Making the Law Explicit: The Normativity of Legal Argumentation (European Academy of Legal Theory Monograph)

321 Pages·2008·3.09 MB·English

by  Matthias Klatt

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MAKING THE LAW EXPLICIT
Legal argumentation consists in the interpretation of texts. Therefore, it
has a natural connection to the philosophy of language. Central issues of
this connection, however, lack a clear answer. For instance, how much
freedom do judges have in applying the law? How are the literal and the
purposive approaches related to one another? How can we distinguish
between applying the law and making the law?
This book provides answers by means of a complex and detailed theory
of literal meaning. A new legal method is introduced, namely the further
development of the law. It is so far unknown in Anglo-American jurispru-
dence, but it is shown that this new method helps in solving some of the
most crucial puzzles in jurisprudence.
At its centre the book addresses legal indeterminism and refutes
linguistic-philosophical reasons for indeterminacy. It spells out the norma-
tivecharacterofinterpretationasemphasisedbyRazand,withthehelpof
Robert Brandom’s normative pragmatics, it is shown that the relativism of
interpretation from a normative perspective does not at all justify scepti-
cism. On the contrary, it supports the claim that legal argumentation can
beobjective,andmaintainsthatstatementsonthemeaningofastatutecan
be right or wrong, and take on inter-subjective validity accordingly.
This book breaks new ground in transferring Brandom’s philosophy to
legal theoretical problems and presents an original and exciting analysis of
the semantic argument in legal argumentation. It was the recipient of the
European Award for Legal Theory in 2002.
European Academy of Legal Theory Series: Volume 7
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EUROPEAN ACADEMY OF LEGAL THEORY
MONOGRAPH SERIES
General Editors
Professor Mark Van Hoecke
Professor François Ost
Professor Luc Wintgens
Titles in this Series
Moral Conflict and Legal Reasoning
Scott Veitch
The Harmonisation of European Private Law
edited by Mark Van Hoecke & Francois Ost
On Law and Legal Reasoning
Fernando Atria
Law as Communication
Mark Van Hoecke
Legisprudence
edited by Luc Wintgens
Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law
edited by Mark van Hoecke
The Policy of Law
A Legal Theoretical Framework
Mauro Zamboni
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Making the Law
Explicit
The Normativity of Legal
Argumentation
Matthias Klatt
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The sense of a sentence—one would like to say—may, of course, leave this
or that open, but the sentence must nevertheless have a definite sense. An
indefinite sense—that would really not be a sense at all. Here one thinks
perhaps: if I say ‘I have locked the man up fast in the room—there is only
one door left open’—then I simply haven’t locked him in at all; his being
locked in is a sham. One would be inclined to say here: ‘You haven’t done
anything at all’. An enclosure with a hole in it is as good as none.—But is
that true?
(Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 99)
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Preface
This book is the English translation of a German monograph (Matthias
Klatt(2004),TheoriederWortlautgrenze.SemantischeNormativitätinder
juristischen Argumentation, Baden-Baden, Nomos). For the purposes of
this edition, the introduction was added and the first and third chapters
were slightly shortened. The German book had benefited from the inspir-
ing advice of Professor Dr. Dr. h. c. Robert Alexy (University of Kiel) and
ProfessorDr.RalfDreier(UniversityofGöttingen)aswellasfromthelong
lasting support by the German National Academic Foundation. It received
the European Award for Legal Theory 2002.
This edition was made possible by generous support from the Warden
and Fellows of New College, the Young Academy and Hart Publishing.
The translation was provided with great care and skill by Jörg Rampacher
and Neil Mussett. It further profited from most valuable advice by
Professor Dr. Dres. h. c. Stanley L. Paulson (Washington University, St.
Louis).
To all these people and institutions I owe my profound thanks.
New College, Oxford
July 2008
Matthias Klatt
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Table of Contents
Preface vii
Introduction 1
I. The Doctrine of the Limits of the Wording 4
A. Interpretation as a Legal Method 4
B. Judicial Development of the Law 5
C. Why the Differentiation Matters 6
II. Interpretation and Invention in English Legal Reasoning 7
A. Statutory Interpretation and Democracy 7
(i) The Purposive Versus the Literal Approach 7
(ii) Law-Applying Versus Law-Making 9
(iii)The Missing Method: Judicial Development of the Law 12
B. Human Rights Act: What Is Possible? 13
C. Result 14
III. Towards a Common European Approach 15
IV. The Possibility of the Rule of Law Defended 18
V. The Sceptical Challenge: Indeterminacy and Vagueness 19
A. The Concept of Indeterminacy 20
B. Vagueness as Boundarylessness 20
(i) Higher-order Vagueness 21
(ii) The Significance of Interpretation in the Law 22
C. Scepticism in Law 22
VI. The Rationality and Objectivity of Legal Reasoning 23
A. Justification, Rationality and Legitimacy 24
B. The Dworkin–Fish Controversy 25
C. ‘B’ Semantics versus ‘KP’ Semantics 26
D. The Objectivity of Law Defended 27
VII.At a Glance 27
A. General Approach 27
B. Chapter 1 28
C. Chapter 2 29
D. Chapter 3 31
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