Explaining India’s Approach to Responsibility to Protect

21 Pages·2021·0.244 MB·English

by  Vikash Chandra

Article
Explaining India’s Jadavpur Journal of
International Relations
Approach to 25(2) 187 –207, 2021
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Protect DOI: 10.1177/09735984211043052
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Vikash Chandra1
Abstract
India has been alleged for adopting a reluctant approach to the doctrine
of responsibility to protect (R2P). In light of this allegation, this article
explains India’s approach to R2P and attempts to answer why India has
adopted a cautious and reluctant approach. To give a comprehensive
picture and provide a compelling account of India’s cautiousness and
reluctance, this article uses an eclectic approach. The systemic and
domestic variables, along with normative and materialistic factors,
have been taken simultaneously into account. It points out that India’s
approach to R2P is shaped by a set of six variables—historical legacies,
especially India’s colonial experience and its applications for its attitude
towards the principles of non-intervention and state sovereignty;
domestic compulsions such as failure of India to deliver inclusive and
equitable development and ensuring human rights and citizen’s dignity
in remote areas; the intentions of the great powers; security concerns
like insurgency in various parts, including Kashmir; its approach to the
doctrine per se; and unintended consequences of conflict escalation
and its implication for India—have been a linchpin in shaping India’s
approach. It demonstrates how these factors have cumulatively shaped
1 Department of Political Science, Kashi Naresh Government Post Graduate College,
Gyanpur, Bhadohi, Uttar Pradesh, India.
Corresponding author:
Vikash Chandra, Department of Political Science, Kashi Naresh Government Post
Graduate College, Gyanpur, Bhadohi, Uttar Pradesh, India.
E-mail: [email protected]
188 Jadavpur Journal of International Relations
India to neither vote in favor of intervention nor stand up with the
governments that fail to protect their citizens, and thus fall in fulfilling
their obligations under the first principle of the doctrine of R2P.
Keywords
Responsibility to protect, great powers, unintended consequences,
sovereignty, non-intervention
Introduction
India has been one of the key beneficiaries of the redistribution of power
in the international system. Based on its changing material status, India
is claiming status accommodation and inclusion in international
organizations and regimes. India is claiming status accommodation, but
the major stakeholders in the international order are still watching
whether and to what extent India is willing to depart from its conventional
foreign policy and shows a willingness to share international
responsibilities. In this regard, India’s approach to and positions in the
debates on the implementation of responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine
in Libya and Syria has been regarded as a litmus test. The international
community and the West were closely watching whether taking a
proactive stand India was willing to depart from its traditional approach
to the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention or decides to
remain circumscribed in its traditional identity and international role?
India’s approach to R2P has gotten considerable scholarly attention in
the recent years. Various studies have analyzed India’s approach to R2P
with emphasis on Libyan and Syrian cases (Aneja 2014; Choedon 2017;
Destradi 2017; Dunne and Teitt 2015; Ganguly 2016; Hall 2013, 2019;
Hansel and Möller 2015; Jaganathan and Kurtz 2014; Khandekar 2015;
Møller 2017; Shrivastav 2011). Most of these have been preoccupied
with the analysis of India’s stand on the three pillars of the doctrine.
Some studies have found that India’s position is still primarily perceived
as an extension of its approach to respect the principles of state
sovereignty and non-intervention as was the case with the humanitarian
intervention (Choedon 2017). India has been alleged for adopting a
traditional Westphalian view on R2P and perceived as a defender of state
sovereignty (Stuenkel 2014: 14). In this way or another, many studies on
Chandra 189
this issue have referred to India’s position as cautious and reluctant in
terms of departing from conventional approach (Destradi 2017;
Khandekar 2015; Virk 2013). These studies have impressively explicated
what India’s approach to the R2P has been so far. Nevertheless, hardly
any serious attempt has been made to explain why India’s position has
been reluctant and cautious.
To bridge this lacuna, this article seeks to explain the causes of India’s
reluctance and cautiousness. It argues that India’s reluctance can be
explained by taking six variables into account: India’s approach to the
doctrine in the UN debates at the time of adoption of the doctrine;
historical legacies; domestic compulsions; the intentions of the great
powers; security concerns like insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir and
other parts; and unintended consequences of conflict escalation and its
implication for India. To provide a holistic picture, this article has been
divided into four sections. In addition to putting things in perspective, the
first section puts things in perspective and spells out the main argument.
The next section explicates India’s position on three pillars of the R2P and
divulges how India’s approach to the R2P has been cautious and reluctant.
Taking the six variables into account, the third section explains why
India’s approach to the doctrine of R2P is reluctant and cautious. This
section divulges how these six variables have prevented India from voting
in favor of intervention, and points out India’s reservations against
regimes that fail to protect their citizens, the first principle of the R2P
doctrine. The concluding part summarizes major findings.
India and Responsibility to Protect
Out of the three pillars of the R2P doctrine, India adheres to the first two
principles. On the first pillar,1 India believes that the states have not only
the authority over but also a responsibility to look after the safety and
well-being of its citizens (Khandekar 2015: 115).2 It has been of the firm
opinion that the responsibility to protect its population in crises is one of
the foremost responsibilities of every state (A/63/PV.99 2009: 25;
Banerjee 2012: 98). India’s permanent representative to the UN
ambassador, Ashoke Mukharjee, has asserted that ‘the protection of
civilians is primarily a national responsibility’ (Puri 2013). It was why
India deplored the use of force by the Libyan authorities against its own
190 Jadavpur Journal of International Relations
people (Bloomfield 2015: 124). India voted in favor of the Security
Council (SC) Resolution 1970 that reminded Libyan authorities their
responsibilities towards their citizens and imposed sanctions for not
fulfilling their national responsibilities. India did not vote against the SC
resolution 1973 authorizing the use of ‘all necessary means’ to prevent
the Gadhafi regime from committing crimes against its citizens because
it may have sent a signal that despite the use of force by the Libyan
authorities against their citizens, India stands with them.
On the second pillar,3 India affirms the international community’s
responsibility to build capacities of the concerned states (Puri 2013).
India recognizes that the UN Security Council has an obligation to
provide technical assistance to affected states to help build their
institutions (Murthy 2012: 2). International capacity building assistance
is not only to deal with the crisis but also, as India’s permanent
representative at the UN has noted, for crisis prevention because
‘capacity-building and early warning are indeed critical to ensure that
these four mass atrocities do not recur’ (A/63/PV.99 2009: 25). Regarding
the central role of the affected state in the crisis response, India opines
that the other states are responsible for assisting the concerned state
without taking the lead role.
Unlike the first two principles, India’s position on the third pillar is
contentious. India’s position on this pillar has evolved around respect for
the principle of state sovereignty and non-intervention; preference for
peaceful political, preference for political and diplomatic means; the use
of Chapter VII means as a last resort; and the recognition of the importance
of the role of regional organizations (A/63/PV.99 2009: 25). The respect
for state sovereignty and territorial integrity is the core principles. India
believes that states have the exclusive right to decide their internal affairs
democratically under the UN Charter. The international community does
not have a legitimate right to intervene in the internal affairs of a state,4
except for in exceptional situations. India argues that pillar III of the
doctrine also envisages non-coercive measures prescribed under Chapter
VI and VIII (Puri 2012: 2). Before using coercive measures, the
international community ‘must stress the importance of political efforts’
(S/PV.6498 2011: 6). Advocating for the use of force as a last resort,
Indian representative reminded that one should exhaust all peaceful
means because, at the ‘international community was enjoined to use
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means, and I
would like to repeat, peaceful means, to help protect populations in the
specific situations of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity’ (A/63/PV.99 2009: 25).
Chandra 191
Even while adopting as a last resort, the coercive measures are subject
to three conditions. First, the ‘resort to Chapter VII, particularly Articles
41 and 42, could be taken only after serious and genuine efforts at the
pacific settlement have failed’ (Puri 2012: 2). India opined that before
turning to Chapter VII measures, the international community must
underline the importance of political efforts, including the Secretary-
General’s Special Envoy’s appointment to address the situation in Libya
(S/PV.6498 2011: 5–6). In Syria’s case, India expressed great satisfaction
over Kofi Annan’s six-point plan and the Syrian government’s
commitment to it, resulting in cessation of violence. However, these
channels were not given sufficient consideration in Libya because the
champions of intervention were more interested in regime change than
alleviating human suffering. Second, India strongly believes that the
coercive measures ‘have to be in conformity with the provisions of the
UN Charter’ (A/63/PV.99 2009: 25). If used in contrary to the principles
and purposes of the UN Charter, it will not only bring ‘bad name’ to the
doctrine per se but also ‘defeat its very purpose’ (A/63/PV.99 2009: 25).
Last, the coercive means should be embarked with the proper authorization
of the Security Council. Mr Vinay Kumar, India’s Charge d’Affaires at
the UN Security Council, while briefing on Syria, pointed out that
India firmly believes that… Unilateral action of any kind will not resolve
the crisis. It will only exacerbate the problem and cause greater instability
and violence even beyond Syria’s borders. We also believe that the
leadership of Syria is for Syrians to decide through a democratic process.
The task of the international community, anchored in the UN, is to assist
the Syrian parties in this process. (Kumar 2012)
Explaining India’s Approach
India’s Reluctance to the Doctrine per se
India’s reluctance on the doctrine of R2P goes even before the adoption
of the doctrine by the UN. India considers the R2P as an extension of the
principle of humanitarian intervention. For India, the R2P is merely a
little more than the repackaging of ‘old’ humanitarian intervention
agenda, not a path-breaking phenomenon or panacea (Virk 2013: 67).
India maintained that the R2P is an ‘intervener’s charter’, designed to
legitimize the western interferences in the domestic affairs of developing
states (Bellamy 2009: 84). It further expressed a suspicion that the
192 Jadavpur Journal of International Relations
doctrine of R2P will become an instrument in the hands of great power
to pursue their national interests sooner or later.5
Perhaps it was why India did not show much enthusiasm while the
R2P was being conceptualized under the auspices of International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). India’s
initial response to the doctrine was ‘one of acute mistrust’ because it
feared that the doctrine ‘might be used as a tool of pressure and
domination by the Western nations’ (Khandekar 2015: 116).
Consequently, when in its preparatory meeting the ICISS visited6 India;
New Delhi’s response lacked enthusiasm (ICISS 2001: 82). None but a
low-ranked protocol officer attended an evening party hosted by the
commission. In addition to the protocol officer, Dipankar Banerjee, a
retired Major-General of Indian Army, and G. Parthasarthi, a retired
diplomat, joined the commission’s meeting; however, in their personal
capacities (Banerjee 2013: 108).
At the UN World Summit Meeting in 2005, speaking against the
doctrine, India pointed out that the ‘(Security) Council was already
sufficiently empowered to act in humanitarian emergencies and
observed that the failure to act in the past was caused by the lack of
political will, not of authority’ (Bellamy 2009: 68). India’s ambassador
Nirupam Sen, questioned the legal status and moral foundation of the
doctrine and alleged that it was ‘patronizing and offensive’ (Bellamy
2009: 88). He warned that ‘the UN was at risk of promoting the ideology
of some kind of “military humanism”, and asserted that R2P should not
be used as a cover for conferring any legitimacy on the so-called “right
of humanitarian intervention”’ (Teitt 2012: 199). Given his intense
assault on the legal status and moral foundations of the R2P doctrine,
ambassador Nirupam Sen was perceived in some quarters as the
principal spoiler (Stuenkel 2014: 10).
Nevertheless, despite its reservations, India decided not to ‘scuttle the
summit by rejecting the R2P paragraphs at the last moment’ (Bellamy
cited in Virk 2013: 79). It gave the doctrine a ‘cautious go-ahead’ (Puri
cited in Virk 2013: 79). However, to minimize the misuse of the doctrine,
India, along with other states, entered in a negotiation. India made it
further clear that ‘the R2P cannot be used to address all social evils,
including violations of human rights and humanitarian law. Rather, it
must only be confined to the four identified crimes, that is, genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity’ (Puri 2012: 2). In
a quid pro quo, norm supporters had to concede significant concessions,
including limiting the scope to only four crises and mandatory UN
authorization, among others.
Chandra 193
Moreover, the roots of India’s reluctance can also be found in a lack
of agreed definitions of ‘war crimes’ and ‘crimes against humanity,’ two
out of four crises in which the R2P doctrine can be resorted to. Although
‘genocide’ is defined in the Genocide Convention (1948); however, the
international community has still not reached an acceptable definition of
war crimes and crimes against humanity. It is also worth mentioning that
even Rome Statute (1998) cannot be considered as an adequate guide to
invoke R2P because many states, including three permanent members of
the UNSC (including the USA) that have the primary responsibility to
maintain peace, are not a party to it (Murthy 2012: 2). Since these
concepts were included as criteria for invoking R2P without defining
them; therefore, India saw this as an opportunity for manipulation by
powerful states to pursue their national interests.
Historical Legacies
The impact of the colonial experience on post-colonial states’ external
behavior has become an established fact today. Given the painful
experience of colonial occupation, most post-colonial states have
introduced ‘antihegemonic discourses’ in their foreign policies (Grovogui
cited in Chacko 2012: 11). These new discourses of these states’ foreign
policies have been ‘conditioned by experiences of colonialism and
imperialism’ (Chacko 2012: 11). As an antihegemonic discourse, the
shadow of colonial legacies is evident in India’s foreign policy as well as
its position on intervention and the state sovereignty.
India’s policy on non-intervention and state sovereignty is largely a
reflection of its colonial experience. Because of its colonial experience
and fear of neocolonialism, safeguarding sovereignty from the great
powers’ predation was India’s top-most priority after independence (Pai
2014: 305). The idea got internalized in its foreign policy through a
series of Third World solidarity initiatives like the Asian Relations
Conference, Panchsheel agreement in 1954,7 the Bandung Afro-Asian
conference in 1955 and the Non-Alignment Movement in 1961. All
these events emphasized the need to respect principle of non-intervention
and state sovereignty. These events consolidated a tradition in Indian
foreign policy to strictly adhere to and abide by these principles. Given
the adherence, India holds the view that no external state or group of
states has the right to intervene in the internal affairs of any state and a
sovereign state cannot and should not be subjugated to and by a state or
group of states. ‘Any decision to intervene that is associated with political
194 Jadavpur Journal of International Relations
motives’ in India’s view ‘distracts from the noble principles and needs to
be avoided’ (Puri 2011). The principles have become one of the most-
cherished principles in Indian foreign policy because they work ‘as a
normative barrier against unwanted external intervention’ (Choedon
2017: 432). Therefore, it can be said that India’s belief that if a state fails
to perform its responsibility towards its citizens, ‘contribution to national
capacity building rather than intervention mechanisms (which violates
the principle of non-intervention and state sovereignty) should be the
priority of the Security Council’ is a reflection of its position on the
principle of non-intervention and state sovereignty (Akbaruddin 2016).
India’s position on the principles of state sovereignty and non-
intervention has an enduring impact on its preference for pacific means to
resolve international disputes. Nehru, the chief architect of Indian foreign
policy, adopted a policy that preferred peaceful means over the military
because he was convinced that ‘…it would be wrong to carry on military
operations when peaceful methods can bring necessary results’ (Berkes
and Bedi 1958: 114). He further argued that ‘it is wrong—not now but
always—to think that you can gain an objective by pursuing military
methods to the utmost and to the last’ (Berkes and Bedi 1958: 114).
Arguing that ‘efforts should be made to solve the conflict by peaceful
means,’ India had refused to join the seven-Power Korean commission on
implementation of the Resolution 376 (V) (Berkes and Bedi 1958: 116).
India’s preference for the fullest exploitation of political, diplomatic, and
other peaceful means before authorizing coercive measures can partly be
attributed to India’s colonial past. The continuing relevance of colonial
experience on India’s foreign policy has rendered an analyst to note that
‘India’s sensitivity about R2P can in part be attributed to nearly five
centuries of colonial subjugation under various European powers. After
nearly 67 years, independent India continues to be highly skeptical about
exterior intervention and it harbors a deep-rooted suspicion of the motives
of Western powers’ (Khandekar 2015: 116).
The Great Powers Intentions
India’s suspicion towards the great powers’ intentions is another factor
that incentivized it to abstain from voting on the Resolution authorizing
coercive measures. India has been witness to the numerous cases where
‘the international community has in the past failed in its duty to respond
to mass atrocities, even when they were a clear threat to international
Chandra 195
peace and security’ (A/63/PV.99 2009: 25). In other cases like Somalia
in 1993, the great powers withdrew prematurely. India knows from its
own experiences that ‘the decision to intervene in another country is
largely political and strategic, even though it may look humanitarian and
also serve the purpose of saving the lives of innocent people caught in
the conflict’ (Muni 2013). In the absence of national interests at stake,
the great powers deliberately avoided even using terms like genocide or
ethnic cleansing in Security Council deliberations on Rwanda because
once the term was used, the Security Council would have to take
appropriate measures to deal with the crisis. Despite the fact that within
the short period of three months over slightly less than one million ethnic
minorities were butchered, the P-5 deliberately avoided using the term
genocide or ethnic cleansing in the Security Council deliberations. India
is also witnessing the situations when the great powers found their
interest at stake; they intervened even though other political and
diplomatic measures could have restored normalcy.
India has been suspicious of the intention of the intervening parties. It
believed that in crises, the focus of the international community,
especially the intervening parties, should be on ameliorating human
suffering, not the regime change or democracy promotion. This was the
reason why in the Libyan case, India stood by the ‘full respect for the
sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Libya’ (S/PV.6498 2011:
6). It ‘deplore(d) the use of force’ and argued that it ‘is totally unacceptable
and must not be resorted to’ (S/PV.6498 2011: 5). It criticized the states
supporting the SC Resolution 1973 on the grounds that they were going
ahead even though the international community ‘do not have clarity
about details of enforcement measures, including who will participate
and with what assets, and how these measures will exactly be carried out’
(S/PV.6498 2011: 6). It called the authorization of the use of ‘all necessary
means’ against Libyan authorities and creation of ‘no-fly zone’ over
Libya, a ‘far-reaching measure,’ and complained that such measures
were adopted despite the fact that the international community had
‘relatively little credible information on the situation on the ground in
Libya’ (S/PV.6498 2011: 6).
While voting on the UNSC resolution 1973, India feared that the
great powers may violate original mandates (to ameliorate Libyan
citizens’ suffering) to serve the great powers’ interests. Later, India’s
fears, unfortunately, have come true. It has demonstrated how the
mandate of the UNSC resolution 1973 on Libya was misinterpreted to
meet influential members’ national interests. India has underscored that
196 Jadavpur Journal of International Relations
originally, the Security Council ‘resolution 1973 (was) aimed at a
ceasefire with the mediation of the African Union (AU); use of all
necessary means to protect civilians; a no-fly zone; arms embargo, and
targeted sanctions’ (Puri 2012: 1). But ‘almost all aspects of resolution
1973, namely, the pursuit of ceasefire, arms embargo, and no-fly zone,
were violated…’ because the intervening states were more interested in
the regime change than in addressing the suffering of Libyans (Puri
2012: 1). A veteran in this field has noted that ambassador ‘Puri
excoriated what he described as the supplying of arms to the Libyan
rebels in violation of the UNSC’s understanding of what was allowed by
a resolution passed as a measure of protection’ (Banerjee 2012: 99).
Obsessed with the regime change, the intervening forces lead by the
great powers, also violated the ‘right intention’ principle of the doctrine
of R2P. Gaddafi was among the champions of African Unity and Pan
Africanism and long-time critic of western policies. Therefore, NATO
and other over-enthusiastic states, led by France, preferred to consult the
Arab League instead of talking to the African Union (AU), as was
mandated in the resolution 1973. The decision to manipulate the UNSC
mandate and consult Arab League (AL) was based on the belief of
interventionist states that it would be challenging to persuade AU than
the AL to allow to use force to bring regime change in the name of halting
the fighting and rescuing civilians in Libya. Under the R2P, the UN and
its members are responsible for taking collective actions to build the
state’s capacity if the concerned state fails to fulfil its responsibilities.
In India’s view, Pillar II of the R2P was not considered in the Libyan
case, as regime change became the prime concern of intervening states.
Military action was sought to remove Muammar Gaddafi instead of
reducing hostility and bringing a ceasefire. The charges of ‘crime against
humanity’ and ‘war crimes’ against Gaddafi were inherited in insufficient
grounds because the international community did not have sufficient
information as the Secretary-General envoy’s report was still awaited. It
was not logical to consider him as guilty because the West did not give a
clean chit to Gaddafi. Interestingly, when we do not know what
constitutes ‘war crime’ or ‘crime against humanity’ because there is no
agreed definition of these concepts, how can anyone, including great
powers, charge anyone guilty of these crimes? What was clear that
military intervention was a violation of the right intention principle of
the doctrine. This is why India abstained on resolution 1973 and criticized
the West’s policy on Libya for being aimed at regime change.