Holding Fire: Security Force Allegiance During Nonviolent Uprisings

365 Pages·2009·1.33 MB·English

by  Anika Binnendijk

Holding Fire:
Security Force Allegiance During Nonviolent Uprisings
A Thesis
Presented to the Faculty
of
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
By
ANIKA LOCKE BINNENDIJK
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
AUGUST 2009
Dissertation Committee
Professor Richard Shultz, Chair
Professor William Martel
Professor Kurt Schock
UMI Number: 3390129

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ANIKA LOCKE BINNENDIJK
[email protected] ♦ [phone]
EDUCATION
The Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy Tufts University Medford, MA
• Dissertation examines security force responses to civic movements in Ukraine and Serbia. August 2009
• 2007-2008 Peace Scholar Dissertation Fellowship, United States Institute of Peace.
The Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, Tufts University Medford, MA
• Master of Arts in Law & Diplomacy May 2006
• Concentration: International Security Studies, International Relations, US Diplomatic History.
• Recipient of the 2006 Edmund A. Gullion Prize for outstanding academic achievement.
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University Princeton, NJ
A.B. cum laude May 2003
• Certificate in Contemporary European Politics and Society.
• Study abroad: Hertford College, Oxford University.
• French proficiency.
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense Washington, DC
Special Assistant May 2009-Present
• Advise and assist the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.
Barack Obama 2008 Presidential Campaign Washington, DC
Assistant to Secretary Richard Danzig, Senior Foreign Policy Advisor Feb-Nov 2008
• Provided research and analysis on relevant national security issues
• Prepared briefing material for campaign travel, public appearances, and media engagements.
FORTUNE Global Forum New York, NY; New Delhi, India
Program Manager Feb-Nov 2007
• Developed program content and coordinated executive speakers for 2007 Fortune Global Forum.
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) Cambridge, MA
Research Associate Jul 2003; May 2004; Sept 2006-Jan 2007
• Drafted paper on coordination of international responses to humanitarian disasters.
• Assisted with project on US military bases in Europe.
• Contributed to publication on defense reforms and military modernization in Southeastern Europe.
NATO Parliamentary Assembly Brussels, Belgium
Research Assistant Sept-Nov 2003; Jun 2004
• Contributed to reports and speeches on transatlantic security issues.
• Prepared, staffed, and reported on Assembly’s plenary session.
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) Washington, DC
Intern Jan-Apr 2004
• Tracked political developments in Central and Eastern Europe.
• Drafted and edited reports and grant proposals.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Washington, DC
Intern Jul-Aug 2002
• Aided staff members with preparation for hearings on Iraq.
• Assisted with analysis of Administration testimony on the US-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty.
Institute for National Strategic Studies Washington, DC
Assistant to Ambassador Robert Oakley Jun-Aug 2000
• Researched US peacekeeping operations and interagency coordination.
FELLOWSHIPS/AWARDS
Truman National Security Project, Truman Security Fellowship. (2009)
United States Institute of Peace, Peace Scholar Dissertation Fellowship. (2007-2008)
Women in International Securituy, 2008 Summer Symposium, awarded “Best Paper.” (Jun 2008)
2006 Global Leadership Seminar, Talloires, International graduate student seminar. (Sept 2006)
Program on Negotiation, Harvard Law School, Summer Fellowship. (2006)
H.B. Earhart Foundation. Fellowship (2006-2007)
Tufts University, Trustee Scholarship, Tufts University. (2004-2006)
Humanity in Action, Senior Fellow. (2002-Present)
The Center for International Studies, Chair, CIS Undergraduate Fellows. (2003)
ARTICLES/PUBLICATIONS
“The Mariyinsky Palace Negotiations: Maintaining Peace Throughout Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.” Program on Negotiation
at Harvard Law School” 2007. [Jason Campbell, with Anika Binnendijk and Andrew Wilson]
Binnendijk, Anika and Marovic, Ivan. “Power and Persuasion: Nonviolent Strategies to Influence State Security Forces in
Serbia (2000) and Ukraine (2004)” Communist and Post-Communist Studies September 2006.
“Extending the Preemption Debate: A Reassessment of Current Theory and Practice” and “Extending the Preemption Debate:
Analysis of Major Themes.” The Fletcher School website, October 2004.
Defense Reform, Modernization, & Military Cooperation in Southeastern Europe. Edited By Charles M. Perry and Dimitris
Keridis. (Herndon, VA: Brassey’s 2004.) [Contributor]
Binnendijk, Anika and Binnendijk, Hans, “Mending NATO: How to Save the Alliance” International Herald Tribune May 13,
2003.
Dedicated to Nat Hoopes, with love and gratitude.
Abstract
This study examines strategies employed during recent episodes of popular nonviolent
struggle to determine their influence on allegiances within police, military, and
intelligence forces. Case study analysis traces challenger actions and security force
decisions through one central episode in Serbia (2000) and then turns to two earlier
Serbian episodes (1991 and 1996/1997) where challengers’ efforts failed. Similarly, a
central successful episode in Ukraine (2004) is examined in light of an earlier effort.
(2000/2001.) Episodes of protest in four additional countries – Georgia, Belarus,
Kyrgzystan, and Uzbekistan – provide further variation. Data gathered through extensive
interviews with participants and observers as well as written accounts is used to track the
timing and nature of loyalty shifts over the course of each episode.
The study proposes a novel framework linking challenger efforts to loyalty shifts within
regime security forces. Highlighting counterinsurgency theory’s emphasis on the struggle
for relative legitimacy, the study argues that challengers able to establish their own
legitimacy and expose regime illegitimacy will be more effective in eliciting loyalty
shifts than those who do not. Utilitarian considerations are also examined. The study
proposes that success in eliciting loyalty shifts will additionally be influenced by the
ability to raise the costs of repression, mitigate the costs to security forces of shifting
alliegances, and bolster perceptions of the opposition’s prospects of replacing the exising
regime. Through the lens of a challenger’s strategy, these might be seen as “strategic
objectives” that, if fulfilled, alter the environment in which members of security forces
make decisions about their allegiances.
Analysis of the cases reveals that while perceived likelihood of assuming power was the
strongest determinant of large-scale loyalty shifts, each of the proposed “strategic
objectives” proved relevant over the longer course of the episodes. Further, challenger
actions played a critical role in influencing security force decisions. In particular,
challengers’ ability to mobilize new segments of society, maintain internal nonviolent
discipline, and build and leverage channels of communication with security forces are
highlighted as particularly significant.
Introduction
The Significance of Security Force Allegiance....................................................................……….1
Nonviolent Uprisings..........................................................................................……….....…..……3
Security Forces During the Colored Revolutions…………………………………………………..5
Cases and Methods.................................................…...................……………...............….....……6
Defining and Observing Allegiance……………………………………………………..………...11
Strategy and Security Force Allegiance.....................................................................…............…..13
Chapter One: Theory
Section One: General Overview...............................................……………………………….…………..19
Literature on Internal War…………………………………………………………...…………….19
Literature on Rational Choice……………………………………………………….………….....22
Literature on Cognitive Constraints: Prospect Theory and Perception Bias……….………..….....24
Literature on Strategic Nonviolent Conflict…………………………………......………………...27
Section Two: Five Strategic Objectives and Theoretical Foundations………………….………..…….30
Strategic Objective I: Expose Regime Illegitimacy................ …………………….……………...30
Strategic Objective II: Establish Challenger Legitimacy.................................…….……………...35
Strategic Objective III: Raise the Costs of Repression................................……….……………...40
Strategic Objective IV: Mitigate the Costs of Accommodation....................…………………..…47
Strategic Objective V: Demonstrate Likelihood of Success………………………………………52
Summary: Five Strategic Objectives...............................................................….………………...59
Chapter Two: Serbia
Introduction............................................................................................................…….…....................….61
Security Forces: Background...........................................................................................……..….......…..63
Interior Ministry............................................................................................................…...…..…..66
Ministry of Defense............................................................................……………………...……..66
State Security (SDB) and Unit for Special Operations (JSO).............................................…........69
Autumn 2000.......................................................................................................……….....................…….70
Security Forces: Behaviors and Decisions………………………………………………………………….71
Interior Ministry………………..………………………………………………………………….71
Ministry of Defense……………………………………………………………………………….80
State Security and Unit for Special Operations………………………………………....…......….85
Assessment of Strategic Objectives.........................................................................…………….…….........87
Strategic Objective I: Expose Regime Illegitimacy...............................................................…….86
Strategic Objective II: Demonstrate Challenger Legitimacy……………………………………..93
Strategic Objective III: Raise the of Repression………………………………………………...102
Strategic Objective IV: Mitigate the Costs of Accommodation.....................................….…….109
Strategic Objective V: Demonstrate Likelihood of Success.........................................…...….…115
Secondary Cases: March 1991 and December 1996-March 1997...........................................……….123
March 1991.............................................................................................................................….…..……113
Exposing Regime Illegitimacy............................................................................................….…115
Demonstrating Opposition Legitimacy...............................................................................…….127
Mitigating Costs of Accommodation…………………………………………………………...130
Raising Costs of Repression……………………………………………………………………133
Demonstrating Likelihood of Success………………………………………………………….135
December 1996- March 1997……………………………………………………………………………136
Exposing Regime Illegitimacy…………………………………………………………………140
Establishing Challenger Legitimacy…………………………………………………………...142
Raising the Costs of Repression………………………………………………………………..146
Mitigating the Cost of Accommodation………………………………………………………..149
Demonstrating Likelihood of Success………………………………………………………….150
Conclusion: Lessons Learned………………………………………………………………………….153
Chapter Three: Ukraine
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………..157
Security Forces: Background……………………………………………………………………..……160
Interior Ministry………………………………………………………………………………...160
Ministry of Defense…………………………………………………………………………….163
State Security: Sluzhba Bespeky Ukrayiny (SBU)……………………………………………..165
2004: The Orange Revolution………………………………………………………………………….166
Security Forces: Behaviors and Decisions……………………………………………………………….168
Interior Ministry………………………………………………………………………………...170
Ministry of Defense…………………………………………………………………………….176
Intelligence: SBU………………………………………………………………………………178
The Night of November 28th………….……………………………………………………….182
Assessment of Strategic Objectives………………………………………………………………………186
Strategic Objective I: Expose Regime Illegitimacy…………………………………………….187
Strategic Objective II: Establish Challenger Legitimacy………………………………….……195
Strategic Objective III: Raise the Costs of Repression...........………………………………….203
Strategic Objective IV: Mitigate Costs of Accommodation..........……………………………..212
Strategic Objective V: Demonstrate Likelihood of Success..............…………………………..220
Secondary case: Ukraine Without Kuchma (2001).................................................…….........……….226
Exposing Regime Illegitimacy.............................................................................................……232
Establishing Challenger Legitimacy...................................................................................…….234
Raising Costs of Repression.……................................................................................................239
Mitigating Costs of Accommodation……………………………………………………….…..242
Demonstrating Likelihood of Success……………........………………………………………..245
Conclusion: Lessons Learned.…………………………………………………………………………..247
Chapter Four: Analysis and Additional Episodes
Section One: Conclusions from Serbia and Ukraine………………………………………………..250
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………250
Regime Legitimacy……………………………………………………………………………252
Challenger Legitimacy………………………………………………………………………...255
Costs of Repression.…………………………………………………………………………...258
Costs of Accommodation……………………………………………………………………...262
Likelihood of Success…………………………………………………………………………265
Implementing the Strategic Objectives……………………………………………………………….267
Attract and Engage New Constituencies……………………………………………………....268
Maintain Nonviolent Discipline……………………………………………………………….268
Expand Capacity for Rapid Mass Mobilization……………………………………………….269
Develop Strategic Communications…………………………………………………………...270
Expand Informal Channels of Communication………………………………………………..271
Cultivate and Leverage External Support……………………………………………………...272
Section Two: Additional Episodes…………………………………………………………………….273
Georgia...................................................................................................................................…274
Kyrgyzstan............................................................................................................................….284
Belarus..................................................................................................................................…..296
Uzbekistan.............................................................................................................................….308
Conclusion..............................................................................................................................…319
Conclusion: Policy implications and avenues for further research…………………………………...324
Sources and Works Cited…………………………..…………………………………………………….333
INTRODUCTION
This study examines strategies employed during recent episodes of unarmed
insurrection to assess their impact on the decisions and actions of police, military, and
intelligence forces. Reviewing successful and failed movements in Ukraine, Serbia, and
four additional post-communist episodes, it offers a systematic assessment of how
variations in the strategic and tactical actions of challenger groups influence the decisions
of individuals in regime security forces to defect or remain loyal in the face of political
crisis.
The Significance of Security Force Allegiance
In any government, security forces fulfill a critical role by providing for public order
and the safety of a population. For non-democratic regimes, police, military, and
intelligence institutions often serve as instruments of coercion and are capable of
applying potentially devastating sanctions against challengers and dissidents. Robert
Dahl noted in 1973 that ‘‘the likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition
increases…with a reduction in the capacity of the government to use violence or socio-
economic sanctions to suppress an opposition.’’ 1
Regimes that rely on coercion to maintain power are particularly dependent on the
loyalty and reliability of their forces. Ted Robert Gurr highlights this relationship,
postulating that “regime coercive control varies strongly with the loyalty of coercive
forces to the regime.” Gurr concludes that “maximum coercive control is likely to require
maximum loyalty in both scope and degree.”2 Mancur Olson similarly emphasizes the

1 Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971) 49.
2 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970) 251.
1