Versl’originephénoménologiquedulangage
D.Popa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
13 TheNecessityofCommunicatingPhenomenologicalInsights–
anditsDifficulties
D.R.Koukal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
CONTENTS vii
14 IntroducingTerms:
PhilosophicalVocabulary,NeologismsandtheTemporalAspect
ofMeaning
F.Mattens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329
Introductory Remarks:
New Aspects of Language in Husserl’s Thought
Filip Mattens
Newthoughtsdemandnewwords.ThisisthemessageofKant’sIntroduc-
tiontohissecondCritique.Thismessage,however,isnotanexpression
ofphilosophicalcourageorcreativity.Rather,itwasinspiredbytheneed
Kant felt to defend himself against the accusation of introducing a new
languagetocompensateforalackoforiginalthinking.Essentially,thisre-
proachsuggeststhatKant’svocabularyveilsthefactthathislanguagedoes
notproperlyplaceitselfintheserviceofhisthinking.Similarreproaches
havebeenaddressed,repeatedly,tothedisciplesofphenomenologicalphi-
losophyingeneral;butalsotoHusserl,andnotinfrequentlyfromwithin
hisownsphereofinfluence.Asacaseinpoint,onecanconsiderErnst
Tugendhat’simputationofHusserl’stalkofGegenständlichkeitenandof
theintroductionofthenotionNoema.Ratherthanbeingtakenasastep
forwardinhisthinking,suchcoinagesarerejectedasobstinatelinguisticat-
temptstoimmunizewhateverdoesn’tfitintohisinitialoriginalschemeof
thought.Thesetermsthemselves,Tugendhatmaintains,areanexpression
ofembarrassment.1
The possibility of such imputations itself rests on the putative sub-
servienceoflanguagetothought.Accusationsofverbalism,justlikethe
imputationofterminologicalbogussolutionsforphilosophicalproblems,
implicitly assume that language not only runs the risk of, but likewise
1ErnstTugendhat,“PhänomenologieundSprachanalyse”,inPhilosophischeAufsätze
(Frankfurta.M.:Suhrkamp,1992),p.8.
ix
x MeaningandLanguage:PhenomenologicalPerspectives
offersanopportunitytoleadoneawayfromthinking.Inthefaceofthis
temptation,the‘externalityoflanguagetothought’cannotremainamere
noncommittalthesisbasedontheoreticalgrounds,butinevitablybecomes
a crucial methodological issue for a philosophy that wishes to employ
rigorousdescriptionscientifically.Toacertainextent,Husserlwaswell
awareofthishimself,aswhenhedrewananalogybetweenthoughtless
operation with inauthentic number presentations and the way we use
language.Thereis,however,adecisivedifference,adifferenceneglected
bytheideaofanideallanguage.Namely,whereasnumbersignspermit
ustoworkwiththeutmostprecision,farbeyondournaturalcapacityof
thought,linguisticexpressionsneedtobeadjustedasmuchaspossibleto
thecontentofouractualthinking.Inthisrespect,onemightsay,philo-
sophicalwritingismorelikedrawing;asonepencils,onemayapproach
whatonehasinmindwithouteverreachingapointwhereprecisionnatu-
rallycoincideswithcompletion.Paradoxically,theincompleteness,and
evenmoreso,thesearchforprecisionthatittriggers,stimulatesandguides
thecourseoffurtherthinking.Thislackofcompletenessliesattheorigin
ofphilosophers’propensitiestocoinnewterms.Likewise,thewillingness
toreformulatetheirthoughtshasitsorigininthefactthatproperthinking
isrequiredtodoso.Inordertohighlighttheinterplaybetweenlanguage
andoriginalthinking,IwouldliketoavailmyselfofaninsightofJames
Dodd:“Theinterestindescription,bothphilosophicalandmundane,is
itspotentialtoyieldconcepts,nottofixconcepts”.1
Theideathatlanguageisnotjustoneobjectofphilosophicalreflection
amongothershaslongbecomeacommonplaceintwentiethcenturyphi-
losophy.Languagehascometobeunderstoodasa‘conditionofpossibility’
forphilosophicalthinkingandhasbeenscrutinizedandassessedinthat
capacity.Inthelightoftheseachievements,theoriginofthephenomeno-
logicaltraditionissituatedinaneraofpre-criticalnaivety,insofarasthe
positionoflanguageinphilosophyisconcerned.
GiventhepremisesthatdominateHusserl’sviewonlanguageingen-
eral, phenomenology may indeed not be the first approach one thinks
1Fromthefirst“HusserlMemorialLecture”deliveredbyJamesDoddattheHusserl-
ArchivesLeuven,onMarch24th,2004.