How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam

290 Pages·2003·1.85 MB·English

by  Gil Merom

How Democracies Lose Small Wars

State, Society, and the Failures of
France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon,
and the United States in Vietnam
GIL MEROM
Tel-Aviv University
University of Sydney
[CAMBRIDGE

UNIVERSITY PRESS
PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE
The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CBI 2RU, UK
40 West 2,oth Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA
477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, vie 3*07, Australia
Ruiz de Alarcon 13, 2.8014 Madrid, Spain
Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa
http:../../../../www.cambridge.org/default.htm
© Gil Merom 2,003
This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without
the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 1003
Printed in the United States of America
Typeface Sabon 10/12 pt. System WpX z [TB]
e
A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Merom, Gil, 1956-
How democracies lose small wars : state, society, and the failures of France in Algeria,
Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam / Gil Merom.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-511-80403-5 - ISBN 0-52,1-00877-8 (pbk.)
i. Low intensity conflicts (Military science) - France 2. Low intensity conflicts
(Military science) - United States. 3. Low intensity conflicts (Military science) - Israel.
4. Military doctrine - France. 5. Military doctrine - United States. 6. Military doctrine -
Israel. 7. Counterinsurgency. I. Title.
U24i. M47 2,003
355.02 - dc2i 2002041490
ISBN o 52,1 80403 5 hardback
ISBN o 52.1 00877 8 paperback
Acknowledgments
Peter Katzenstein, a scholar and friend of a rare breed, supervised my doc-
toral dissertation, out of which this book grew. I owe him, as many others
do, a debt he would never bother to collect, nor would I be able to pay. No
one so wisely and generously supports others' research and at the same time
fiercely protects their intellectual independence,
Alan Dowty was instrumental in my decision to study for an advanced de-
gree. He probably does not realize how much I learned from him throughout
the years. Martin Shefter, Lawrence Scheinman, and Jim Goldgeier improved
my work with wise suggestions. Jim, in particular, put his own work aside
simply because I needed his advice. John Garofano, Dafna Merom, and Amir
Weiner followed and supported my research from its inception. John put at
my service his critical mind and literary talent; Dafna forced me to rethink
and distill ideas; and Amir, a compulsive historian, contributed his analysis,
insight, and advice.
I am indebted to Andrew Mack and Samuel Huntington, who must be
unaware of their contributions. Mack's seminal article in World Politics about
small wars ignited my interest in the topic and inspired many of my ideas.
Huntington's essays on political order in changing societies shaped much of
my thinking about how the state, as an institution, approaches society.
Many others have also supported my work. The anonymous reviewers
of Cambridge University Press invested much time in carefully reading the
manuscript and offering superb and detailed suggestions for improvement.
Richard Ned Lebow was instrumental in bringing me to Cornell, and Judith
Reppy helped me thereafter, I still treasure her good advice. Professor Jean
Pierre Rioux helped me in Paris with bibliographical advice. Other peers dis-
cussed various parts of my work with me, commented on drafts, corrected
me, and contributed exciting ideas. In particular, I thank Gad Barzilai, Michal
Ben-Josef-Hirsh, Avi Ben-Zvi, Assif Efrat, Yair Evron, John Fousek, Azar
Gat, Benjamin Ginsberg, Tami Hermann, Stanley Hoffmann, Steve Jackson,
Mary Katzenstein, Aharon Klieman, Walter Lafeber, Theodore Lowi, Roger
xii Acknowledgments
Marcwick, John Mearsheimer, Joe Nye, David Patton, Bruce Porter, Barry
Posen, Jeremy Rabkin, Yossi Shain, Jim Sickmeier, and David Vital. For
expressing confidence in my work and showing me the generous face of
academic institutions, I am indebted to Avi Ben-Zvi, Deborah Brennan,
Azar Gat, Graeme Gill, Samuel Huntington, Alfred James, Eti C. Lenman,
Anne Madden, Stephen Nicholas, Martin Painter, Bruce Porter, M. Ramesh,
Merrilee Robb, Yossi Shain, David Siddle, and Rod Tiffen.
Several programs and foundations supported my research. The Peace
Studies Program became my home within Cornell. The Mellon Fellowship
Program at Cornell and the Institute for the Study of World Politics in
Washington, D.C., granted me generous fellowships. The Cornell Center for
International Studies awarded me a Mario Einaudi Research Travel Grant,
and the university's Western Societies Program granted me a SICCA Re-
search Fellowship in Europe. The Center for International Affairs and the
John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies in Harvard provided me with
various privileges, including a distinguished Olin Postdoctoral Fellowship.
The Israeli Council on Higher Education extended me its prestigious Alon
Fellowship, and the University of Sydney granted me a Uzooo Research
Fellowship. The Department of Government and International Relations at
the University of Sydney has also helped by covering some of the production
costs of this book.
This book could not have been written without the help of the de-
voted staff of the following institutions: the libraries of Haifa and Tel-Aviv
Universities, the Archive of the Ha'aretz daily; the libraries of the Sorbonne,
University Paris VIII (St, Denis), and University of Paris X (Nanterre); Fon-
dation Nationale de la Science Politique in Paris; the Olin library at Cornell;
the Weidner and other libraries at Harvard; the library of the Army War
College in Carlisle, PA; and the Fisher Library of the University of Sydney.
I also thank Frank Cass for permission to use my article in Small Wars and
Insurgencies, as a basis for discussion, particularly in Chapter z, and to pho-
tographer James Nachtwey and Photo Agency VII of Paris, France, for per-
mission to use his photo from the book Deeds of War on the cover of this
book.
Many friends have helped me in various ways, often by offering me crit-
ically needed logistic and other assistance that made my research easier. In
particular, I thank Vera and Lucio Acioli, Anne and Mayor Admon, Nurit
and Noga Alon, Julia Erwin-Weiner, Nurit and Avi Israeli, Darryl Jarvis, John
and Monica Garofano, Sarah Garofano, Jose Fernandez, Marnie Goodbody,
Mary and Peter Katzenstein, Paula and Bertrand Lazard, Carmela and Aryeh
Merom, Shaul Mishal, Jim T. Pokorny, Maria Robertson, and Gideon-"Gidi
the Bear"-Schaller.
Finally, I am extremely grateful to my editors, Aryeh Merom and Susan
Park, to my copy editor Ronald Cohen, and to Lewis Bateman from Cam-
bridge University Press for patiently guiding me throughout the laborious
Acknowledgments xiii
process of turning my book-draft into an acceptable manuscript. I am also
grateful to Robert Swanson for preparing the index.
In large measure, my work was pleasant and rewarding because of the
outstanding individuals I have mentioned. There is something of each of
them in the book and, happily, by now, in myself.
Contents
List of Figures and Tables page x
Acknowledgments xi
PART I
1 Introduction 3
The Biased Study of War and the Neglect of Small Wars 3
International Relations Theory and Small Wars 5
How Do Democracies Fail in Small Wars 14
The Role of Realist, Motivational, and Other Factors Reconsidered 2,4
Research Design and Methodological Considerations z6
Plan of the Book 30
2 Military Superiority and Victory in Small Wars: Historical
Observations 33
fighting Small Wars: Insurgents and Oppressors 33
Violence and Counterinsurgency: Brutality as a Means of Cost
Management 42
Conclusion 46
3 The Structural Origins of Defiance: The Middle-Class, The
Marketplace of Ideas, and the Normative Gap 48
Power Out of Feebleness: The Rise of the Middle-Class and the
State 48
Foundations of a Normative Gap 56
Colonial Wars: The Domestic Dimension of Brutalization 60
Conclusion 63
4 The Structural Origins of Tenacity: National Alignment and
Compartmentalization 65
Institutional Incongruity and Strategic Preferences 66
The Modern Foundation of the State's Autonomy: Popular Alignment 6 j
viii Contents
Institutional Responses to Threats against the Normative
Alignment 71
A Question of Timing 75
Conclusion 7 8
PART II
5 The French War in Algeria: A Strategic, Political, and
Economic Overview 83
The Strategic Dimensions of the War in Algeria 83
The French Political System, the State, the Army, and the War 8 8
The French Economy and the Algerian War 95
Conclusion 98
6 French Instrumental Dependence and Its Consequences 99
7 The Development of a Normative Difference in France, and
Its Consequences 108
The Utilitarian Debate about the Necessity of the War 108
The Debate about the Morality of the Conduct of the Military in
Algeria no
The Debate about the Identity of the State 119
8 The French Struggle to Contain the Growth of the Normative
Gap and the Rise of the "Democratic Agenda" 12.1
The Domestic Reaction of the Government and the State 12,2.
The Secondary Expansion of the Normative Gap 130
9 Political Relevance and Its Consequences in France 136
The Intellectuals and the Press 138
The Consequences of Political Relevance 145
PART in
10 The Israeli War in Lebanon: A Strategic, Political, and
Economic Overview 155
The Strategic Dimensions of the War in Lebanon 156
The Israeli Political System, the State, the Army, and the War 158
The Israeli Economy and the Lebanon War 164
Conclusion 168
11 Israeli Instrumental Dependence and Its Consequences 169
iz The Development of a Normative Difference in Israel, and Its
Consequences 177
The Utilitarian Debate about the Human Cost of War 177
The Debate about the Morality of the Military Conduct in Lebanon 184
The Debate about the Identity of the State 191
13 The Israeli Struggle to Contain the Growth of the Normative
Gap and the Rise of the "Democratic Agenda" 194
Contents ix
The Domestic Reaction of the Government and the State 197
The Secondary Expansion of the Normative Gap 201
14 Political Relevance and Its Consequences in Israel 108
The Conformist Soft-Left and the Press 2,13
The Consequences of Political Relevance 2,2.0
PART IV
15 Conclusion 2.19
Domestic and International Causality Reconsidered 231
The Role of Instrumental Dependence in a Comparative Perspective 2,38
Democracy and the Use of Force 243
Concluding Remarks 249
Postscript 251
Bibliography 261
Index 277
0000 - 0010.htm Page 1sur 1
List of Figures and Tables
Figures
i.i The balance-of-tolerance page 20
1.2, The process of democratic failure in smallwars23
Tables
3.1 Extension of the franchise in the U.K. 53
4.1 Education levels in France, Germany, and England 69
5.1 The Algerian war and the French economy 97
6.1 Growth of French forces in Algeria, 1954-1956 100
6.2, Rise in prominence of the Algerian war at home 102,
6.3 National vs. personal perceptions of the Algerian problem 105
io,i The Israeli Treasury's perspective, 1984/85 167
12.1 Israeli fatalities in Lebanon, 1981-1985 178
12.2 Difference in Israeli non-justification of the Lebanon war 182
14.1 Satisfaction with Begin's and Sharon's performances 209
14.2 Confidence in the Israeli government, April i98i-June 1982 211
14.3 Approval rating decline, October 1982-June 1983: Aridor,
Begin, and the government 212
14.4 Sabra and Shatilla; A timetable of societal coercion 222
15.1 Levels of instrumental dependence of the democracies in
Lebanon, Algeria, and Vietnam 239
15.2 Fatalities in Algeria, Vietnam, and Lebanon 240
15.3 Key Israeli demonstrations during the Lebanon war - a
counterfactual calibrated comparison 242
Introduction
Put narrowly, this book explains how democracies fail in small wars in spite
of their military superiority. Yet this book is not so much about military mat-
ters and the interaction between unequal parties on the battlefield. Rather,
it is largely about societal processes within democracies that are engaged
in counterinsurgency and about how these processes affect world politics.
Indeed, the explanatory power of the argument and the implications of this
study transcend the phenomenon of small wars, and, as I explain in the
Conclusion, are relevant to a number of important issues of political sci-
ence, foreign policy, and international relations.
The Biased Study of War and the Neglect of Small Wars
Paradoxically, the study of war in political science and international rela-
tions may have narrowed the understanding of war. By and large, war was
subjected to mechanistic models that considered variables such as industrial
capacity, military hardware, levels of forces deployed, and organizational
structures and routines that lend themselves to easy operationalization and
measurement. Society was hardly ever the focal point of the research on war.
Indeed, rarely were social friction, cultural attributes, prevailing values, and
norms taken into serious consideration as determinants of the outcomes of
war. Rather, the amorphous collective of society was by and large considered
important only in relation to its potential as a source for the men and mate-
rial needed for war. Human beings were the subjects of study of war, mostly
when they were dwellers of the upper level of the political order: politi-
cians, bureaucrats, and generals. Ironically, conventional wars were studied
by political scientists mostly from the state perspective, precisely when the
relations between state, society, and war became ever more complex.
Within the field of international relations, the study of war was biased
in yet another way. Major systemic wars attracted most of the attention,
whereas small wars - those that pitted powerful states against insurgent