Table Of ContentS P E C T R U M MULTIVIEW BOOKS
G O D A N D T H E
P R O B L E M O F E V I L
F I V E V I E W S
CHAD MEISTER
EDITED BY
JAMES K. DEW JR.
and
CONTRIBUTIONS BY
Phillip Cary, William Lane Craig, William Hasker,
Thomas Jay Oord, and Stephen Wykstra
InterVarsity Press
P.O. Box 1400, Downers Grove, IL 60515-1426
ivpress.com
[email protected]
©2017 by Chad V. Meister and James K. Dew Jr.
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Cover design: David Fassett
Interior design: Jeanna Wiggins
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ISBN 978-0-8308-9174-0 (digital)
ISBN 978-0-8308-4024-3 (print)
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Meister, Chad V., 1965- editor.
Title: God and the problem of evil : five views / edited by Chad Meister and
James K. Dew Jr.
Description: Downers Grove : InterVarsity Press, 2017. | Series: Spectrum
multiview books | Includes index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017000165 (print) | LCCN 2017008459 (ebook) | ISBN
9780830840243 (pbk. : alk. paper) | ISBN 9780830891740 (eBook)
Subjects: LCSH: Theodicy. | God--Christianity. | Good and evil--Religious
aspects--Christianity.
Classification: LCC BT160 .G58 2017 (print) | LCC BT160 (ebook) | DDC
231/.8--dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017000165
Contents
Introduction 1
Chad Meister and James K. Dew Jr.
PART ONE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
1 A Classic View 13
Phillip Cary
2 A Molinist View 37
William Lane Craig
3 An Open Theist View 57
William Hasker
4 An Essential Kenosis View 77
Thomas Jay Oord
5 A Skeptical Theist View 99
Stephen Wykstra
PART TWO: RESPONSES
6 The Classic Response 131
Phillip Cary
7 The Molinist Response 143
William Lane Craig
8 The Open Theist Response 151
William Hasker
9 The Essential Kenosis Response 163
Thomas Jay Oord
10 The Skeptical Theist Response 173
Stephen Wykstra
Name Index 185
Subject Index 187
Praise for God and the Problem of Evil 198
About the Author 199
More Titles from InterVarsity Press 200
IVP Academic Textbook Selector 201
Introduction
CHAD MEISTER AND JAMES K. DEW JR.
Evil abounds.
Regardless of when or where we look—in the feudal
systems of the Middle Ages or the cyber world of the twenty-first century,
in the posh suburbs of a major city or the poor slums found across the globe,
in the practice of organized crime or the peccancy in organized religion—in
all times and in all places we find pain, we find suffering, we find evil. Evil
is no less present, no less pernicious, and no less perplexing in the modern
world than it has ever been. This poses a tenacious problem for those who
believe in a God who is perfectly good and loving, all-powerful, and infi-
nitely smart. For surely a God who is good and loving would not want there
to be widespread pain and suffering in the world. And surely a God who is
omniscient and omnipotent could ensure that no such world would exist.
But such a world does exist. Our world.
In a world like ours, the adherents of traditional theism face the burden
of attempting to offer a reasoned response to this problem of evil. At least
the editors and contributors of this book believe that theists face such a
burden, and that is why we have crafted it. By “traditional theism” we are
referring to the conventional view of God historically held within the
Judeo-Christian faith. On this view God is generally understood to be per-
sonal (or at least not less than a person: one who possesses mind and will,
has goals and plans and purposes, and so on), ultimate reality (the source
and ground of all things), distinct from the world yet actively involved in
the world (creator and sustainer), and worthy of worship (wholly good,
having inherent moral perfection, and excelling in power). This theistic
concept of God includes a cluster of properties, and the ones most relevant
2 Chad Meister and James K. Dew Jr.
to our discussion of evil are omnibenevolence, omnipotence, and omni-
science. It is important to note that there are intramural debates within
Christian theism about the meanings of these attributes. Some of these
debates are reflected in the contributions to this volume. Yet all of the con-
tributors affirm the grand wisdom, knowledge, goodness, and power of the
God of historic Christianity.
We (the editors) have chosen five leading Christian thinkers who em-
brace five different perspectives to present in clear and accessible prose what
they take to be the best way to respond to what is called “the problem of
evil.” Before exploring their responses to the matter, it will be helpful to
cover some of the relevant background material and major terms and con-
cepts involved in the contemporary discussion on the subject.
To begin, what does the term evil connote? Evil is not an easy term to
define in a precise and comprehensive manner. It is used in such diverse
ways that one might wonder whether there truly is a singular meaning that
captures each and every example of its usage. One might say, for example,
that Joseph Stalin was an evil man, that the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia was
an evil event, that an ISIS prison is an evil place, and that evolution in the
animal kingdom (“nature red in tooth and claw,” to quote the poet Alfred
Lord Tennyson) is an evil process. But what is an accurate meaning of the
term evil that covers each of these examples and the countless others that
could be included? Lexicons and dictionaries offer little help in this way by
telling us, for example, that evil is “the opposite of good” or “that which is
morally reprehensible.” Here, as with many other instances, the standard
dictionary definition of the term falls short of capturing the depth, com-
plexities, and variegations of the way the term is actually used. (A similar
problem exists with the word good, for one might have a good pet, a good
dinner, a good relationship, a good job, and a good God.)
While a useful, specific definition of the term evil might elude us, we can
still have a sense of what we are talking about when we use it in various
contexts. General descriptions such as those mentioned above can prove
helpful. David Hume provides a few more: “Were a stranger to drop on a
sudden into this world, I would show him, as a specimen of its ills [that is,
its evils], a hospital full of disease, a prison crowded with malefactors and
debtors, a field of battle strewed with carcasses, a fleet foundering in the
Introduction 3
ocean, a nation languishing under tyranny, famine, or pestilence.”1 The list
of evils is endless, and it includes such broad notions as pain (physical states
in which one wishes his or her circumstances were otherwise), suffering
(mental states in which one wishes his or her circumstances were otherwise),
and injustice (unfairness, the violation of the rights of others, and un-
corrected abuse, neglect, or malfeasance).
Beyond these general categories and examples, there are also classifica-
tions of evil. A standard classification divides evil into two types: moral and
natural. Moral evils are those evils that are in some sense the result of a
person who is morally blameworthy of the resultant evil. There was i ntention
behind the event, and the person’s free will was involved. Some moral evils
are very great, as in the horror of child abuse. Other examples include
genocide, torture, and other terrors inflicted on humans (or perhaps other
animals) by other humans. There are also less severe types of moral evils,
such as stealing or speaking very negatively about someone. F urthermore,
certain defects in one’s character are also often counted as moral evils,
including dishonesty, greed, and gluttony.
The second category of evil has to do with naturally occurring events or
disasters rather than with moral agents. Examples of natural evils include
hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, tsunamis, famine, illnesses such as leu-
kemia and Alzheimer’s disease, disabilities such as deafness and blindness,
and other terrible events that do harm to humans and other living creatures
but for which no personal agent is responsible. Consider the tsunami noted
above that occurred in Indonesia. Because of that event, over 250,000 people
died. Countless others were left homeless or without fathers, mothers, sib-
lings, and other loved ones. In times past such instances of uncontrollable
natural forces have often been referred to as “acts of God” (notably in in-
surance claims), though more recently they are often referred to as “acts of
nature.” In any case, such events are natural in the sense that no human
person is culpable for them, and they are evil in the sense that harm was
incurred to humans or other animals.
In this book we are concerned with responses to arguments from evil—
arguments that attempt to show that belief in God is unreasonable. Such
1David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (London: Penguin, 1990), 106.
4 Chad Meister and James K. Dew Jr.
arguments generally begin by pinpointing some broad class of evils, or some
particular evil or set of evils, and then presenting premises that point to the
penultimate conclusion that a good, wise, and all-powerful God would not
have allowed for there to be such evils. This leads to the final conclusion that,
since such evils do exist, God does not exist (or at least it is likely that God
does not exist).
As the phrase is used in the literature, “the problem of evil” has taken
many forms. Consequently, it is probably more accurate to speak of problems
of evil, as there are various difficulties we are confronted with given evil’s
reality. Nevertheless, what is generally taken to be the heart of the problem
can be put simply in standard logical form as follows:
If God exists, then evil should not exist.
Evil does exist.
Therefore, God does not exist.
The problem is that there seems to be an inconsistency between God’s
nature and the reality of evil. As ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus
(341–270 BC) put it: “Either God wants to abolish evil, and cannot; or he
can, but does not want to. If he wants to, but cannot, he is impotent. If he
can, but does not want to, he is wicked. If God can abolish evil, and God
really wants to do it, why is there evil in the world?”2
There are two primary approaches in responding to arguments from evil.
One approach, referred to as a theodicy (which comes from an ancient Greek
term that means “a justification of God”), attempts to offer an account that
demonstrates that God has a good reason or set of reasons for allowing or
not preventing what appears to be the evil in question. A second approach,
generally referred to as a defense, does not claim to provide an actual reason
or set of reasons for God’s allowing or not preventing evil. Instead, it at-
tempts to rebut the argument from evil in a different way, such as by con-
troverting one or more of the premises in the argument. A defense takes on
less of a burden than a theodicy, for it is not proposing a solution to the
problem of evil, nor offering a justification for any particular evil or set of
2Epicurus, according to Lactantius (ca. AD 240–ca. 320) in De Ira Dei (On the Wrath of God ). An
online translation of the work by Philip Schaff can be found at Documenta Catholica Omnia, 2006,
www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/03d/0240-0320,_Lactantius,_De_Ira_Dei_%5BSchaff%5D
,_EN.pdf, page 409 in the text.
