Table Of ContentOUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,31/10/2013,SPi
Intuition
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OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,31/10/2013,SPi
Intuition
Elijah Chudnoff
1
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For Linda Chudnoff
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Andso,throughallthethickmistsofthedimdoubtsinmymind,
divine intuitions now and then shoot, enkindling my fog with a
heavenlyray.
HermanMelville
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Acknowledgments
I wrote my dissertation on intuition. Then I published some papers on
intuition. And now I’ve written a book on intuition. The basic idea has
remainedthesame:intuitionisalotlikeperception.Butthedevelopment
and presentation of it has, I’d like to think, improved. This is mostly
because of help from others—in conversation, through email, over
dinners,attalks,etc.
Iwouldliketoexpressmygratitudetothefollowingpeopleforhelping
metothinkthroughthematerialinthisbook:YuvalAvnur,JodiAzzouni,
George Bealer, Jake Beck, John Bengson, Selim Berker, Sharon Berry,
John Biro, Michael Bishop, Jessica Brown, Otávio Bueno, David Chal-
mers, Herman Cappelen, Al Casullo, Anthony Coleman, Brad Cokelet,
Troy Cross, Robert D’Amico, Sinan Dogramaci, Fabian Dorsch, Aaron
Edidin,CatherineElgin,EdErwin,DavidEtlin,SimonEvnine,KitFine,
MelissaFrankel,PeterGodfrey-Smith,WarrenGoldfarb,NedHall,Richard
Heck, Frank Hoffman, Terry Horgan, Robert Howell, Paul Katsafanas,
Sean Kelley, Michal Klincewicz, Peter Koellner, Uriah Kriegel, Sam
Levey, Jon Litland, Kirk Ludwig, Jack Lyons, Fiona Macpherson, Doug
Marshall, Jon Matheson, Kevin Mccain, Anne Meylan, Kevin Morris,
Bernhard Nickel, Eylem Özaltun, Charles Parsons, Ángel Pinnilos, Ted
Poston, Jim Pryor, Greg Ray, Andrews Reath, Andy Roche, David
Rosenthal, Martine Nida-Rümelin, Kranti Saran, Jonathan Schaffer,
Harvey Siegel, Susanna Siegel, Charles Siewert, Nico Silins, Alison Sim-
mons, Michael Slote, Declan Smithies, Gianfranco Soldati, Tatjana von
Solodkoff, Ernie Sosa, Nick Stang, Daniel Stoljar, Gisela Striker, Amie
Thomsasson, Charles Travis, Anand Vaidya, Bharath Vallabha, Matthew
Walker, Nick Wiltsher, Gene Witmer, Richard Woodward, Chase
Wrenn, Sarah Wright, and various anonymous reviewers of the papers
forjournalsandofthebookmanuscriptforOxfordUniversityPress.
Ted Locke was my research assistant during the fall semester of 2012.
Ithankhimforhisassistancewithmakingfinalcorrectionstothemanuscript.
IthankPeterMomtchiloff,SarahParker,EleanorCollins,DanielBourner,
RosieChambers,andJavierKalhatformakingabookoutofthemanuscript.
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,31/10/2013,SPi
viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Ihavedrawnonmaterialfromthefollowingpapers:
“What Intuitions Are Like.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
82(3):625–54.
“The Nature of Intuitive Justification.” Philosophical Studies 153 (2):
313–33.
“WhatShouldaTheoryofKnowledgeDo?”Dialectica65(4):561–79.
“IntuitiveKnowledge.”PhilosophicalStudies162(2):359–78.
“The Rational Roles of Intuition.” In Anthony Booth and Darrell
Rowbottom(eds),Intuitions.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.
“Presentational Phenomenology.” In S. Miguens and G. Preyer (eds),
ConsciousnessandSubjectivity.Frankfurt:OntosVerlag.
“IsIntuitionBasedonUnderstanding?”PhilosophyandPhenomenological
Research.OnlineFirst.Doi:10.1111/phpr.12001.
“Awareness of Abstract Objects.” Noûs. Online First. Doi: 10.1111/
j.1468-0068.2011.00851.x.
IthankJohnWiley&SonsInc.,Springer,andOntosVerlagforpermis-
siontousematerialthatappearedintheirpublications.“TheRationalRoles
of Intuition” was written for the volume Anthony Booth and Darrell
Rowbottomhaveedited,andIthankthemforallowingmetousematerial
fromthatpaperinthisbookaswell.
Finally:loveandthankstoBohyunKimforhersupportandforbearance.
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Contents
ListofFigures xi
Introduction 1
1. IntuitionasIntellectualPerception 1
2. Alternatives 6
3. IntuitionandtheAPriori 13
4. PlanoftheBook 17
Part I. Intuition Experiences
1. WhatIntuitionsareLike 25
1.1 PerceptualExperiences 27
1.2 PresentationalPhenomenology 32
1.3 IntuitionsAreSeemings 41
1.4 IntuitionsPossessPresentationalPhenomenology 44
1.5 TheAbsentIntuitionChallenge 52
2. TheVarietiesofIntuition 58
2.1 Preliminaries 59
2.2 IntuitionandThought 61
2.3 IntuitionwithoutReflection 70
2.4 PhilosophicalIntuitions 76
Part II. Intuitive Justification
3. PhenomenalDogmatism 83
3.1 PhenomenalDogmatismaboutPerceptualJustification 84
3.2 PhenomenalDogmatismaboutIntuitiveJustification 93
3.3 SkepticismaboutIntuition 98
4. Understanding-BasedReliabilism 114
4.1 Understanding-BasedViewsofIntuitiveJustification 115
4.2 ProblemCases 124
4.3 AssessingtheDamage 134
4.4 ARoleforUnderstanding 140
5. TheRationalRolesofIntuition 145
5.1 IntuitionsasJustifiersandasEvidence 146
5.2 InferentialInternalism 148
