From Plural to Institutional Agency: Collective Action II

311 Pages·2017·2.58 MB·English

by  Kirk Ludwig

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From Plural to Institutional Agency
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From Plural to
Institutional Agency
Collective Action II
Kirk Ludwig
1
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For 林 世 娉
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Preface
We are pre-eminently social beings. But this is not what makes us special: what
makesusspecialisthatwemakeinstitutions.Therearenoothercreaturesweknow
ofwhoarecapableofdoingthis.Othercreaturescanengageincooperativebehavior.
Other creatures exhibit role specialization in a division of labor geared toward the
collective good, e.g., termites, bees and ants. But no others can design and build
institutions as we do. Institutions organize our activities by providing a differenti-
ationoftransferablerolesdefinedintermsofhowtheoccupieristoactintentionally
insocialcoordinationwithothersinlightoftheirinstitutionalroles.Akeydifference
betweentheformsofsocialorganizationmadeavailablebyinstitutionsandthesocial
organization of life in the termite mound or the beehive is that role specialization
amongthesocialinsectsisbiologicallyprogrammed.Rolesininstitutionsincontrast
are intentionally adopted. Their implementation requires the expression of our
agency self-consciously as occupiers of those roles. Institutions are tools for coord-
inating joint action in pursuit of collective goals over time. They are not physical
tools,butsocialtools.Wedesignandimplementthem.Thelimitsontypesofroles
arethelimitsofouringenuity.Institutionsarebothcrucialfor,andthecruciblefor,
civilization.Theydominatemodernlife.Theyarewhatgiveusthegreatpowerthat
wehaveachievedoverthenaturalworld.Ourmostpowerfulinstitutions,especially
the nation state with its systems of laws—and the forms of governance, the instru-
mentsofpower,theformsofbusinessorganization,includingthecorporation,which
itmakespossible—outlastthelivesoftheindividualswhosustainthem,andformthe
world into which we have been and into which all future generations will be born.
Whatistheirnature?Fromwhencedoesthepowertomakeinstitutionsderive?To
whatdegreedotheyhavealifeoftheirown?Howaretheysustained?Whatarethe
conceptualresourcesthatgointotheirdesign?Whatarethepsychologicalresources
needed to implement them? What makes us different? This book is concerned to
answerthesequestions.
Thisisthesecondvolumeinatwo-volumeprojectonthenatureandstructureof
collectiveactionandintentionmoregenerally.Thefundamentaltenetoftheproject
isthatallcollectiveintentionalaction,fromtwopeopletakingawalktogether,tothe
ParisMobstormingtheBastilleonJuly14,1789,totheAlliedinvasionofNormandy
on June 6, 1944, while not mere aggregates of individual intentional behavior, can
still be understood ultimately in terms of concepts already in play in our under-
standingofindividualagency.
The first volume, From Individual to Plural Agency, concerned the analysis of
plural action and intention—the analysis of action as expressed in plural action
sentences(‘Weliftedapiano’),theanalysisofsharedintentionasexpressedinplural
sentences about intention (‘We intended to lift a piano’), and the analysis of the
collectiveintentional actionasexpressedinpluralactionsentencesmodifiedbythe
adverb ‘intentionally’ (‘We lifted a piano intentionally’). The second volume con-
cerns collective action expressed in grammatically singular action sentences. This
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includesmostdiscourseaboutinstitutionalactionaswellastheactionsofinformal
groupsthatcanchangetheirmembershipovertime.Examplesare:
TheFederalReserveBankisgraduallyendingtheexpansionofitsbondholdings.
DetroitfiledforbankruptcyonFriday.
TheEuropeanParliamentmeetsinStrasbourgfor12partsessionseachyear.
Surveillancevideoshowsthemobtryingtoforceentry.
Largecrowdshavebeentippingovervehiclesandclashingwithlawenforcement
inAmes.
The second volume may be read independently of the first volume. Sufficient
background from the first is provided in the second chapter. But the first volume
providestheconceptualfoundationforthesecond.Itisonlybyfirstunderstanding
the structure of plural intentional action and the nature of the intentions of those
participating in it—we-intentions vs. I-intentions—that we can understand what is
going on in institutional action or in the expression of group agency in mobs and
crowds.Forultimatelyinstitutionalaction,andmobactioninasimilarway,restson
our capacity to conceptualize what we do as collective intentional action. It is by
employingconceptsoftypesofrolesincollectiveintentionalactionthatweareable
to describe institutional structures, which we can then conceive of as persisting
throughtheinterchangetheparticularfillersofthoseroles.
Thefirstvolumearguedforthemultipleagentsaccountofpluralagencyandthe
shared plan account of we-intentions. On the multiple agents account of plural
agency, for us to do something together is just for each of us (and no one else) to
contributetobringingitabout(insomerelevantwayorways).Onthisaccount,the
truth conditions for ordinary plural statements about group action do not require
groupagentsperse.Thesharedplanaccountofwe-intentionsholdsthatwhenone
intends to participate in joint intentional action, one intends to do something to
contributetobringingitaboutthat,atthetimeofaction,wedosomethingtogether
in accordance with a shared plan. For us to share an intention, on this account, is
forusalltowe-intendthatwedosomething.Forustodoittogetherintentionallyis
forusalltocarryoutourwe-intentionssuccessfully.Thisreducessharedintention
tosharedwe-intentions,andexplainswhatisspecialaboutwe-intentionsasrelating
not to their modebut to their content, but in doing so it appeals to no irreducible
concepts involving intentional group behavior.
Thepresentvolumeextends thisaccounttothecontextofinstitutional andmob
actionexpressedingrammaticallysingularactionsentences.Thecentralideaisthat
institutionsaresystemsofstatusroles(citizen,senator,judge,professor,lawyer,and
soon),wherestatusrolesarestatusfunctionsassignedtoagentsinsocialtransactions
requiring theintentionalexpressionoftheirownagency.Statusfunctionsarefunc-
tionsthatthings(persons,objects,events,processes)haverelativetosocialtransac-
tions only in virtue of the participants (in a certain sense) assigning them those
functions.Thiscomesaboutfromtherelevantsocialtransactionsbeinggovernedby
constitutiverules(rulestheintentionalfollowingofwhichconstitutetheactivitythey
govern)thatspecifyfunctionalrolesforobjects,whichrequirethosewhoparticipate
inthemtocoordinateonthesamethingsasfillingthoserolesinordertocarrythem
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 ix
out.Sharedpoliciesregardingwhichthingsortypesofthingstocoordinateongive
risetoconventions. These conventions aretheinfrastructureof socialreality.Insti-
tutional membership per se is also a status role, hence, socially constructed, not
natural,andistypicallytimeindexed.Inthisliesthesolutiontomostofthepuzzles
about how to extend the account of plural agency to the domain of grammatically
singularactionsentences.Itisthecontentionofthisbookthatallofsocialrealityis
madeofthesebasicingredients.
The preface to the first volume reviewed the intellectual history of the project.
There remains here the task of thanking the many people who havecontributed to
mythinkingabout thetopics of this bookandhelped me toavoid mistakes,and of
apologizingtothoseIforgettomention.MygreatestintellectualdebtsaretoDonald
Davidson and to John Searle whose influence on my thinking will be apparent on
almosteverypage.Ioweagreatdealtothepioneersofthetheoryofcollectiveaction
andintention,MichaelBratman,MargaretGilbert,andRaimoTuomelainaddition
toSearle.Ihavelearnedalotfromthem,andthoughIhaveinmanyplacestakena
different path, whatever contributions I have to make rest on theirs. Among the
manywhohavecontributedtomythinkingandhelpedmewiththeircriticismsand
questions are John Biro, Daniel Buckley, Sara Chant, David Copp, Aaron Edidin,
ZacharyErnst,LucaFerrero,HanaFilip,CharlesHermes,MarijaJanković,Michael
Jubien, Daniel Linsenbardt, Paul McNamara, Larry May, Seamus Miller, Anna
Moltchanova, Wade Munroe, Marina Oshana, Greg Ray, Abe Roth, Kevin Savage,
AndrewSmith,ErnieSosa,andGeneWitmer.Iowethanksalsotothreeanonymous
readersforOxfordUniversityPressforhelpfulcommentsonthepenultimatedraftof
thebook.Thankstoallofthemfortryingtosetmestraight.Finally,Ithankmywife,
Shih-PingLin林世娉,forsupportandencouragement,forreadingthemanuscript
and giving me characteristically brutal feedback, and for innumerably many other
graces. I do claim solely for myself, however, the authorship of all the errors that
remain,andremainsofaroverlooked,inthebook.