Hitler's Second Book

258 Pages·2016·0.99 MB·English

by  Adolf Hitler

HITLER’S SECOND BOOK:
GERMAN FOREIGN
POLICY

ADOLF HITLER

The Full Text of the Unpublished 1928 Book
Translated, Introduced and Annotated by
Arthur Kemp B.A. (Intl. Pol., Pol. Sci., Pub. Ad.)

Ostara Publications
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Hitler’s Second Book: German Foreign Policy
By Adolf Hitler
Translated, Introduced and Annotated by Arthur Kemp
Ostara Publications © 2104
http://ostarapublications.com

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CONTENTS
Introduction: The Story of the Manuscript
Foreword
The South Tyrol question—Blindness of the bourgeois nationalists—Italy, not
France, the desirable ally
Chapter I
History is the story of peoples’ struggles for existence—Peace and war as means
of waging the struggle—Neither should be the sole means—Too much war kills
off the elite—Too much peace leads to submissiveness and emigration.
Chapter II
Territorial conquest is necessary for a people’s security and healthy growth—
Morality of conquest: no one owns any part of the Earth—Birth control
eugenically unsound—Spartan exposure logical—Emigration sacrifices best
elements—Increase in productivity of no help competitively—Export trade
vanishing as other nations modernize—Necessity of strife.
Chapter III
Weapons on hand no gauge of national strength—National will the decisive
factor—Old German army as source of people’s will and discipline—National-
Socialist mission to revitalize national will—Blood and folk values superior to
internationalism—Leadership superior to mass democracy
Chapter IV
Must learn from the past—Must forge the instruments for change to a fruitful
German foreign policy—Correct ideas valueless unless translated into action—
The Pan-German League—Necessity of taking risks—Policies must be carried out
with vigor even if total success not guaranteed—Breaking the circle of enemies of
Germany.
Chapter V
NSDAP is socialist and nationalist—Bourgeois nationalists aim to restore
Germany’s pre-war frontiers—NSDAP foreign policy aims at territorial expansion,
and bringing Germans under German sovereignty—Folkdom as basis of policy.
Chapter VI
Need of alliances to achieve German aims—German borders unsatisfactory both
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economically and militarily
Chapter VII
Lack of national goals after Bismarck—Democracy responsible for bungling—
Goal should have been acquisition of German areas of Europe—Worthlessness of
Hapsburg Empire—German part of South Tyrol would be German territory today
if territorial policy had been followed—Catholic Center and Jewish Social
Democrats blocked territorial policies—Worthlessness to Germany of Triple
Alliance—Destruction of Germanism in Austria-Hungary—Unwise failure to
support Italy in Tripoli—Italy cannot oppose England—Austria sole profiteer from
Triple Alliance—German colonial policy a blunder, led to conflict with England—
Western Russia the proper area for German expansion.
Chapter VIII
Lack of German war aims in World War—Aim should have been territorial, prize
lands for fighter-farmers—Decline of “old” army—Deficiencies of today’s
mercenary army—Bismarck and preventive war—Germany’s two-power land
standard—America has upset balance of power—Reichswehr turned into
domestic police force—Need for nationalist spirit—Border-restoration policy will
lead to coalition of victor nations—Beer-hall patriots’ empty talk of “national
honor”.
Chapter IX
Germany today powerless to defend honor or borders—Increased production no
solution—England won’t tolerate merchant trade competition—Emigration no
solution—American racial immigration policies—Pan-Europeanism no solution,
leads to loss of folk-values—American values based on dominant kindred groups.
Chapter X
Neutrality as policy means some other nation wins—Desirability of action—
Worthlessness of League of Nations—American greatness the result of
intervention in World War—Italy justified in deserting Triple Alliance.
Chapter XI
Franco-Russian and Anglo-French alliances surround Germany—Militarily
indefensible German borders—Vulnerability of German cities to attack from the
air—Russian alliance would be catastrophic—France always the enemy—Soviet
Russian goal is Jewish communist poisoning of Germany—Jews have destroyed
Russian elite—Russo-German alliance would mean invasion of Germany from
West—Russian alliance would block German expansion by conquest of Russian
territory—Jews dominate Russia, but could in future be displaced by “National
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Bolshevism.”
Chapter XII
Eight principles.
Chapter XIII
Inaction dangerous—Peaceful economic expansion no solution—Border
restoration policy futile—Necessity of Völkisch territorial policy.
Chapter XIV
English race-values—Colonies—England doesn’t oppose continental power, but
does oppose trade and naval rivals—Wilhelm II squandered resources on German
fleet—Could have had understanding with England—England threatened by
France on continent, America on the seas, and Russia in Asia—Jewry in England a
threat to an Anglo-German alliance.
Chapter XV
Italy promising as German ally—Mussolini and race-values—Must forget Italy as
enemy in World War—Italy natural enemy of France, natural ally of England—
Germany should also have abandoned Austria-Hungary—Blindness of bourgeois
nationalists who oppose Italy and Mussolini—South Tyrol—Jews use Tyrol to set
Italy and Germany at odds—Germans in Alsace, Poland, etc., just as important as
those in South Tyrol—Advice to Mussolini—The true villains who bear guilt for the
South Tyrol—US Secret Service Head Reveals Why America Entered the War.
Chapter XVI
Italy as an ally of Germany—England, and perhaps Hungary and Spain, as allies of
Germany—Jewry responsible for German disaster in World War—An overview of
Jewish interventionist tactics in International Relations.
Appendix 1: How America Entered the War: Article originally meant to
be inserted in Chapter XV
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Introduction: The Story of the Manuscript
Dedicated in 1928 to Max Annan, Hitler’s personal friend and head of the NSDAP’s
publishing house, the Franz Eher Nachfolger GmbH (the “Eher-Verlag”), the
unedited and draft manuscript, provisionally titled “Deutsche Aussenpolitik” but
later more commonly known as Hitler’s “Second Book,” was never published in
Hitler’s lifetime.
Various reasons have been put forward as to why the manuscript was
never published. It is often claimed that poor sales of Mein Kampf, Hitler’s first
book, were the reason. The facts of the situation do not support this claim. Hitler
was already independently wealthy from sales of his first book, to the point
where he never accepted a salary from the state for the thirteen years he spent
as chancellor.
The most likely reason for the non-publication of this, his second book, is
simply time. The manuscript was completed in 1928, and in the following four
years, Hitler and the National Socialist party took part in no less than five major
national elections (1928, 1930, July 1932, November 1932, and March 1933).
Between this exertion, his hectic speaking schedule and day-to-day
politicking, it is clear that Hitler and Max Annan simply never had the time to edit
the manuscript properly, and correct any spelling or grammatical errors. The book
was also prepared at a time in German history when the question of South Tyrol
was specifically in the news, and it was also an attempt to win adherents to the
NSDAP.
As a result, when there would have been time to finish editing the book,
Hitler was already in office—and thus there was simply no need, financially or
politically, for another book predicting what the new Chancellor was already
doing.
Thus the manuscript—of which there were two copies—lay locked up—
one in Hitler’s safe at his home in the Obersalzburg, and the other in the safe of
the Eher Verlag in Munich.
Just prior to the end of the war, by Hitler’s order, the SS garrison at the
Obersalzburg burned all his papers—and his house.
At the time, no one seemed to know what had happened to the copy in the
Eher Verlag’s safe. The matter was forgotten in the immediate aftermath of the
war, even though Hitler did refer to the manuscript at least once.
On February 17, 1942, he remarked during a discussion on Japan and the
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Jews, that “In 1925 I wrote in Mein Kampf (and also in an unpublished work) that
world Jewry saw in Japan an opponent beyond its reach” (Adolf Hitler, February
17, 1942, as quoted in Hitler’s Table Talk, February 17, 1942, midday).
The story of how the manuscript was found was detailed in the October
1962 edition of The American Archivist, published by the Society of American
Archivists, Volume 25, Number 4, pages 469–472).
According to that journal, in the winter of 1950–51 two enlisted men,
military intelligence linguists, were engaged in unpacking crated German records
that had been held in storage pending analysis.
One of these men later recalled that they had seen then a typescript that
an intelligence team had picked up from the Eher Verlag.
Although this document was labeled “an alleged unpublished work by Adolf
Hitler,” they assumed it to be “a draft copy of Mein Kampf” and had therefore
tentatively identified it as a “Mein Kampf manuscript.”
It was put in a safe containing other miscellaneous items that could not be
assigned to an established series and not left on any of the open shelves—
meaning that it was buried even deeper in the paperwork records.
In July 1958, a German historian named Erich Lauer, director of the
Arbeitskreis fur Kriegsgeschichte, wrote to the US Army Archives, asking for
information about an unpublished book by Adolf Hitler with the title Deutsche
Aussenpolitik (“German Foreign Policy”).
Lauer had information that the manuscript had been acquired from Josef
Berg, business manager of the Eher Verlag, by Captain Paul M. Leake, Signal
Corps, AUS, the officer in charge of the intelligence team that visited Berg’s firm
in April 1945, when Munich was occupied by the US Seventh Army.
Richard Bauer, former enlisted linguist in the German Military Documents
Section and, in 1958, in charge of the reference service on captured documents,
proceeded to make a careful examination of the paper, which he knew to be in
the special document safe.
He soon realized that the document in question was mislabeled in that it
was not a draft of Mein Kampf. Although it had no title or title page, its 324
pages, typed double-spaced in purple ink, did deal with German foreign policy,
and the style and phraseology appeared to be Hitler’s.
Since the documents in the safe, as indeed many series of captured
records, had not been reached in the progressive program of security review and
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downgrading, the manuscript still retained its confidential classification.
Pending the security review and determination of policy with respect to
handling the document, Lauer was merely informed that no such document was
among the unclassified German records in US custody. At the same time, the
document was immediately given a number, EAP 105/40, in the series of
miscellaneous documents arranged according to the German Army Unified
Documents System (EAP); and it was submitted to the Army Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence, with a request for its removal from the confidential
classification.
Removal of the classification was promptly authorized and in August 1958,
the document was submitted informally to the Historical Division, Department of
State. By 1959 it had been microfilmed and released into the public domain.
German Jewish historian Gerhard Weinberg then quite falsely claimed that
he had discovered the manuscript (“Revealed: the amazing story behind Hitler’s
second book”, The Telegraph, London, Sept. 25, 2003).
In reality, Weinberg had only been told about the manuscript’s existence by
Bauer, who should really be credited with finding the book.
After obtaining a copy of the manuscript from Bauer, Weinberg then
produced a highly-edited (actually a censored) version of the book in German,
titled Hitlers Zweites Buck, ein Dokument aus dem Jahr 1928 (“Hitler’s Second
Book, a Document from the Year 1928”), published by the Institut für
Zeitgeschichte (“Institute of Contemporary History”) in Munich. The Institut für
Zeitgeschichte was, and still is, a historical research center set up by the post-war
West German government in 1947, at the insistence of the Allied occupying
powers, to present anti-Hitler propaganda in Germany.
Subsequent to the edited version appearing in German, an unknown
“pirate” edition of Weinberg’s version appeared in English.
This first translation was pitifully poor, and in some sections, completely
incomprehensible. This was probably aggravated by the fact that the original
manuscript was also unedited. Finally, another English edition appeared, of better
quality, but that remained only a translation of the “edited” Weinberg version.
The work you now hold in your hands is the very first complete and
accurate translation done in which the basic ideas are put down in readable and
everyday English. All of the ideas, thoughts and concepts have been faithfully
captured, analyzed and set down in the manner in which they would ultimately
have appeared, had it ever been officially printed.
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