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Figuringtheself:subject,absolute,andothersinclassicalGerman
philosophyIDavidE. KlemmandGunterZoller,editors.
p. em.- (SUNYseriesinphilosophy)
ChieflyproceedingsofaconferenceheldApr.9-11, 1992,atthe
UniversityofIowa.
Includesindex.
ISBN0-7914-3199-1 (hc:alk. paper).- ISBN0-7914-3200-9(pbk.
:alk. paper)
1.Self(Philosophy) 2. Absolute,The. 3.Philosophy,
German-18thcentury. 4.Philosophy,German-19thcentury.
1.Klemm,DavidE., 1947- . II.Zoller,Giinter, 1954-
III.Series.
B2748.S44F54 1996
193-dc20 96-12018
CIP
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Introduction
DavidE. Klemm and GunterZoller
The selfis notoriously elusive. It is not something to be encountered
likeotherthingsintheworld. Rather,itprovidestheveryperspectiveorstand
pointfromwhichanysuchencounterwithotherthingscantakeplace.Accord
ingly, our ordinary ways ofthinking about the world and its objects are ill
suited to articulating the peculiar status and function of the self. Not
surprisingly,then, philosophicalelucidationsoftheselfhavebeenthepointof
origin for new ways ofthinking not only aboutthe selfbutalso aboutall the
otherthingsfrom whichtheselfistobedifferentiatedandtowhichitisyetinti
matelyrelated. This holds equallyforpastattempts, suchasDescartes' intro
ductionofthecogitoastheultimatefoundationofcertaintyinknowledge,and
contemporaryeffortsinphilosophyofmind, suchasthesemanticsofindexical
self-reference.
Aparticularlyintriguing wayofthinking abouttheselfcanbefoundin
the work ofImmanuel Kant and his successors, the German idealists. In the
decadesaround 1800,thesephilosophersdevelopeddetailedandvariedtheories
thatplacethe selfatthe very centerofphilosophicalreflection. Theclassical
Germanwayofthinkingabouttheselfischaracterizedbyadecidedly idealist
bent.Theselfisunderstoodnotonlyasthegroundofallknowledgeconcerning
the world, butalsoas the groundofthe veryreality ofthe world. Theidealist
extension ofthe self's original, epistemological function to a larger, meta
physical role made it imperative to develop a specific terminology that
addressed the radical, world-constituting function ofthe self. The absolute
ness ofthe selfas the universal condition ofreality was expressed by such
constructsas"subject,""subject-object,"and"spirit."
Twohundredyearsafteritsinception,theGermanidealistthinkingabout
the selfis both a source ofembarrassment and a challenge. The unabashed
vii
viii Introduction
idealiststanceoftheGerman idealistshasfound virtually nofollowers incon
temporary philosophy, and even leads to revisionist, nonmetaphysical read
ingsoftheclassicalGerman authors themselves. Andyetthesustainedreflec
tion on the structure ofthe selfthat is to be found in Kant and his successors
remains an important point oforientation and inspiration for historically
informedattemptsatatheory ofhumanselfhood.
Muchoftherecentattempts toretrieveclassicalGermanthinkingabout
theselfforcontemporaryphilosophyofmindhaveoriginatedintheworkofthe
German philosopher Dieter Henrich and a number ofhis associates, most
prominently among them Manfred Frank. In works like theirs, historical
researchintotheexceedinglydifficultcentralargumentsofKantandhisidealist
successorsiscarriedoutinaspiritatoncecriticalandappreciative.Moreover,
the reconstructionand assessmentofclassical German theories about the self
hasbeenincreasinglyinformedbyrelateddiscussionsinanalyticphilosophyof
mind, thus contributing to an emerging dialogue between different historical
periodsandphilosophicaltraditions.
Theessaysinthepresentvolumepartakeinthisongoingprojectofrein
troducing classical German thinking about the selfinto contemporary philo
sophicaldiscussion. TheyprovidetheEnglish-speakingreaderwithasurveyof
the main issues and positions to be found in German thinking about the self
around 1800,whilealsointroducingacontemporaryperspectiveonthehistor
icalmaterial.Theessayspresent,discuss, andassessaccountsoftheselfinthe
main philosophical authors oftheperiod. In addition totheprimaryfigures
Kant, Schelling, and Hegel-some ofthe lesser-known participants in the
debateontheselfreceivecriticalattention,amongthemthephilosophicalthe
ologian Schleiermacher and the poets Holderlin and Novalis. In disciplinary
terms,theaccountsoftheselfcoveredspanabroadrangeofareas,frommeta
physics and epistemology through ethics, political and social philosophy to
aestheticsandphilosophy ofreligion. The volumeas awhole thus provides a
detailedandcomprehensiveintroductionto thephilosophyofGermanidealism
throughthefocus ofthetheory oftheself.
Theessaysareorganizedunderthreeheadings,eachofthemaddressing
a'key conceptfor figuring the selfin classical German philosophy. PartOne
examines the role ofthe selfas the subject underlying ourexperience ofthe
world.ManfredFrankcarefullydistinguishesbetweenthefactthatselveshave
consciousness oftheir very being ("subjectivity") and thefact thatselves are
unique and not interchangeable ("individuality"). Frank places the Kantian
and post-Kantiandiscussion ofthe selfinto the largercontextofmodernand
contemporary thinking about mind and consciousness. Richard Aquila pro
vides a detailed reading of Kant's account ofthe subject ofmental activity.
Aquilastresses the proximity ofKant's doctrine ofinnersenseto anonmeta
physicaltheory ofthesoul. KarlAmerikssurveystherecentinterpretationsof
Introduction ix
Kant's theory ofmind. Ameriks's critical assessment focuses on readings of
Kant that draw on the work ofFichte. Gunter Zoller presents Fichte's tran
scendentaltheory ofconsciousnessandself-consciousness. Zoller'semphasis
is on themethodological requirements for an adequate accountofthe subjec
tivityoftheI.
PartTwoexaminesthedependenceoftheselfonsomeultimate,absolute
ground. Dieter Henrich argues for the role ofmetaphysical thinking in our
understanding ofthe selfand its place in the world. He focuses on the close
connectionbetweentheself-relationexpressedinthefirst-person singularpro
noun, "I," and thepure self-relationoftheabsolutedevelopedbyHegel. Jane
Knellerexamines the accounts ofselfhoodthatcan be found in the novels of
HolderlinandNovalis. Intheseliteraryconceptionsofselfhood, Knellerdetects
acritiqueofFichte'stheoryofself-consciousnessandareturntoKant'sagnos
ticism about the ultimate nature and origin ofthe self. Richard Velkley dis
cusses the relation between selfand nature in Schelling's theory ofart. His
focus isonthephilosophicalpotentialofartandontheroleoftheselfasartis
ticgenius.DavidKlemmpresentsSchleiermacher'stheoryofmind,according
towhichtheunityofthethinkingselfandthewillingselfliesinimmediateself
consciousnessorfeeling. KlemmconcentratesonSchleiennacher'stheological
interpretation ofimmediate self-consciousness as both an empirical feeling
andatranscendentalcognitionoftheutterdependenceoftheself-positing"I"
onanabsolutegroundhecalls"God."
PartThreeisconcernedwiththemutualdependence ofselfandothers.
WalterJaeschkeclarifiesHegel's complexposition onthe natureand value
ofsubjectivity. He argues that Hegel's critique ofthe principle ofsubjec
tivity in modern philosophy and romantic thought is entirely compatible
with Hegel's own conception ofthe infinite subject as mediated with its
ownother. Jeffrey Hoovercomparesthe accounts ofownershipinSchleier
macher and Hegel. Hoover shows how social and economic relations with
other selves are part of the concrete realization of the self. John Durham
Peters examinesHegel's accountofsymbolicinteractionthroughlanguage..
Petersreads Hegel's treatmentofself-consciousnessandspiritasproviding
a theory ofcommunication between selves. David Stern traces the Kantian
heritage ofthe accounts ofselfhood in Heidegger and Wittgenstein. Stern
diagnoses acontinuedpresenceofKant's emphasisonthe active andstruc
turing function ofthe self.
Earlierversionsoftenofthetwelveessayscollectedherewerepresented
ataconferenceontheclassicalGermantheory oftheselfthatwasheldatthe
UniversityofIowaunderthetitleFiguringthe SelfonApril9-11, 1992.The
conference was sponsored by the Department ofPhilosophy, the School of
Religion, and the Project on Rhetoric ofInquiry at the University ofIowa,
withadditionalsupportfrom theNationalEndowmentfortheHumanities.The
x Introduction
conference was in turn the culminating event of a semester-long Scholars
Workshop, directed by the editors ofthe presentvolume, and supportedby a
grantfrom the NationalEndowmentfor theHumanitiesundertheauspicesof
theProjectonRhetoricofInquiryattheUniversityofIowa.
ThetwoessaysnotoriginallypresentedattheIowaconference,byMan
fredFrankandDieterHenrich, wereincludedinordertoprovidesomeofthe
GermancontextfortheworkoftheAmerican-basedscholarsrepresentedinthis
volume. Frank's essay was publishedoriginally underthe title "Subjektivitat
undIndividualitat: UberblicktibereineProblemlage,"inSelbstbewuf3tseinund
Selbsterkenntnis (© 1991 Philipp Reclamjun. GmbH& Co., Stuttgart). Hen
rich'sessay, originallyentitled"SelbstbewuBtseinundspekulativesDenken,"
waswrittenfortheFrenchjournal Critiqueandthus withaFrenchaudiencein
mind. It subsequently appeared in Fluchtlinien: Philosophische Essays (©
SuhrkampVerlagFrankfurtamMain 1982).Thetwoessaysweretranslatedby
GunterZollerandappearherewiththekindcooperationoftheauthorsandthe
permissionofthepublishers.
ThepiecesbyFrankandHenrichexemplifytwomainpositionsincurrent
German thinking about the self. Frank contrasts the semantic and epistemo
logical orientation ofthe account ofselfhood in analytic philosophy ofmind
withtheconstitutiveroleofunderstandingandinterpretationinself-conscious
individualsasemphasizedbythehermeneuticaltradition.Bycontrast,Henrich
draws on the tradition ofHegelian metaphysics and portrays the selfas tran
scendingthenaturalworldanditsontologyofindividualityaltogether,relating
itinsteadtotheabsoluteconceivedasmediatedself-relation.WhileFranksug
gestsacomplementaryrelation betweenContinentalandanalyticthinking on
themind, Henrichradically challengesthe naturalismunderlying virtuallyall
currentaccountsofmindandself.
TheeditorswishtothanktheircolleaguesintheDepartmentofPhiloso
phy,theSchoolofReligion, andtheProjectonRhetoricofInquiryattheUni
versity ofIowaforsupportingtheScholarsWorkshop andtheconferencethat
providedthebasisforthiscollectionofessays. Specialthanksgototheexecu
tive director ofthe Projecton Rhetoric ofInquiry, Kate Neckerman, and her
staff,fortheirvaluablehelpwithallphasesoftheproject,fromthegrantwrit
ing through the Workshop and conference organization. Valuable technical
support in preparing the translation ofDieter Henrich's essay was provided
byMaureneMorgan.
FollowingtheleadoftheIowaconference,aninternationalconferenceon
the selfin German philosophy was held at the University ofNotre Dame in
April 1994.Avolumewithpapersfromthatgathering,editedbyKarlAmeriks
---------
Introduction xi
and Dieter Sturma, has since appeared under the title The Modern Subject:
Conceptions ofthe Selfin Classical German Philosophy (Albany: State Uni
versityofNewYorkPress, 1995).Thatvolulllecontainstwofurtherpiecesby
ManfredFrankalong withessays by German and American scholar-philoso
phersandincludesabibliography.
Part One
Self and Subject
1
Subjectivity and Individuality:
Survey ofa Problem*
ManfredFrank
"Subjectivity"and"individuality":withthesewords,twostatesofaffairs
areevokedwithwhichwebelieveourselvestobefamiliaratalltimes. Afterall,
theystandforpreciselythoseobjects,amongalltheobjectsintheworld,which
wetaketobeourselves.Weare,first, subjectsingeneral,thatis,beingsthatare
notjust what they are but that have as an essential property self-conscious
ness ofthis their being. And we are, second, individuals, that is, unique and
unmistakablesubjects. Welivein suchanintimateanddoubt-freefamiliarity
with ourselves that the mere question regarding our subjectivity might seem
aberrant, abusinesstypicalofidlephilosophers.Theremay oeotherquestions
that cannot be answered, which may even be without meaning, such as the
question of whether we have a soul and, if so, whether it is immortal, or
whether there is an external world independent of our consciousness, or
whether our moral conscience acts according to evident reasons. All these
questions have indeed been posed by the metaphysical tradition. They are of
vitalinterest. Thosequestions are genuine, where "genuine"means thattheir
answers are not obvious, that they cannot even be given in a final form
exceptintheunsatisfactorymannerofdissolvingratherthansolvingtheprob
lem atissue, thatis, making itdisappearas aproblem. Thelatteris Wittgen
stein'stherapeuticprocedure,whichregardsmetaphysicalthinkingasakindof
diseasefrom whichphilosophy wants to heal humanity as thoughfrom some
plague.
Bycontrast,thequestionconcerningtheessenceofsubjectivityandindi
vidualityisobviouslyalreadyansweredthroughtheself-consciousexistenceof
the one who posesthe question. In orderfor himorherto be able to askthat
question,heorshealreadyhadtobefamiliarwiththestateofaffairsdesignated
by those concepts. And no state of affairs in the world could be more inti-
3
4 SelfandSubject
matelyfamiliartousthanthisfamiliarityitself: thatstrangelyelusivecognition
that turns phenomena into the experience ofphenomena and that as it were
turns on a light in the darkness that covers the unconscious. Thus on first
glance, our questions concerning the ontological and epistemological status
ofsubjectivityandindividualityseemeithersuperfluousorevensuspicious.
I
Will this impression persist, ifwe take the time for a second glance?
Are not those very states of affairs about which we have the feeling ofan
unsurpassablecertaintyandfamiliarity inreality amongallthephenomenaof
theworldthatarethemostthoroughlyconcealed?Andisitnotratherthecase
thatthesubjectivitythatweeachareinanunmistakableway(orpretendtobe)
al",/ays remains a sealed book that obstinately resists being opened, exactly
becauseofitsenormousfamiliarity? Heideggeroncespokeofthesubjectsthat
we are as beings that are neitherclose nor transparentto themselves: we are
"creatures ofdistance."1 And in his lectures on the Basic Problems ofPhe...
nomenology from the summer semester of 1927 (the year ofpublication of
BeingandTime)hesays:
Viewedontically, weareclosestofalltothebeingsthatweourselvesare
andthatwecallDasein;forwearethisbeingitself.Nevertheless,whatis
nearesttousonticallyisexactlyfarthestfrom usontologically. Descartes
entitles thesecondofhismeditationsonmetaphysics"Onthe nature of
thehumanmind,thatitisbetterknowntous thanthebody."Despiteor
precisely because ofthis alleged superiorfamiliarity ofthe subject, its
modeofbeing is misunderstoodandleapedovernotonly in Descartes
buteverywhereintheperiodfollowing him,sothatnodialecticofmind
canoncemorereversetheeffectofthis neglect?
Heideggersoughttomakethestructureofthisbeingintelligiblefromits
veryproblematiccharacter.Heterms"Dasein"thebeingthathasthedistinction
of being problematic to itselfregarding its very own being. In Sartre this
becomes the locution that subject is "a being whose characteristic mode of
beingconsistsinthe factthatin its very beingitquestionsitsbeing" andthat
"consciousness is almost a kind ofontological interrogation."3 Heidegger's
own formulation, from which Sartre's takes off, canbe found in section4 of
BeingandTime. ThereDaseinispresentedasthatbeingfor which"initsvery
Being [...JthatBeingisan issue."4ThusDaseinwouldhavethe structureofa
self-relation, it would be autoreflective. Heidegger has expressed the same
thoughtbysayingthatDaseinisaccessibletoitself("disclosed,"ashesays)in
SubjectivityandIndividuality 5
the light ofa given understanding ofBeing, and this in such a way that the
ecstaticopeningtowardsomeotheristhegroundforitsfamiliarity withitself.
In the lectures of 1927 mentioned above, the reflection-model that informs
Heidegger's elucidation ofthe structure ofsubjectivity appears more clearly
yet:
Reflection in the sense ofa turning back is only amode ofself-appre
hension, butnotthemode ofprimaryself-disclosure. The wayin which
the selfis unveiled to itselfin the factical Dasein can nevertheless be
fittinglycalledreflection,exceptthatwemustnottakethisexpressionto
mean what is commonly meant by it-the ego bent around backward
andstaringatitself-butaninterconnectionsuchasismanifestedinthe
opticalmeaningoftheterm"reflection."Toreflectmeans,intheoptical
context,tobreakatsomething,toradiatebackfromthere,toshowitself
inareflectionfrom something.s
Thus,theselfthatweare(ortakeourselvestobe)wouldnotbeoriginally
disclosedto itself. Its self-consciousness would only come aboutthrough the
reflectionoftheworldtowhichitisfirstcompletely"givenaway."Hence,the
selfthatweourselvesare(ortakeourselvestobe)wouldnotbeoriginallydis
tinguished by self-consciousness. Rather, self-consciousness would be a
"derivativemode"ofsomemoreoriginalstructure,thatoftheunderstanding(of
Being),andthisinsuchamannerthatitwouldbepartofthestructureofsub
jectivitytoposethequestionconcerningBeingandalsotointerpretitselffrom
acertainunderstandingofBeing(asresultsfrom answeringthequestioncon
cerningBeing).Thus,intelligibilitywouldbesomethingthatprecedeswhatour
traditioncalls"self-consciousness,"itsapriori(intheliteralsenseoftheterm).6
Jean-Paul Sartre has objected to this, arguing that ifDasein were ini
tially deprived ofthe dimension ofconsciousness, then at some later pointit
couldonlyregainconsciousnessatthepriceofcircularity.Indeed, whatwould
an understanding be that does not include a consciousness ofbeing such an
understanding?
ButthisattempttoshowfirsttheescapeofselffromtheDaseinisgoing
toencounterinturninsurmountabledifficulties; wecannotfirstsuppress
thedimension"consciousness,"notevenifitisinordertoreinstallitsub
sequently. Understanding has meaning only ifit is consciousness of
understanding.7
Thisisnottodenythatbeingaselfincludesaself-relationofunderstanding(or
arelationtoBeing, whateverthatmaymean). Sartreonlydeniesthatthisrela
tionprecedesthesubject'sbeingfamiliarwithitself,andfurtherdeniesthatthis
