Experimenting with Social Norms: Fairness and Punishment in Cross-Cultural Perspective

654 Pages·2014·18.36 MB·English

by  Jean Ensminger

Experimenting with Social Norms
Fairness and Punishment in Cross-Cultural Perspective

Edited by Jean Ensminger and Joseph Henrich
The Russell Sage Foundation
The Russell Sage Foundation, one of the oldest of America's general purpose foundations, was established
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Experimenting with social norms : fairness and punishment in cross-cultural perspective / Jean Ensminger
and Joseph Henrich, editors.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-87154-500-8 (alk. paper) — ISBN 978-1-61044-840-6 (ebook) 1. Game theory—Social
aspects—Cross-cultural studies. 2. Social norms—Cross-cultural studies. 3. Experimental economics—
Cross-cultural studies. 4. Economics—Sociological aspects—Cross-cultural studies.
I. Ensminger, Jean. II. Henrich, Joseph Patrick.
HB144.E97 2014
303.3'7—dc23
2013034010
Copyright © 2014 by Russell Sage Foundation. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America.
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by
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permission of the publisher.
Reproduction by the United States Government in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose.
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for
Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials. ANSI Z39.48-1992.
Text design by Genna Patacsil.
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10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
CONTENTS
Illustrations
Contributors
Part I Theory, Method, and Comparative Analysis
Chapter 1 Introduction, Project History, and Guide to the Volume
Jean Ensminger and Joseph Henrich
Chapter 2 Theoretical Foundations: The Coevolution of Social Norms, Intrinsic
Motivation, Markets, and the Institutions of Complex Societies
Joseph Henrich and Jean Ensminger
Chapter 3 Cross-Cultural Methods, Sites, and Variables
Jean Ensminger, Abigail Barr, and Joseph Henrich
Chapter 4 Major Empirical Results: Markets, Religion, Community Size, and the
Evolution of Fairness and Punishment
Joseph Henrich, Jean Ensminger, Abigail Barr, and Richard McElreath
Chapter 5 Double-Blind Dictator Games in Africa and the United States:
Differential Experimenter Effects
Carolyn K. Lesorogol and Jean Ensminger
Chapters 6–18 are available for download at
https://www.russellsage.org/publications/experimenting-social-norms.
Part II Society Case Studies
Chapter 6 Better to Receive Than to Give: Hadza Behavior in Three
Experimental Economic Games
Frank W. Marlowe
Chapter 7 Cruel to Be Kind: Effects of Sanctions and Third-Party Enforcers on
Generosity in Papua New Guinea
David P. Tracer, Ivo Mueller, and Jennifer Morse
Chapter 8 The Tsimane' Rarely Punish: An Experimental Investigation of
Dictators, Ultimatums, and Punishment
Michael D. Gurven
Chapter 9 Fairness Without Punishment: Behavioral Experiments in the Yasawa
Islands, Fiji
Joseph Henrich and Natalie Henrich
Chapter 10 Economic Game Behavior Among the Shuar
H. Clark Barrett and Kevin J. Haley
Chapter 11 Economic Experimental Game Results from the Sursurunga of New
Ireland, Papua New Guinea
Alexander H. Bolyanatz
Chapter 12 Maragoli and Gusii Farmers in Kenya: Strong Collective Action and
High Prosocial Punishment
Edwins Laban Gwako
Chapter 13 Sharing, Subsistence, and Social Norms in Northern Siberia
John P. Ziker
Chapter 14 Gifts or Entitlements: The Influence of Property Rights and
Institutions for Third-Party Sanctioning on Behavior in Three Experimental
Economic Games
Carolyn K. Lesorogol
Chapter 15 Cooperation and Punishment in an Economically Diverse
Community in Highland Tanzania
Richard McElreath
Chapter 16 Social Preferences Among the People of Sanquianga in Colombia
Juan-Camilo Cardenas
Chapter 17 The Effects of Birthplace and Current Context on Other-Regarding
Preferences in Accra
Abigail Barr
Chapter 18 Prosociality in Rural America: Evidence from Dictator, Ultimatum,
Public Goods, and Trust Games
Jean Ensminger and Kathleen Cook
Index
ILLUSTRATIONS
Table 3.1 Samples Sites and Mean Market Integration
Table 3.2 Ethnographic Summary of Societies in the Study
Table 3.3 Mean Demographics, by Society
Table 4.1 Mean Summary Statistics on Offers and Rejections, by Society
Table 4.2 Dictator Game, Ultimatum Game, and Third-Party Punishment
Game: Linear Regressions for All Offers
Table 4.3 Linear Regressions for Dictator Game Offers
Table 4.4 Linear Regressions for Ultimatum Game Offers
Table 4.5 Linear Regressions for Third-Party Punishment Game Offers
Table 4.6 Linear Regressions for Offers in the Ultimatum Game and the
Third-Party Punishment Game With and Without the Mean Minimum
Acceptable Offer as a Predictor
Table 4.7 Linear Regressions on the Difference Between Mean Dictator Game
and Third-Party Punishment Game Offers
Table 4.8 Linear Regressions for the Difference in Ultimatum Game and
Third-Party Punishment Game Offers
Table 4.9 Ordered Logistic Regressions for the Minimum Acceptable Offer in
the Third-Party Punishment Game, Using Community Size
Table 4.10 Ordered Logistic Regressions for the Minimum Acceptable Offer in
the Third-Party Punishment Game, Using LNCS
Table 4.11 Ordered Logistic Regressions for the Minimum Acceptable Offer in
the Ultimatum Game, Using Community Size
Table 4.12 Ordered Logistic Regressions for the Minimum Acceptable Offer in
the Ultimatum Game, Using LNCS
Table 5.1 Statistical Tests of Null Hypothesis Comparing Offers for the
Double-Blind Dictator Game and the Dictator Game for Each Site
Table 6.1 Results in the 2002 Round Compared to the 1998 Rounds
Table 6.2 Linear Regressions of Hadza Dictator Game Offers
Table 6.3 Linear Regressions of Hadza Ultimatum Game Offers
Table 6.4 Linear Regressions of Hadza Third-Party Punishment Game Offers
Table 6.5 Linear Regressions of Hadza Ultimatum Game Minimum
Acceptable Offers
Table 6.6 Linear Regressions of Hadza Third-Party Punishment Game
Minimum Nonpunished Offers
Table 7.1 Linear Regressions of Au Dictator Game Offers
Table 7.2 Linear Regressions of Au Ultimatum Game Offers
Table 7.3 Linear Regressions of Au Ultimatum Game Minimum Acceptable
Offers
Table 7.4 Linear Regressions of Au Third-Party Punishment Game Offers
Table 7.5 Linear Regressions of Au Lowest Game Offers Not Punished in
Third-Party Punishment Game
Table 8.1 Statistical Comparison of Game Samples Drawn from the Tsimane',
Hadza, and Germans
Table 8.2 Linear Regressions of Tsimane' Dictator Game Offers
Table 8.3 Linear Regressions of Tsimane' Ultimatum Game Offers
Table 8.4 Linear Regressions of Tsimane' Ultimatum Game Minimum
Acceptable Offers
Table 8.5 Linear Regressions of Tsimane' Third-Party Punishment Game
Offers
Table 8.6 Linear Regressions of Tsimane' Third-Party Punishment Game
Minimum Acceptable Offers
Table 9.1 Comparison of Yasawan Offer Distributions
Table 9.2 Linear Regressions of Yasawan Dictator Game Offers
Table 9.3 Linear Regressions of Yasawan Ultimatum Game Offers
Table 9.4 Linear Regressions of Yasawan Ultimatum Game Minimum
Acceptable Offers
Table 9.5 Linear Regressions of Yasawan Third-Party Punishment Game
Offers
Table 9.6 Linear Regressions of Yasawan Third-Party Punishment Game
Minimum Acceptable Offers
Table 9.7 Genetic Relatedness on Behavioral Measures
Table 9.8 Market Integration Variables
Table 9.9 Correlation Coefficients for Market Integration
Table 9.10 Experimenter Effects on Behavioral Measures
Table 9.11 Number of Examples Used to Explain the Games