HISTORICAL JUDGEMENT The Limits of - PhilPapers

321 Pages·2011·4.2 MB·English

HISTORICAL JUDGEMENT

The Limits of Historiographical Choice

Jonathan Gorman

25th September 2007
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Preface

It was Steven Gerrard, Publisher, who, at the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society
and the Mind Association at Queen’s University Belfast in 2003, encouraged me to
write this book, and I am most grateful to him and to a number of anonymous readers
from North America and the UK, both philosophers and historians, for their support
and observations. Fortunately, I did not have to start from scratch, because I first
began to worry philosophically about the issues involved in the book as an
undergraduate at Edinburgh University under Leon Pompa’s supervision. That
supervision developed into lifelong mentorship and friendship, and I take pleasure here
in affirming how much I have valued, and continue to value, our relationship.
Inevitably, given that my quality of philosophical thought rarely achieves his, there
have been both agreements and disagreements over the years, and this book is a
contribution to such debates rather than a resolution of them. Here I acknowledge
also other continuing influences on my thinking about history: another tutor at
Edinburgh was George Davie, who introduced me to French philosophy (interesting
but irrelevant, I then thought), and whose The Democratic Intellect had not long
before been published, and it was he who (alone) claimed to recognise in my writing a
feeling for history itself rather than, as historians might see it, mere philosophy. A
lesser but still important influence and source of encouragement was W.H. Walsh, not
so much for his work in philosophy of history but for his lectures on F.H. Bradley, by
whose holistic empiricism he thought I was over-impressed. This outcome I ascribe to
the persuasiveness of his lecturing and his supporting scholarship.

I was indeed impressed by Bradley’s philosophical approach. I moved to Peterhouse,
Cambridge for my Ph.D. research in order to work under W.B. Gallie, whose writing
on narrative historical understanding I much appreciated, and it took me a while to
notice the relevance to philosophy of history of another of his interests, American
pragmatism, with its connections to Bradley’s holistic empiricism. Pragmatism and
Bradley come together in the work not so much of Gallie’s Peirce but of Quine, and a
further important influence was Quentin Skinner’s lectures on that philosophically
difficult material. (Later, Quine himself helped, a tiny bit.) If Skinner’s position as a
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historian teaching Quine was not quite sufficient to remove any sense I had of the
divisions between historians and philosophers, then the last step in that direction was
provided by Ian Hacking, my adviser of philosophical studies at Peterhouse, who was
thought of by we philosophy students as mainly a probability theorist, but who
surprised us by lecturing (almost as if he had also learnt from George Davie) on
Bachelard, Foucault and Althusser. My second Ph.D. supervisor was Mary Hesse,
and she – another appreciator of Quine’s philosophy – and Gerd Buchdahl (less so), of
the History and Philosophy of Science Unit, showed me just how complex a task the
development of a proper philosophy of history would have to be, while Bernard
Williams did not think it could be done. But all I had to do was apply the complexity
of Cambridge’s fast-developing new philosophies of science to history; and then I
crossed the road back to Peterhouse and talked to the historians.

The practical, if not theoretical, divisions between history and philosophy were rapidly
reinstated. Herbert Butterfield had recently retired as Master, but was still present; I
was philosophically baffled when conversing with him. Maurice Cowling cross-
examined my thinking, usually before breakfast (and I tried, with limited success, to
learn how to cross-examine him back; it was rather different from philosophical
discussion, despite his philosophical expertise). Joe Lee – another lifelong friend –
delighted me with his brilliance (but what made this a different brilliance from that of
Bernard Williams?). E.A. Wrigley displayed the mathematics and science in history.
Denis Brogan, Martin Golding, Roger Lovatt, Edward Norman, M.M. Postan, David
Watkin and Brian Wormald are foundational in my memory as Peterhouse historians
who, in their different ways, helpfully illustrated for me the philosophical tasks which I
faced. In that wider Cambridge beyond the College, G.R. Elton (whom I criticise
later) was very helpful, and I believe I recall correctly that it was he who introduced
me to Arnaldo Momigliano in London, with whom I had long discussions. Perhaps
most influential, however, was Peter Laslett through his History of Ideas Seminar,
earlier members of which had included Skinner and John Pocock, for it was to that
Seminar in Trinity College that Richard Vann, Editor of the then fairly new journal
History and Theory, came, seeking original thinking in just the area to which I wished
to contribute. History and Theory has given me many opportunities and much
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encouragement over the years, its influence on my work is immeasurable, and I should
like here to express my thanks to Richard Vann and to the current Editor, Brian Fay.

All these early influences will be apparent in this book, but it has had much more recent
help. Much of chapter 2, “The philosophy of a discipline”, builds on an extended
version of a paper which, at Michael Bentley’s invitation, I delivered in summary form
in July 2005 at the meeting of the panel “Beyond Science in Historical Theory”,
organised by the International Commission on the History and Theory of
Historiography, at the 20th International Congress of Historical Sciences in Sydney,
Australia. I am glad to acknowledge the support of The British Academy in attending
this panel. At the meeting, Eduardo Tortarolo trustingly accepted that I could provide
a publishable version of the paper, and an early development of it appeared as “The
truth of historical theory” in the journal he edits, Storia della storiografia 48, 2006. I
am very grateful to the many respondents to that paper, especially Maria Grever, for
discussion, and particularly to Michael Bentley also, who, in addition to his own many
stimulating contributions to historical theory and historiography, had earlier organised
a workshop on behalf of the Commission in St Andrews in July 2004, a formative time
for me in the production of this book, when I was the discussant in a valuable session
of papers given by Jörn Rüsen, Ewa Domańska, Rolf Torstendahl and Mark Day. I
would also like to thank George Pavlakos for many discussions in legal theory which I
have used as a central source in historical theory, and, in addition to some of those
mentioned earlier, to thank David Evans, Christopher McKnight and Alan Weir for
comments on part of the book’s early drafts.

I dedicated my first book, The Expression of Historical Knowledge, to my wife Kyra,
who by 1982, when it was published, had been more close than anyone could
reasonably wish to someone else trying to write philosophy. She has with her usual
and supererogatory grace put up with a very great deal more by now; and she helps
me to write better than I would naturally do.
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CONTENTS

Chapter 1 The Argument 5
Chapter 2 The Philosophy of a Discipline 24
Respect for historiography 24
Modelling a discipline: the truth of historical theory 39
Description and prescription 50
Justification in the second-order context: Popper and Hempel 61
Justification in the second-order context: Kuhn 72
Rival historiographies of science 92
Chapter 3 Writing the History of Historiography 96
Historiography of historiography: prior considerations 96
Our primary sources 102
Our use of primary sources 117
Choices and questions 124
Character and consensus 132
Historiography of historiography 142
Historians’ self-understanding 173
Chapter 4 Pragmatic Postmodernism 189
Postmodernism 189
Commonsense and experience: Hume 197
Quine as postmodernist 203
The costs of belief 215
Quine not postmodern enough 230
Chapter 5 The Room for Judgement 239
Narrative truth 239
A fancy view of truth 256
Holistic choice 265
Structuring factual synthesis 275
Moral judgement in historiography 293
Bibliography 305
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Chapter 1 The Argument

This book contains an argument which is summarised in this first chapter. In very
brief outline, the argument begins by showing, in the second chapter, that the
philosophy of a discipline requires drawing on its historiography in a particular way, so
that the philosophy of historiography should draw on the historiography of
historiography in this way. That second chapter also argues that the philosophical
issues concerning a discipline should arise from that discipline itself, as shown in its
historiography. The following chapter, chapter three, seeks to write the required
historiography of historiography, and that search, in disclosing its own presuppositions
of writing historiography, discloses also the philosophical issues which arise for
historians, which have to do with their factual and moral judgements made in a context
of a multiplicity of choices. The form which these philosophical issues take for many
contemporary historians is a worry about the postmodern destabilisation of historical
reality, and chapter four analyses postmodernism, overcoming its problems for
historians by showing its practical limits. Finally, chapter five shows how, in the light
of those limits, the historical world may be established in our factual and moral
understanding.

Next we1 explain how the various elements of the book connect to each other. While
the book is organised in terms of five chapters including this one, the titles of which
give a broad overview of their contents, the ongoing argument of the book is presented
in a series of sections, listed on the “Contents” page, each naturally following its
predecessor throughout. In so far as the book consists of a developing argument as
just briefly outlined, it has a traditionally analytical philosophical structure. However,
it is not necessary to read it by starting at the beginning. Those with philosophical and
those with historiographical backgrounds may well have different interests. For
example, some readers may wish to skip the metaphilosophical arguments in the next
chapter “The Philosophy of a Discipline”, take for granted the conclusions reached,

1 Why not “I”? In part, for the ordinary literary reason that the construction of meaning is intended
to be shared with the reader, but more importantly because “I” has a raw use for which I wish (we will
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and proceed directly to the issues involved in the third chapter “Writing the History of
Historiography”. Again, some readers may take the conclusions in that chapter for
granted, and go directly to “Pragmatic Postmodernism”; similarly for “The Room for
Judgement”. The remainder of this introductory chapter will help with such decisions.

In a little more detail than the very brief outline just given, this book argues for a
historiography-friendly philosophical response to historians’ theoretical concerns, first
showing how to model historiography in a philosophical way by analysing the
metaphilosophical and historiographical moves made in the philosophy of other
disciplines, in particular science and law. The philosophy of a discipline requires the
historiographical recovery of that which the practitioners of the discipline conceive as
characterising their discipline and under which they conceive themselves to be
operating. Philosophical and historiographical points of view are compared, and
associated problems are addressed. The unavoidability of writing our own
historiography of historiography is then argued for, and as this proceeds the
fundamental conditions of writing that historiography are demonstrated. The nature
of historical questions and their link to historiographical choices and other relevant
presuppositions are explained. Historians are themselves used as our primary sources,
and this matter too is explained. Historians’ self-understanding is then recovered
through critical construction on the basis of historians’ own views, both as directly
expressed and as expressed in their historiographies of historiography. Contrasting
with recent epistemological discussions of “consensus”, historians’ characteristic
modes of questioning are recovered, identifying not just what they agree about but
what they agree they are disagreeing about. Relevant philosophical thought about
historiography is presented in passing. The historiography of historiography, written
by us using the material now explained, presents historians as thinking different things
about the nature of historiography. Yet they can only disagree with each other if in
some broad sense they share the issues about which they are disagreeing. What is
characteristic is that historians disagree about interrelated issues: the role and nature
of truth and truth-telling, the acceptability and grounds of moral judgement, the
synthesis of facts, and their role or function in society. The book concludes with a

find we will wish) to reserve it. The contrast between “I” and “we” matters for our later argument
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pragmatic analysis of these matters.

And now, the detailed summary of the argument which is the purpose of this first
chapter. Chapter 2, “The Philosophy of a Discipline”, presents our first section,
“Respect for historiography”. This section analyses the word “history” in some detail,
and our reasons for using the word “historiography” to refer to the discipline “history”
are explained, reserving the word “history” for the subject matter of that discipline.
This terminology is to some extent artificial, but it is introduced because historians
commonly use the word “history” in ways which may, given the distinctions we will
present, seem ambiguous. However, while, for exactness and consistency, our
terminology is used throughout the book, later we will see justification for historians’
normal usage. Following the analysis of “history”, we then outline a dismissive
attitude on the part of a number of historians towards the philosophy or theory of their
subject, even when that is written by historians themselves. Some historians see
philosophers as imposing their theoretical positions on historians while in ignorance of
their successful methodological practices. They think philosophers should focus on
what historical practice actually is, and should provide some sort of portrait of
historians. They think that philosophers should have more respect than they do for
historians and historical work. They are right: some philosophers should indeed have
more respect for historiography than they have shown, and this section explains why all
philosophers should. A central feature to be understood is the historian’s historically
situated yet privileged position of hindsight. A further reason for making
historiography central for philosophical interest is its continuity with everyday
commonsense understanding. Ultimately, the acceptability or otherwise of our
judgements of truth can only be an acceptability to us in our everyday world, itself a
world continuous with the past.

Nevertheless, to some extent the dislike on the part of some historians for historical
theory displays a misunderstanding of philosophers’ interests in historiography. Many
of those philosophers with an interest in the subject approach it with a desire to locate
historiography as a knowledge-acquiring or knowledge-expressing discipline, and their

and is particularly dealt with in the section “Quine not postmodern enough”, in Chapter 4.
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attitudes reflect their background theories of knowledge. Some, for example, may
take historical knowledge for granted, and ask with Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) how
that knowledge is possible. Others may, with René Descartes (1596-1650), doubt all
knowledge claims, and insist as Descartes did on standards of proof which no usual
discipline could successfully meet. Positions like Descartes’ unquestionably suggest
philosophical arrogance, but this perception is difficult to avoid in the case of
philosophers with an interest in the theory of knowledge. This is because knowledge,
even in our everyday understanding of that term, can only be such if some justification
is available. Theorists of knowledge are in the business of questioning and analysing
justifications, usually not taking them on trust, but here – reflecting the pragmatic
approach which characterises this book – we recognise that there is important room for
the idea that claims to knowledge might be self-justifying. In this section we describe
the wide range of interpretations of “justification” in this context, and make explicit a
feature of the pragmatic approach which is crucial to our argument, the presence of
choice.

Yet our own concern in undertaking the philosophy of historiography is more general
than this. It is to provide an understanding of historiography for those who are
puzzled by it, by what it does, by what it achieves, by its role. Those puzzled may be
within and without the discipline. Their curiosity may or may not have been induced
by the views of philosophers, for many historians have claimed things of their discipline
with which other historians would disagree. Thus part of our task is to sort this
puzzlement into clear questions. Importantly, the philosophy of historiography should
not be seen as essentially an exercise in the theory of knowledge. The philosophical
problems of historiography should arise from the study of that discipline, not be
imposed upon it.

It is right for philosophy to take historiography seriously. We are not alone among
philosophers of historiography in thinking that, but that is a very general
characterisation, and we argue for a specific new approach. In the section “Modelling
a discipline: the truth of historical theory” we analyse what it is to take a discipline
seriously from a philosophical point of view. We see that the removal of philosophical
puzzlement about historiography requires a “model” of historiography. A model says
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something “true” about the matter being modelled, and we explain what it is for a
philosophical model to be successful. Both philosophers and historians have, in the
last one hundred years or more, worried about whether historiography should properly
be regarded as scientific, and it is the imposition of models of science on
historiography which has typically given rise to those already-mentioned complaints
about philosophical arrogance. We eschew the question whether historiography is a
science, but the history of the debate about this matter gives us the opportunity to
understand how the philosophy of science has modelled science, and we learn from this
some main ways in which philosophy can model any discipline. In this section we
examine in particular work by Karl Popper and Carl Hempel, and in doing so we
recover issues about the nature of historiography from the fact that our presentation is,
in part, a historiography of the philosophy of science. We observe, too, how in
particular Hempel tries to model historiographical explanation, and how in particular
Popper uses his approach to express a view about the ethics of historical change.
Both make causation essential to their analysis of historiography. We do not.

Continuing this approach for illustrative purposes, in the section “Description and
prescription” we emphasise two features of the Popper-Hempel model of science, first,
that it purports to describe scientific thought or practice, and second, that it sets a
prescriptive standard for that thought or practice. That the model is true, if it is,
means that the model is true in both ways, and this requires that both the descriptive
and prescriptive elements are appropriately justified. Using material from the
philosophy of law (which attempts to model law), we analyse and query the
“descriptive”/“prescriptive” – often seen as the “fact”/“value” – distinction, an issue we
keep in mind as we introduce Thomas Kuhn’s work. The way in which Kuhn’s
approach is to be interpreted as descriptively and prescriptively inconsistent with that
of Popper and Hempel is newly analysed. Separating description from prescription,
we first see that Popper and Hempel may be historiographically wrong by contrast with
Kuhn, that is, that they disagree about the history of science. Nevertheless, given the
descriptive/prescriptive distinction, their work as setting a standard for science might
still stand. Yet stand it did not. Kuhn did not revolutionise philosophy of science by
merely offering a descriptive update of the history of science, and the way in which his
philosophy sets a standard for science is analysed. A part of our analysis here
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