Table Of ContentEssays in Ancient Epistemology
Essays in Ancient
Epistemology
GAIL FINE
1
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Contents
PrefaceandAcknowledgements ix
1. Introduction 1
PART I: PLATO AND [PLATO]
2. DoesSocratesClaimtoKnowthatHeKnowsNothing? 33
3. KnowledgeandTrueBeliefintheMeno 63
4. The‘TwoWorlds’TheoryinthePhaedo 94
5. EpistêmêandDoxa,KnowledgeandBelief,inthePhaedo 109
6. RecollectionandInnatisminthePhaedo 134
7. PlatoontheGradesofPerception:Theaetetus184–186
andthePhaedo 155
8. Meno’sParadoxandtheSisyphus 189
PART II: ARISTOTLE
9. AristotleonKnowledge 221
10. Aristotle’sTwoWorlds:KnowledgeandBeliefinPosterior
Analytics1.33 243
PART III: SEXTUS
11. SkepticalDogmata:OutlinesofPyrrhonismI13 265
12. Subjectivity,AncientandModern:TheCyrenaics,Sextus,
andDescartes 288
13. DescartesandAncientSkepticism:ReheatedCabbage? 325
14. SextusandExternalWorldSkepticism 356
References 391
IndexLocorum 407
Preface and Acknowledgements
Thisvolumebringstogetherthirteenofmyessaysonancientepistemology,along
with a new, synoptic introduction. The earliest of the essays was published in
2000;thelatestwerestillunpublishedwhenIsubmittedthisvolumetothePress.
Theyareallreprintedherewithminorchanges.Forexample,thereareoccasional
slightvariationsincontent.Somereferenceshavebeencorrected;andsometimes
transliterations are used where the originally-published version used Greek. For
variousreasons,somematerialthatwasoriginallyinthetextisnowinfootnotes;
hence the footnote numbers in the essays as they appear here are sometimes
differentfromthoseintheessaysastheyoriginallyappeared.Theessaysasthey
wereoriginallypublisheddifferinstyle,usuallybecausethevenuesthatpublished
themhaddifferenthousestyles.Inthisvolume,somechangeshavebeenmadeso
asachievemoreuniformityofstyle.
IntheIntroduction,Idiscusssomeoftheessays’mainthemesandindicatehow
the essays fit together. I also occasionally criticize what I say in one or another
essay;andsometimesIdiscussliteraturethattheessaysdiscussonlyverybrieflyor
not at all. However, I have not done either of these things systematically or in
detail. Nor does the Introduction defend my views in detail. It provides an
overview;detailsarereservedfortheessaysthatfollow.
Thechaptersthatfollowrecordvariousdebts.ButIshouldalsoliketorecorda
few particular acknowledgments here: to Peter Momtchiloff and Henry Clarke,
bothofOxfordUniversityPress,forhelpandencouragementatvariousstages;to
Peter Osorio for compiling the list of references and the index locorum; and, as
always,IowemoretoTerryIrwinthanIcansay.
Theessaysprintedherewereoriginallypublishedasfollowsbelow.Theyappear
herewiththekindpermissionoftherelevantpublishersand/oreditors.
Chapter2. ‘Does Socrates Claim to Know that He Knows Nothing?,’ Oxford
StudiesinAncientPhilosophy35(2008),49–85.OxfordUniversityPress.
Chapter3. ‘Knowledge and True Belief in the Meno,’ Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy27(2004),41–81.OxfordUniversityPress.
Chapter4. ‘The “Two Worlds” Theory in the Phaedo,’ British Journal for the
History of Philosophy 24 (2016), 557–72. Reprinted by permission of the
publisherTaylor&FrancisLtd,http://www.tandfonline.com.
x
Chapter5. ‘Epistêmê and Doxa, Knowledge and True Belief, in the Phaedo,’ in
FionaLeigh(ed.),ThemesinPlato,Aristotle,andHellenisticPhilosophy,BICS
supplementaryvol.(2021),27–46.UniversityofLondonPress.
Chapter6. ‘Recollection and Innatism in the Phaedo,’ in G. Sermamoglou-
Soulmaidi and E. Keeling (eds.), Wisdom, Love, and Friendship in Ancient
Greek Philosophy: Essays in Honor of Daniel Devereux (Berlin: De Gruyter,
2020),191–214.
Chapter7. ‘Plato on the Grades of Perception: Theaetetus 184–186 and the
Phaedo,’ Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 53 (2017), 65–109. Oxford
UniversityPress.
Chapter8.‘Meno’sParadoxandtheSisyphus,’inG.GurtlerandW.Wians(eds.),
Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 28 (2013),
113–46.Brill.
Chapter9.‘AristotleonKnowledge,’Elenchos14(2010),121–55.Bibliopolis.
Chapter10.‘Aristotle’sTwoWorlds:KnowledgeandBeliefinPosteriorAnalytics
1.33,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series vol. 110 (2010),
323–46.OxfordUniversityPress.
Chapter11.‘ScepticalDogmata:OutlinesofPyrrhonismI13,’Methexis13(2000),
81–105.Editor:ProfessorFrancoTrabbatoni.
Chapter12. ‘Subjectivity, Ancient and Modern: The Cyrenaics, Sextus, and
Descartes,’ in J. Miller and B. Inwood (eds.), Hellenistic and Early Modern
Philosophy(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2003),192–231.
Chapter13.‘DescartesandAncientScepticism:ReheatedCabbage?,’Philosophical
Review, vol. 109, No. 2 (2000), 195–234. Reprinted by permission of Duke
UniversityPress.
Chapter14. ‘Sextus and External World Scepticism,’ Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy24(2003),341–85.OxfordUniversityPress.
1
Introduction
1.
Theessaysinthisvolumediscussancientepistemology,especiallyinPlato,Aristotle,
and the Pyrrhonian skeptics. One central theme is cognitive conditions and their
contents.¹ In particular, how are epistêmê, doxa, dogma, and the corresponding
verbs, to be understood? Is epistêmê knowledge as it is conceived of nowadays?
Aredoxa anddogma beliefasitisconceived ofnowadays?Considerationofsuch
questionsshouldnotbelimitedtotheGreekwordsjustmentioned.SinceGreekhas
a rich cognitive vocabulary, we should also consider other Greek words that are
sometimestranslatedas‘knowledge,’suchaseidenaiandgignôskein,aswellasother
Greekwordsthataresometimesthoughttoindicatebelief,suchashupolêpsisand
oiesthai.Weshouldalsoconsiderwhatknowledgeandbeliefare.
ThefirstworkinthePlatoniccorpusthatengageswithsomeoftheseissuesis
the Apology,which I discuss in Chapter2. Socrates is often thought to havesaid
thattheonlythingheknowsisthatheknowsnothing.Ifhesaysthis,andif‘know’
isusedunivocally,heseemstocontradicthimself.Forifheknowsthatheknows
nothing,hedoesn’tknowanything,contrarytohisclaimtoknowsomething(viz.,
thatheknowsnothing).Ontheotherhand,ifhedoesn’tknowanything,thenhe
can’tknowthatfact.Forifhedid,hewouldknowsomethingafterall.Yettheview
that Socrates says that he knows that he knows nothing, though by no means
universal,² is widespread.³ In Chapter2, I ask whether, in the Apology, Socrates
says,orimplies,thatheknowsthatheknowsnothinginawaythatinvolvesself-
contradiction.Ialsoconsidertherelatedbutdifferentquestionofwhetherhesays
that he knows nothing, a claim that, unlike the claim to know that one knows
nothing,isnotself-contradictory.⁴
¹ Cognitiveconditionsincludestatesofknowingandbelieving,aswhenJohnknows,orbelieves,
that2+2=4.Cognitivecontentsincludewhatisbelievedandknown,e.g.that2+2=4.
² Seee.g.C.C.W.Taylor,Socrates:AVeryShortIntroduction(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,
2nded.,2019),44–50.
³ Foronerecentexample,seeS.Bakewell,HowtoLive(London:ChattoandWindus,2010),124.For
another, see H. Lagerlund, Skepticism in Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 2020), who says that
‘Socratesfamouslyproclaimedthatheknowsthathedoesnotknowanything’(2;cf.26).Icitefurther
examplesinChapter2.
⁴ Onemightarguethatitimpliesacontradiction,sinceitisanassertion;and,accordingtooneview,
ifoneassertsthatp,onetakesoneselftoknowthatp.Butthatviewofassertioniscontroversial;and
IsuggestinChapter2thatPlatodoesnotacceptit.
EssaysinAncientEpistemology.GailFine,OxfordUniversityPress(2021).©GailFine.
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198746768.003.0001
2
AtAp.21b4–5,Socratessays:
ForIamawareofbeingwiseinnothing,greatorsmall.
Egôgardêoutemegaoutesmikronsunoidaemautô(i)sophosôn.
This passage isn’t explicitly self-contradictory, for it uses two different cognitive
phrases,sunoidaemautô(i)andsophosôn.However,thepassagewouldbeimpli-
citly self-contradictory if these phrases were synonymous, or if to suneidenai
somethingimpliedbeingsophoswithrespecttoit.⁵
However,toknowsomethingwouldnotusuallybethoughtsufficientforbeing
wisewithrespecttoit.⁶Itwouldnormallybethoughttobemoredifficulttoattain
wisdomthantoattainjustanyoldknowledge.IfSocratesclaimstoknowthatheis
not wise, that does not imply a contradiction unless the knowledge he takes
himself to have is wisdom. But the Apology does not support that view. Indeed,
itisnot evenclear thatsuneidenai isbeingusedforknowledge:thewordcan be
used for being aware of something in a way that falls short of knowing it. In
Chapter2,IarguethatSocratesissayingeitherthatheknowsthatheisnotwise
(whereknowingsomethingfallsshortofbeingwisewithrespecttoit);orelsethat
he is aware that he is not wise (where being aware of something falls short of
knowingit).Neitherclaiminvolvesorimpliesacontradiction.⁷
Onemightarguethatif,inAp.21b4–5,Socratesclaimstolackallwisdom,he
contradictstheoracle’sclaimthatnooneiswiserthanheis(21a)andthatheis
wisest(21b).Fortheoracledoesn’tlie(21b).OnesolutionistosaythatSocrates
disclaims wisdom onlybefore hearing whatthe oracle said;after hearing whatit
said, he decides that he is wise after all. He doesn’t contradict himself, holding
bothpandnotpatthesametime;rather,uponreflectionhechangeshismind.⁸
Idefendadifferentsolution,accordingtowhich,evenafterreflectingonwhat
the oracle said, Socrates continues to believe that he lacks all wisdom. This is
consistentwithwhattheoraclesays.ForSocratescanbewiserthanotherswithout
anyofthembeingwise,justasonepersoncanbewealthierthananotherwithout
⁵ ThisishowRichardKrautunderstandsthepassage.Hetranslates‘sunoida’as‘know,’andsaysthat
‘youcannotknowthatyouarenotwiseeveninasmallway;fortoknowsomethingistohaveasmall
amountofwisdom’:SocratesandtheState(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1984),272n.44.
⁶ InRep.428c–429a,Platotakessophiatobejustonekindofepistêmê.However,inMeno96e–100c
heusesavarietyofcognitivetermsinterchangeably,includingsophiaandepistêmê.Tht.145d7–e6
explicitlyidentifiesepistêmêandsophia. Despitethis terminologicalvariation,Platooftenseemsto
recognizedifferentkinds,orlevels,ofepistêmê.
⁷ Eitherway,ontheinterpretationI’vesuggested21b4–5usestwodifferentcognitivetermsfortwo
differentcognitiveconditions.GregoryVlastos,bycontrast,arguesthatSocratesnotonlytakesavariety
ofcognitivetermstobesynonymousbutalsotakeseachofthemtobeambiguousasbetweentwo
sensesof‘know,’whichVlastoscalls‘certainknowledge’and‘elencticknowledge.’Seehis‘Socrates’
DisavowalofKnowledge,’PhilosophicalQuarterly35(1985),1–31.ReprintedinG.Fine(ed.),PlatoI,
64–92,at82–4,91.SomecommentatorsagreewithVlastos’sbasicpointbutfavordifferentsensesof
‘knowledge’thanhedoes.
⁸ Forthisview,seeKraut,SocratesandtheState,271.
