Invisible language : its incalculable significance for philosophy

244 Pages·2014·1.047 MB·English

by  Garth L. Hallett Saint Louis University

Invisible Language

Invisible Language
Its Incalculable Significance
for Philosophy
Garth L. Hallett
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Contents
Introduction 1
1 Plato’sPhaedo 9
2 Aquinas’sTruth 29
3 Descartes’sMeditations 49
4 Kant’sCritiqueofPureReason 75
5 James’sPragmatism 105
6 Moore’sPrincipiaEthica 121
7 Wittgenstein’sTractatusLogico-Philosophicus 137
8 Husserl’sCartesianMeditations 151
9 Confirmation 177
10 ConcludingDialectic:Philosophy’sIncalculablePossibilities 199
Bibliography 221
Index 233
v

Introduction
The invisibility of language, my title suggests, has had incalculable signifi-
cance for philosophy and its history. Before undertaking to establish this
strong claim, let me first explain it. How, to start with, is “language” here
understoodandinwhatsenseislanguage,sounderstood,“invisible”?
In one familiar sense of the word, language is written or spoken dis-
course;in another it isthemedium employed.Whereas thediscourse canbe
seen or heard,themedium cannot. In thisrespectlanguageresembles chess.
Thus, as people watching a game of chess see players moving pieces on a
boardbutdonotseetherulesthatgovernthemovesanddefinethegame,so
peoplehearingorreadingthewordsofalanguageperceivesoundsormarks
but do not perceive the rules that govern the signs’ use and define the lan-
guage. Similarly, as people do not think of the rules of chess as they them-
selvesplaythegamebutofthemovestheymakeinit,sopeopledonotthink
of the rules of a familiar language as they write or speak it but of what they
say in thelanguage. Even iftheydid pause to think abouttherules, whether
of chessor of theirlinguistic medium,that would not signify doing with the
inner eye what they could not do with the outer. The whole calculus would
nottherebelaidouttoview,rulebyrule,movebypermissiblemove.
Despite these parallels, atypical humanlanguageisfarless accessibleto
reflective awareness than is the game of chess. For: (1) Whereas we first
learnourmothertonguesearlyinlife,morebylinguisticinterchangethanby
instruction in the grammar, semantics, and pragmatics of the language, we
typicallylearnchessthroughexplicitinstruction,rulebyrule,lateron.(2)A
naturallanguageisincomparablymorecomplexthanchess.(Who,forastart,
knowsallthetensofthousandsofwords,withalltheirvariedmeaningsand
inflections,listedin astandarddictionary?)(3)Fromperiod to period,place
toplace,dialecttodialect,alanguageisalsofarmorefluidandflexiblethan
1
2 Introduction
chess, with its relatively rigid, uniform rules. (4) In particular, the cognitive
content of terms varies widely from person to person, according to people’s
experience,knowledge,andbeliefs,andfromculturetocultureaccordingto
prevalent worldviews. (The name “Moses,” for example, may have very
different cognitive content—may express and convey very different be-
liefs—dependingonwhetherthespeakerorhearerisacriticalbiblicalschol-
arorabelieverinallthatscripturerecounts.)(5)Withregardtothiscontent
the impression may readily arise that a language, its speakers’ shared me-
dium (neither true nor false), is as theoretically committed as are those who
make us of it. (6) This impression can, in turn, help to foster linguistic
practice in which no distinction between medium and message is in fact
discernible. (7)Widespread practice of thiskind,forinstance andespecially
in philosophy, further obscures the missed distinction, and an unfortunate
circle results: the more the distinction between medium and message is ig-
nored, the less realistic or relevant the distinction may come to appear, and
vice versa. Were such practice to prevail still more widely, the distinction
wouldinfactdisappear,andwithit,notonlyanylinguisticpracticecompar-
ablewithchess,butanythingrecognizableashumanlanguage.Suchconsid-
erationsasthese,plusthepresentwork’sprimaryfocusonwrittenratherthan
oraldiscourse,explainthetitleInvisibleLanguage.
Despite this increasingly bleak account, the phrase “invisible language”
need carry no more negative connotations than does, for instance, talk of
“invisible particles” or “invisible waves.” Neither should the phrase here
oftensubstitutedforit,“linguisticblindness”(focusedontheuserratherthan
the medium), be taken to impute any blame. In certain contexts, the words
could suggest willful blindness; yet linguistic blindness, like physical, is
seldomanybody’schoice. The wordsmight alsosuggest total blindness; yet
linguistic blindness, like physical blindness, admits of degrees and, unlike
physicalblindness,ispracticallynevertotalinthosewhostillhavetheirwits.
Again,thewordscouldsuggestconstantdeprivation,whereasonmostocca-
sions the condition described has no untoward effects. Again, the phrase
suggestsanunnaturalcondition,whereaslinguisticblindnessiseversonatu-
ral—as natural as our ignorance of the inner workings of our lungs, hearts,
and nervous systems. Indeed, the condition the words denote is not only
natural, but largely necessary: as we speak or write we cannot constantly
monitortheintricatefunctioningofourlinguisticmedium,anymorethanwe
can continually scrutinize our spectacles or the functioning of our hearts,
lungs,ornervesastheydotheirthing.
Not only are we largely blind to the workings of our languages, but we
arelargelyunawareofourblindness.Theinvisibilityisitselfinvisible.Thus,
concerning the words of our mother tongues it has for instance been said:
“Allofusdomeetmostofourcriteriaforunderstandingthoseterms,inthat
we can use them correctly, and correctly paraphrase sentences containing