Guidelines for Analyzing and Managing the Security Vulnerabilities of Fixed Chemical Sites (CCPS Guidelines)

233 Pages·2003·3.28 MB·English

by  Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS)

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Introduction
1.1. ANewImperativeforChemicalFacilitySecurity
Whilesecurityandsafetyhavebeenkeyprioritiesatfacilitiesthatman-
ufacture, store, use, or handle hazardous chemicals, after the terrorist
attacksontheUnitedStatesofSeptember11,2001,anewandurgent
risk paradigm has been presented. The Center for Chemical Process
Safety(CCPS®)recognizedtheneedtopublishrisk-basedguidelineson
howtoaddressthepotentialforintentionalactsagainstthesetypesof
facilities. While the events of September 11th were not directed
towardsthechemicalindustry,chemicalfacilitiesmayposeanattrac-
tive target to terrorism, with the purpose of using the physical and
chemicalpropertiesofthechemicalstocausemasscasualties,property
damage,andeconomicorenvironmentalimpacts.
The industry is faced with the important need to assess whether
currentsecuritymeasureseffectivelyaddressthesenewandunforeseen
threats,andmakeenhancementsasrequiredtoprovideforthesafetyof
thepublic,workers,andtheenvironment.Securityimprovementsmay
beneeded,especiallyatsitesthatposeamoreattractivetargettoterror-
istsduetotheireconomicimportance,perceivedlevelofconsequences,
and other factors. Even though facilities cannot prevent or protect
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2 AnalyzingandManagingtheSecurityVulnerabilitiesofFixedChemicalSites
against all known or suspected threats, there are reasonable measures
and approaches than can be taken. Beyond that upper limit, facilities
need to seek out assistance and coordinate efforts with federal, state,
andlocallawenforcementagencies,andwiththelocalemergencyser-
vices and Local Emergency Planning Committee to obtain and share
intelligence, coordinate training, and tap other resources to deter
attacksandtomanageemergencies.
Chemicalsecurityhastobebalancedwithotherobjectives,andhas
tobecommensuratewiththethreatandlikelihoodofoccurrence.Con-
sequently, the chemical security management process requires a sys-
tematic approach to analyzing risk of these issues. The process has to
identify the potential threats facing the site, analyze how intentional
actsmaybecarriedout,andassesswhethercountermeasuresaresuffi-
cient. The analytical portion of this management system is called a
Security Vulnerability Analysis (SVA), and is the main topic of this
book. It is a process of analyzing risks to a facility and selecting and
implementingsecuritycountermeasurestoreduceriskfromintentional
releaseorthefteventsatanacceptablecost.Itisastructured,yetflexi-
ble, approach to understanding the security threats confronting a site
handling hazardous chemicals, and, then, a process for developing
effective security countermeasures and options with consideration of
bothcostsandbenefits.
1.2. Objectives,IntendedAudience,andScopeofThisBook
1.2.1. Objectives
The CCPS formed a Chemical Security Subcommittee in November
2001,composedofabalanceofsecurityandprocesssafetyexperts.The
missionofthesubcommitteeistoapplyCCPS’sconsiderableportfolio
of risk evaluation and risk reduction tools to the practice of security,
whileimprovingexistingprocesssafetytoolsbymorefullyincorporat-
ing security considerations. The first effort of CCPS in the area of
chemicalfacilitysecuritywasthisguidelineonhowtoperformsecurity
vulnerabilityanalyses.Theprimaryobjectiveofthisbookistoprovide
a useful tool that can be used by any industrial company that handles
hazardouschemicalsatafixedfacilitytoassesstheirriskfromterrorist
events. Second, the book provides some tools and guidance on
approachestomanagetherisks.
Introduction 3
ThisGuidelinesseriesbookpresentsanSVAapproachwherebya
facilitycanevaluatethepotentialforarangeofinternallyorexternally
committedintentionalacts.Thefocusofthebookisonmajorevents—
particularly those events that may have the high-end consequence
potentialforthechemicalindustry.Domesticandinternationalterror-
istshaveincreasinglyfocusedonattacksthatyieldmaximumdestruc-
tion, casualties, and high visibility impacts, and this is where the
resourcesoftheindustryneedtobeaddressedasafirstpriority.
The SVA method described is intended to be widely applicable to
sites that handle and manufacture chemicals. Individual companies,
workingcooperativelywithlocalofficials,arebestsuitedforconduct-
ing a SVA and determining how best to protect their assets. This is
because potential threats and appropriate security measures vary dra-
matically based on size, location, facility type, and existing security
measuresalreadyinplace.
Themethodisriskbasedandperformancebased.Itisriskbasedin
that it recommends that the highest level of consideration be given to
thoseprocessesandsitesthatinvolvechemicalswithhighhazardprop-
erties,wheretheseverityoftheattackwouldbegreatest,andwherethe
difficultyofattackisleast.Itisperformancebasedinthatspecificsafe-
guardsarenotprescribedinthebook;rather,thebookdescribesanana-
lytical approach that identifies and characterizes the risks. Facility
managers, in consultation with facility stakeholders, must then deter-
minethedegreeofsecuritynecessarytoaddresscompany-specifichaz-
ardsandanypublicconcerns.
1.2.2. IntendedAudience
Thebookisintendedforchemicalsitemanagers,processsafetymanag-
ers, security managers, and others responsible for conducting security
vulnerability analyses and managing security at fixed chemical facili-
ties.
1.2.3. Scope
The book covers how to conduct an SVA for fixed chemical sites and
howtomanagetheprocessofconductingSVAs.Themethoddescribed
inthisbookmaybewidelyapplicabletosecurityissues,butthekeyhaz-
ardsofconcernarethosethathavethepotentialforwidespreadcasual-
tiesordamage.Thekeyeventsandconsequencesofinterestinclude:
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• Loss of containment of hazardous chemicals on the plant site
from intentional damage of equipment or the malicious release
ofchemicals,whichmaycausemultiplecasualties,severedamage,
andpublicorenvironmentalimpacts
• Chemicaltheftormisusewiththeintenttocausesevereharmat
thefacilityoroffsite
• Contamination or spoilage of site products to cause worker or
publicharmonoroffsite
• Degradation of assets or infrastructure or the business function
orvalueofthefacilityortheentirecompanythroughdestructive
actsofterrorism.
Thisbookdoesnotincludeacompletediscussionon:
• Specificcountermeasuresthatmustbeappliedforagivenrisk
• The analysis of risks of intentional acts against chemical trans-
portation systems, including overland distribution or marine
security.
• Alife-cyclesecuritymodelforthetotalmanagementofsecurity
issues(ChemicalSecurityManagementSystemorCSMS).
ThesesubjectsmaybeaddressedinfutureCCPSpublicationsand
arefoundinotherreferences1,2,3.
Includedinthispublicationisalistingofperformance-basedcrite-
riaforasecurityvulnerabilityanalysisapproach.Theintentofthecrite-
rialististoeducateontheattributesandstepsofwhatCCPSbelieves
constitutesacompleteSVA.ThesecriteriaformthebasisoftheCCPS
SVAandprovideapossiblereferencepointforfacilitiestojudgetheir
own methods against the CCPS criteria. CCPS recognizes that there
maybenumerousindividualapproachesemployedforanalyzingsecu-
rity risks and is providing a key set of performance-based parameters
forcompaniestoconsiderinassessingthemeritsandcompletenessof
theirownapproaches.
1.3. IntegrationofThisGuidancewithOtherCCPS®Guidance
Security is an integral component of process risk management. The
analysis of the potential for catastrophic incidents caused by inten-
Introduction 5
tional, malevolent acts is a related task to the analysis of accidental
risks, and these approaches and process safety management strategies
arewelldocumentedinmanypreviousCCPSpublicationsincluding:
• GuidelinesforImplementingProcessSafetyManagementSystems
• Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, Second Edition with
WorkedExamples
• PlantGuidelinesforTechnicalManagementofChemicalProcessSafety,
rev.ed.
• GuidelinesforChemicalProcessQuantitativeRiskAnalysis,2nded.
• GuidelinesforVaporReleaseMitigation
• GuidelinesforUseofVaporCloudDispersionModels
• GuidelinesforSafeStorageandHandlingofHighToxicHazardMate-
rials
• EvaluatingProcessSafetyintheChemicalIndustry:AUser’sGuideto
QuantitativeRiskAnalysis
• InherentlySaferChemicalProcesses:ALifeCycleApproach
• LayerofProtectionAnalysis:SimplifiedProcessRiskAssessment
This book focuses on the SVA process, and it is anticipated that
userswouldreferencethefullCCPSpublicationssuiteaswellasother
securityreferencesasisappropriatewhenimplementingtheresultsofa
SVA.Thebookdoesnotrepeatallofthebasicinformationcontained
intheseguidesandreferences,butusestheprinciplesinmanyofthem.
1.4. OrganizationoftheBook
ThebookiswrittenwiththekeyprinciplesforSVAinthebodyofthe
book,andtoolsforimplementingtheSVAapproachintheappendices.
Chapter 2 introduces the topic of chemical facility security and
describes the added responsibilities the industry faces following Sep-
tember11th.ThekeytermsandthephilosophybehindtheCCPSSVA
arealsodescribed.
CCPS has developed a set of criteria that characterize a complete
vulnerability analysis method, which is explained in Chapter 2. These
formthebasisoftheCCPSSVA.Recognizingthataperformance-based
approach to conducting a SVA may result in multiple approaches to
6 AnalyzingandManagingtheSecurityVulnerabilitiesofFixedChemicalSites
conducting an analysis, the criteria may be used as a benchmark in
assessinganySVAforcompleteness.
Chapter3presentstheoverallCCPSSVAapproach.Thisincludes
a description of the methodology, and a description of each of the six
stepsoftheprocess.Alternativemeanstoachievetheanalysis,namely
theasset-basedandthescenario-basedapproaches,areexplained.The
accompanyingworksheetsandreferenceinformationtotheanalysisis
presentedintheappendices.
TheCCPSSVAisfoundedonarisk-basedapproachtomanaging
chemicalfacilitysecurity,andthisisexplainedinChapter3.Tobegin
the process, companies may perform an enterprise-level screening
methodology to sort out significant risks among multiple sites and to
determine priorities for analysis and implementation of any recom-
mendedchanges.Thescreening,ifperformed,wouldresultinapriori-
tized list of sites and forms the foundation of the choice of specific
SVAsrequired.
Chapter 4 covers how to integrate chemical security management
andprocesssafetymanagementstrategiesintoacomprehensiveprocess
safetyandsecuritystrategy.Securityriskreductionopportunitiesduring
theprocesslife-cycleareexplained,aswellasvariousprocessriskman-
agementstrategies(includinginherentsafety)thatareapplicable.
In the appendices, the book contains a set of tools including an
enterpriselevelscreeningtool,referenceinformationavailabletocon-
ducttheCCPSSVA,andaworkbookwithworksheetsforconducting
the CCPS SVA, examples of enhanced security measures and check-
listsforassessingsecuritymeasuresatasite.
TablestoaccommodateanassessmentofanotherSVAmethodol-
ogy against the CCPS SVA criteria are also presented in the Appen-
dices. These forms may also be used by anyone conducting a CCPS
SVAinordertosatisfycompletenessandqualityoftheeffort.
References
1. Counterterrorism and Contingency Planning Guide. Special publication from
Security Management magazine and American Society for Industrial Secu-
rity,2001.
6. Dalton,Dennis.SecurityManagement:BusinessStrategiesforSuccess.Newton,
MA:Butterworth-HeinemannPublishing,1995.
Introduction 7
7. Walsh,TimothyJ.,andRichardJ.Healy,eds.,ProtectionofAssetsManual
(Santa Monica, CA: Merritt Co.). Four-volume loose-leaf reference
manual,updatedmonthly.
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CCPS® Security Vulnerability
Analysis (SVA) Methodology
3.1. Introduction
The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS®) has created an SVA
methodologytoevaluatethevulnerabilityofchemicalfacilitiestoterror-
ist or other malicious attacks and, based upon that assessment, to plan
enhancedsecuritywhereappropriate.TheSVAisarisk-basedapproach
tochemicalsitesecurity.Itistheresultofcollaborationbetweenchemi-
cal industry process safety personnel and security vulnerability assess-
ment experts who have experience at identifying vulnerabilities and
protecting national security programs and assets from terrorist attack.
Theresultisaholistic,robustvulnerabilityassessmentprocessdesigned
toenhancechemicalindustrysecurityintoday’suniquethreatenviron-
ment.
TheCCPSSVA,oranequivalentmethod,shouldbeimplemented
atallsiteswherehazardouschemicalsareprocessedorstoredinlarge
enoughquantitiestobeofinterestto,orthetargetofterrorists.Useof
the SVA should be an integral part of a company’s overall security
management program. The security management program should be
integrated with the other risk-management strategies at a site to the
extentpracticable,particularlywhenconsideringsignificanthazardsor
riskstothesitepersonnelandthecommunity.
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38 AnalyzingandManagingtheSecurityVulnerabilitiesofFixedChemicalSites
ThischapterexplainshowtomanagetheSVAprocesswithinacor-
poration or within an individual site and the specific steps to conduct
anSVA.
3.2. SVAMethodology
Eachcompanyorsiteshouldhaveanapproachforaddressingthepro-
cess of conducting SVAs. This includes a management system for the
SVA program for purposes of defining roles and relationships, for
obtaining necessary resources, for ensuring the effort is done when
required,forensuringqualityofeffort,andforfollowinguponimple-
mentationofenhancedcountermeasures,asexamples.
There are four occasions when the SVA may be required, as illus-
tratedinFigure3.1:
• Aninitialreviewofallrelevantfacilitiesandassets
• Whenthethreatortheprocesssubstantiallychanges
• Afterasignificantsecurityincident
• Periodically,torevalidatetheSVA
3.2.1. InitialSteps
TheinitialeffortinvolvedinestablishinganSVAprogramwithinacor-
porationistodesignateachampionfortheeffort.Thiscouldbeabusi-
nessmanagerofthecorporation,orasecurityorsafetymanager,ora
specialistinthosefields.Thatpersonshouldbegiventheauthorityand
resourcestoimplementacomprehensiveprogramwithinthecorpora-
tionorfacility.
Theprocessshouldbemanagedbyasystemofproceduresandpoli-
cies that provide oversight and help the process achieve the program
goals. Management is often characterized as the process of planning,
organizing,directing,andcontrolling.Programsneedtobedeveloped
toaddresseachofthesefourfunctionalareas.
ThefundamentalactivitiesoftheSVAprogramsthatneedtobeini-
tiatedinclude:
• Thedefinitionofamanagementsystemincludingrolesandrela-
tionships,proceduresforensuringtheeffortisdonewhenrequired,
procedures to manage the quality of effort, and procedures for
CCPS®SecurityVulnerabilityAnalysis(SVA)Methodology 39
Figure3.1. SVAmanagementprocess.
managing the follow-up on implementation of enhanced coun-
termeasures.
• ThedevelopmentoradoptionofanSVAmethod.
• ThedefinitionoftheobjectivesandscopeoftheSVAprogram.
• The gathering of necessary information to adequately prepare
SVAteamswithaccurateinformationastheyembarkonthepro-
cess.
• Theacquisitionofnecessaryresourcesandbudgettoconductthe
studies.
• Thetrainingofemployeesthatwillbeinvolvedintheprocess.
• The identification of needs for achieving the SVA program,
includingexpertise.